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This is a time of decline. True. But we have not chosen this time. 
 
     Oswald Spengler 
 
 
If anything about the present century is certain, it is that the power conferred on 
‘humanity’ by new technologies will be used to commit atrocious crimes against it.  
 
     John Gray 
 
 
The philosopher will display a kind of anarchy…as a precondition for a new, 
healthier culture. 
      
     Georg Henrik von Wright 
 
 
It is not the task of philosophy to sing Hallelujah chorus to science or to police its 
pronouncement.    
                                                         
      P.M.S Hacker 
 
 
…what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is enable you to 
talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions…and if it does not 
improve your thinking about the questions of everyday life… it is difficult to think 
well about “certainty”, probability”, “perception” etc. But it is, if possible, still 
more difficult to think, or try to think, really honestly about your life & other 
peoples lives. 
      
     Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
 
The study of philosophy can help make you feel better. It can loosen your mind 
muscles, smooth out the dogmatic cramps, prescribe exercises which will be a step 
toward a greater intellectual ease. 
      
     Donald Davidson 
 
 
Irreducibility has its consequences.  
 
     David Chalmers 
 
 
   Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................ 1 
 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 2 
 
Chapter one: A challenge for the philosophy of mind and the Davidsonian – von Wrightian 
response ......................................................................................................................................... 9 
 
1.1 Naturalism and its consequences for the mental aspects of humans ...................................... 17 
1.1.1 Science gone too far – eliminative materialism ............................................................. 27 
1.2 A Davidsonian – von Wrightian response to the challenge ................................................... 35 
1.2.1 A Wittgensteinian view of philosophy .......................................................................... 43 
1.2.2 Davidson’s conception of philosophy ........................................................................... 51 
1.2.3 Von Wright’s conception of philosophy ........................................................................ 68 
1.3 A methodological caveat ..................................................................................................... 78 
1.4 Conclusions of chapter one .................................................................................................. 79 
 
Chapter two: Non-reductive physicalism and its warrantability .............................................. 80 
 
2.1 One answer to the mind–body problem: Davidson’s anomalous monism ............................. 84 
2.1.1 The place of AM in contemporary philosophy of mind ................................................. 85 
2.1.2 The physicalistic monism of AM .................................................................................. 95 
2.1.3 Davidson’s physicalism .............................................................................................. 106 
2.2 Von Wright’s physicalism and its relation to Davidson’s position ...................................... 132 
2.2.1 Von Wright’s supervenience ....................................................................................... 151 
2.3 A problem for non-reductive physicalism: Mental properties ............................................. 165 
2.3.1 The nature of mental properties................................................................................... 169 
2.3.2 Why mental properties create a problem for non-reductive physicalism ...................... 180 
2.3.3 Davidson on properties ............................................................................................... 189 
2.3.4 Is Davidson’s rejection of properties justified? ............................................................ 198 
2.3.4 Are mental properties physical properties? .................................................................. 205 
2.4 A problem for non-reductive physicalism: Token identity .................................................. 219 
2.4.1 A Davidsonian approach: Token identity between the mental and the physical ........... 220 
2.4.2 A von Wrightian approach: Token-identity is a serious confusion ............................... 225 
2.4.3 Token reducibility....................................................................................................... 229 
2.5 The nature of mental phenomena ....................................................................................... 247 
2.5.1 A distinction between conscious and non-conscious beliefs ........................................ 254 
2.5.2 Radical interpretation – Davidson’s conception of the mental ..................................... 258 
2.5.3 Interpretation and the nature of mental states .............................................................. 267 
2.5.4 Consequence of interpretationism: Mental phenomena are not states of the brain ........ 275 
2.6 An alternative to physicalism, dualism and non-reductive physicalism .............................. 282 
2.7 Conclusions of chapter two ................................................................................................ 299 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three: The irreducibility of the mental ...................................................................... 303 
 
3.1 Anomalism of the mental................................................................................................... 315 
3.1.1 Why strict psycho-physical laws are impossible? ........................................................ 319 
3.1.2 Why strict psychophysical laws are impossible: A Concrete example ......................... 343 
3.2 Why the mental has a priority over the physical ................................................................. 364 
3.3 The irreducibility of the mental.......................................................................................... 389 
3.3.1 What does a reduction of the mental to the physical mean? ......................................... 391 
3.3.1.1 New wave reductionism: A challenge for Davidson’s position ............................. 396 
3.3.2 The subjective and intersubjective nature of thoughts ................................................. 419 
3.3.3 The dispositional character of mental concepts ........................................................... 430 
3.3.3.1 AM’s relation to the functional model of reduction .............................................. 436 
3.4.4 Externalism ................................................................................................................ 446 
3.4 Conclusions of chapter three .............................................................................................. 453 
 
Chapter four: The problem of mental causation and the possibility of epiphenomenalism .. 456 
 
4.1 What happens to mental causation if the mental is not an ontological category? ................ 471 
4.1.1 Davidson on causal explanation and causation ............................................................ 482 
4.1.2 Davidson on mental causation and rational explanation .............................................. 494 
4.2 The new problem of mental causation, epiphenomenalism and precursory reasons ............ 501 
4.2.1 Epiphenomenalism ..................................................................................................... 507 
4.2.1.1 Von Wright’s epiphenomenalism ......................................................................... 509 
4.2.1.2 Apparent mental causation ................................................................................... 525 
4.2.2 Precursory reasons ...................................................................................................... 531 
4.2.2.1 The consequences of taking precursory reasons seriously ..................................... 547 
4.3 Conclusions of chapter four ............................................................................................... 551 
 
Appendix: Against Material Mind ........................................................................................... 553 
 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 582 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
                      Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
This work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland, University of Helsinki, 
Finnish Cultural Foundation, Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation and the Finnish-
Norwegian Cultural Foundation. Thank you. 
 
I thank Lauri Kultti for being a friend and an early guide. Sami Pihlström who has given 
valuable feedback deserves my gratitude. I owe special thanks to Frederick Stoutland who has 
been an example of a great philosopher and has given me support. I thank and respect Gabriel 
Sandu, my supervisor, who has endured my pig-headed project. 
 
My parents deserve to be mentioned here since they are part of the causal chain the result of 
which is me. Eila and Eero, your kindness is invaluable and I thank you dearly.  
 
It  is  quite  likely  that  without  Laura’s  emotional  support  the  completion  of  this  thesis  would  
have taken another ten years. Therefore this work is dedicated to her. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction  
 
The human being is a social, psycho-physical being. For centuries, religion, philosophy and 
science have tried to understand and explain, in their differing ways, the nature of this being. 
As far as we know each human has a physical body. But unlike any other animal, the human 
is also a self-conscious being with a mental life. Does this mean that humans have a non-
physical mind, soul or spirit? Many, especially those with religious beliefs, answer 
affirmatively. Others, those with a scientific world-view, think that the answer is obviously 
negative. In philosophical discussions, serious dualists insist that a non-physical soul or mind 
is an essential aspect of humans, whereas materialists claim that humans consist entirely of 
matter: the brain is what counts. Both approaches seem to leave something out by ignoring the 
dual nature of the human being. This being has a physical as well as a mental aspect. But what 
does it mean to say that a human being is both a physical and a mental being? What, for 
example, does Ludwig Wittgenstein mean when he writes of his fellow humans that: ”My 
attitude towards him is an attitude towards soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul”?1 
How should we understand Wittgenstein’s claim that: “[…] faith is what my heart, my soul 
needs, not my speculative intelligence. For it is my soul, with its passions, as it were with its 
flesh and blood, that must be saved, not my abstract mind.”2 How should we read Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s view when he wonders: “I see this man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same 
time  as  a  man.  What  does  this  signify?  What  do  I  mean  when  I  assert  that  this  object  is a 
man?”3 What is the key characteristic of a human being, towards whom my attitude is an 
attitude  towards  a  soul?  An  answer  to  this  question  is  far  from  clear,  and  at  times  
contemporary philosophy of mind brushes this question aside.  
Whereas for a scientist the mind–body problem may have dissolved, a philosopher 
considers the problem in a more abstract vein, trying to understand, clarify and dispel the 
conceptual complexities relating to this problem. Scientific discoveries about the brain are 
continually made; in the United States the years 1990–1999 were labeled as the “Decade of 
the Brain”. Do these discoveries tell us anything about the soul or about the mind? Are they 
describing the properties of consciousness? No. The relation of physical and mental reality, 
the “world knot” as Arthur Schopenhauer it so vividly described it, has not yet been untied. 
Certain basic philosophical problems about the mind are still without an answer and scientific 
                                               
1 Wittgenstein, 1953, 178. 
2 Wittgenstein, 1980a, 33. 
3 Sartre, 1965, 341. 
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knowledge about the mind-brain, although impressive in some areas, is silent with respect to 
the deepest philosophical problems. The mind–body problem is still a disturbingly difficult 
question. Philosophers of mind often quote Thomas Huxley, who in the 19th century wrote in 
amazement: ”How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as 
a result of initiating nerve tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djinn, 
where Aladdin rubbed his lamp in the story.…”4 Some contemporary philosophers have, for 
different reasons, concluded that the mystery may be unsolvable; they are still as amazed as 
Huxley was.  
In this work my purpose is to consider what kind of perspective on the mind–body 
problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive 
physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism 
which I favor is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson and Georg 
Henrik von Wright. I defend their position and discuss its relationship to the problem of 
mental causation. In its simplest form, the problem of mental causation is the problem of how 
mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. Non-reductive 
physicalism is committed to the thesis of the irreducibility of the mental. In the philosophical 
literature, the nature of this irreducibility is expressed in different ways. It is seen as 
ontological,  conceptual,  or  both.  Davidson  and  von  Wright  claim  that,  in  some  important  
sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, i.e. that 
there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. Non-reductive physicalism can 
thus been seen as accepting the view that an attitude towards a human is an attitude towards a 
soul;  the  mental  aspect  (be  it  a  soul,  mind,  or  spirit)  is  an  irreducible  part  of  the  human  
condition. Non-reductive physicalism helps to formulate this claim and explains how it should 
be understood.  
The essential point of non-reductive physicalism – the irreducibility of the mental – 
and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce 
to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena 
have causal powers? Humans explain their actions in terms of mental causes, and the notion 
of human agency requires that there are mental causes which are under the control of the 
acting individual. If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when – 
or whether – the mental causes in terms of which actions are explained are actually effective? 
I  will  argue  that  this  –  how to decide when mental causes really are effective –  is  the  real  
                                               
4 Huxley, 1866, 193. 
4 
 
problem of mental causation. In the modern philosophy of mind, the problem is formulated in 
a confusing way. Our current understanding of the problem of mental causation is a result of 
an “empirical metaphysics” and a consequence of thinking about the nature of philosophy in a 
certain way. The problem needs to be considered in a broader perspective, one which takes 
seriously the facts of actual human life. The “solution” to the problem of mental causation 
that is proposed in this work emphasizes the possibility of epiphenomenalism, but also 
suggests how this strange conclusion could perhaps be avoided.  
Davidson’s contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind are well known; yet it is 
often claimed that his position of anomalous monism fails as an adequate theory of mind. 
Although Davidson’s position has faced severe criticism and his specific claims are rejected 
by most commentators, his attempt to provide a systematic vision of the human mind and its 
relation to the world has nevertheless been widely acclaimed and he is considered as one of 
the great philosophers of the 20th century.  This  is  not  so  clearly  the  case  with  von  Wright,  
whose contributions to philosophy of mind are relatively unknown. Although contemporary 
philosophers may recognize von Wright’s work on logic and some may remember his book 
Explanation and Understanding, it is fair to say that von Wright’s later work has gone largely 
unnoticed. One important purpose of this work is to clarify some exegetical issues around the 
works of these two philosophers and thereby dispel the criticism that Davidson’s and von 
Wright’s views are old-fashioned, relate to an outdated understanding of the nature of 
philosophy, and are irrelevant to the modern discussion of the mind–body problem. In this 
work, I describe von Wright’s and Davidson’s place in the contemporary philosophy of mind, 
discuss their relation to naturalism, and compare their views to the views of other well known 
modern philosophers. Interesting things about the mind and brain are published constantly. 
My purpose is to show what kind of relevance von Wright’s and Davidson’s positions might 
have for some of these views. In doing this I emphasize the similarities between von Wright’s 
and Davidson’s positions. This has not yet been done in the literature. Insofar as the views of 
these two philosophers have been compared at all, the focus has been on the differences. The 
emphasis will be on Davidson’s views, because his work in the philosophy of mind is more 
extensive than von Wright’s, whose contributions are mainly presented in his last book In the 
Shadow of Descartes. 
A great number of articles have been written on Davidson’s philosophy, but the 
discussion of central aspects of his philosophical views is still ongoing.5 A good example of 
                                               
5 Perhaps the best general expositions of his philosophy of mind are the somewhat outdated Evnine, 1991, and 
more up-to-date Joseph, 2001. 
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this is a recent debate between “world leading authorities on Davidson’s philosophy”: Ernest 
Lepore and Kirk Ludwig on one side, and Frederick Stoutland, who incidentally knows von 
Wright’s philosophy very well, on the other.6 This  debate  shows  that  there  exist  
disagreements about the central features of Davidson’s views. My purpose is to clarify 
Davidson’s position in order to simplify these exegetical debates. I will show that Davidson’s 
views changed over the years, and thus contend that any interpretation which does not take 
this into account cannot be a truthful description of his views. It was only at a late stage of the 
writing  process  of  this  thesis  that  I  became  aware  of  two  recent  studies  of  Davidson’s  
philosophy of mind which look quite interesting from the perspective of this work. Neil 
Campbell’s Mental Causation: A Nonreductive Approach and Lars Reinholdtsen’s doctoral 
thesis Interpretation and Explanation: Reflections on Donald Davidson’s Philosophy of Mind 
contain views which come close to certain conclusions of my own work.7 However, both 
these works leave open many questions concerning Davidson’s position, and some of those 
questions are addressed in this work. A complete clarification cannot be expected, however. 
Davidson’s views are sometimes inconsistent and leave room for different interpretations. 
Whereas a lot has been written about Davidson, there is not much of a secondary 
literature on von Wright’s philosophy of mind. The exegetical issues concerning his 
philosophy are still largely unresolved, and there is a need for a detailed analysis of his views. 
The fact that von Wright’s philosophy of mind is unknown to many is unfortunate because, as 
I will show, his arguments are certainly relevant to the contemporary discussion. The “non-
causalist” view often attributed to von Wright and to other “neo-Wittgensteinians” is a 
relevant contribution to the discussion concerning the problem of mental causation, and I 
suggest that a solution to the problem should be sought from this direction. Von Wright’s 
views and arguments are unconventional, both in their style and in their conclusions, from the 
naturalistic mainstream. His understanding of the nature of philosophy provides an alternative 
for those who are perhaps frustrated by the naturalistic conception. “What is philosophy?” and 
“What is a philosophical method?” are important metaphilosophical questions that have great 
relevance, especially for modern philosophy of mind, which emerges as a hybrid of empirical 
and conceptual considerations.  
It would be a loss for the philosophical community if von Wright’s views came to be 
forgotten. In addition to von Wright’s published writings, I have therefore studied his 
unpublished work, hoping to put it in chronological order so as to reveal von Wright’s final 
                                               
6 See Stoutland, 2006, 2007 and Lepore and Ludwig, 2006. 
7 See Campbell, 2008 and Reinholdtsen, 2006. 
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conclusions about the mind.8 I am focusing especially on von Wright’s views on the 
philosophy of mind and not so much on his views on the philosophy of action (insofar as 
these views can be clearly separated). The reason for this is that von Wright’s philosophy of 
mind has not been much studied, whereas there are interesting analyses about his views on 
action. At a time when von Wright’s work in the philosophy of mind was largely unpublished, 
he once wrote that perhaps his purpose in writing about these issues was only to leave a small 
legacy for his younger philosophical congenial spirits9.  Two  years  before  his  death,  von  
Wright wrote down that his thoughts were more and more often moving outside the 
mainstream. At this time, he again expressed his hope that perhaps someday in the future 
others would dig up some of his later thoughts and develop them further.10 My modest 
attempt here is to cherish this legacy by showing what kind of views von Wright can be seen 
as defending, and thence suggesting what further explorations, based on these views, might be 
started in the future. Von Wright’s views can (I believe) provide an interesting perspective on 
the problem of mental causation, which is a widely discussed contemporary problem in 
philosophy. This being said, it has to be acknowledged that von Wright’s work was left 
unfinished and the author himself could not reach a final conclusion about the difficult 
problems under study. Von Wright was himself acutely aware that further thinking would be 
required; perhaps congenial spirits would continue his work further. 
The main purpose of this work is to clarify the views of Davidson and von Wright and 
to discuss how the problem of mental causation should be understood from a non-reductive 
perspective. The substantial, although obviously not conclusive, conclusions that will be 
presented in this thesis are as follows. 
 
1. The “physicalism” of non-reductive physicalism is unwarranted. 
 
Non-reductive physicalism is meant to be a position which is true to the scientific world-view, 
according to which everything that exists is in some abstract sense physical. But certain forms 
of non-reductive physicalism try to maintain also the “common-sense” idea that humans are 
not merely physical systems whose behavior can be strictly predicted and controlled. Non-
reductive physicalism, as a philosophical position, is an attempt to explain how humans can 
be part of the physical world but also free agents who are capable of choosing and acting out 
                                               
8 I refer to the unpublished writings with UP. 
9 Von Wright, 1991. 
10 Von Wright, 2002. 
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of reasons. A classic formulation of non-reductive physicalism is Davidson’s anomalous 
monism.11 I will consider how well argued the physicalism of AM is, and show that although 
Davidson and von Wright both accept the view that everything that exists is physical, they do 
not provide good philosophical arguments in support of this view. My claim is that the 
physicalistic ontology of non-reductive physicalism is unwarranted and problematic. 
 
2. The mental aspect of humans is irreducible to the physical aspect. 
 
Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) 
Mental  phenomena  cannot  be  reduced  to  states  of  the  brain.  I  suggest  that  whereas  the  
argument in favor of physicalism is unconvincing, there are good reasons to believe that 
mental phenomena are irreducible. Drawing on the views of Davidson and von Wright, my 
purpose is to explain why mental phenomena as well as our mental vocabulary and mental 
explanations are all irreducible to their physical counterparts. The irreducibility of the mental 
is both ontological  as  well  as  conceptual.  This  means  that  brain  research  will  not  solve  the  
mystery of consciousness and that explanations referring to mental phenomena cannot be 
replaced by explanations which refer to physical phenomena. These assertions support 
conclusion 1) above, according to which the physicalism of non-reductive physicalism is 
unwarranted. The truth of physicalism cannot be shown. Mental phenomena and mental 
explanations are indispensable and will so remain. 
 
3. Non-reductive physicalism cannot solve the problem of mental causation.   
 
If the claim about the irreducibility of the mental is taken seriously, the problem of mental 
causation cannot be solved. How exactly consciousness can have a causal effect on the 
physical world remains a mystery. Jaegwon Kim, among others, has repeatedly argued that 
non-reductive physicalism cannot solve the problem of mental causation. I find his view 
convincing. My claim is, however, that the failure to solve the problem of mental causation is, 
pace Kim, a virtue of Davidson’s and von Wright’s accounts – because it leaves room for 
human freedom. The desire for a reductive solution to the problem of mental causation is a 
consequence of adopting an overtly metaphysical perspective towards the problem, and the 
result is a confused way of seeing the nature of the problem. 
                                               
11 AM from now on. 
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 4. A reserved form of epiphenomenalism may be true. 
 
If  the  problem  of  mental  causation  cannot  be  solved,  the  possibility  arises  that  
epiphenomenalism – a view according to which mental aspect of humans is causally 
inefficacious and there is no such thing as mental causation – may be true. I claim that there 
are further reasons, in addition to the failure to solve the problem of mental causation, to think 
that a reserved form of epiphenomenalism may be true. In making this conclusion, I also 
show how evidence from neuroscience and psychology tentatively support it.  
 
5. There is a way out of epiphenomenalism. 
 
A view according to which consciousness is always causally inefficacious and freedom a 
mere illusion cannot be accepted. If the irreducibility of the mental is true there cannot be a 
reductive solution to the problem of mental causation. I will argue that the only way to reject 
epiphenomenalism and make sense of mental causation is by rejecting the idea of 
physicalism. Inspired by the views of Davidson and von Wright, I will show how it is perhaps 
possible to make sense of mental causation in the context of non-reductive physicalism. A 
physicalistic answer to the problem of mental causation cannot be given, but a non-reductive 
answer to this problem is available. This is the only way in which this problem can be 
“solved”. One therefore has to go beyond conclusion 1) and insist not only that physicalism is 
unwarranted, but also that the idea of physicalism has to be rejected in order to save human 
freedom.  This  could  be  seen  as  a  kind  of  transcendental  argument:  it  takes  as  basic  certain  
facts familiar from ordinary life and asks what kind of ontology must follow. We can, and in 
fact must, choose how we want to describe human beings – and this choice has consequences 
for the coherence of a physicalistic world view. 
This rejection of physicalism is based on the view that a materialistic metaphysics and 
its consequent – a material mind – is a threat to the autonomy of human beings. In arguing in 
favor of the irreducibility of the mental and against physicalism, I want to emphasize the 
importance of the question of how human nature should be understood, and how humans 
should be treated. The philosophical problems of the mind should be considered in the 
broader context of human life and not merely as specific problems waiting for a technical 
solution in philosophical terms, which are understood only by professional philosophers. 
Human beings should not be seen as material machines, but as beings with “Wittgensteinian 
souls”. This is a kind of existential or transcendental choice which, to use von Wright’s 
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words, must be made but cannot be further grounded. Seeing a human as a mere physical 
system does not capture the essence of what it is to be a human being. Seeing a human being 
as a being with soul and not as a machine obviously has far-reaching ethical and moral 
consequences  which,  or  so  I  claim,  cannot  and  should  not  be  treated  separately  from  
conclusions in the philosophy of mind. 
 
Chapter one: A challenge for the philosophy of mind and the 
Davidsonian – von Wrightian response 
 
The conclusions of this work center around two closely related problems. The first is the 
problem of the status of mental phenomena. What is the relation between phenomena like 
thoughts, desires and wants, which we tend to call “mental”, and phenomena like brain-
processes which are understood as being “physical” phenomena? This is the old problem 
about the relationship between mind and body or mind and matter. Today the problem has 
turned into the mind–brain problem and is often formulated in terms of consciousness: what is 
the relation between conscious states, and the brain – or more broadly – physical world? 
Philosophers talk about the “hard problem of consciousness” and about the “explanatory gap” 
which exists between the conscious and non-conscious. Is consciousness a “dance of atoms” 
and can we really understand it as such, or is this kind of claim nonsense? Whatever term – 
consciousness, mind, soul, or spirit is chosen – a distinction between its referent and physical 
phenomena is nevertheless a crucial and problematic part of our current self-conception.    
The second problem on which this work focuses is the problem of how consciousness, 
a seemingly non-physical phenomenon, can have causal efficacy in the physical world. Both 
of these problems have been called “philosophical”, and in the history of philosophy the task 
of solving them has therefore been a philosopher’s task. But what is a philosophical problem? 
Is the mind–body problem a philosophical problem? Is the problem of mental causation a 
philosophical problem? Is there a philosophical and non-philosophical side to these problems? 
Philosophy can be seen as a systematic attempt to explicate conflicting intuitions. It needs to 
be considered whether these problems are philosophical, where our intuitions lie, and what 
kind of clarification of them, if any, philosophy can provide. Do the views of Davidson and 
von Wright clarify these problems in any way? Sometimes philosophical discussion, instead 
of clarifying, confuses the views that we might hold if we had not started philosophizing in 
the first place. It was already Descartes who claimed that the problem of mental causation is 
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only a philosopher’s problem; in the course of everyday life the problem of mental causation 
does not arise. With some justification, it could be argued that a notable part of modern 
philosophy of mind is guilty of mystification. A certain kind of modern philosophy of mind 
distorts  what  we  already  know  in  order  to  include  our  mental  reality  into  a  metaphysics  of  
materialism. This philosophy does not consider the lived position of human beings. Instead it 
uses metaphors when it refers to the “language of thought”, to “brains that make 
interpretations”, or claims that the “mind is [like] a computer.” But what do these claims 
really mean? Do they mean, for example, that the mind is a sort of computer? This is not a 
scientific claim, although it is made by those who want to themselves as “scientific 
philosophers”. We should however ask: are these metaphors philosophically perplexing or do 
they cause confusions? Misunderstandings follow when a biased theoretical attitude is taken 
towards things that are already known. Sometimes explanations are sought when none are 
needed. For a philosopher the difficult problem is that of deciding what kinds of questions 
require explanations, i.e. when does one encounter a question which requires philosophical 
clarification? How to avoid the temptation to search for explanations where none are needed? 
The nature of mental phenomena and the question of the possibility of mental 
causation are problems which are linked to a broader issue, namely that of what our place in 
the physical reality is. This deep question has dimensions, like the question of the “meaning 
of life”, that cannot be entirely captured by science but that nevertheless have enormous 
importance for humans. These questions are not scientific questions, but they are not 
meaningless questions either. Do we, in recognizing them, have to settle for a view that a 
person is part of the physical order but also a queer inhabitant of this reality? It is reasonable 
to  claim  that,  to  use  J.J.C  Smart’s  expression,  that  the  question  about  “our  place  in  the  
universe” troubles (in one way or another) most humans at some point of their lives.12 With 
respect to philosophy, it is not an exaggeration to claim, as John Searle has recently done, that 
“There is exactly one overriding question in the contemporary philosophy... we could put it in 
this form: How do we fit in?”13 This  seems  to  be  the overriding question, at least in the 
contemporary philosophy of mind. 
The importance of this question – how do we fit in? – is profound and should not be 
ignored when thinking about the mental aspects of human beings. Different belief-systems, 
like those provided by religions or the ones offered by modern science, give different and 
often mutually exclusive answers to this question.  It is possible to claim that brain-research 
                                               
12 Our Place in the Universe is the title of Smart 1989. 
13 Searle, 2007, 4. 
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already shows that mind is part of the physical world and that mental causation is a form of 
physical causation. However, the crucial point is that conscious human beings do not seem to 
function like mere physical systems, because their behavior cannot be predicted or explained 
in  the  same way that  the  behavior  of  purely  physical  systems can.  We would  be  puzzled  to  
hear that somebody could predict our thoughts. This could seem humiliating by downgrading 
our status as autonomous individuals. As long as this difference between mental and physical 
systems remains, we can claim that there is a conceptual difference between causal relations 
involving consciousness and causal relations involving phenomena that are “clearly” physical. 
Despite the scientific enthusiasm for subsuming everything under the physical, it is of course 
the case that science has not conclusively shown either that mind is part of the physical world 
or that mental causation is a form of physical causation. This is why philosophers still fiercely 
debate these two problems, and the question “how do we fit in?” is such that for many a 
neutral stand towards it is difficult to take. Searle captures also this aspect perceptively when 
he writes:  
 
[...] problems of the mind and consciousness are regarded with a passion that is unlike that felt for most 
other scientific and philosophical issues. The intensity of feeling borders on the religious and the 
political. It matters desperately to people what sort of solution we get to the[se] problems. Oddly 
enough, I have encountered more passion from adherents of the computational theory of them mind than 
from adherents of traditional religious doctrines of the soul. Some computationalists invest an almost 
religious intensity into their faith that our deepest problems about the mind will have a computational 
solution.14 
 
We can only guess why this is so; an answer would require considering the sociology of 
modern philosophy and how it relates to society at large. But there are indeed interesting 
“ideological” camps in the philosophy of mind – among them “dualists”, “eliminative 
materialists”, “reductive physicalists”, “non-reductive physicalists”, “emergentists” and so on 
– not to mention the smaller sub-groups like “pan-psychists” or “epiphenomenalists”. Some 
of these positions connect concretely to broader issues of a social and political nature.15 I 
believe that the broader questions, and the relations of philosophical positions to them, should 
be taken into consideration when discussing the mind–body problem. Science and scientific 
philosophy can describe how things are, but they cannot answer the question of how things 
should be. Science aims to provide a clear and coherent picture of reality, but the nature of 
actual human life is defined by its openness, incoherence and uncertainty. This is part of what 
it is to be a human being.  
                                               
14 Searle, 1997, 190. 
15 That this is true, for example, with respect to eliminative materialists is shown in the appendix. 
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The amount of scientific knowledge at our disposal increases dramatically on a daily 
basis. Unfortunately, this knowledge has not helped humans to understand the deep 
complexities of their lives. In many cases, the progress of science has increased these 
complexities or made them more complicated. The scientific image of man simply does not 
correspond to the self-image of man which many people have. Humans are still struggling 
with many of the same psychological problems which have always troubled mankind. Perhaps 
it could be argued that the reason for this is that these problems are not waiting for a scientific 
solution, but for philosophical clarification; the nature of the problems should be understood 
in the right way. It is very unfortunate that many philosophers are not concerned about the 
nature of their task, about the nature of philosophy, or about the question of whether modern 
philosophy could be unhealthy in some ways. Partly because of this, philosophy is distancing 
itself from the actual lives of people. In times like ours when trust in “progress” and in 
“rational”  solutions  has  taken  over,  philosophers  who want  to  stay  in  their  ivory  towers  are  
ignoring problems which truly trouble humans. Perhaps it should be required that especially 
in our times, when certain aspects of progress threaten the very existence of humans, 
philosophizing as an activity should have concrete consequences. It should aim at being an 
activity which helps people in some way and reveals problematic aspects of our era. One 
important merit of von Wright’s work is that, as we will see in the final chapter, he was aware 
of the mood of our times and did not hesitate to express skepticism towards it.     
A modern person has reasons to think that human beings, or at least their bodies, are 
physical objects. Being physical objects, humans obey the laws of nature; their bodies cannot 
escape the realm of physical laws. If current scientific world view depicts correctly the origin 
of humans, it is then quite clear that we are part of the long chain of evolution and nothing 
supernatural, like divine intervention, belongs in the story concerning the history and nature 
of humans. But it seems that humans have also free will; we can choose what to do with our 
physical bodies. The claim that human as a whole obeys the laws of nature is therefore 
rendered  problematic:  there  are  no  laws  of  nature  –  that  we  know  of  –  which  apply  to  the  
mental  realm.  Whereas  the  story  of  our  evolution  as  a  species  is  known  quite  well,  the  
question of how the kind of freedom that humans enjoy, or suffer from, is possible has not, of 
course, pace Daniel Dennett and others, been explained naturalistically.16 The dual nature of 
humans – the problem of how to reconcile free will with the fact that humans are part of the 
physical order – is, as the histories of philosophy and religion testify, one reason which can 
                                               
16 For Dennett’s recent approach see his Freedom Evolves. 
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lead  to  the  postulation  of  a  mind  or  soul.  The  mind,  soul  or  spirit  must be something other 
than a physical entity if  it  is  to  avoid  the  grasp  of  physical  laws.  Although  the  triumph  of  
materialistic metaphysics is evident today, our self-conception is, for better or worse, 
nevertheless still essentially dualistic. This does not apply just to the views of laymen but to 
scientific talk as well. Doctors talk of mental diseases and wonder how to improve the mental 
and physical health of their patients. It may be the case that mind is nothing “over and above” 
the brain but if this is so, people have not really grasped what this means. 
In the past, the mind–body problem and the problem of mental causation have been the 
concern  of  philosophers.  However,  it  is  not  clear  any  more,  if  it  ever  was,  what  a  
philosophical problem is. Thus the nature of philosopher’s task is also unclear. The nature of 
philosophy and the task of the philosopher are questions which have troubled philosophy and 
its self-image for a long time, but during the 20th century they have become even more 
pressing. This situation is a result of the naturalization of philosophy; naturalists claim that 
philosophy should be continuous with science, that there is no special philosophical method, 
that there are no philosophical problems, and that the truths of philosophy do not enjoy a 
privileged status. Philosophy has no special way to discover truths about the world, and the 
correct method for the pursuit of truth is the scientific, empirical method. W.V.O. Quine, the 
teacher of Davidson and an important figure behind contemporary naturalism writes: “We 
naturalists say that science is the highest path to truth….”17 and therefore: “Naturalism looks 
only to natural science… for an account of what there is and what there is does.”18 Jerry 
Fodor, a famous contemporary naturalist, claims that: “Science discovers essences…”19, i.e. it 
is science and only science which describes how things really are. The status of naturalism 
and the justification for it are under heated debate.20 For  the  purposes  of  this  work,  it  is  
important to ask whether the naturalistic challenge renders obsolete the need for philosophical 
investigations. What is the relevance of Davidson’s and von Wright’s philosophical 
arguments if the naturalistic philosophers are correct? What is the relevance of conclusions 
which one has arrived at by using a philosophical method? 
                                               
17 Quine, 1995, 261. 
18 Quine, 1992, 9. Quine’s impact on contemporary naturalism is widely recognized. His importance for 
eliminative materialism, the most extreme version of contemporary naturalism, is also often acknowledged.  
19 Fodor, 1998, 5. Compare, though: “I don’t know whether science discovers essences. It may be that 
philosophers make them up.” (Fodor, 1987, 49) 
20 For a general criticism of naturalism see Wagner and Warner, (eds.), 1993, Olafson, 2000, De Caro and 
Macarthur, (eds.), 2004. For a critique of physicalist naturalism, according to which the only genuine and 
irreducible natural science is physics, see Robinson, 1982, 1996, Baker, 1987, Gillett and Loewer, (eds.), 2001. 
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The Quinean view, which is accepted among many modern naturalists, is that 
scientific claims have a “higher status” than other claims, and only they express truths about 
reality. The knowledge that traditional philosophy produces is “factually empty” or 
“conventual” as, for example, “neurophilosopher” Paul Churchland claims.21 If  this  is  so,  a  
conflict between philosophical claims and scientific claims is evident at some point. The 
question about the “threat of science” is relevant for the purposes of this work, because 
Davidson’s and von Wright’s philosophical views, or philosophies, are especially vulnerable 
to the naturalistic challenge. The relevance of Davidson’s and von Wright’s views for the 
modern discussion depends in part on the question of whether or not philosophy can or should 
make a contribution that is something other than the contribution made by science. In my 
defense of the Davidsonian–von Wrightian conception of the philosophy of mind, I try to 
show the importance of genuine philosophy, as opposed to science, for the psycho-physical 
problem.  
Although the mind–body problem and other problems related to it have been discussed 
for centuries, the approach called “philosophy of mind” is new.22 If philosophy is understood 
as conceptual analysis, which  in  the  case  of  the  mind  aims  to  clarify  the  nature  of  mental  
concepts, then the contemporary naturalistic challenge against it is obvious. The challenge is 
posed by science and its ability to answer questions that have been thought to be 
philosophical, and perhaps unsolvable. The empirical method has proved to be successful 
with respect to the traditional questions, whereas conceptual analysis has produced only 
conventional knowledge. Whereas in previous centuries the question about the nature of the 
non-physical mind was a perfectly legitimate philosophical question, a view according to 
which humans have such a mind is thought to be naïve and “unscientific” today.23 Science has 
thus solved, at least to its own satisfaction, a problem which was philosophical in the past. 
Currently mind, or consciousness, is equated with the brain by most naturalistic philosophers, 
and therefore questions about the mind become questions about the brain. The view according 
to which study of the brain is also straightforwardly study of the mind is tempting. Patricia 
Churchland, a philosopher and a neuroscientist, i.e. a neurophilosopher, notes: ”In a way, 
nothing is more obvious than that philosophers of mind could profit from knowing at least 
something of what there is to know about how the brain works. After all, one might say, how 
could  the  empirical  facts  about  the  nervous  system  fail  to  be  relevant  in  the  philosophy  of  
                                               
21 Churchland, 2007a. 
22 According to Richard Rorty (1994) the term came into currency in the 1950s.  
23 For a discussion how “unscientific” philosophical positions are currently treated, see Meixner, 2005. 
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mind?”24 The  neurophilosopher’s  view  is  straightforward;  it  is  obvious that philosophers of 
mind benefit from the findings of neuroscience. How could it be otherwise? How indeed? 
One cannot fail to appreciate how fast brain research is progressing. Interesting facts 
about the brain are revealed constantly, and what sounded like science-fiction or was almost 
unimaginable just a few decades ago is reality now. Perhaps even a committed dualist has to 
pay some attention to these results. Many of the problems which are intuitively identified as 
problems of the mind – for example questions about personality – are being solved, or so it is 
at least being claimed, by studying the brain. If one is not a “new-mysterian”, the scientific 
view about the mind-brain holds the promise that all problems of the mind will receive, in 
principle at least, an empirical answer.25 It could be claimed that in this context the need for 
conceptual analyses disappears. What could they reveal? Science has already explained how 
things are, why should anyone bother with an obscure analysis of concepts which may not 
even touch reality at its joints. 
Is there any place for philosophy of mind in this kind of intellectual atmosphere? If the 
answer is affirmative, then the crucial question is that of how a philosophical investigation of 
the mind differs from a scientific inquiry. My claim is that Davidson’s and von Wright’s 
positions are especially vulnerable to the challenge that science poses for the philosophy of 
mind. Because I take their views to be relevant for the contemporary philosophy of mind, my 
purpose is to show how a position influenced by their views could perhaps overcome the 
challenge. This, in turn, is an attempt to show that there is a place and a need for a philosophy 
of mind which is clearly non-scientific and non-empirical. The claim is that the contribution 
of philosophy is something other than the contribution of science. This may sound obvious; 
yet the view is challenged by many naturalists. Even if one agrees with the naturalists and 
acknowledges that “of course” the contribution of philosophy differs in some way from that 
of science, it should be noted that it is not obvious how the contribution of philosophy differs 
from the contribution of science and what the consequences of this kind of philosophy should 
or could be. Professional philosophers are often surprisingly indecisive with respect to these 
questions;  they  do  not  consider  the  nature  of  their  task,  even  though  there  are  “ideological  
camps” among philosophers, and although philosophy may have consequences which are 
political and ethical. Any philosophy which is a result of accepting a certain ideology is 
superficial, because it leaves open the basic question; what is it that philosophers are doing? 
                                               
24 Churchland, 1986, 4. 
25 For a different view see Mcginn, 1994. 
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The view of philosophy of mind as conceptual analysis is not one that is favored today. 
One reason for this is the rise of empirical philosophy of mind, which is influenced by and 
integrated with cognitive science, neuroscience or to some other research line of natural or 
physical science. With such empirical influence comes the question of how the discipline 
called philosophy of mind should be defined. What counts as “legitimate” philosophy of 
mind, and who are its practitioners? There clearly exists an empirical trend, but philosophers 
do not agree on the question of what philosophy of mind is and how it should be pursued. The 
lack of agreement on these questions is what makes them pressing and interesting. What is at 
stake is the nature of the proper philosophical method. Naturalists claim that the proper 
method  is  ultimately  empirical  research.  Some  of  those  who  reject  this  view  think  that  the  
proper method is the analysis of concepts. I believe that a particular view on the philosophy of 
mind, such as Davidson’s or von Wright’s, will not be correctly evaluated if there is no 
agreement on the question of what it is that a philosopher of mind should do. If, as some 
would argue, the purpose of philosophy of mind is to provide theories which explain in 
scientific terms, for example, what the relation between mind and brain is, then an approach 
which focuses on the analysis mental concepts is automatically unsatisfactory. If, as some 
others would argue, the purpose of philosophy of mind is to clarify problems through 
conceptual analysis, then an approach which focuses on discovering new empirical facts is 
unsatisfying.  
The “philosophy of mind as conceptual analysis” and the “philosophy of mind as 
empirical research” approaches are so distinct from one another that even the productive 
results of one approach are often ignored or downgraded by the other. The contemptuous 
attitude which certain scientists or scientifically oriented philosophers have towards more 
traditionally oriented philosophers shows how deep the disagreement is. In the next section, 
some of the consequences of scientific philosophy of mind are considered and found 
problematic. The discussion could be called “metaphilosophical” because it includes both 
describing views of modern philosophers and considering what the motivation for these views 
is. Whether this kind of analysis is relevant for the substantial philosophical issues is partly a 
matter of intuition. I claim, for the reasons that follow, that such an analysis is relevant.  
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1.1 Naturalism and its consequences for the mental aspects of humans 
 
Modern science challenges philosophy, the “mother of all sciences”. Jaegwon Kim has noted 
that the development of cognitive science and other sciences studying the brain has “[…] to 
some extent (some will say fundamentally), changed the character of philosophy of 
mind….”26 When faced with this kind of view, a question worth asking is: “What has 
changed?” Is, or was, there a clearly defined enterprise called “philosophy of mind”, the 
essence  of  which  changed  because  of  the  development  of  science?  What  was  this  pure 
philosophy of mind which has changed? Perhaps the kind of conceptual analysis pursued for 
example by Ryle and Strawson? Yet, if one agrees with Rorty that philosophy of mind is 
whatever philosophers of mind think they are doing, then there can be different ways to 
practice “philosophy of mind” and these ways can exist in their own right. This would mean 
that the character of philosophy of mind has not really changed, but it has attracted 
competition from cognitive and other sciences which, according to some philosophers, 
perhaps undermine the importance of philosophy of mind. Kim, for example, thinks that there 
is no real connection between the kind of work that he does in the philosophy of mind and the 
results of the sciences of cognition or consciousness.27 He is thus among those whose 
philosophical views have not really changed. To give a counterexample, Ned Block argues 
that philosophy of mind, as opposed to other branches of philosophy, is particularly amenable 
to empirical approaches and that good philosophy of mind always has some empirical 
grounding.28 There are thus foundational disagreements that influence the question of what 
counts or should count as legitimate, interesting or good philosophy of mind. Contemporary 
philosophy of mind relies heavily on empirical research methods and on empirical results. 
Von Wright once claimed that in modern philosophy Russell had defeated Wittgenstein, by 
which he meant that the empirical method had overtaken conceptual analysis. Perhaps this 
general trend is what partly explains why the character of philosophy of mind has changed in 
the way Kim suggests.  
What weight does the term philosophy carry in the kind of philosophy of mind which 
is highly empirical? Not much, because philosophy of mind which is a result of a naturalistic 
view includes the idea that although philosophical problems are very general and very broad, 
there is nevertheless no difference in kind between these problems and problems that are 
                                               
26 Kim, 1996, xii. 
27 Kim, 2000. 
28 Block, 2007. 
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clearly empirical and amenable to scientific solutions. According to this view, there are no 
real philosophical problems, only problems whose connection to observation-based solutions 
are more or less distant. Questions that cannot be solved through empirical methods are not 
interesting because an analysis of them would amount to mere speculation or to “playing with 
words”.  Russell’s long shadow influences the philosophical climate of the 21st century. The 
problem  of  philosophy,  according  to  many  naturalists,  is  that  it  has  not  been  empirical  
enough. In the history of philosophy up to the present day, there has been too much thinking 
but not enough experimentation. The belief is that a priori solutions are flawed and the old-
fashioned approach is not going to lead anywhere because it does not provide “real 
knowledge” about the world. This is what a naturalist claims. She criticizes philosophers for 
the fact that they have been carrying out conceptual research from the armchair, from which 
one can get only a twisted perspective on reality. Certain modern philosophers never tire of 
ridiculing Descartes because he thought that the interaction between mind and body took 
place in the pineal gland. But was Descartes a bad philosopher and was he doing bad 
philosophy? The same question can be asked with respect to Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and 
Sartre, just to give a few more examples. A naturalist would no doubt claim that in some 
sense philosophy done by traditional philosophers is of a lower quality than current 
naturalistic philosophy.  
In her book Neurophilosophy, Patricia Churchland advises philosophers that if they 
want to get out from the “narrow canyons of the commonsense conception of the world” they 
should welcome the alliance of philosophy and the hard sciences.29 The most desirable result 
is  nevertheless  not  an  alliance  of  philosophy  and  hard  science;  it  is  the  replacement  of  the  
former by the latter. Looking back, it is easy to see, according to the “neurophilosophers”, that 
non-empirical philosophy of mind has been making little or no progress. The uselessness of 
philosophy is sometimes emphasized also by notable scientists.  Steven Weinberg, a Nobel 
laureate in physics, has noted that: “I know of no one who has participated actively in the 
advance of physics in the post-war period whose research has been significantly helped by the 
work of philosophers.”30 Among naturalists, the current view seems to be that philosophers of 
mind, instead of helping scientists, are merely hindering progress. Neuroscience and its 
progress look promising by contrast. Science can provide solutions to problems which have 
                                               
29 Churchland, 1988, 3. Paul Churchland shares this view: ”The single most important development in the 
philosophy of mind during the past forty years has been the emerging influence of the philosophy of science” 
(Churchland, 1989, xii). According to those who share Churchland’s vision (e.g. Bickle et al. 2006) 
Neurophilosophy is considered to be a hallmark of neuroscientific philosophy, since it made (some) philosophers 
finally realize the relevance of neuroscientific findings for the philosophy of mind. 
30 Weinberg, 1993, 133-134. 
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been considered philosophical in the past, and it thus has potential to replace the more 
philosophical approaches. Churchland writes:  
 
It is difficult to resist the excitement that now typifies so much research in the neurosciences...The 
excitement is generated in part because neuroscience is science, and in pushing back the bounds of 
darkness it is discovering surprising new things... 31 
 
What is exciting, according to Churchland and other neurophilosophers, is that the mind is 
finally amenable to scientific study. Those philosophers who expect that neuroscience will 
have only a minor impact on philosophy are making a bad judgment error. Among certain 
philosophers, the possibility of the scientific study of the mind has led to the conclusion that 
such scientific study is the only alternative when it comes to the question of how the problems 
of the mind should be studied. Scientific study of the mind has thus become not only an 
alternative to philosophy but a mandatory approach, which is superior when compared to 
other ways of comprehending the world. One is reminded of Russell’s view according to 
which work in philosophy should eventually come to resemble work in physics. The 
challenge of science is a concrete challenge for philosophy, because it can be imagined that 
future philosophers will be advised to focus increasingly on the empirical results of science. 
This would change the nature of philosophical investigations as they are traditionally 
understood. What would be the philosopher’s task in this kind of setting?  
The methodological import of naturalism, according to which science is the highest 
path to truth, and its consequential ontology – physicalism – has in some philosophical circles 
led  to  the  conclusion  that  if  mental  phenomena  are  real  they  must be “naturalizable”. Some 
naturalists, especially eliminative materialists, claim that if mental phenomena like beliefs and 
thoughts cannot be naturalized then there are no such phenomena.32 The elimination of these 
mental phenomena is a dramatic step given the role that these phenomena have in human life, 
and this elimination goes against our common-sense views about the status of mental 
phenomena. I believe we can imagine a situation in which an eliminative approach might 
compete with some other view about the nature of human cognition. Which kind of position is 
chosen could have some very practical consequences. Some of these consequences will be 
considered in the last chapter, where I claim that we should not defend a purely physicalistic 
conception of human beings as long as we want to avoid the consequences that this may 
bring.  We  can  instead  choose  the  ontology  of  everyday  life  as  basic  and  consider  the  
prospects of physicalism from this point of view.  
                                               
31 Churchland, 1988, 10. 
32 See Churchland, 1981, 1998a. 
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Many are not willing to accept the common sense ontology as basic. According to 
naturalists, “intentional irrealism” follows if the “proper place” of mental phenomena in the 
physical world cannot be shown. Stephen Schiffer claims that “[…] we should not be 
prepared to maintain that there are… psychological facts unless we are prepared to maintain 
that such facts are completely determined by, and nothing over and above, physical facts.”33 
This view does not yet methodologically privilege natural science in questions about the 
mind, but it asserts that a discussion of psychological facts should include the view that these 
facts  are  dependent  on  physical  facts.  Fodor  is  more  explicit  when  he  writes:   “[…]  the  
deepest motivation for intentional irrealism derives… from a certain ontological intuition: that 
there is no place for intentional categories in a physicalistic view of the world; that the 
intentional can’t be naturalized.”34 The physicalistic world view, expressed by Schiffer, is the 
basis for intentional irrealism if a naturalization of mental phenomena is required for their 
vindication. That naturalization of mental phenomena is required for their vindication is 
explicitly expressed by Fodor: “Psychologists have no right to assume that there are 
intentional states unless they can provide… naturalistic sufficient conditions for something to 
be in an intentional state.”35 A psychologist must be able to provide “naturalistic conditions” 
for intentional states. Here a metaphysical principle, “an ontological intuition”, the source of 
which is unclear, allegedly guides what psychologists have or do not have the right to assume. 
In the contemporary philosophy of mind the requirement of naturalization, which is an 
abstract metaphysical principle, is thus taken very seriously. Fodor writes: 
 
Either there is a naturalistic theory of representation – in which case, it is the solution to the problem of 
intentionality – or there is no naturalistic theory of representation, in which case, I for one, will give it 
all up, become an eliminativist about the mental, and opt for early retirement.36  
                                               
33 Schiffer, 1982, 119. 
34 Fodor, 1987, 97. Cf. “… there is a worry that the semantic (and / or the intentional) will prove permanently 
recalcitrant to integration in the natural order” (Fodor, 1984, 232). A closely related reason why mental irrealism 
could turn out to be true lies in the possibility that the causal efficacy of mental phenomena cannot be 
established. This is the fear of epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenal phenomena that have no causal efficacy can 
be considered unreal. Fred Dretske (1989, 1) notes: “If beliefs and desires are not causally relevant to behavior, 
I…  fail  to  see  why  it  would  be  worth  having  them…  If  reasons  aren’t  causes,  one  of  the  chief  –  indeed  (for  
certain people) the only – motive for including them in one’s inventory of the mind, vanishes.” A similar worry, 
which interestingly has just the opposite source, is the belief that the success of physicalism – i.e. showing how 
reasons are causes will render reasons qua reasons causally inert. The methodological demand of naturalism has 
the consequence that science is privileged. If a science of mentality is impossible, then mental phenomena are 
less than real. According to Fodor (1994a) and Kim (1984), laws of mentality are required for a science of 
mentality and therefore the possible lawlessness of the mental, defended by Davidson, also implies the irrealism 
of the mental. 
35 Fodor, 1994, 5.  
36 Fodor, 1998, 185. So either there has to be a scientific theory of mental representations or eliminativism is 
true. This can be compared to the view of Stephen Stich, who argued for eliminativism but later changed his 
mind stating that: “It is, I think, deeply irresponsible to suggest that research be stopped and laboratories closed 
because the work being carried on there fails to live up to some vaguely stated ontological standard whose 
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The naturalist claims that a philosopher who does not want fall back on dualism has only two 
options with respect to mental phenomena: they must be reduced to non-mental phenomena or 
eliminated. The status of mental phenomena is clear if the approach of a naturalistic 
philosophy of mind is chosen.  
Less clear is how seriously the principle of “reduce or be eliminated” can be taken. 
Psychologists, sociologists or laymen are not going to stop referring to mental phenomena via 
mental concepts while patiently waiting for a naturalist to justify the use of this conceptual 
framework and its consequent ontology of the mental. In its demand that naturalizations be 
made necessary for the vindication of mentality, naturalistic philosophy suggests that facts 
already certain from everyday experience require an even firmer basis. Science has become “a 
transcendental ground”, which must ultimately secure facts already familiar to all. But no one, 
not even Fodor, is really going to turn eliminativist if it can be shown that mentality will not 
smoothly  reduce  to  the  “natural  order”.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  all  the  talk  about  intentional  
irrealism or the non-existence of propositional attitudes is just polemical, one can ask what the 
point of this talk is. If naturalists are not really claiming that the results of science are 
privileged, then what are they claiming? If they are claiming that science is truly privileged, 
then they should really think that intentional irrealism is a viable option. They should really 
think that common-sense talk about mental phenomena has a second-grade status. Yet, to my 
knowledge, there are no philosophers who take this possibility seriously. There are no 
philosophers whose lives are actually governed by this principle. A question worth asking is 
whether philosophers should “live according to their views”; perhaps this is too much to ask. 
One can only hope that philosophers would aim for intellectual honesty and that they would 
take philosophy seriously. Perhaps good philosophy should really change the way we think 
and act. 
The general naturalistic challenge to philosophy is that philosophy is rendered useless 
because all interesting questions are considered to be amenable to scientific treatment, and the 
scientific method is therefore privileged.37 The challenge for the philosophy of mind is the 
claim that mental phenomena need “scientific vindication” through reduction. Without such 
vindication, mental phenomena may turn out to be unreal. The challenge of this claim is that 
                                                                                                                                                            
importance has not been made clear.” (Stich, 1996, 150)  Fodor’s ontological intuition seems to be Stich’s 
ontological standard, which should not constrain research. 
37 It is not clear what “scientific method” includes or excludes. What counts as acceptable science is a question 
that will not be considered here. It is noteworthy, though, that Fodor, for example, claims that psychologists, 
who should count as scientists, have “no right” to assume that there are psychological states unless they can 
show, in “non-psychological” i.e. in “naturalistic” terms, how such states are possible. This suggests that the 
vocabularies and methods of the natural sciences should be privileged. But why should a metaphysical principle, 
an “ontological intuition”, guide what can be “assumed”? 
22 
 
the study of mental concepts which are familiar to all is useless, because these concepts fail to 
refer to real phenomena. The suggestion that mental phenomena may turn out to be non-
existent is a queer consequence of the view according to which science is the highest path to 
truth. Fodor, among others, claims that the world picture given by natural sciences has 
absolute priority, and this being the case: “[...] the philosophical problems about mind and 
world have to be situated within the general scientific enterprise, if literal truth is what 
philosophers aim for.”38 Fodor is eager to emphasize that there are “ways of talking” and then 
there is science with its literal truths. Only science tells the truth about the world.39 The 
scientific vocabulary is thus a kind of super-vocabulary because it allegedly describes the 
world as it really is.  
The claim that scientific talk has a priority in questions of ontology is the basic view of 
the  post-Quinean  reductive  and  eliminative  materialists.  What  kind  of  status  is  given  to  
scientific talk and what role is granted for science? These are crucial questions dividing 
contemporary philosophers of mind. Whereas Fodor’s naturalism is based on the view that 
science discovers essences and that “literal truths” can be expressed only in the scientific 
vocabulary, many see the commitments and consequences of naturalism differently.40 It is not 
                                               
38 Fodor, 1998, 4. 
39 Consequently, finding a place for mentality requires “[...] showing how you could have... a respectable science 
whose ontology explicitly acknowledges states that exhibit the sorts of properties that commonsense attributes to 
the attitudes” (Fodor, 1987, 10). As noted already, it is unclear what counts as “respectable science” and whether 
the distinctions between sciences could be anything more than arbitrary distinctions based, for example, on 
sociological factors. 
40 Philosophers have not agreed what “naturalism” exactly means and the discussions of its status are ongoing. 
We can agree with Charles Taliaferro’s (2000, 134) remark that: “Sometimes naturalism is simply another name 
for a thoroughgoing form of physicalism, while at other times naturalism is simply any view of the world that is 
incompatible with supernaturalism.” In a critical discussion of naturalism Craig and Moreland (2000, xi) note: 
“[…] naturalism usually includes… (2) a Grand Story which amounts to an etiological account of how all 
entities whatsoever have come to be told in terms of an event causal story described in natural scientific terms 
with a central role given to the atomic theory of matter and evolutionary biology; and (3) a general ontology in 
which the only entities allowed are those that bear a relevant similarity to those thought to characterize a 
completed form of physics.” According to Quine (1993, 1, my emphasis): “[…] physicalism is bound to have… 
important side effects in the framing of more special hypotheses in various branches of science; for physicalism 
puts a premium on hypotheses favorable to closer integration with physics itself.”  An important remark about 
the nature of naturalism is made by Wagner and Warner (1993, 1) when they claim that “…we take naturalism to 
be the view that only natural science deserves full and unqualified credence.” Warner (1993, 212) repeats this in 
noting: “Naturalism… takes natural science as a paradigm of justified belief. The idea… is that only scientific 
beliefs are legitimate or that these have more legitimacy than any others.” As we have seen, contemporary 
naturalistic philosophy of mind subscribes to these doctrines. In a recent critical study of naturalism, De Caro 
and Macarthur (2004) separate three influential types of naturalism. They are: 1) Ontological scientific 
naturalism, which holds that the entities posited by acceptable scientific explanations are the only genuine 
entities there are; 2) Methodological (or epistemological scientific naturalism), which holds that it is only by 
following the methods of the natural sciences that one arrives at genuine knowledge; 3) Semantic scientific 
naturalism, which holds that the concepts employed by the natural sciences are the only genuine concepts we 
have, and other concepts can only be retained if we can find an interpretation of them in scientifically respectable 
terms. De Caro and Macarthur (2004, 7, 9) note that: “[…] scientific naturalism tends toward a global doctrine, 
committed to all of these versions [1-3] together, on the basis of aspiration for a complete and exhaustive 
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clear what a proper naturalist can or must accept. There is thus, so I would claim, an intrinsic 
tension in modern naturalism. For example, according to Rorty, to be a naturalist:  
 
[...] is to be the kind of antiessentialist who, like Dewey, sees no breaks in the hierarchy of increasingly 
complex adjustments to novel stimulation–the hierarchy which has amoeba adjusting themselves to 
changed water temperature at the bottom, bees dancing and chess players check-mating in the middle, 
and people formenting scientific, artistic, and political revolutions at the top.41 
 
An interesting difference between Rorty’s and Fodor’s versions of naturalism can be seen. 
According  to  the  former,  naturalism  goes  well  with  anti-essentialism,  whereas  according  to  
the latter naturalism goes together with essentialism. To acknowledge that naturalism can be, 
and is,  understood in different ways is to emphasize that a philosopher can be a “naturalist” 
without being committed to the doctrines that “science is the highest way to truth”, that “only 
natural science tells what there is or what there is does”, or that “there are essences to be 
discovered”. The form of naturalism which accepts these doctrines sees other positions in 
pejorative terms – as an “unscientific” or “supernatural” sliding towards dualism, which is the 
worst position that a modern philosopher of mind can defend.42 But  the  criteria  of  good  
philosophy may differ from the criteria of good science, and to dismiss philosophical views 
simply on the grounds that they are “unscientific” is to slide towards a form of scientism, 
which (or so I would claim) is a dangerous position. Davidson and von Wright can be counted 
among  naturalists  as  long  as  the  commitments  of  naturalism  are  not  understood  in  the  way  
they usually are in the post-Quinean philosophical atmosphere. This means that whereas 
Davidson and von Wright are – or can be seen as – naturalists, they are certainly not the kind 
of “naturalizers” of philosophy that Quine, Fodor, the Churchlands and other truly physicalist 
philosophers of mind are. The basis for this difference goes back to differing views about the 
nature of philosophy itself. It could be said that the latter naturalists, following the logical 
positivists and for example Russell, want to naturalize philosophy, whereas some 
philosophers following for example Wittgenstein want to resist this tendency.  
                                                                                                                                                            
explanation of all phenomena” and “Scientific naturalism involves the… claim that science is, or ought to be, our 
only genuine or unproblematic guide in matters of method or knowledge or ontology or semantics.” In their 
respective writings, both De Caro and Macarthur (2004) as well as Stich (1996) have noticed that this kind of 
ideology has led growing number of philosophers to increasingly reductive forms of naturalism. De Caro and 
Macarthur call these forms “militant naturalism”, whereas Stich talks about “puritanical naturalism”. These 
conceptions depend on restrictive conceptions of natural science, and especially of nature.  
41 Rorty, 1991, 109. 
42 For an insightful discussion about the status of contemporary dualism, see Meixner 2005, 2006. 
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What naturalistic alternatives are there to Quinean naturalism? According to Rorty’s 
naturalism: “[…] we should let a thousand vocabularies bloom and then see which survive.”43 
Scientific vocabularies are not given an automatic privilege because they claim to describe the 
true essence of reality. They are not privileged for ontological reasons. If they are privileged, 
it is because they perform certain tasks quite well. But this is really no reason to give these 
vocabularies a special status, because other vocabularies perform well certain other tasks 
which cannot be carried out by the scientific vocabularies. The pragmatism in Rorty’s 
naturalism becomes evident, especially in his later views. A position which, by rejecting 
“supernatural” entities, is still a version of naturalism but which stands in a sharp contrast to 
reductive version of naturalism is expressed when Rorty writes that:  
 
[…] all our idioms are tools for coping with the world. This means that there can be no philosophical 
interest in reducing one idiom to another…. As pragmatists see it, we are equally in touch with reality 
when we describe a hunk of space-time in atomic, molecular, cellular, physiological, behavioral, 
intentional, political or religious terms. Looking for an ontological or epistemological gap between such 
idioms strikes pragmatists as like looking for such gaps between a small Phillips screwdriver and a large 
crescent wrench; there are all sorts of similarities and differences, but none of them have ontological or 
epistemological import. There is no invidious ontological or epistemological distinction to be made, for 
example, between physics and literary criticism.44 
 
There is no philosophical interest in reducing certain vocabularies to other vocabularies. This 
is something accepted also by Davidson and von Wright. As we will see, Rorty’s overall 
understanding of naturalism comes very close to Davidson’s and von Wright's positions. 
Contemporary versions of reductive naturalism are strikingly different from “classical 
naturalism”, of which the most famous modern proponents are the American pragmatists. 
Why naturalistic philosophy has taken a distinctively scientistic turn is an important and a 
                                               
43 Rorty, 1970, 182. The pragmatic version of naturalism can be compared to Quine’s naturalistic view. 
According to Quine, mental phenomena do not belong to the scientific conception of the world, there are no facts 
of the matter about them, and therefore they may have to be eliminated. We are told: “The issue is… whether, in 
an ideal last accounting of everything or a present practical accounting of everything we can, it is efficacious so 
to frame our conceptual scheme as to mark out a range of entities or units of a so-called mental kind in addition 
to physical ones. My hypothesis, put forward in the spirit of a hypothesis of natural science, is that it is not 
efficacious.” (Quine, 1953, 214) In a famous passage  Quine (1960, 221) writes: “One may accept the Brentano 
thesis either as showing the indispensability of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science 
of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My 
attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the second.” These views should be compared to Quine’s later suggestion, which 
has a resemblance to pragmatism: “There is a scope for science on the intensional side too…. Both [extensional 
and intensional ways of accounting for all events] count as science – good, bad, or indifferent…. We must in any 
event settle for multiple scientific theories, jointly true.” (Quine, 1990, 72-73) This is however not the kind of 
pragmatism which Rorty (1994, 126), for example, strives for when he says that: ”A pragmatist should not say.. 
.that  physics  tells  us  all  we need to  know about  the  way the  world  is,  but  rather  should  follow Goodman and 
Putnam in  saying that  there  is  no  ’Way the  World  Is’”.  Whereas  Quine’s  view gives  a  privilege  to  physics  in  
dictating what there is, his later doubts about the meaningfulness of the question of “what there really is” moves 
his position closer to the kind which Rorty suggests. 
44 Rorty, 1999, 576. 
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very interesting question. Perhaps this turn is just a result of the “mood of our times”, which 
von Wright perspicuously describes thus: 
 
The enormously enlarged access to factual information thanks to electronic technology, in combination 
with spectacular advances particularly in the experimental sciences and their technological applications, 
has resulted in the hypertrophy of knowledge at the expense of understanding. This tends to encourage a 
corrupted paideia, an unwholesome panscientist atmosphere or implicit belief that increase in 
knowledge alone can successfully cope with all problems worthy of rational consideration in the moral 
and societal sphere45 
  
As was briefly suggested before, the increase in scientific knowledge has not led people to 
solve certain fundamental problems of life; on the contrary, sometimes scientific progress has 
raised these very problems. In philosophy Russell has won, but the consequences for 
philosophy have been unfortunate. Scientific philosophy is not really science but the kind of 
panscience of which von Wright warns. The general mood today praises and privileges 
scientific knowledge. We all know, for example, that there are psychological differences 
between men and women. Then suddenly some scientific research reveals that there are 
differences between the brains of the two sexes. Now we know the previous fact scientifically 
– as if we did not really know it before. When something is scientifically proven or a result of 
scientific research, the hope that everything can become knowable in this way arises. When 
this happens it should be remembered, as von Wright points out, that knowledge without 
understanding cannot cope with all the problems that are important for us, and may in fact 
lead to darkness. 
The methodological monism of reductive or eliminative naturalism is opposed to the 
kind of view which the classical naturalists, in their refusal to eliminate the seeming plurality 
of the world, strove for. For a classical naturalist, and for a modern naturalist like Rorty, there 
are no fundamental distinctions like science / non-science or natural / non-natural. A classical 
naturalist would say that whatever is, in whatever way that it is, belongs to nature.46 Von 
Wright’s description of our times, in which understanding has suffered a loss in favor of 
knowledge, is an example of a situation in which overemphasizing one method (which is 
taken to be exemplary and applicable to every aspect of nature) leads to the ignorance of 
something which is real and important for human life as well. An eliminativist attitude 
towards mental phenomena is a concrete example of this. It could be claimed that the threat 
which science, with its promise of factual knowledge, poses for philosophy is a result of a 
general symptomology of the intellectual mood of our times. 
                                               
45 Von Wright, 2000b, 280, my emphasis. 
46 An interesting example of modern “liberal naturalism” can be found in Buchler, 1966. 
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Philosophers  who  want  to  turn  philosophy  of  mind  into  a  scientific  enterprise  claim  
that non-scientific discourses, philosophy among them, are mere loose talk and they are not 
telling the truth about the world. In claiming this, they ignore the fact that non-scientific 
discourses have functions and serve purposes which are important for the cognitive lives of 
humans,  whether  or  not  these  discourses  count  as  knowledge  revealing  the  “ultimate  truth”  
about reality. Labeling these non-scientific discourses as “loose talk” because they are not 
telling the “truth” about the world is to seriously overestimate the importance of the role of 
science for human life. To label non-scientific discourses as “loose talk” is to downgrade the 
fact that human life is based on these discourses in a very concrete sense. The scientific 
method, while certainly successful, beneficial, and important with respect to many problems, 
does not help in answering what people should do with their lives or with other “deep” 
questions. Science has its proper place, but it should not infiltrate areas which are clearly 
outside  its  domain.  It  is  doubtful  that  the  scientific  method  could  offer  the  kind  of  overall  
picture of the human condition which many desire. Since one purpose of philosophy can be 
taken to be the evaluation of the human condition in its entirety, i.e. to try to formulate a 
coherent general picture, a scientific philosophy which simply ignores or eliminates aspects of 
the human condition and dictates that questions have to be answered in a certain way by 
following specific methods falls short of being good philosophy and becomes dogmatism.  
 Whereas a scientific conception of philosophy – reductive naturalism – has a firm 
place in the modern philosophy of mind, the demand for plurality is expressed by many 
contemporary philosophers – people as diverse as John Dupre, Barry Stroud, Jennifer 
Hornsby, Hilary Putnam, Noam Chomsky, Stephen Stich and John Mcdowell, to name just a 
few.47 Some of their views resemble the views of the classical naturalists and emphasize the 
need for intellectual and methodological diversity in the study of human reality. Davidson and 
                                               
47 Mcdowell (2004, 95) defines his view by saying that: “[…] liberal naturalism – does not accept that to reveal 
thinking and knowing as natural, we need to integrate into the realm of law the frame within which the concepts 
of thinking and knowing function. All we need is to stress that they are concepts of occurrences and states in our 
lives.” This version of naturalism should be contrasted with restrictive naturalism, which “[…] aims to naturalize 
the concepts of thinking and knowing by forcing the conceptual structure in which they belong into the 
framework of the realm of law.” (ibid.) As we have seen, this latter view is something which, for example, Fodor 
defends. Putnam (1999, 38) writes that: “The metaphysical realignment I propose involves acquiescence in a 
plurality of conceptual resources, of different and not mutually reducible vocabularies… coupled with a return 
not to dualism but to the “natural realism of the common man.” According to Stich (1996, 197): ”On the open 
ended pluralistic picture I would urge, we should not expect that we could find the sort of criterion that the 
naturalist seeks… the ontology embraced by the best of our physical and biological sciences… is astoundingly 
diverse… if we throw in the ontology of the social sciences, the list seems even more heterogeneous… according 
to the naturalist all of these (or at least all that are really respectable) must stand in some special relation to the 
properties of physics. This strikes me as singularly implausible proposal.” Finally, Chomsky (2000, 77) notes 
that: “…a naturalistic approach does not exclude other ways of trying to comprehend the world.” This remark is 
often neglected by those who claim that science is the highest path to truth.      
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von Wright are clear examples of thinkers who defend the need to pursue methodological 
diversity.  Davidson,  for  example,  accepts  the  Rortyan  claim  according  to  which  we are 
equally in touch with reality through different ways of describing it.48 As long as the debate 
about the demands of naturalism remains unresolved, the question of what counts as a 
sufficiently naturalistic philosophy of mind is also open. If all philosophical problems of the 
mind can be solved by discovering more facts, the success of science is the reason why a 
scientific philosophy of mind threatens to replace “pure” philosophy of mind. If all questions 
about the mind are questions which can be solved by doing empirical research, then the 
unquestionable success of, for example, neuroscience is one reason why it could replace pure 
philosophy of mind – conceptual analysis – entirely. If all problems of the mind are such that 
the best way to study them is in terms of natural science, then the discipline called philosophy 
of mind can and perhaps should be forgotten.49 If mental phenomena require scientific 
vindication, then the threat of intentional irrealism exists insofar as mental phenomena cannot 
be vindicated in a scientifically respectable way.  
 In evaluating the importance of classical naturalistic philosophers like Davidson or 
von Wright, it is crucially important to be clear on the question of what currently counts as 
legitimate philosophy. My claim is that their views are criticized mostly because they do not 
fit the prevalent naturalistic consensus. Their conception of philosophy is in conflict with the 
modern view concerning what philosophy should be.  But  if  the  principles  that  make  up  the  
prevailing naturalistic consensus are a mistake, then a major part of the criticism against 
Davidson and von Wright is ill-founded as well. 
 
1.1.1 Science gone too far – eliminative materialism 
 
In their denial of the “supernatural”, Davidson and von Wright subscribe to a form of non-
reductive naturalism. Other forms of naturalism deny much more than the existence of 
supernatural entities and, allegedly, are threatening to eliminate all that is human.50 
Eliminative materialism draws a dramatic conclusion: mental phenomena cannot be reduced 
to the phenomena which “hard” sciences talk about; therefore mental phenomena do not exist. 
                                               
48 Davidson, 1999.  
49 As  Kim  and  others  have  noted,  the  role  of  philosophy  is changing. This creates the question of what the 
current and future task of philosophers is. It also raises a question concerning the relevance of past philosophers 
like  Davidson  and  von  Wright.  The  question  of  the  future  of  philosophy  is  attracting  the  attention  of  
philosophers, as is shown by the titles of the books like The Future of Philosophy: Towards the Twenty-First 
Century (Oliver, 1998) or The Future For Philosophy (Leiter, 2004). Philosophers who have written on the 
subject include Searle, 1999 and Kim, 2004.  
50 See Rudder-Baker, 1987. 
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The main reason why mental phenomena may have to be eliminated from the one “true 
ontology” is that they do not fit well into the picture created by science. The progress of 
science is a threat to pure philosophy, but threatens also phenomena which do not keep up 
with this progress. Paul Churchland writes:  
 
FP [folk-psychology] shows no sign of being smoothly integrable with the emerging synthesis of the 
several physical, chemical, biological, physiological and neurocomputational sciences. Since active 
coherence with the rest of what we presume to know is a central measure of credibility for any theory, 
FP’s emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.51 
 
What Churchland is suggesting is not that active coherence with common-sense knowledge is 
a measure of credibility, because on that criterion the status of folk-psychology would be 
secure. What we really know is determined by science, and active coherence or non-
coherence with scientific knowledge is the final measure of credibility. Eliminative 
materialism reveals the consequences of a view privileging the results of science.52 Even deep 
intuitions about ourselves should be ignored if they cannot be confirmed by science or made 
to fit with scientific knowledge. This rejection can be sustained, but not without doing great 
injustice to views which undeniably have an enormous role in human life. If philosophical 
honesty is respected and eliminativism is taken seriously, it should have consequences also 
outside the circles of dry academic philosophy.53  
Naturalists who try to avoid these eliminative conclusions have proposed theories 
about the mind which are a mixture of scientific results and pure philosophical speculation. 
The  reductive  theories  of  Fodor  or  Dretske  and  eliminative  theories  of  the  Churchlands  or  
Stich are themselves all highly speculative and not views confirmed by empirical evidence.54 
There seems to be a great deal of confusion in the contemporary philosophy of mind, all of 
which comes back to this: philosophers are not clear about the nature of their philosophical 
investigations. Therefore they try to steer a middle course between “pure conceptual analysis” 
and “pure empirical philosophy”. The result is a position which can be labeled as empirical 
                                               
51 Churchland, 1998a, 8. See also Churchland, 1983. 
52 Putnam (1988, 59) criticizes the Churchlands on the grounds that ”Their whole argument turns on the 
following inference: if the instances of X do not have something in common which is scientifically describable... 
then X is a ”mythological entity.”   
53 For a discussion of philosophical honesty, see Hertzberg, 2006. 
54 Although Churchlands emphasize that most philosophers have been thinking too much and have not done 
enough experiments, their own speculations, which sometimes reach the level of science fiction, fit poorly the 
conception of philosophy which they seem to defend. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that they 
intend to base their views on empirical findings and have certainly produced interesting research results on 
which their more philosophical views rely. Whether the research results really imply everything that the 
Churchlands claim is questionable, as it often is with scientific findings that have competitors.  
29 
 
metaphysics.55 The proposals of reductive and eliminative naturalists transcend what is 
verifiable and postulate phenomena like ‘the language of thought’, which are metaphysical 
constructions meant to vindicate what already lies before everyone’s eyes. These proposals or 
constructions are optimistic assumptions or predictions that are put forward in a style that 
gives the impression that the views, because they are “scientific”, amount to established facts. 
Philosophy of mind has become a battleground where pseudo-empirical views, hybrids of 
science and philosophy, compete. Paul Churchland ends his book The Engine of Reason the 
Seat of the Soul by claiming:  
 
You came to  this  book assuming that  the  basic  units  of  human cognition  are  states  such as  thoughts,  
beliefs, perceptions, desires... these bedrock assumptions are probably mistaken. In humans, and in 
animals generally, it is now modestly plain that the basic unit of cognition is the activation vector. It is 
now fairly clear that the basic unit of computation is the vector-to-vector-transformation.56 
 
The ‘activation vector’ as a basic unit of cognition is an example of what we scientifically 
claim to know, and our folk-psychological conception of ourselves must be made to fit with 
this knowledge or be dismissed as another myth. We are told that it is now modestly plain that 
the “basic unit of cognition” has been found and therefore: “...recent science already suggests 
that... folk-psychology... fails... to capture the basic kinematics and dynamics of human... 
cognition.”57 The conclusion is:   
 
[...] our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a 
theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually 
be displaced... by completed neuroscience.58 
 
This is a radical claim. Yet, we also hear: “We are still too ignorant to insist that hypotheses 
[about activation vectors] will prove adequate to explain all of the representational capacities 
of mind. But neither can we insist that they are doomed to prove inadequate.”59 Which view is 
                                               
55 I borrow the term from Glock, 2006. 
56 Churchland, 1995, 322. The view that folk-psychological conceptions should be replaced with a 
neuroscientific theory because the truth of the latter is already well confirmed is repeated in various places. See 
Churchland, 1988, 294, 351, Churchland and Churchland, 1998, 10, 13, 41, 257-258, 272-273. Whereas 
eliminative materialists claim that the basic unit of human cognition is vector-to-vector-transformation, Fodor 
(1998), who holds a very different view about the nature of human cognition, claims that “nothing is true” in 
Paul Churchland’s book mentioned above. This shows that although scientifically minded philosophers claim 
that they have well-confirmed empirical theories about the mind, the acceptance-rate of those theories among 
other, even like-minded philosophers is, to say the least, quite modest. 
57 Churchland, 1998c, 10. 
58 Churchland, 1981, 67, my emphasis. 
59 Churchland and Churchland, 1998a, 76. The difference in tone is remarkable. Sometimes, for example in 
Churchland, 1998c, it is argued that it is already a scientifically proven fact that folk-psychology is a false 
theory, which is just about to be replaced by a neuroscientific theory. Sometimes, like in the quote given here, it 
is only claimed that we cannot at the moment prove that the new theory won’t come out as an inadequate one.  
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correct? Because the claims of eliminative materialism often involve predictions about the 
future, it is difficult or impossible to evaluate their correctness. My claim is that one way to 
measure their correctness is to consider how well the claims fit with what we currently know 
about ourselves. As philosophers we should not be mesmerized by science and should resist 
the temptation to put the scientific cart before the horse of the ontology of actual human life. 
We have reasons to believe that our knowledge about the brain increases our 
understanding of the nature and functioning of the mind as well, to some extent. But this 
modest view is something entirely different from a philosophical or ideological view 
according  to  which  all  descriptive  vocabularies  must  be  made  to  fit  with  the  ontology  of  
physicalism through reduction. This latter claim is implicit in naturalistic philosophy, be it a 
reductive version like Fodor’s or eliminative version like Churchlands’, and in its explicit 
claim that there is no room for pure philosophy any longer. Of course the results of 
neuroscience cannot and should not be dismissed. Notable progress has been made in a 
relatively short period of time. This progress is bound to have both negative and positive 
effects for philosophy. What is worrying, as von Wright has noted, is that human 
understanding may suffer a great loss if the importance of scientific knowledge is over-
emphasized. As a consequence of this, scientists may draw the wrong conclusions from their 
evidence and overestimate the importance of their scientific findings. A scientistic atmosphere 
in society encourages this kind of activity and scientists as well as many philosophers are not 
immune to societal influences. A possible consequence is that scientific results and their 
implications infiltrate areas in which scientific solutions are, or so many may feel at least, 
inappropriate and even harmful. Scientists and scientifically inspired philosophers may 
ignore philosophical problems by altogether dismissing them or by transforming these 
problems into scientific questions. 
Although reductive and eliminative naturalists often claim that the purpose of science 
is to provide a superior conception of the world, and that therefore the results of science are 
privileged, “pragmatic considerations” also influence these forms of naturalism to an 
increasing extent.60 In the philosophy of mind, pragmatism is often associated with some form 
                                                                                                                                                            
Because the views are roughly from the same time-period, the chronological order of the suggestions does not 
explain this change of mind.  
60 “Pragmatism” is obviously such a complicated position that it would not be beneficial to try to define its 
nature here in detail. The crucial distinction between naturalism and pragmatism that I want to make is merely 
that whereas science is the highest path to truth according to the former position, the latter position, at least in its 
Rortyan form, suggests that science is not privileged because of metaphysical reasons. It does not better capture 
the ultimate truth about reality and does not bring us closer to reality than other descriptive systems. Insofar as 
contemporary naturalism is really moving towards pragmatism, it needs to get rid of the idea that science 
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of non-reductive naturalism, and it is unclear how reductive or eliminative naturalism can 
accept pragmatist conclusions without rejecting the views about the importance and nature of 
reduction  which  are  essential  to  these  positions.  In  Paul  Churchland’s  case,  the  position  of  
eliminative materialism and the conception of reduction on which the position is based 
sometimes allow room for a form of pragmatism. The reason for this is the observation that if 
a reducing theory always eliminates the theory which is reduced, the consequence is that all 
scientific theories have been falsified and that all future theories will, most likely, also turn 
out to be false. If old scientific theories are eliminated in favor of new ones, at any given time 
we face an unattractive state of skepticism because all current theories are possible candidates 
for falsification and thus for elimination by future theories, just as much as the old theories 
were. As Churchland notes:  
 
So many past theories, rightly judged excellent in their time, have since proved to be false. And their 
current successors, though even better founded, seem but the next step in a probably endless and not 
obviously convergent journey.61 
 
To insist or suppose that now we have arrived at true theories about reality lacks a rationale. 
True, scientific theories must be largely correct if the ability to predict, control or manipulate 
the course of events is the measure of truth. But doesn’t this mean that the correctness of these 
theories relates to their usefulness with respect to certain kinds of tasks? Yet, there are aspects 
of reality – mental reality is an obvious and perhaps the best example – for which we do not 
have theories of strict manipulation, control or prediction. Those who are enthusiastic about 
scientific psychology perhaps say that psychological theories allow for the prediction and 
explanation of human behavior. But, at least at present, the explanation or prediction of the 
behavior of an individual is impossible; this should be indisputable. Prediction and 
explanation of human behavior is of a totally different kind from prediction and explanation 
in the natural sciences. The answer to the question “Why was it that a certain individual did x 
at time t?” is always speculative, unlike explanations in natural science. 
 The claim that theories which depict us as we “truly are” are forthcoming lacks a 
foundation.62 As Chomsky among others has argued, it is possible that the cognitive 
capacities of humans are simply too modest to understand certain aspects of reality or to 
produce a “final theory of everything”. The nature of reality may just be too complex for 
                                                                                                                                                            
discovers essences, as Fodor claims, or that a naturalistic approach describes the true pulleys and levers of our 
cognition, as Patricia Churchland argues. 
61 Churchland, 1989, 140. 
62 The expression “as we truly are” is from Churchland, 1995, 324. 
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human capacities.63 This may be so especially when we are trying to understand ourselves. 
Perhaps our minds could not really comprehend a situation in which their workings could be 
strictly predicted, controlled or manipulated.64 This  kind  of  conclusion  would  then  not  be  a 
cognitively live option for humans. It is perfectly possible that the problem of consciousness 
and the problem of mental causation will remain mysteries which will never be scientifically 
solved. Some philosophers have already reached this conclusion.65 
To avoid the skeptical dead end, Churchland concludes that we should:  “…remove the 
goal itself – a unique truth – as well as any sure means of getting there” and that “...the proper 
course to pursue in epistemology lies in the direction of a highly naturalistic and pluralistic 
form of pragmatism.”66 We are told: “Service to our practical purposes is the only 
justification that will really count in the end.”67 This sounds like the statement of a 
pragmatist.68 It is something that Putnam and Rorty, among others, have been stressing for a 
long time. Whereas eliminative materialists criticize folk-psychology on the grounds that this 
conceptual framework does not describe us as we truly are, it is also acknowledged that folk-
psychology nevertheless has “considerable predictive success”.69 Predictive success is useful 
and given this service to practical purposes, on Churchland’s own account this should, pace 
the eliminative polemics, justify the retention of folk-psychological notions. If one accepts, as 
Churchland does, that: a) all knowledge is speculative and revisable; and b) “…presumptive 
knowledge earns that status by allowing us to anticipate, to explain, and in general to navigate 
and to manipulate phenomena within the domain thereby grasped, whether natural or 
social”,70 then how can the claim of folk-psychology’s radical falsity be supported? If it is not 
the reducibility to hard sciences which determines the fate of folk-psychology but the service 
to our practical purposes, then how could folk-psychology be a candidate for elimination? We 
can try to anticipate and explain our own behavior or that of others in terms of activation 
                                               
63 Famous quantum physicist Anton Zeilinger has recently emphasized that he cannot really understand any 
longer the results of quantum physics, or what the nature of reality is, if the results are followed to their 
conclusion. Different kinds of opinions obviously exist, as the title of physicist Steven Weinberg’s book Dreams 
of a Final Theory suggests. 
64 By considering the nature of certain mental illnesses like schizophrenia, where people sometimes think that 
somebody else is controlling them or giving them orders, it is perhaps possible to get a feeble glimpse of the 
problematic situation in which human mind could be if somebody could actually strictly manipulate its 
autonomy. This obviously is not an argument against the possibility of that kind of manipulation, but the 
question is whether the resulting situation would be comprehensible for human cognition.   
65 See for example, Mcginn, 1999. 
66 Churchland, 1989, 194, my emphasis. 
67 Churchland, 1995, 324. 
68 Churchland keeps also emphasizing that there is no final theory and no final science, and that we should let go 
of the utopian attitude when it comes to our long-term cognitive progress. See for example Churchland, 1998a, 
43-44 and Churchland, 1989, 151. 
69 Churchland, 1988, 395. 
70 Churchland, 2007, 160. 
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vectors. Then we can attempt to anticipate and explain the same phenomena in folk-
psychological terms. It does not need to be emphasized which mode of explanation succeeds.  
If service to practical purposes is what counts, what does it mean to claim that: “The 
function of science... is to provide us with a superior... conception of the world”?71 In what 
sense is this conception superior? In the sense that science is the cognitive activity best 
serving our practical purposes? As far as I understand, this is not the sense which Churchland 
intends. He suggests that science provides a superior conception of the world because it 
describes the true nature of reality. But is it possible to maintain the distinction between 
“reality as it is” and “reality as it seems to us” in the context of pragmatism? This distinction 
does not make good sense, and this is perhaps reason why Churchland describes himself as 
“at least a closet pragmatist”72. What the consequences of pragmatism for folk-psychology are 
is an interesting question, because if service to practical purposes is what counts then status of 
folk-psychology or “common-sense” should not be under threat; on the contrary. This would 
mean  that  the  threat  from  science  to  mental  phenomena  and  common-sense  is  over-
emphasized. The serious threat to philosophy is also averted if the goal of unique truth and the 
putative sure means proposed for getting there are rejected. What is important is not the truth 
of a theory, but how useful a given theory is. According to the pragmatist criterion, the 
“goodness” of a theory depends on its practical usefulness. If this criterion is accepted, then 
many philosophical theories about the mind can compete with scientific theories.  
Whereas both Paul and Patricia Churchland on occasions worry that: “...folk-
psychology constitute[s] a radically false account of the cognitive activity of humans...”73 or 
claim that “...FP is approaching the brink of falsification...”74 or insist that folk-psychology is 
a boat “...leaking at every seam”,75 they  nevertheless  do  not  want  to  rule  out  a  “pragmatic  
toleration” of a strictly false, yet a highly useful folk-psychological causal explanatory 
theory.76 It is admitted that folk-psychology will be a crucial element in a neuroscientific 
theory of the future and that: “Despite the occasional polemics...the primary lesson is not that 
FP is already doomed, or that our current social practices are about to be swept away.”77 On 
Churchland’s pragmatist view, there should be no other false / true distinction than the 
pragmatic criterion – according to which service to practical purposes is what counts. The 
                                               
71 Churchland, 1979, 2. 
72 Churchland, 2001a, 103. 
73 Churchland, 1998 
74 Churchland, 1998b, 33. 
75 Churchland, 1998b, 36. 
76 For this view see Mccauley, 1996.  
77 Churchland, 1998b, 38.  
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importance of folk-psychology and the need to maintain this framework should be evident if 
the pragmatic criterion is what counts.78 Reductive or eliminative naturalists seem to insist 
that god’s point of view remains beyond human reach because scientific knowledge is always 
fallible  and  open  to  revision,  and  yet  they  want  to  claim  that  science  provides  a  superior  
conception of reality. 
The distinction between a true, scientific description of human mentality and a 
description which is useful but false remains utterly unclear if service to practical purposes is 
what counts in the end. It remains a mystery how an expression like “pragmatic toleration” of 
a  theory  should  be  understood,  and  the  status  of  a  tolerant  view is  unclear  if  we  accept  the  
view that a scientific “utopian theory” is always privileged. The pragmatic toleration of a false 
theory resembles Quine’s double standard with respect to physical and mental notions. But it 
should be asked, as Davidson once did: “What is the point of saying that intentional idioms 
are ‘second class’ if we are going to go on using them?”79 Perhaps it could be claimed that all 
naturalists are willing to admit this: there are important “ways of speaking”, and we cannot 
get rid of them because they are so useful. But naturalists would also claim that these are not 
scientific views, and ultimately they are literally just ways of speaking. We could ask: So 
what? What is the point of emphasizing that everyone agrees that certain vocabularies are 
useful and indispensable, but at the same time according them a second-grade status?   
 What can be said about the contemporary challenge for the philosophy of mind is this: 
Whereas eliminative materialists like the earlier Quine, Rorty, Stich, as well as the 
Churchlands have now reached the conclusion that common-sense mental notions are too 
useful  to  be  dispensed  with  and  therefore  the  proper  course  of  epistemology  lies  in  the  
direction of a kind of pragmatism, their desire to turn philosophy into a scientific enterprise or 
altogether dispense with philosophy in favor of “hard science” is nevertheless evident.80 That 
naturalism is, in some sense, going through a “pragmatist turn” is interesting, but the real 
consequences of this can be evaluated only in the future. Here I have very briefly described 
                                               
78 A pluralistic form of naturalistic pragmatism gains ground in Churchland’s views from time to time, but the 
grip of sacred science is also firm. Paul Churchland (1989, 52, 1988, 47) claims that, when it comes to the 
human cognitive life, there is a “...correct account that a utopian theory will eventually provide” and that the 
“…a priori probability of eliminative materialism is not lower, but substantially higher than any of its 
competitors.” The latter view is defended with an obscure claim. It is claimed that there are more ways of giving 
a successful neuroscientific account which does not mirror the ontology of folk-psychology than giving a 
neuroscientific account which does mirror this ontology; thus it is more likely that eliminative materialism is true 
than that it is not. This is of course pure speculation. 
79 As quoted by Putnam, 1987, 70. 
80 For Quine’s eliminative views see Quine, 1975, 1985. For a change of mind, see, Quine 1990 and 1995a. For 
Rorty’s eliminative views, see Rorty, 1965, 1970, 1970a, 1977 where he argues that scientific progress will rid 
us of the need to establish identities between brain states and mental states. For a change of mind see Rorty, 
1999. For Stich’s eliminativism see, Stich, 1983. For a change of mind see Stich, 1996. 
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how the position of eliminative materialism, the most scientifically oriented philosophy of 
mind, faces problems if its main message is taken seriously. There seems to be an intrinsic 
conflict in the views of eliminative and reductive naturalists, a conflict which is summed up 
by Davidson’s question about what the real point of the scientific / non-scientific distinction 
is.  Despite  this  conflict,  the  challenge  of  naturalism  is  a  problem  for  any  position,  such  as  
Davidson’s and von Wright’s, which is highly non-empirical and yet tries to seriously 
challenge views based on empirical evidence. The relationship between these two 
understandings of philosophy is one of the most pressing (although largely ignored) questions 
of modern metaphilosophy.  
 
1.2 A Davidsonian – von Wrightian response to the challenge 
 
The philosophies of Davidson and von Wright are rarely compared to each other. From the 
textual evidence it can be seen that these philosophers did not challenge each other’s views 
directly in print. The lack of discussion between these two philosophers and lack of 
comparison of their views by scholars are surprising given that their philosophical careers 
spanned almost the same period of time and touched on many of the same philosophical 
issues. One important exception, which has also created discussion, is their work in the 
philosophy of action where, so the standard interpretation goes, Davidson and von Wright 
held opposite views during the 1960s and 1970s. This interpretation is still held by many 
commentators. It is noted for example that: “[…] the only real resistance to Davidson’s ruling 
influence over the Philosophy of Action has come from various Wittgensteinian camps, most 
prominently that of G.H. von Wright and his pupil Frederick Stoutland”.81 Views like this 
show that on those rare occasions when Davidson and von Wright have been mentioned 
together, the focus has been on the differences of their views. A common interpretation is 
that, at least in the philosophy of action, a “Davidsonian” causal approach must be separated 
from a “Wittgensteinian” non-causal approach. The differences and similarities of Davidson 
and von Wright’s views will be discussed later in detail. Here I focus on the question of what, 
according to these philosophers, the purpose and nature of philosophy is. With respect to this 
question, Davidson and von Wright do think alike.    
Davidson’s and von Wright’s positions are vulnerable to the challenge that science 
poses for the philosophy of mind. My claim is that their views in the philosophy of mind are 
                                               
81 Sandis, 2004, 223. 
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criticized and largely ignored because their overall conception of what philosophy is does not 
meet the contemporary requirements of what philosophy should be. Davidson’s philosophy of 
mind was widely discussed earlier, but now his views are rejected to the extent that there are 
basically no philosophers who would today accept, far less defend, his theory of mind.82 Von 
Wright’s case is worse. There is literally no discussion about his views concerning philosophy 
of mind. It is surprising that even the few von Wright scholars in Finland have almost 
completely ignored this aspect of his philosophy.83  
Because the reason that the views of Davidson and von Wright are not well accepted 
among modern philosophers of mind traces back to their understanding about the nature of 
philosophy, it is crucially important to be clear on their views on this issue. I suggest that the 
contemporary challenge for philosophy of mind can be overcome by considering what one 
specific purpose of philosophy is, or could be, and by showing that a scientific philosophy 
does not and cannot meet this purpose. I do not want to claim that von Wright or Davidson 
are trying to meet the naturalistic challenge on purpose although they – especially von Wright 
– do express severe criticisms of the scientistic tendency in modern philosophy. What I am 
claiming instead is that it is possible to take cues from their views in showing the challenge 
can be overcome if it is taken up.84 
It is fair to say that Von Wright’s and Davidson’s views about the mind / brain are 
highly non-empirical. These views are very removed, both in their style and in their goals, 
from the kind of philosophy that works like Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy, Paul 
Churchland’s Neurophilosophy at Work or John Bickle’s Philosophy and Neuroscience: A 
Ruthlessly Reductive Account represent. The number of philosophical books which are 
strongly based on empirical evidence is increasing. As works of philosophy, they are quite 
different from many of the philosophical classics of the 20th century. This is not a point that 
needs further emphasis; it merely shows that the nature of philosophy is changing. Perhaps 
this observation supports von Wright’s view that in modern philosophy, Russell’s view about 
the nature of philosophy has triumphed.  
From the perspective of naturalism, the speculative character and non-empirical nature 
of Davidson’s and von Wright’s views makes them straightforwardly false, or at best 
uninteresting or irrelevant. As the titles of the Churchlands’ or Bickle’s books show, the 
                                               
82 One notable exception is Campbell, 2008. 
83 The most up-to-date discussion of Von Wright’s philosophy is Stoutland, 2009, which however does not really 
discuss many aspects of von Wright’s philosophy of mind.  
84 It should be obvious that I am not saying that the challenge can be dismissed. I am merely showing one way 
how to think about the challenge and its relation to philosophy. 
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integration of philosophical views of the mind with scientific work, especially with 
neuroscientific results, is one way to do philosophy. Philosophical claims are, to an increasing 
extent, backed up by scientific evidence and, so it is argued, cannot stand on firm ground 
without such evidence. This predicts a dim future for the views of Davidson and von Wright. 
Their relevance for the modern discussion is judged as historical, at best. This kind of view 
reflects  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  scholars  studying  their  work,  and  generally  describes  
the different orientations of contemporary philosophers of mind. It is argued that philosophers 
of mind should simply be interested in different questions than those Davidson and von 
Wright considered, and should seriously focus on empirical results in the future. 
Although von Wright and Davidson do not take empirical results into consideration to 
any great degree, their views are not openly antiscientific. They belong to the naturalist 
consensus in the sense that they reject ontological dualism and they do not put forward claims 
which would be in direct conflict with scientific knowledge.85 This being said, the positions of 
these two philosophers could be still labeled as antiscientific. This could be done because they 
do not take into account well enough the results that science has provided, and because they 
criticize the idea of the unity of science and are somewhat critical of the idea of scientific 
philosophy. Scientifically oriented philosophers could argue that some of the philosophical 
proposals of von Wright and Davidson are simply not true, and that these views are 
antiscientific and false precisely because they are at odds with what we already know about 
the mind due to science. As will become clear, with respect to certain suggestions of von 
Wright and Davidson this complaint seems valid. But the reason that the views of these two 
philosophers are nevertheless important and relevant for the current debates about the mind is 
that they are doing philosophy of mind instead of neuroscience, cognitive science, or any kind 
of “philosophy” which tries to mimic these and which is often guided by the abstract demands 
of scientistic ideology.  
A critic could claim that philosophy of mind is an interesting approach only if 
philosophy can make a contribution to the problems of mind which differs from  the  
contributions made by science. On the other hand, a defender of philosophy could claim that 
the importance of philosophy is based on the fact, or perhaps more modestly on the view, that 
philosophy is a different kind of intellectual activity than science. Naturalists would perhaps 
grant this; yet, as we have seen, they would claim that science, as a human activity, stands on 
a higher level than philosophy. We can recall Patricia Churchland’s view that philosophers 
                                               
85 There are modern philosophers who defend Cartesian dualism. See e.g. Foster, 1991. On one interpretation 
these philosophers could be rightly labeled as antinaturalists. 
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should free themselves from the “narrow canyons” of the commonsense conception of the 
world. Commonsense conceptions and the kind of philosophy which relies on them remain in 
the narrow canyons whereas science, allegedly, pushes back the “bounds of darkness”. 
Whether philosophy of mind can be seen as an autonomous field and whether the views of 
von Wright and Davidson are relevant depends on how one understands the relation between 
philosophy and science. It is again the nature of philosophical method which is at stake.  
Although the positions of von Wright and Davidson are vulnerable to the challenge 
made by science, my claim is that they overcome – or more importantly could overcome – this 
challenge because of their similar views on what the purpose of philosophy is. Those who 
have a differing view about the nature or purpose of philosophy may find most of the claims 
of these two philosophers uninteresting or irrelevant for the contemporary “philosophy” of 
mind. As was described in section 1.1, differences of opinion about the purpose of philosophy 
divide contemporary philosophers of mind. The existence of these differences is something 
which should be recognized when comparing philosophical accounts of the mind against each 
other and when evaluating their merits or correctness. These differences of opinion concretely 
influence the way in which current philosophy of mind is done, in what direction philosophy 
of mind should allegedly proceed, and also what kind of solutions are currently favored. But 
surely the possible merits of a philosophical position should be considered without having to 
consider whether they meet certain abstract standards which happen to be currently favored. 
The standards are result of the mood of our times and therefore depend on sociological, 
political, economical and other factors which are arbitrary from a philosophical point of view. 
The different views about the purpose of philosophy have to be acknowledged and 
accepted, because it is an absurd suggestion that philosophizing as a human activity has only 
one purpose, that there is an “essence of philosophy” as an activity. It is impossible to settle 
the question of what the purpose of philosophy is or what the purpose of philosophy should 
be. Because philosophy has no clearly defined nature, one could say that its purpose or nature 
is a matter of personal opinion or intuition. Instead of trying to convince the reader that the 
Davidsonian – von Wrightian understanding of the purpose of philosophy is the right one, I 
merely describe their understanding in order to justify and clarify the consequent approach 
which they have adopted to the problems about the mind.86 This description makes it easier to 
see where the real conflict between a naturalistic philosophy and a Davidsonian–von 
Wrightian approach lies. My purpose is not to consider what Davidson’s and von Wright’s 
                                               
86 What would it even mean to say that this is  the  right  approach,  that  this  is  what  one  should think about 
philosophy? 
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rationales for their conception of philosophy are.87 The question about what kind of 
conception of philosophy one should hold is a question to be judged ultimately by the reader 
as she sees fit.  There is  no easy answer to the question of why a certain philosopher finds a 
specific conception of philosophy congenial, not to mention why a certain conception should 
be found congenial. 
 I want to suggest that there is a philosophical figure that is an important inspiration for 
both Davidson and von Wright and, more importantly, whose understanding of the nature and 
purpose of philosophy clarifies the respective views of these two philosophers. This figure is 
Wittgenstein.  The  influence  of  Wittgenstein  on  von  Wright  is  evident.  Von  Wright  was  
Wittgenstein’s student, friend, follower in Cambridge and, according to his own words, as 
Wittgensteinian as possible without being a Wittgensteinian. Von Wright also noted that he 
“learned philosophy from Wittgenstein” and that he learned more from him as a moral 
example than from anybody else.88 Despite all this, not much attention has been paid to the 
fact that understanding von Wright’s Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy is crucially 
important for understanding his work in general and his work in the philosophy of mind in 
particular. Wittgenstein’s influence for the development of von Wright’s views is a theme 
which, although studied, has not been explored enough. This being said, von Wright claimed 
that his philosophical work, his way of stating philosophical problems and arriving at 
conclusions, was very different from Wittgenstein. It is true that von Wright’s work in logic is 
alien to the “Wittgensteinian spirit”; I think, however, that von Wright’s later work in the 
philosophy of mind comes closer to this spirit. It is clear that von Wright shares 
Wittgenstein’s view about the nature of philosophy to a great extent, although their 
philosophical styles may differ.  
Davidson, on the other hand, has been credited or discredited in light of the fact that 
his views on action and its explanation revived the interest in causal theories, and that on 
these questions Davidson’s views are opposite to those of Wittgenstein. According to 
                                               
87 Finding this out would be a very interesting task, but it would take the discussion too far, towards issues 
relating to Davidson’s and von Wright’s life stories. There are also people who can answer this question without 
the kind of speculation that I would offer. This being said, in the appendix I do want to offer a brief suggestion 
about how von Wright’s philosophy of mind could be related to his “social humanism”. Stoutland (2006b) has 
noted, correctly in my opinion, that In the Shadow of Descartes is one of the works resulting from von Wright’s 
general shift of attitude. But he has not explored the question how von Wright’s social humanism is related to his 
philosophy of mind. 
88 At the same time von Wright (2001, 179) notes that: ”[…] neither my style of writing nor my treatment of 
particular problems have much in common with Wittgenstein’s.” However, I believe that if one considers the 
style and the arguments of In the Shadow of Descartes, it is easy to see that this self-observation of von Wright is 
not entirely correct.   
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Stoutland, Davidson is near the top of the enemies list of the Wittgensteinians.89 Stoutland is, 
however, one of the few commentators who see important connections between Davidson and 
Wittgenstein. In this sense, he is also one of the most perspicacious interpreters of Davidson, 
capturing the spirit of Davidson’s work – and his analysis certainly casts doubt on the 
conventional wisdom that Davidson’s causal theory of action stands in sharp contrast to non-
causalist accounts.90 I shall not here repeat Stoutland’s arguments, which I find very 
convincing.91 Against Stoutland’s interpretation, P. M. S. Hacker, the famous Wittgenstein 
scholar, writes that Davidson’s “[…] constructive theory, anomalous monism, won many 
adherents and was patently at odds with Wittgenstein’s conception of action and its 
explanation.”92 When the details of AM are discussed I will show that Hacker’s negative view 
of the status of anomalous monism is seriously questionable. The critical view of Hacker is no 
surprise, given the fact that he is among the “Wittgensteinians” to whom Stoutland refers. I 
think, however, that Hacker is misinterpreting Davidson’s views and that these views actually 
come close to a conception of philosophy which Hacker, as a Wittgensteinian, supports. 
Certain similarities between Davidson and Wittgenstein, which will be presented here, have 
gone unnoticed by the commentators. My purpose is to show that Davidson’s philosophy of 
mind is clearly influenced by Wittgensteinian insights. It is interesting to notice that certain 
points made by Wittgenstein are repeated almost literally by Davidson.93 
My interpretation of von Wright and Davidson as philosophers continuing the work of 
Wittgenstein in the philosophy of mind places them in the center of a recent discussion. This 
debate is interesting, as it shows a return to the very problems which Wittgenstein emphasized 
in  his  times  and,  so  I  believe,  shows the  relevance  of  a  Wittgensteinian  conception  also  for  
contemporary  discussion.  There  are  reasons  to  think  that  the  same  problems  to  which  
Wittgenstein drew our attention survive in a modified form in the views of many modern 
philosophers and scientists studying the mind, brain, or mind-brain. This would mean that the 
importance of Wittgensteinian insights may not yet have reached their peak. The interesting 
discussion to which I am referring was started by the publication of Philosophical 
                                               
89 Stoutland, 2008.  
90 Stoutland was one of the earliest commentators to suggest that Davidson’s position may have epiphenomenal 
consequences, and earlier he argued that Davidson’s views are in clear conflict with both Wittgenstein’s and von 
Wright’s  views.  See  Stoutland,  1986.  For  a  change  of  mind  with  respect  to  Davidson  and  von  Wright,  see  
Stoutland, 1999.  
91 For a similar view about Davidson’s position see also Mcintyre, 2004. 
92 Hacker, 2001, 127.                 
93 At times Davidson acknowledges Wittgenstein’s influence. Stoutland (2008) tells of how he once asked 
Davidson whether  he  should  be  seen  as  a  “closet  Wittgensteinian”,  to  which  Davidson replied  “I  don’t  know 
about the closet.” 
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Foundations of Neuroscience by Hacker and Bennett.94 In this book, which von Wright 
incidentally described as something which “[…] will certainly, for a long time to come, be the 
most important contribution to the mind–body problem which there is”, Bennett and Hacker 
interpret the recent results of neuroscience and neurophilosophy from the perspective of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.95 Their main claim is that modern neuroscience is guilty of 
serious conceptual confusions and, as a metaphilosophical suggestion, they claim that one 
important task of a philosopher is to draw attention to such confusions. Two philosophers 
who were especially targeted in the book were Dennett and Searle. This in turn led to an 
intense debate resulting in the publication of Neuroscience and Philosophy, in which the 
replies of Dennett and Searle are presented.96  
The debate is fascinating, since it shows what happens when philosophers with very 
different presuppositions and different intellectual agendas try to find common ground. What 
the debate shows is that, at least in some cases, finding such ground is simply not possible. 
Philosophers who disagree about the nature and purpose of philosophy find it difficult to find 
a common ground also on the more substantial philosophical topics. It is telling that whereas 
von Wright held a high opinion of the Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, calling it 
one of the most important contributions to the mind–body problem, Dennett’s view about the 
same book is: “I found nothing new in their book.”97 Because of the foundational nature of the 
disagreement, the debate will certainly continue between philosophers like Bennett and 
Hacker on the one side and philosophers like Dennett, Searle and the Churchlands on the 
other.98 Sometimes a common enemy, in this case Bennett and Hacker, provides a reason for 
philosophers  disagreeing  with  each  other  to  join  forces.  Searle  and  Dennett  have  a  serious  
dispute with each other and Searle’s views are very different from Paul Churchland’s position 
as well. Yet, all vigorously want to oppose the “Wittgensteinians”. Sometimes it seems that 
the only thing which brings reductive naturalists together is their hostility towards 
Wittgensteinian insights.  
What is interesting about this debate from the viewpoint of this work is the following: 
In his reply to Bennett and Hacker, Searle notes: “The best way to understand [Bennett’s and 
Hacker’s] book is to see it as an application of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind to 
                                               
94 Bennett and Hacker, 2003. 
95 Von Wright’s appraisal can be found in the inside cover of the book. 
96 Bennett (et al.), 2007. 
97 Dennett, 2007, 75 fn. 4. For this comment Dennett may have personal reasons, because he considers that 
Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience contains a “remarkably insulting attack” against him. I am tempted 
to ask: Can philosophical disputes be settled objectively in this kind of setting? 
98 Paul Churchland (2005a) has critically commented on the conclusions of the original book. 
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contemporary neuroscience. Much of the originality of the book lies in the fact that this has 
not been done before… [the] position is – as far as I know – unique in contemporary debates 
in the philosophy of mind.”99 But, and this is the point that will be argued for in this work, 
Davidson and von Wright can be seen as carrying on the same agenda as Bennett and Hacker, 
only not with the same detailed view about neuroscience. In fact, many of the arguments of 
Bennett and Hacker bear a resemblance to the ones von Wright puts forward in his In the 
Shadow of Descartes.100 This is obviously not a surprise since there is a common figure – 
Wittgenstein – behind these philosophers. Insofar as the position of Bennett and Hacker is 
not especially original but anticipated by the works of Davidson and von Wright, the views 
of these latter philosophers are brought into the middle of a recent discussion. This 
undermines Hacker’s view that a Davidsonian philosophy of mind is anti-Wittgensteinian. 
On the contrary, it can be used to defend the kind of position which Hacker himself argues 
for. Very few philosophers have paid attention to this side of Davidson.101  
My purpose is not to provide a detailed description of Wittgenstein’s views but to 
show how a Wittgensteinian attitude, the exact nature of which is itself a matter of serious 
on-going dispute, helps to explain how Davidson and von Wright can answer to the challenge 
posed to the philosophy of mind and why an answer to this challenge is important.102 
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy clarifies one way in which the eliminative challenge 
for the philosophy of mind can be treated, and it gives one refreshing and interesting way to 
think about the philosophical problems of the mind. Without attempting to claim that this is 
the right or only method, I suggest that it is a method which contemporary philosophy of 
mind should not neglect and one which deserves more attention. Von Wright thought that it 
would not be surprising if Wittgenstein’s contributions to the philosophy of psychology 
would actually be the most lasting contribution of his philosophy.103 Wittgenstein’s views are 
largely neglected in the modern philosophy of mind because they challenge the very way in 
which much of contemporary philosophy is being done. It is interesting that although 
Wittgenstein is widely recognized as one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century, his 
philosophical insights have been successfully silenced. There is perhaps a very practical 
                                               
99 Searle, 2007, 101. 
100 The book is surprisingly unknown. I am aware of only one review, by Kivinen, 1998. 
101 Philosophers who have seen this side of Davidson include Stoutland in his later writings, perhaps Rorty and 
Jeff Malpas. 
102 Wittgenstein is such a complex thinker that I do not expect to describe his views here in a way which could 
not be seriously criticized by Wittgenstein scholars. Whether or not my description of Wittgenstein is correct is 
not  crucial.  What  is  important  is  the  conception  of  philosophy which  can  be  found from his  writings  and the  
insights that can be further developed. 
103 Von Wright, 1995. 
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reason for this. As Hacker notes: “If Wittgenstein’s warnings against emulating the methods 
and goals of science in philosophy are warranted, then much contemporary work in 
philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and of action is no more than houses of 
cards.”104 Indeed, Anthony Kenny noted already in 1984 that:  
 
[…] some of the philosophical gains we owe to Wittgenstein seem in danger of being lost. This is not 
because his work has been superseded… by… some succeeding philosophical genius. Rather, his 
contribution has been neglected because more and more philosophers, especially in the United States, 
have attempted to model their studies on the pattern of a rigorously scientific discipline… holding up… 
an abstract system for artificial intelligence as the goal of philosophy of mind.105 
 
Interestingly, a similar remark has been made about Davidson. According to Rorty: “Many 
who have no use for Wittgenstein have none for Davidson, and for the same reason: to adopt 
the  views  of  either  would  be  to  dissolve  problems  which  they  have  spent  the  best  years  of  
their  lives  trying  to  solve.”106  In the following three sections I clarify Davidson’s and von 
Wright’s views about the nature of philosophy and discuss how their views relate to a 
Wittgensteinian view of philosophy. The purpose of this clarification is to show how 
Davidson and von Wright could answer the challenge. 
 
1.2.1 A Wittgensteinian view of philosophy 
 
How Wittgenstein saw the nature of philosophy is an on on-going and severely debated issue 
among Wittgenstein-scholars.107 Wittgenstein’s remarks on this question are scattered around 
his works and it is not easy to reach a final conclusion about their nature.108 My purpose is to 
briefly describe a broadly Wittgensteinian view without taking a strong stance on the question 
whether this was Wittgenstein’s actual view. I claim that a Wittgensteinian attitude can be 
found in the views of Davidson and von Wright, although these two philosophers are not 
“Wittgensteinians” in the same sense as certain contemporary philosophers clearly are.109 I am 
not defending the view beyond briefly suggesting why it could seem reasonable. 
                                               
104 Hacker, 2001, 127. 
105 Kenny, 1984, vii-viii. 
106 Rorty, 2005. The reference is to an electronic review for which page numbers cannot be given. Davidson 
(1998a, 91) commented that: “Rorty sees some of my views as serving his Wittgensteinian agenda, which is 
flattering if deserved.” 
107 For discussion see Kahane, Kanterian and Kuusela (eds.), 2008, Pichler and Säätelä (eds.), 2006. 
108 Glock (2007) distinguishes between rationalist and irrationalist interpretations and makes an additional 
distinction between seven irrationalist interpretations, which include postmodern interpretations and therapeutic 
interpretations. He also makes a distinction between “extrinsic and intrinsic interests” in Wittgenstein research. 
The former include, for example sociological, political and psychopathological angles on Wittgenstein. 
109 I am thinking such philosophers as Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond and Marie Mcginn. 
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 In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein famously claimed that philosophy 
is not one of the natural sciences and that philosophy is something which stands above or 
below, but not beside the natural sciences. This is metaphorical talk, but the distinction 
between a Wittgensteinian and a Quinean naturalistic conception of philosophy is clear. 
Hacker has noted that: “If Quine is right, then philosophy is an extension of science…. If 
Wittgenstein right, then philosophy is sui generis.”110 Roger Gibson, an important Quine-
scholar, perceptively comments that certain philosophers “[…] not without reason view the 
naturalistic philosopher as having sold out, that is, as having given up being a Philosopher. 
We are left, then, with two conceptions of philosophy.”111 This highlights the on-going debate 
which concerns the self-image of philosophy. If philosophical activity is something else than 
scientific activity, if the methods and results of philosophy differ from those of science, what 
then is the real purpose of philosophy? Does philosophy aim at truth, as science does? The 
answer, according to naturalists, is clear. Philosophy does not differ from science except 
perhaps in the broadness of its questions. There is no “philosophical method” which could 
challenge the scientific one. Before accepting the truth of this naturalistic view, let us consider 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about philosophy:  
 
 The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.112 
 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our 
language.113 
 
Philosophy unties knots in our thinking.114 
 
Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations.115 
 
Philosophical investigations try to untie the perplexities that we have created for ourselves, or 
which have occurred when we have used language too freely. This suggests that philosophical 
                                               
110 Hacker, 1996, 33. 
111 Gibson, 1997. 
112 Wittgenstein, 1933, 4.112. Compare to: “[…] logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to 
see to the bottom of things and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that. It 
takes its rise, not from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connexions: but from an 
urge to understand the basis, or essence, of anything empirical” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §89). 
113 Wittgenstein, 1953, § 109. 
114 Wittgenstein, 1967, § 452. 
115 Wittgenstein, 1967, §457. 
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problems are, above else, problems of language. Philosophy or philosophizing, the 
philosophical method, gets its special nature from the nature of philosophical problems. The 
problems arise when “language goes on holiday” and – because of this – philosophical 
problems are not empirical ones. Since philosophical problems result from linguistic 
confusions, they cannot be solved by discovering new facts, by empirically finding out how 
things really are. Wittgenstein notes: “[…] our considerations could not be scientific ones… 
and we may not advance any kind of theory.”116 This kind of view is in sharp contrast with 
current views in the philosophy of mind where the demand for the naturalization of the mind, 
i.e. for a naturalistic theory, is pressing.117 The  considerations  which  aim  for  a  naturalistic  
theory of are precisely scientific ones.   
A problem which has, in principle, a scientific solution is not a “knot” in our thinking 
in the same sense as a philosophical problem is. As Wittgenstein says, a philosophical 
problem has the form: “I don’t know my way about”.118 One does not know even how to 
begin with the answering attempt. The claim that a philosophical question cannot be answered 
in scientific terms is one which crucially distinguishes scientific and philosophical questions. 
This criterion is problematic, because how could it be known in advance which questions 
have what kind of answers? When one encounters a question which makes one realize that 
one does not know one’s way about, the reason for this should be recognized. According to 
Wittgenstein, the way has been lost because words have been detached from their ordinary 
use and are instead used in way which causes misunderstandings. These misunderstandings 
must be cleared away by clarifying the logic of our thought. This, in turn, is done by looking 
into the actual workings of language. Philosophical problems which have occurred because 
people have started to use language in a strange way, for example by drawing analogies 
between expressions in different regions of language, are nevertheless not merely linguistic 
confusions. The problems are not mere word-games. Wittgenstein notes:  
 
The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. 
They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of language and their significance    
 is as great as the importance of our language.119 
 
Humans are linguistic creatures, and therefore the importance of language to life is profound.  
The importance of the problems which arise due to language is as remarkable as the 
                                               
116 Wittgenstein, 1967, §109. 
117 Fodor (1994) for example writes that the “naturalization project” is an attempt to show how something – in 
this case a “mental representation” – can both represent and cause. 
118 Wittgenstein, 1953, §123. 
119 Wittgenstein, 1953, §111. 
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importance of language itself, and therefore a solution to these problems is extremely 
complex. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems keep occurring and seem to 
remain unsolved because ordinary language has remained relatively unchanged. Our 
understanding receives the same “bumps” over and over again when it runs against the limits 
of our language. As long as we do not recognize that this is the source of philosophical 
problems, we continue to suffer from a philosophical illness, because philosophical problems 
really trouble many of us and we do not know how to get rid of them. 
           The main difference between a Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy and 
contemporary naturalism is that whereas the latter approach aims at explanatory theories and 
suggests that the philosophical problems of the mind are scientific problems, the former 
suggests that the task of philosophy is not explanation but description. But is philosophy 
something which should aim at truth in the same sense as science, should philosophy change 
our knowledge about empirical facts or increase our knowledge with respect to them? Should 
philosophy be an explanatory project? Wittgenstein clearly thinks that this is not the task of 
philosophy. The task of philosophy is to give a presentation of the actual use of language and 
the language-games in which expressions are actually used must be respected. As 
Wittgenstein notes: “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it 
can in the end only describe it… It leaves everything as it is.”120 Philosophy leaves everything 
as it is because once the linguistic confusions have been clarified the original problem ceases 
to be.  If  one keeps on craving for a more fundamental  answer,  one is still  under the illusion 
that the source of the philosophical problem lies outside language. When a philosophical 
problem dissolves, the problem has not been solved by presenting new information as in the 
case of science – rather, it has been dissolved by re-arranging what we have always known. 
What we know and have always known is based on the facts about how words are used in the 
course of our lives. This, after all, is the bedrock of meaningful communication, of social 
institutions – in sum, of our lives as we currently understand them. It is also the bedrock of the 
problems. 
What is wrong with the tendency of philosophy becoming or trying to become more 
scientific? The influence of science on philosophy is not necessarily corruptive, but it should 
be recognized that if philosophical problems have their peculiar nature, if they are due to 
linguistic confusions and misuses of language, then science will be a wrong place to look for 
                                               
120 Wittgenstein, 1953, §124. Or as Wittgenstein (1953, §126) also clarifies the task of philosophy: “Philosophy 
simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view 
there is nothing to explain.” 
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the answers. If philosophy and science are approaches with different purposes and different 
sets of problems, then one approach should not try to infiltrate the domain of the other. 
Because the line between philosophical and non-philosophical questions is not sharp and 
cannot always be drawn, it is understandable that overlaps do occur. But the question is 
whether philosophy can be entirely replaced by science; that is the naturalistic challenge of 
science for philosophy, and to this question the answer is no as long as the peculiar nature of 
philosophical problems is admitted.  
How could this insight be applied to problems in the philosophy of mind? 
Wittgenstein’s claim is that the concepts in terms of which these problems are formulated are 
concepts whose meaning is determined by the roles that they have everyday life.121 He writes: 
“Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly fashioned 
by science for its own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry.”122 
Psychological concepts, in terms which many philosophical problems about the mind are, or 
at least have been, formulated, are concepts which are familiar to all. Even eliminative 
materialists who claim that the concepts of folk-psychology should and will be replaced by 
the concepts of future neuroscience explain and evaluate their own behavior in terms of 
everyday concepts. These philosophers believe this and that, have desires and expect that they 
can rely on the folk-psychological system in their interactions with others. Whether this mode 
of description will be replaced in the far future is one question; another is its indispensability 
now. But it is also obvious that we do not command a clear view of the use of the words in 
terms of which we in any case have to continue speaking. The misuse of these concepts and 
the confusions about their “correct” use creates deep perplexities, and therefore, or so it could 
be claimed, the task of philosophy is to clarify the nature of everyday concepts. Philosophy 
aims to clarify the meaning of these concepts in terms of a descriptive analysis. The use of 
mental concepts in the course of ordinary life is quite unproblematic. But when extraordinary 
areas are approached, the use of ordinary concepts becomes problematic. Examples of these 
kinds  of  cases  could  be  the  application  of  these  concepts  to  animals  or  machines  or  –  as  
modern neuroscience does – to the brain. In these cases, it is not clear any longer how the use 
of everyday concepts should be understood, because the concepts have been so severely 
detached from their ordinary usage.   
                                               
121 As is well known, Wittgenstein (1980, §687) claims that “words have meaning only in the stream of life.” The 
context in which expressions are meaningful is the context of everyday life.    
122 Wittgenstein, 1980, § 62. 
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The first difficulty of a scientific philosophy of mind is thus its attempt to answer 
questions which do not and cannot have scientific answers. The problems for which 
philosophy is a cure are not empirical, in the sense that they could be solved by consulting 
“mother nature”, by checking how things are, by considering where nature’s joints lie. The 
problems are outside the domain of natural science. The possibility of scientific philosophy is 
based on the view that a philosophical puzzlement could be removed by means of a new 
discovery, that the puzzlement would suddenly go away when we understand in more detail 
how nature works. Indeed, the reason why there are no real philosophical problems according 
to scientifically oriented philosophers is precisely this: solutions to “philosophical problems” 
can be found in the same way as solutions to clearly scientific problems.  
The second difficulty is  that  by looking for answers in the wrong places,  a scientific 
philosophy of the mind which attempts to replace ordinary mental concepts or tries to justify 
their use – as if something like this were needed – is in danger of becoming wildly speculative 
by transcending what is actually empirically verifiable. This task, speculation in terms of 
thought-experiments, is or has traditionally been one task of philosophy. But it should not be 
the task of scientific philosophy, according to those who think that literal truths can be 
achieved only through scientific enterprise. The insistence that philosophy should be closely 
continuous with science leads to a speculative philosophy which has no real grounding. 
Wittgenstein famously wrote:  
 
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and 
leads philosophers into complete darkness.123 
 
These words were written a long time ago but they are very relevant today as the rise of 
scientific philosophy testifies. The metaphysical attitude which may lead to the assimilation of 
philosophy and science should be resisted, because, as Stoutland for example has noted, the 
metaphysical constructions of a scientifically oriented philosopher give the illusion of 
resolving philosophical problems when in fact the real problems have been replaced by 
puzzles generated by this metaphysical activity itself.124 Stoutland, following Wittgenstein’s 
lead, suggests that a philosopher who gets lost in such metaphysical speculations “[…] is no 
longer looking at the way concepts work in our life and thought; she is considering how they 
must work in the context of a metaphysical construction of her own creation.”125 This  is  an  
                                               
123 Wittgenstein, 1958, 18. 
124 Stoutland, 2006a. 
125 Ibid.  
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important observation. Speculation guides the naturalistic philosophy of mind; naturalization 
is required for the vindication of mental phenomena because otherwise they would not fit into 
the framework required by the demands of physicalism. Mental phenomena must be 
naturalizable because they must be part of the metaphysical framework of physicalism. 
The failure to see that philosophical problems arise because language goes on holiday 
leads to the view that a philosophical problem is something which requires a scientific 
solution or explanation, and thus to a demand that there must be a solution expressible in 
scientific terms. Von Wright traces the return of speculative metaphysics, the rehabilitation of 
the speculative, as he calls it, as being an unfortunate consequence of the rapid development 
of the empirical sciences.126 Von Wright takes Chomsky’s “Cartesian linguistics” as a 
paradigm example of a speculative metaphysics.  Also Davidson, in his criticism of Chomsky, 
Fodor and Pinker on their postulation of the ‘language of thought’ sees that this kind of 
rehabilitation has occurred.127 New empirical findings require explanations and a theoretical 
framework that accommodates these findings. But the construction of a metaphysical 
framework in order to understand or explain how empirical facts go, or as Stoutland notes’ 
must go together, results in a situation in which concepts get hopelessly detached from their 
original and actual use in human life. The metaphysical constructions are nothing but, to use 
Wittgenstein’s famous expression, houses of cards which will collapse when the concepts that 
helped  to  build  the  castles  have  been  completely  isolated  from their  actual  use.  What  is  the  
point of these construals – a la eliminative materialism – if the concepts from which we 
started have been transformed and lost beyond recognition? Do the scientific revelations 
reveal the nature of the original concepts? Whenever a relapse into speculative metaphysics 
occurs, we should ask: “…is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game 
which is its original home?”128 A battle against speculative and scientistic metaphysics should 
be fought by bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.129 
This brief description of a Wittgensteinian view of the nature of philosophy is meant 
to suggest a way in which philosophy can answer the challenge posed by science. Philosophy 
can do this by insisting that philosophical problems differ from empirical problems and by 
being an activity which differs from the scientific enterprise. An important task of 
                                               
126 Von Wright, 2000b. 
127 See Davidson, 1997. 
128 Wittgenstein, 1953, §116. 
129 Whether “a battle against metaphysics” should be carried out is a question in its own right, which I shall not 
further consider in this work. Wittgenstein had his own reasons to be suspicious about speculative metaphysics. 
The question that interests me here is not whether “speculative metaphysics” is something that should be 
resisted. I merely note that contemporary scientific philosophy is, contrary to its own principles, often wildly 
speculative.  
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philosophers is to clarify how philosophical problems differ from scientific ones. This helps 
us to understand why these problems do not have similar solutions as scientific ones, and 
eventually  dispels  the  desire  to  see  philosophy  and  science  on  a  par.  Von  Wright,  who  
certainly had a good grasp of Wittgenstein both as a person and as a philosopher insofar as 
these two can be separated, described the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy as being a 
therapeutic conception of philosophy because its purpose is to “exorcize” or “demolish”, and 
not to solve, the disquietudes of the mind which arise from a failure to understand the logical 
grammar of language.130 This  is  one  way  to  see  Wittgenstein’s  view  about  the  form  of  
philosophical problems and also his view about the nature of philosophical activity, which is 
very different from the naturalistic view about the nature of philosophy. In the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein states that: “Philosophy is not a theory but an activity”,131 and later this view of 
philosophy as a kind of therapy is developed further. We hear: “The philosopher’s treatment 
of a question is like the treatment of an illness”,132 but because philosophizing is an activity, 
perhaps quite a personal one, there is no straightforward answer as to how the philosophical 
illness is cured; it is instead the case that: “There is not a philosophical method, though there 
are indeed methods, like different therapies.”133 Philosophy is a form of conceptual therapy 
which heals by appealing to ordinary language. This therapeutic activity is not theoretical or 
explicative, it is descriptive. It is clear that naturalistic philosophy does not want to have 
anything to do with the view that philosophy should be understood as “therapy” of any kind. 
I have clarified the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy because from this 
perspective the challenge of science can be resisted, and because this conception clarifies also 
the Davidsonian / von Wrightian understanding of philosophy. I suggest that, in important 
                                               
130 Von Wright, 2000. As von Wright (2000b, 281) says, the therapy called philosophy dissolves “linguistic 
fixations” or “mental cramps”. Our “mind comes to rest” when we cease craving an answer which cannot be had 
and realize why this is so and has to be so.  
131 Wittgenstein, 1933, §4.112. 
132 Wittgenstein, 1953, §255. 
133 Wittgenstein, 1953, §133. Consider also: “In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It 
must run its natural course, and slow cure is important.” (Wittgenstein, 1967, §382) How this and other cryptic 
remarks, like references to “illnesses” or “therapies” should be understood is not entirely clear. Although 
Wittgenstein uses these kinds of expressions when discussing the nature of philosophy he was annoyed, 
according to von Wright (2000b), with the label “therapeutic positivism” which was often applied to his 
philosophizing. Perhaps one way to understand the therapeutic conception of philosophy is to think of 
philosophy as being a very subjective activity in which one is only concerned to clarify one’s thoughts to oneself 
i.e. to release oneself from the problems which have been tormenting one. If also others benefit from this: good. 
The benefit will be a new way of seeing something familiar. In Wittgenstein’s case, it is often said that his 
philosophy cannot really be separated from his life in general and it is clear that “deeper” problems about life 
certainly occur in his philosophical writings, (e.g. in Wittgenstein, 1961) in a sense which is alien to most 
contemporary (naturalistic) thinkers. Wittgenstein (1967, §456) has a point when he notes that: “Some 
philosophers (or whatever you like to call them) suffer from what may be called loss of problems. Then 
everything seems quite simple to them, no deep problems seems to exist anymore, the world becomes broad and 
flat and loses all depth, and what they write becomes immeasurably shallow and trivial.” 
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respects, both Davidson and von Wright understand the nature of philosophy in a similar way 
to Wittgenstein. In von Wright’s case this is often recognized but not sufficiently emphasized. 
The connection between Davidson and Wittgenstein has so far remained without discussion.  
 
1.2.2 Davidson’s conception of philosophy 
   
The remarks about Davidson’s conception of philosophy here may be controversial. Whether 
or not they capture his actual view is a secondary question: my main interest is to show that 
there is a way in which a Davidsonian could answer the challenge posed by science. I want to 
show that there are important insights to be gleaned from Davidson’s writings – insights 
which he did not develop further.   
In his first published article entitled “Why Study Philosophy?” Davidson, when 
considering how the study of philosophy could be justified, writes that most arguments 
against philosophy: “[…] err because they do not take account… the special character of 
philosophical activity, and therefore try to give a wrong sort of justification for it.”134 In 
Davidson’s work, in contrast to that of many philosophers who are not really interested about 
philosophy, the question about the nature of philosophical activity is thus raised right in the 
beginning. The worst mistake is to think that in order to be justified, philosophy must be one 
among the sciences or perhaps even above science, as a sort of super-science. This view, that 
philosophy is not among the sciences, is related in spirit to the Wittgensteinian conception of 
philosophy. According to Davidson “philosophy is not among the sciences.” Yet he counts 
himself as a naturalist and a proponent of the standard Quinean naturalistic view usually 
declares that: “Naturalistic philosophy is continuous with natural science.”135 This view 
implies that philosophy is among the sciences, it is not above or below science, as 
Wittgenstein suggests.136 Two important philosophical figures – Quine and Wittgenstein – 
each holding different views about the relation between philosophy and science can be seen as 
influences for Davidson. So what to make of this? 
Hacker, for example, makes a firm distinction between a Quinean and a 
Wittgensteinian view. Von Wright makes a similar distinction when he draws the line between 
a Russellian and a Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy. How coherent is an 
amalgamated Quinean–Wittgensteinian view about the nature of philosophy, which Davidson 
                                               
134 Davidson, 1952, 22. 
135 Quine, 1995, 256-257. 
136 Strictly speaking “continuous with” does not by itself suggest that philosophy is “among” the sciences. But, 
as Hacker notes, the Quinean view is that philosophy is an extension of science. This is denied by Davidson. 
52 
 
seems to be accepting?  Davidson is a naturalist who accepts the results of common sense and 
science. But this is not a reductive version of naturalism, because it does not involve the idea – 
to use the example from the philosophy of mind – that a naturalization of mental phenomena 
requires showing, or attempting to show, how mental states might be reduced to something 
that can be subsumed under the natural sciences.137 In Davidson’s naturalism, science isn’t 
privileged in the way it is in the views of reductive and eliminative materialists. But, why isn’t 
a reductive naturalization required? Why isn’t our mental vocabulary in need of “vindication” 
or justification? The complete answer to this question will emerge later in this discussion, 
when  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  irreducibility  of  the  mental  will  be  considered.  My  
interpretation is that the general motivation for resisting reductive naturalizations is the belief 
that a reductive approach to philosophy would jeopardize the distinctive character of 
philosophy by bringing philosophical problems closer to scientific ones or even assimilating 
the two kinds of problems. This would go against Davidson’s conviction that the natures of 
these problems are essentially different. On the other hand, a reduction of, for example, 
mental phenomena would try to answer certain kinds of problems in the wrong kind of way. 
The questions for which one seeks answers “at the mental level” receive the wrong kind of 
answers if the answers are formulated in physical terms. Whereas Quine and his ideological 
followers insist that mentality needs “vindication” or that the use of folk-psychological 
concepts must be “justified” by science, Davidson by contrast takes the Wittgensteinian 
attitude, according to which it is absurd to require vindication of concepts which are currently 
indispensable.   
Davidson is thus a naturalist who rejects the idea that our mental vocabulary could or 
should be replaced by the vocabulary of science.138. As a part of his naturalism, Davidson 
accepts Quine’s abandonment of the analytic / synthetic distinction. The consequent blurring 
of the boundary between philosophy and science is treated with suspicion by those 
philosophers, Wittgenstein among them, who think that a priori conceptual analysis is one 
                                               
137 For Davidson’s understanding of naturalism see Davidson, 1995 and 2000. In the latter, Davidson challenges 
the view that naturalization requires showing, or trying to show, how to reduce mentality to something which can 
be understood in non-mental terms.  
138 I suggest that Davidson’s position comes close to “classical naturalism” and insists that the study of reality 
should not be carried on in terms of methodological monism. Davidson’s naturalism, which is sensitive to 
biological facts about humans and tries to non-reductively explain the existence of thought from this position, 
comes out in full force in Davidson’s later philosophy when the idea of triangulation is introduced. This is a 
model the purpose of which is to explain the emergence of thought as a result of our natural capacities and social 
interactions. This suggests that there is nothing supernatural involved in the process in which thought emerges, 
and it should be enough to defuse the cravings to “vindicate” mentality through “naturalizations”.      
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defining feature of philosophy or that such analysis is a philosopher’s task.139 Although 
Davidson expresses a commitment to naturalism, he believes that philosophy can provide 
solutions to empirical problems through conceptual analysis. In this sense Davidson’s view 
differs from Wittgenstein’s, who thinks that when a philosophical problem is analyzed it is 
eventually realized that the original problem vanishes. The tormenting problem disappears 
through the realization that the problem was a pseudo-problem. The realization is reached 
through description. This is also von Wright’s view.  
Contrary to von Wright and Wittgenstein, Davidson seems to think that philosophy 
can make an important contribution to problems which are clearly empirical. In his 
philosophy, Davidson seeks explanations in a different way than Wittgenstein does. But how 
the results of Davidsonian conceptual analysis should be understood is, in my opinion, 
unclear. Sometimes Davidson suggests that the task of philosophy is merely to describe 
features of certain concepts140 and that he tries “to express what is attractive about a position 
by showing how it fits together with other things which we find plausible”.141 This is a 
different way of describing how to fit things together than the demand that “higher level 
phenomena” need naturalization if their “proper place” in the “grand scheme of things” is to 
be described. It is also a specific view about the nature of philosophical activity, and it does 
not suggest that philosophy should aim for explanations in the same sense as science – and 
does not hold that the main task of philosophy is to come up with substantial explanations of 
phenomena. The task of a philosopher is to describe features of concepts; it is concepts that 
are being analyzed, not “things in themselves”. This strategy can be seen resulting from the 
Quinean view that the line between questions of fact and questions of meaning cannot be 
clearly drawn. This blurs the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology. From a 
Quinean  viewpoint,  the  results  of  conceptual  analysis  are  treated  with  suspicion  since  a  
naturalist is wary of the concept of the a priori. On the other hand, Quine makes a 
metaphysical distinction in his insistence that some discourses are more “factual” than others. 
Rorty claims that in Quine’s case the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology is 
                                               
139 Wittgenstein is such a complex thinker it is impossible to conclude what a defining feature of philosophy, if 
such there is, would be according to him. However, Wittgenstein certainly thinks that the method of philosophy 
differs from that of the sciences (the term conceptual analysis as a description of the method of philosophy 
seems not to be out of place here), and whereas philosophy may not discover new facts philosophizing 
nevertheless has consequences. 
140 See, for example, Davidson, 1982. Davidson (1995, 205) notes that this kind of description of concepts could 
also be called an analysis of them. This view is in contrast to the naturalistic Quinean view, according to which 
there are no conceptual truths and therefore there are no conceptual analyses either. This being said, it should be 
acknowledged that Quine’s own philosophy was speculative and done from the armchair. 
141 In an interview by Jones, 2003. 
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brought back precisely through science.142 It  seems  to  me  that  if  Davidson  really  accepted  
Quinean naturalism, it would be unclear what his conceptual analyses could actually achieve.   
According to Davidson, the philosophical description of concepts is not reductive 
since it does not attempt to explain concepts in terms of other concepts that are thought to be 
more basic or clear.143 The  way  I  read  this  is  that  the  most  basic  concepts  are  without  
foundation,  which  would  transcend the  way that  these  concepts  are  used.  The  foundation  of  
basic concepts lies in the ordinary language. Although philosophy aims at the clarification of 
concepts, it does not aim at definitions. The purpose is not to lay down rules that would show 
how concepts should be used. A philosopher is not an expert in forming definitions, but he is 
perhaps skilled enough to clarify the nature of already existing concepts in cases where 
confusions occur. Following a Wittgensteinian view, it could be claimed that this is a 
normative claim about philosophy and the task of philosophers. Philosophers should focus on 
the clarification of concepts in cases of occurring confusions; they should be skilled enough to 
do this. Of course, there cannot be any “proof” that this is how things should be. Instead, my 
suggestion can be read as a description how to think about philosophy and how certain 
philosophers, for example Davidson and Wittgenstein, see their own conceptions of it. 
Clarification is the main task of a philosopher. In an important passage in which Davidson 
describes his method, we read: 
 
In philosophy we are used to definitions, analyses, reductions. Typically these are intended to carry us 
from concepts [that are] better understood, or clear, or more basic epistemologically or ontologically, to 
others we want to understand. The method I have suggested fits none of these categories. I have 
proposed a looser relation between [the] concepts to be illuminated and the relatively more basic.144 
 
Davidson claims that clarification, not in terms of reduction or explicit analysis but in terms 
of understanding, teaches us more than the efforts to produce correct and revealing definitions 
                                               
142 Rorty, 1991. 
143 Also this goes contrary to the naturalistic view that mental concepts should be analyzed in terms of physical 
concepts because the latter are more natural or clear. The demand for naturalizations is based on this view. 
144 Davidson, 1973a, 136. See also Davidson, 1977, 219. With regard to irreducible basic concepts, like truth, 
knowledge, belief or action, it should not be expected that they could be reduced to more basic concepts, but  
something revealing about them can be said by relating them to other concepts. What makes a concept 
irreducible is less than clear. Davidson (1998, 85) only notes that a concept is irreducible if it cannot be defined 
in terms that are as general and at least as clear as the concept to be reduced. In my opinion, the questions of 
what concept is clearer or more general than some other concept and how concepts can be compared in terms of 
their generality is problematic and something for which Davidson does not propose a solution. A basic or 
irreducible concept is a concept that cannot be defined in terms of other concepts. Why, according to Davidson, 
such definition is unavailable is unclear. Philosophy should not aim at definitions, but a basic concept is 
nonetheless defined in terms of irreducibility. 
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or reductions of basic concepts in terms of clearer or more fundamental concepts.145 Why? 
Because reductive analyses of the most primitive concepts have always failed, whereas 
philosophical clarifications of the kind to which Davidson refers have already revealed 
something. This of course is merely Davidson’s view, and to claim that so far there has been a 
systematic failure in reductive analyses is perhaps not a very compelling reason to believe that 
such analyses are impossible. Yet, a suggestion that a philosopher tries to clarify in terms of 
understanding can be seen again as a suggestion of the nature of the philosopher’s task. As we 
will see, this view is very close to von Wright’s view of the task of the philosopher. Clearly 
the question of which kind of strategy “teaches us more”, or which kind of attitude towards 
philosophical questions should be chosen, is once again something for which there cannot be 
an answer which would remain beyond dispute. In what sense philosophical clarifications 
have actually increased our understanding or explained anything is also a question the answer 
to which must be left for everyone’s own intuitions, and for which I shall not advance an 
answer in this work. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, it could be said that a philosophical 
clarification has occurred insofar as one has been cured from a particular philosophical 
disease or from the disease of philosophy in general. Whether the latter would lead to the end 
of philosophy is a question worth considering. 
What is important in Davidson’s way of doing philosophy is the attempt to see things 
in a new light and to clarify conceptual muddles. It is not surprising if this way of putting 
things sounds metaphorical. After all, it cannot be clearly described or explained what 
happens when a person understands something which he did not understand before – i.e. it is 
not possible to describe in mental, not to mention physical, terms what “seeing things in a 
new light” means beyond what can be intuitively grasped about the meaning of this 
metaphorical expression. Wittgenstein once wrote that: ”Thoughts that are at peace. That’s 
what someone who philosophizes yearns for.”146 This is a beautiful description of how 
philosophy can benefit an individual; perhaps seeing things in a new light could be 
understood simply as a process which brings peace to thoughts so that philosophical problems 
do not trouble one anymore. Notwithstanding how we understand the nature of philosophical 
clarification, the philosopher’s task in Davidson’s view, as in Wittgenstein’s case also, is to 
re-arrange what we already know instead of coming up with new empirical knowledge. The 
puzzles  often  result  from a  conflict  between things  that  one  already  knows,  and  therefore  a  
                                               
145 A claim according to  which  we try  to  understand basic  concepts  in  terms of  others  is  vague,  as  Davidson 
(1977, 219) himself admits. 
146 Wittgenstein, 1980a, 43. 
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solution should not look beyond what is already familiar. When discussing the work of 
Einstein, Davidson notes that the philosophical activity of Einstein was the “[…] clarification 
of basic concepts”147 and that in this case philosophy helped by “[…] providing a new and 
more productive way of thinking about empirical concepts”.148 Whether this is the “right” way 
to do philosophy is not an essential question since, as noted already, the idea that philosophy 
would have only one purpose or that there would be only one correct philosophical method is 
utterly implausible.149 I merely want to emphasize that Davidson has a certain view about the 
nature of philosophy and his philosophical arguments should, or better, could be understood 
against this background.  
As the title of Davidson’s first article – “Why Study Philosophy?” – shows, he seems 
to suggest that philosophers should contemplate the question of what they are doing when 
they practice philosophy. It can be said, at the very least, that this question interested 
Davidson. One way to understand the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy is to see 
philosophy as a form of therapy which, instead of solving its problems, exorcises them. It 
could be claimed that exorcising is solving; perhaps the appropriate term for a philosophical 
solution would therefore be therapeutic solution.  Interestingly, what Davidson says about the 
nature of philosophy resembles this view. He writes:  
 
[…] the disease for which philosophy is a specific cure is not confusion… but the anxiety of confusion. 
If you do not mind being vague and muddled, no one can… promise that you will be better off less so. 
But if you do mind, then you have a philosophic disease, and the study of philosophy can help you make 
feel better. It can loosen your mind muscles, smooth out the dogmatic cramps, prescribe exercises which 
will be a step toward greater intellectual ease.150 
 
These lines bear a curious resemblance to von Wright’s and Wittgenstein’s views. Both von 
Wright and Davidson talk about “cramps”, which philosophy is meant to relax. Whereas 
Wittgenstein is yearning for “thoughts that are at peace”, Davidson is looking for “intellectual 
ease”. Perhaps we could, programmatically, suggest that philosophy is best suited for those 
who, unfortunately, are troubled by questions which do not trouble most people; Anthony 
Kenny has claimed that philosophy is useful only for sick people and Wittgenstein thought 
that a philosopher must cure himself before helping others.  
                                               
147 Davidson, 1952, 23. Davidson refers to Einstein because, although being a physicist, he was by his own 
account engaged in a philosophical enterprise. 
148 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
149 There are correct methods in science, but there one already has a view of what the possible answer could be 
like, one roughly knows what to look for. In philosophy one does know one’s way about.   
150 Davidson, 1952, 24. 
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Davidson claimed that philosophy is the only hope for those who are troubled, for 
example, by the apparent conflict between free will and a deterministic universe. Since 
philosophy is not among the sciences and philosophy is the only hope for those troubled by 
such conflicts, we can assume that, according to Davidson, this conflict and others similar to it 
cannot be solved empirically. This understanding of the nature of philosophy is very different, 
and I would say deeper, than our current naturalistic understanding. An analysis of Davidson’s 
philosophy which ignores this aspect does injustice to his views. It needs to be acknowledged 
that  the  goal  of  a  naturalistic  philosopher  is  to  find  out  how certain  things  are,  whereas  the  
goal of a Wittgensteinian–Davidsonian–von Wrightian is to dispel the confusions which exist 
between ordinary concepts.151 We have seen that philosophers of mind, for example, Kim and 
Block, have differing views about the question of how empirical the philosophy of mind 
should be. The differences in views about the nature of philosophy are much deeper. A 
Wittgensteinian–Davidsonian–von Wrightian conception, which sees philosophy loosening 
the mind’s muscles and offering intellectual ease by providing new and productive ways to 
think is something fundamentally different from Fodor’s, who wants to integrate philosophy 
into the scientific enterprise, or Searle’s, who thinks that the purpose of philosophy is to make 
way for science.  
According to Davidson, philosophy can make you feel better if you have a philosophic 
disease: it can examine, clarify, reconcile, criticize, regroup or unearth our basic convictions 
and assumptions, but it can also do something more. Philosophy can lead to knowledge which 
was  not  in  sight  at  the  start  of  philosophical  contemplation  and  which  was  not  necessarily  
implicit in what was known before the contemplation. There can be progress in philosophy, 
but the new knowledge that may be achieved is not empirical knowledge in the sense that it 
would be based on new facts which are found. It is, rather, a result of understanding in a new 
way what we already knew. The new knowledge is thus a result of conceptual – philosophical 
– investigations. Where Davidson’s view differs from that of Wittgenstein is that the former 
is,  at  least  occasionally,  trying  to  give  explanations  whereas  the  latter  insists  that  only  
descriptions must be given. A Davidsonian could perhaps think that there can be progress in 
philosophy, whereas both Wittgenstein and von Wright are skeptical of this view.  
                                               
151 Consider Davidson’s (1993, 179, my emphasis) comment: “No one can object to the attack on confusion, 
conflict, obscurity and self-deceit in our everyday beliefs: these defects in our views of ourselves and the world 
exist in profusion, and if some philosophers can with skill or luck do something about reducing them, those 
philosophers deserve our respect and support.” The purpose of naturalistic philosophy is not this. With respect to 
“everyday beliefs”, eliminative materialism creates more confusion than it dispels.  
58 
 
So far I have claimed that Davidson’s conception of philosophy is close to 
Wittgenstein’s view, and alien to a naturalistic understanding according to which philosophy 
and  science  stand  on  the  same level.  Yet,  it  is  also  clear  that  Davidson  is,  some would  say  
very strongly, influenced by Quine’s naturalism. Certain commentators see Davidson 
continuing the strict physicalistic ideology starting from Quine.152 But, as Davidson’s non-
physicalistic philosophy of mind testifies, this interpretation should be challenged. My 
purpose is to argue that Davidson’s philosophy of mind is meant to be a novel contribution for 
physicalism, but that the non-reductive side of his philosophy of mind is more interesting and 
prevalent than his contribution for physicalism. Perhaps it would be best to say that 
Davidson’s approach differs from the approaches of Quine and Wittgenstein in an interesting 
way. According to the Wittgensteinian view, philosophy should not try to provide conceptual 
truths, because the method of philosophy is destructive (although in a therapeutic way). The 
method and aim of philosophy is “destructive” because it dispels the problems in question. 
Philosophy leaves everything as it is. Wittgenstein thought that, because of the nature of 
language, there are no fixed meanings, and what one says about things is intertwined with 
issues of an arbitrary nature – above all else, with the actual use of language in the practices 
of the language-users. Quine, on the other hand, argued that the distinction between claims 
which  are  true  in  virtue  of  empirical  content  and  claims  which  are  true  because  of  the  
meaning of the words of those claims cannot be maintained – and this, among other reasons, 
was why he thought that the boundary between philosophy and science vanishes. Philosophy 
cannot provide conceptual truths, and is thus on a par with science which does not provide 
conceptual truths either. 
 Davidson praises Quine’s conclusions about the hopelessness of the analytic / 
synthetic distinction but has a Wittgensteinian view about the nature of language, and his way 
of doing philosophy and achieving philosophical conclusions gives the impression that 
important truths can be achieved through conceptual analysis. Many of Davidson’s most 
important philosophical conclusions are not based on empirical evidence. This is especially 
true with respect to his philosophy of mind, and the a priori style of Davidson’s philosophy 
has been criticized by many. Fodor notes that Davidson holds a small number of general 
principles, the application of which allegedly solves a vast number of philosophical puzzles, 
but concludes that these stunning arguments “don’t quite work.”153 Hans-Johann  Glock,  a  
recent commentator of Davidson’s work concludes that his “a priori arguments are more 
                                               
152 See for example, Mulhall, 1987 and Glock, 2003. 
153 Fodor, 2002, 12. 
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suggestive than compelling”154 and Nannini, another recent commentator, claims that 
Davidson:  
 
[…] like many ‘classical’ philosophers (e.g. L. Wittgenstein, G. Ryle and also the logical empiricists), 
overtrusts the ability of philosophy to solve (or dissolve) a priori, by means of simple conceptual 
analysis, theoretic problems that arise from empirical sciences or common sense.155 
 
I think the commentators are right in their claim that Davidson tries to “prove”, in some sense 
of the word, various things by means of conceptual analysis. Perhaps it is also correct to say 
that his arguments are more suggestive than compelling, but in my view this is a meritorious 
aspect of those arguments. After all, one purpose of philosophy should, or could, be to 
provide new insights, new ways of thinking, and not to compel people to adopt certain 
views.156 This, obviously, is again only one suggestion or intuition concerning the task of a 
philosopher. I am not defending it here, but merely proposing its possible importance. 
I think, however, that the critics err in their claim that Davidson fails to prove what he 
intends. This is because they do not take seriously enough Davidson’s view that he is merely 
describing the features of concepts. This means that Davidson is not even trying to say 
something about the world i.e. he is not, pace Nannini’s claim, trying to solve problems which 
arise from the empirical sciences. Wittgenstein was not interested in solving or dissolving 
empirical problems; the same observation applies to Davidson. Indeed, Davidson makes a 
firm distinction between the enterprises of the scientist and the philosopher. The distinction 
follows from the conviction that was discussed in relation to Wittgenstein, namely that 
philosophical and scientific questions differ in important respects and require different kinds 
of treatment. Davidson notes, for example: 
 
How  many…  speakers  of  a  language  must  there  be  if  anyone  can  be  said  to  speak  or  understand  a  
language?  Since this is a matter governed by the crooked course of evolution, I have no idea what the 
answer is; perhaps it takes quite a crowd. But as philosophers we can ask the question in a more 
theoretical vein.157 
 
When Davidson describes his approach he notes: “I am arguing, as philosophers will on a 
priori grounds, that psychology and the social sciences are impossible.”158 According to him 
                                               
154 Glock. 2003a, 351. 
155 Nannini, 1999, 113. 
156 What, after all, is a compelling philosophical argument? Is it such that the conclusion must be accepted, that 
the conclusion cannot be avoided? The compulsiveness of the argument depends on whether or not one accepts 
the premises. As we have seen, it is often the case that philosophers do not agree about the premises. How could 
an argument be compelling then? 
157 Davidson, 1992, 107, my emphasis.   
158 Davidson, 1964, 47, second emphasis mine. 
60 
 
philosophers use a priori arguments  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  strategy  certainly  not  
favored among scientists or naturalists.159 As far as Davidson’s example above is concerned, I 
think a naturalist would say that empirical research is required to settle the question of 
whether language is a social phenomenon – and that the scientific verdict, so to speak, ends 
the discussion. A naturalist would insist that challenging valid empirical results would be 
useless philosophical speculation or wordplay. Davidson suggests, however, that philosophers 
may approach the same questions as scientists do, but philosophers approach them in a more 
theoretical vein because they are actually engaged “only” in a conceptual exercise. But what 
is characteristic of theoretical approach favored by philosophers? A partial answer is given 
when Davidson notes that: “I am not concerned with the scientific explanation of the 
existence of thought; my interest is in what makes it possible.”160 Likewise, we see how 
Davidson is trying to show, by using a priori arguments, that something - in this case social 
science - is impossible. This is an interesting approach, since it suggests that even though 
scientists may come up with a scientific explanation for the existence of thought, this would 
not necessarily satisfy a philosopher.161 What matters to a philosopher is not the kind of 
explanation that various sciences can and may provide, but an analysis of the concept of 
thought, because she is interested of the Kantian-like question of what makes thought 
possible.162 In Davidson’s view, the question of what the conditions on the possibility of 
thought are is not empirical. What characterizes the philosopher’s efforts is a desire to 
conceptually explore the limits of possibilities.  
                                               
159 Fodor (2007, 114) for example writes : “I hate a priori arguments that such and such discourse can’t be 
naturalized….” Paul Churchland (2007a) dislikes the a priori knowledge typical of modern analytic philosophy 
because it is “factually empty” or “conventional”. It seems to me that philosophy of mind, which uses a priori 
arguments, will not receive fair consideration from those who “hate” a priori arguments.  
160 Davidson, 1995, 208, my emphasis. 
161 The question “Why there is such thing as thought?” is used here as an example of a philosophical problem 
due to the fact that that it was a problem which was central in Davidson’s later philosophy of mind. For the ease 
of exposition I will use this problem as an example. 
162 For  a  reference  to  Kant  on  this  issue,  see  Davidson  1995.  Consider  also:  ”Of  course,  we  knew  it  
[interpretation] was possible in advance. The philosophical question was, what makes it possible?” (Davidson, 
1990, 325). A distinction between an empirical question and a philosophical one is made again when Davidson 
(1994) notes that he is not interested in what does happen when people interpret each other but what could 
happen. This means that he wants to give one suggestion about how interpretation is possible. Davidson (1999g, 
300) also comments: “…even if I did know [how we actually understand each other], I would still be interested 
in the question what the formal properties of the system are that make it possible.” This should be compared to 
Wittgenstein’s (1953, §125) remark about the nature of philosophy: “One might also give the name ‘philosophy’ 
to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.” Consider also: “In a scientific investigation we 
say all sorts of things, we make many statements whose function in the investigation we don’t understand…. We 
move through conventional thought patterns, automatically perform transitions from one thought to another 
according to  the  forms we have  learned.  And then finally  we must  sort  through what  we have  said.  We have  
made quite a few useless, even counterproductive motions and now we must clarify our movements of thought 
philosophically.” (Wittgenstein, 1980, §155) 
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 I must note that the nature of the “conditions” that Davidson is looking for is 
nevertheless unclear. Sometimes his purpose seems to be to describe sufficient conditions for 
various  phenomena,  while  at  times  he  is  after  necessary conditions. Given Davidson's 
skepticism towards modal notions and his rejection of the analytic / synthetic distinction, it is 
not  absolutely  clear  how  these  expressions  should  be  understood:  for  example,  it  is  unclear  
what  the  status  of  Davidsonian  necessity  is.  But  it  is clear  that,  when it  comes  to  questions  
about the nature of thought, Davidson is interested in the philosophical questions, which in his 
view are not empirical. They could be understood also as empirical questions if one would be 
interested in finding out why or how, in the course of evolution, creatures with the capacity to 
think have evolved.163 But, according to Davidson, this question is “[…] a matter for the 
speculation or discovery of scientists”,164 and  he  makes  it  very  clear  that  this  is  not the 
question which he is interested in.  In Davidson’s view, a philosopher is trying to understand 
the question of what makes thought in principle possible, and his interest is therefore not on 
the same level as the scientist’s, who is interested in empirical facts. In spirit, this is 
reminiscent of Wittgenstein, who states that:  
 
It is all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist understands or appreciates my work, since 
he will not in any case understand the spirit in which I write…I am not aiming at the same target as the 
scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs.165   
 
This is a telling and an extremely important passage from Wittgenstein, which encapsulates a 
part of the spirit of his work. Of course I do not want to claim that Davidson would have had 
subscribed to this view, although it is clear that he too was not aiming at the same target as the 
scientists. On many occasions Davidson notes that Chomsky, for example, has mistakenly 
thought that Davidson is providing views which would compete with Chomsky’s claims.166 
But Davidson is not interested in the same phenomena as Chomsky, and his aims and interests 
are different. Many modern philosophers are interested in the same questions as the scientists; 
although they are called philosophers, the empirical element in their work is so notable that 
the question of how their work differs from scientific work is worth asking. As Wittgenstein 
                                               
163 Then the possibility-question would be answered simply by describing how creatures with thought have 
actually evolved. 
164 Davidson, 1995, 207, my emphasis. It is doubtful whether a scientific answer to the question of why thought 
has evolved can be given. This is not a question which can be answered in evolutionary terms. Given the fact 
that thought has evolved “naturally” without human intervention, it would be most accurate to say that a question 
“why thought has evolved” is meaningless. There is a “how” question to be answered by scientists, but there is 
no reason for thought’s occurrence, and thus the “why” question exceeds the limits of science, or better, the 
“why” question is not a scientific question unless one believes that evolution has a purpose. 
165 Wittgenstein, 1980a, 7, my emphasis. 
166 See, for example, Davidson, 1995a. 
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notes, his way of thinking is  different from the scientist’s way of thinking. Can the same be 
said of a contemporary philosopher of mind, say Fodor, who in his own words is “not really 
very interested in philosophy” and yet counts himself a philosopher? 
 It is no easy to draw a clear line between an empirical and a philosophical question, 
and perhaps the line between a philosopher's and scientist's task will remain – and should 
remain – vague as well. That philosophical and scientific questions form a continuum is the 
point stressed by naturalists. We can imagine that they could ask: isn’t a scientific explanation 
of  the  existence  of  thought  also an explanation of how this phenomenon is possible? In 
Davidson’s  case  this  cannot  be  so  because,  as  I  have  described,  on  many  occasions  he  
emphasizes that he is not interested in the same questions as the scientists and that the 
question in which he is interested cannot be solved through scientific explanations. It is also 
important to notice that, according to Davidson, his approach is “speculative” and does not 
explain the emergence of thought. But it would be strange to criticize Davidson’s position as 
being insufficiently explanatory, as naturalists would, since his whole point is that a certain 
kind of explanation cannot be given. The hopelessness of coming up with an explanation 
about how thought has emerged was something that Davidson took seriously; he noted that he 
was glad to be a philosopher instead of a developmental psychologist, because the latter may 
face insuperable conceptual difficulties in their explanatory task.  
The distinction between a scientific and a philosophical question is emphasized when 
Davidson notes:  
 
I do not think I have ever conflated the (empirical) question [of] how we actually go about 
understanding a speaker with the (philosophical) question [of] what is necessary and sufficient for such 
understanding. I have focused on the latter question… because I think it brings out the philosophically 
important aspects of communication while the former tempts us to speculate about arcane empirical 
matters that neither philosophers nor psychologists know much about.167 
 
It is telling that in Davidson’s view empirical matters are arcane while the aspects which 
philosophy can bring into light are necessary. Certain aspects of phenomena are 
philosophically important.  This  view  differs  from  the  naturalistic  attitude,  which  states  that  
“philosophical” problems require answers in scientific terms. We should note that, according 
to Davidson, an empirical question would lead to speculation about arcane matters. This 
claim is the opposite of the naturalist view. Those questions – scientific ones – which lead to 
empirical speculations are not candidates for “reasonable philosophic speculation”, as 
                                               
167 Davidson, 1994b, 3. It should be noticed that here Davidson mentions both necessary and sufficient 
conditions as a target for his philosophical investigations. For a separation between a scientific and a 
philosophical question see also Davidson, 1982 and, 1995.  
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Davidson argues.168 The view that an empirical question gives raise to speculations bears 
some resemblance to von Wright’s view that a rehabilitation of the speculative has occurred 
in modern philosophy. Empirical results lead to metaphysical speculations, and it is precisely 
empirically oriented philosophers who are guilty of these kinds of speculations. 
 When considering Davidson’s approach, we should ask what the relevance of 
philosophical speculations or conceptual analyses is. An answer to this question distinguishes 
Davidson’s approach from those of Quine and Wittgenstein. Davidson agrees with 
Wittgenstein that a philosopher is interested in different questions than the scientist and the 
philosophical method differs from the scientific one. But the results of philosophy do not 
concern only the features of concepts because – and this is distinctive of Davidson’s position – 
there cannot be a major distinction between the ways one conceptually interprets the world 
and how it is actually “put together”.169 Conceptual investigations can lead to substantial 
results given that language mirrors reality.170 From a Davidsonian point of view, philosophical 
conclusions can be seen as empirical or a priori. There is always some empirical element in 
reasonable philosophical speculation; usually the starting point is based on facts that are 
already known. In Davidson’s case – as in von Wright’s and in Wittgenstein’s as well – the 
starting point that must be respected, the empirical element, is the language of the everyday. 
This language, and what is expressed in it, are more familiar to us than the results of science. 
The facts of everyday life are something which we all know, but they can become a source of 
philosophical problems when we let ourselves become confused in the ways Wittgenstein 
warned about. We become confused when we lose sight of the ways that concepts are actually 
used; the way they are used is of course an empirical issue. 
 Davidson’s non-reductive naturalism is sensitive to science and common-sense. Many 
of the philosophical arguments that he puts forward depend in part “not on purely a priori 
considerations but rather on a view of the way people are”171 and “Logic does not assure us of 
                                               
168 See Davidson, 1991, 157. “Reasonable philosophic speculation” is of course a very obscure term, the 
meaning of which remains without clarification in Davidson’s writings. 
169 This  is  the  famous  point  of  Davidson’s  classic  article  ”On the  Very  Idea  of  a  Conceptual  Scheme” dating  
back to 1974. Later Davidson has elaborated the idea that concepts describe truly language-independent reality 
and that sense cannot be made of the claim that the conceptual structure we employ might not describe objective 
reality. For this claim, see Davidson, 1984a, 1993a, 1991 and 2000. In these later articles, Davidson’s version of 
realism is strongly connected to his idea of triangulation, which establishes what the content of observation 
sentences is. 
170 A detailed discussion of this ”mirroring” would require a clarification of questions relating to Davidsonian 
epistemology. This topic cannot be discussed in this work. 
171 Davidson, 1999, 194, my emphasis. This, “the way people are”, is not a scientific fact but part of the common 
knowledge that we all possess. The conclusions of philosophy, say about the emergence of thought, should be 
understood in the context of our biological nature. Davidson’s philosophical arguments are not based on the way 
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this [that communication depends on the shared propensities of people to react similarly to 
their environment], it’s an empirical fact about people.”172 I think that the role these empirical 
facts play bears a resemblance to Kant’s synthetic a priori propositions, which are empirical 
but universal – given human natural history. Certain facts of nature apply to all human beings, 
but this is not to say that these facts could not be different. Davidson’s philosophical approach 
has been interpreted as a form of “philosophical anthropology”, which attempts to describe 
human behavior and human capacities in general and language and linguistic capacities in 
particular.173 Consequently, the cornerstones of his philosophy are philosophy of language, 
mind and action. Simon Evnine even claims, with some justice, that Davidson’s “technical 
work in logic and formal semantics, and his metaphysical work on the nature of events and 
causation… is primarily… apparatus necessary for the completion of his anthropological 
project.”174 Glock, another commentator, claims that the guiding question in this project is 
“What it is to understand other human beings”.175 I think the project can be broadened to 
include the question of how the human position could be understood. Incidentally, 
Wittgenstein also showed an interest in the natural history of humankind. In his own words he 
was: “contributing… observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark 
only because they are always before our eyes.”176Glock notes perspicuously that 
Wittgenstein’s investigations into human nature were meant to show that “a change in 
contingent natural conditions would render plausible or useful concepts and practices other 
than our current ones, thereby dispelling the appearance that the latter are metaphysically 
necessary.”177 Wittgenstein’s purpose was to show that if philosophical problems can be 
dissolved into uncontroversial facts of human natural history, then a troubled mind should 
accept this result and achieve peace. 
Let us suppose, along Wittgensteinian lines, that it is possible to defend the view that 
our current concepts are not metaphysically necessary, although they can be a priori in the 
sense that they apply universally. Let us in other words suppose, as Davidson does, that 
empirical facts can grant an “a priori” status to certain claims. Here a tempting question is: 
How strongly can the conclusions of a philosopher conflict with the actual use of language? 
To what extent must the empirical facts of common-sense be respected? Sometimes, after all, 
                                                                                                                                                            
people are, but on a view of the way people are.  I  suggest  that  “the  view of  the  way people  are”  is  a  kind  of  
existential choice of a given philosopher, the further grounding of which is not easy. 
172 Davidson, 1999, 165, my emphasis. 
173 See Evnine, 1991 and Glock, 2003. 
174 Evnine, 1991, 5. 
175 Glock, 2003, 37. 
176 Wittgenstein, 1953,  §415 
177 Glock, 2006, 298. 
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it is these very facts which lead us astray. Davidson does not offer clear answers to these 
questions, so I will offer an answer when discussing von Wright’s understanding of 
philosophy in the next section. Here I want to point out that those, like Fodor, accusing 
Davidson for the use of a priori arguments, ignore the way in which Davidson himself sees 
the results of philosophy.178 It  is  interesting  that  whereas  some,  like  Fodor  or  Nannini,  
criticize Davidson for being overtly philosophical because he uses a priori arguments, others 
like Pagin, criticize Davidson for indulging unjustified empirical speculations with no direct 
philosophical significance.179 These are curious accusations given Davidson’s own conviction 
that he is interested only in the philosophical aspects of phenomena.    
The status of philosophical conclusions is clarified when Davidson, defending one of 
his philosophical arguments, explains that:  
 
There cannot be said to be proof of this claim [that aspects of our interactions with others and the world 
are partly constitutive of what we mean and think]. Its plausibility depends on a conviction which can 
seem either empirical or a priori;  a  conviction  that  this  is  a  fact  about  what  sort  of  creatures  we are.  
Empirical if you think it just happens to be true of us that this is how we come to be able to speak and 
think about the world; a priori if you think, as I tend to do, that this is part of what we mean when we 
talk of thinking and speaking. After all, the notions of speaking and thinking are ours.180 
 
The quote explains what the status of a priori conclusions based on conceptual investigations 
is. The philosophical convictions are “a priori” in the sense that  – since concepts are of our 
own making and we can, in some sense of the word, decide how they are correctly used – the 
applicability of concepts is answerable to our understanding of their meaning. Once the 
application conditions of a concept are in place, there exist “a priori” conceptual connections 
which cannot be violated without turning the concept into another concept, or ultimately into 
nonsense. Bennett and Hacker, analyzing the conceptual confusions inherent in modern 
neuroscience, have noted: “It is an empirical fact… that a given vocable or inscription is… 
used in a certain way in a given linguistic community. It is not an empirical fact that a word, 
meaning what it does, has the conceptual connections, compatibilities, and incompatibilities 
that it does.”181 This is their modern Wittgensteinian view, which agrees with the Davidsonian 
conception. The “a priori” status of Davidson’s claims gets is force from the conviction that 
ordinary language is a “transcendental ground” beyond which there is no way to go. This is 
something strongly emphasized also by von Wright; our notions must be respected. 
                                               
179 For Fodor’s critique of philosophy as conceptual analysis see, Fodor, 2000, 2004. For his criticism of 
Davidson, see, Fodor, 2002.    
179 Pagin, 2001. 
180 Davidson, 2001d, 294.  
181 Bennett and Hacker, 2007, 147. 
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This being said, it must be acknowledged that concepts can change as a result of non-
conceptual changes. Sometimes new scientific results dramatically change the way in which 
reality  is  seen.  But  in  many cases  the  resulting  situation  is  one  in  which  we have  to  choose 
how to best describe the situation. Should a change in the applicability of concepts occur, the 
empirical starting point would be different from the one we would have, had such a change 
not occurred. As Davidson claims, the way philosophy can help a scientist is by providing a 
new and more productive way of thinking about empirical concepts. Also this is something 
that has been recently emphasized by Bennett and Hacker, who claim that the way philosophy 
can assist science is “not by offering scientists empirical theories in place of their own, but by 
clarifying the conceptual structure they invoke”.182 This is a different view of philosophy than 
the one shared among naturalists; they offer theories or claim that the task of philosophy is to 
make  way  for  science.  Insofar  as  philosophy  is  required  to  be  beneficial,  I  believe  that  
conceptual clarification is certainly a contribution that philosophy can make. It is however a 
different kind of contribution from the contribution of science, which describes how things 
are. Philosophy, on a Davidsonian account, does not aim at knowledge but can guide the way 
to  how the  results  of  science  are  interpreted  and  how the  consequences  of  these  results  are  
evaluated. A discovery, a scientific claim, that consciousness takes place in a certain part of 
the brain or that a neural correlate of consciousness has been found does not, in itself, force 
the conclusion that the location of consciousness has been found. The correctness of the 
discovery will be decided on the grounds of how well it fits with other things we find 
plausible.  
I would like to suggest, tentatively, that a distinction needs to be made between the 
purpose of philosophy – between the contributions that philosophy can make – and the nature 
of philosophical arguments themselves. The contribution that philosophy or philosophers can 
make, and this is obviously only one opinion, is the one described by Hacker: to clarify 
conceptual structures. This view is based on the idea that philosophy is not a contribution to 
human knowledge but a contribution to human understanding.183 The justification of this kind 
of  philosophy is  in  its  promise  to  eradicate  the  diseases  of  intellect  which  trouble  us  in  the  
form of conceptual confusions. According to Hacker, these kinds of confusions are manifold, 
extensive and have far-reaching consequences not only in philosophy but also in the various 
sciences and in our culture at large. These confusions distort our vision of what we really 
                                               
182 Bennett and Hacker, 2007, 128. 
183 As noted before, “human understanding” is an expression the nature of which has to remain unclear.  
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know.184 Often  these  confusions  have  wide  consequences,  and  therefore  the  kind  of  
philosophy  which  attempts  to  clear  us  of  these  confusions  should  be  an  approach  worth  
continuing.  
On a Davidsonian account, philosophy is an activity which attempts to clear of 
confusions; this in essence is a Wittgensteinian view. But how, in this context, should the 
status of philosophical arguments be understood? Davidson’s ambitious attempt to prove 
something with the use of a priori arguments is perhaps alien to a Wittgensteinian conception 
of philosophy, which aims for description. Davidson’s a priori arguments, when they are not 
meant to clarify conceptual confusions, can be criticized as being in conflict with empirical 
knowledge or not taking such knowledge sufficiently into account. Perhaps the criticism that 
Davidson overtrusts philosophy’s ability to solve problems is justified. One should 
nevertheless acknowledge that since Davidson is not aiming for “definitions” but for a 
description of the features of concepts, there is no need to argue or defend the view that the 
results of philosophy would amount to “necessary truths” or other such modally dubious 
consequences. For naturalists who are suspicious of a priori arguments Davidson has a reply: 
“Since we are thinkers, and it is we who devise the ways of talking and explaining, I am not 
abashed when I am told that for me the difference between mental  and physical is 
‘metaphysical’ or ‘a priori’.”185 The acceptance of “metaphysical” or a “priori arguments” 
could be seen just  as an expression of the rejection of the analytic /  synthetic distinction.186 
This would undermine the importance and distinctiveness of philosophical conclusions 
because they would not differ from the conclusions of science. However, given that Davidson 
thinks that he is providing necessary conditions for phenomena, the strength of his 
philosophical conclusions must, in my view, be somehow greater than those of science 
(which are based on arcane empirical matters). Scientists do not ordinarily make claims about 
necessity or claim that something is impossible.187 If Davidson intends to really describe 
necessary conditions, this would grant his philosophical conclusions a true a priori status.  
I nevertheless hesitate to say anything more about Davidson’s conclusions than what 
has been claimed already. The reason for this is the inconsistencies that can be detected in 
Davidson’s views when he considers the relevance of his conceptual investigations. 
Sometimes he claims that conceptual investigations have not much to do with the way things 
                                               
184 See Hacker, 2001. 
185 Davidson, 1999a, 620.  
186 See Davidson, 2001d. 
187 Of course it is often claimed also among scientists that something is not possible. But usually this means 
something entirely different than, for example, Davidson’s claim that scientific psychology is an impossibility. 
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actually are.188 Naturalists aim for substantive explanations, which describe how things are.  
From this perspective the charge against Davidson is the question: what is the point of these 
conceptual exercises? My answer is that conceptual exercises ease the diseases of intellect; 
such conceptual exercises bear a resemblance to Wittgensteinian therapy. In my view, the 
attempt to clarify conceptual muddles (and not the attempt to say how things are) could be the 
real importance of Davidson’s philosophy On the other hand, Davidson suggests that 
conceptual investigations can reveal important features of, for example, thought and throw 
indirect light on the actual empirical questions.189 This is in conflict with other views that he 
puts forward.  
I cannot provide a final solution to the inconsistencies found in Davidson’s conception 
of philosophy. I think we can nevertheless summarize Davidson’s position by noting that the 
clarification of concepts is an important task, and this is done by re-arranging the already 
familiar  field  of  concepts.  If  a  clear  separation  between the  way we put  world  together  and  
how it is put together is not accepted, the conceptual investigations can shed indirect light also 
on empirical questions. Wittgenstein’s position has been summed up by claiming that:  
 
He accepted that philosophical problems and propositions are a priori in that they have their root not in 
reality but in the conceptual scheme we use in describing reality... he regarded this conceptual scheme 
as essentially embodied in language. He came to recognize... that language is not [an] abstract logical 
system... but rather a human practice and hence subject to historical change. 190 
 
This, so it seems to me, captures also the spirit of Davidson’s work despite his Quinean 
naturalism.  Quine  held  on  to  the  idea  that  science  is  the  highest  path  to  truth,  and  this  is  a  
view rejected by Davidson, who turned philosophy’s focus more towards ordinary language. 
 
1.2.3 Von Wright’s conception of philosophy 
 
My claim is that von Wright’s understanding of what philosophy is and what a person is 
doing when she does philosophy are especially important in order to understand his views on 
the philosophy of mind. These kinds of questions are often ignored, but a discussion of them 
helps us to understand, partly, why a certain philosopher holds a certain position. Von 
                                               
188 When describing his famous thought experiment of radical interpretation, Davidson (1980, 12) writes that 
“The approach to the problems of meaning, belief and desire that I have outlined is not… meant to throw any 
direct light on how we master our first concepts and our first language….”  Exactly the same point is repeated 
ten years later (Davidson, 1990, 325), so on this issue Davidson’s views remained steady.  He repeatedly 
emphasizes that the model of radical interpretation should not be seen as a suggestion for how we actually 
understand each other. See Davidson, 1973a, 1984, 1994, 1994b, 1995a, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f and 2000. 
189 See Davidson 1991, 1994. 
190 Glock, 2006, 295. 
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Wright’s views about the nature of philosophy changed during his career. I will not describe 
the subtleties of the different conceptions that he held. I focus on the view which he reached 
as a result of his intellectual journey, because this conception is the most relevant one for von 
Wright’s views in the philosophy of mind. Von Wright thought that it would be futile to 
search for a general definition of philosophy, but he thought that useful progress would have 
been made if we could appoint a task for philosophy which looked interesting in itself and 
which clearly differed from the tasks of special sciences191. 
  Von Wright strongly emphasized that the question about the nature of philosophy or 
philosophizing was something which interested him.192 He  traced  this  interest  back  to  
Wittgenstein by noting: “The most lasting and consequential way in which Wittgenstein has 
‘influenced’ me concerns my view what philosophy is, of what I, as a philosopher, am 
doing.”193  Von Wright thought that this kind of reflection about the nature of philosophy is 
especially important at times when a change in paradigm can be detected. I believe that the 
challenge of science for philosophy, which is reality now,  is  an  example  of  a  change  in  the  
way how to think about the nature of philosophy; we have seen how many modern 
philosophers of mind that the nature of philosophy is changing. Although the naturalistic 
conception of philosophy is currently quite well accepted, surprisingly few philosophers pay 
attention to the question of whether there are features peculiar to philosophy which are 
missing from science or whether science and philosophy are altogether two very different 
kinds  of  activity.  Few contemporary  philosophers  pay  attention  to  the  question  of  what  is  it  
that they are doing when they are doing philosophy. Von Wright is a refreshing exception to 
this consensus.  Philosophers not considering the nature of philosophy pay insufficient 
attention also to the question of what it is that the philosophers who do not share a naturalistic 
conception of philosophy are doing. Insensitivity to this question causes misinterpretations 
regarding their conclusions about non-naturalistic philosophy.  
 Von Wright, who did not ever arrive at a final conclusion concerning the question 
what philosophy is, claimed that certain principles were part of his understanding of the nature 
of philosophy and of the nature of philosophical problems194. They are: 
 
1) Philosophy is not one of the (natural) sciences. 
2) Philosophy is an activity and not a doctrine. 
                                               
191 See von Wright, 1947. 
192See von Wright, 1985a. 
193 Von Wright, 2001, 179. 
194 Von Wright, 1985a, 2001. 
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3) The purpose of philosophy is the clarification of meaning. 
4) Philosophical problems originate from linguistic confusions. 
5) Exposing the confusions makes the problems vanish. 
6) Philosophical method is logical analysis. 
 
These remarks bear an obvious resemblance to Wittgenstein’s views. It is not a coincidence 
that von Wright, who accepted a Wittgensteinian view about the nature of philosophy, 
thought that Wittgenstein’s most original contribution was perhaps his understanding about 
the nature of philosophy and its relation to science.  
 According to von Wright, philosophy attempts to understand and clarify meaning, 
whereas science aims at truth. Alien to this conception of philosophy is the idea that 
observations would be especially relevant to philosophy or that philosophy would be an 
experimental activity. By claiming that philosophy is in some sense an a priori discipline, von 
Wright is clearly continuing the Wittgensteinian “philosophical project”. Although 
Wittgenstein was reluctant to form a school of philosophy and have followers continuing his 
work, he also thought that he had arrived at a new way of philosophizing which wasn’t merely 
a stage in the evolution of philosophy but rather the beginning of a new subject. The question 
about the importance and relevance of the “Wittgensteinian project” is currently in focus as 
the debate between Dennett / Searle and Hacker / Bennett shows. The conception of 
philosophy which Hacker and Bennett defend is in essential respects the conception to which 
also von Wright subscribes. The relevance of this conception is seriously challenged by 
Searle, Dennett, Churchland and others. 
 Some of von Wright’s principles have been discussed in connection with 
Wittgenstein. The claim that philosophical problems originate from linguistic confusions and 
that the problem vanishes when the confusions are exposed should be understood in the 
Wittgensteinian spirit. The same can be said about the views that philosophy is not one of the 
sciences and that philosophy is an activity and not a doctrine. I think that it is not entirely 
clear how the rest of von Wright’s defining principles should be understood. What exactly is 
“logical analysis”? How are “meanings clarified”? Instead of trying to find out what von 
Wright  means  by  these  expressions,  one  can  consider  the  ways  he  actually  did  philosophy.  
One way to consider this is to see in detail how von Wright sees the nature of philosophical 
problems and how he tries to solve them. If philosophy should be understood as an activity, 
how does von Wright pursue this activity? In his writings von Wright is often troubled by the 
question of what the source of philosophical motivation is.  He  is  trying  to  describe  what  is  
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characteristic of a situation in which philosophical motivation arises. I believe this is a 
relevant question for any contemporary philosopher to think about. This is especially relevant 
for a modern philosopher of mind, because there are various ways to study the mind and they 
are often in competition. What are those occasions, for example in the context of questions 
about the mind, when a philosopher instead of a psychologist or a neuroscientist is needed? 
What is the contribution of a philosopher? What could it be? What should it be? When does 
one  encounter  a  question  which  requires  philosophical  treatment,  that  is,  clarification  of  
meaning in terms of conceptual analysis? How to tell whether such a question has been 
encountered? In a word, how to detect a philosophical problem? For the self-image of 
philosophy these are important questions, especially in a society where the highest measure of 
success (truth) is a clear result, which should be useful. If philosophical problems are not 
empirical problems, it is hopeless to think that they could be solved in terms of science. 
Likewise, a philosopher may be, and most likely is, useless when a scientific problem about 
the mind awaits a solution.  
 According to von Wright, what motivates a philosopher, and not perhaps a 
psychologist or a neuroscientist, is a confusion which a poorly set question creates. Such a 
question may contain a latent or an obvious inconsistency, which is possibly a result of the 
fact that words are being used in ambiguous ways or outside their usual fields of application. 
A philosophical question is thus a question which is a result of the misuse of language. How 
to solve this kind of problem? The source of philosophical motivation is a confusion caused 
by a poorly formulated question, but what is the aim of philosophy? The aim of philosophy is 
to calm the anxiety of thought by revealing the obscure conceptual structures which were the 
reason for the occurrence of a philosophical problem in the first place, and thus to provide a 
reason for the perturbation of thought. Philosophical clarification shows that there was no 
reason to be anxious, because the problem was wrongly stated. There was something wrong in 
the original way in which the question was formulated. Philosophical problems are therefore 
not solved, but they cease to be problems when our understanding about their nature 
increases.195 They cease to be problems when our thoughts regain peace. But it must be 
acknowledged that the problems are not solved through explanation. Von Wright claimed that 
it is a mistake to think that philosophical problems could be solved; the thought that these 
problems would have a final solution is “atrocious”196. 
                                               
195 Von Wright (1985) notes that philosophical problems cannot be solved but they may lose their importance, 
which is not to say that the same problems could not become important again. 
196 Von Wright, 1979. 
72 
 
 If philosophical problems are due to misuse of language and if the confusion which 
these problems create may be removed by analyzing language, how is this actually done? The 
question of how to approach a scientific problem is, in the context of a given science, often 
straightforward. The question of whether the problem has been solved is also often possible to 
answer; the criteria of success are relatively clear. But how to decide whether a philosopher 
has succeeded in clearing away a philosophical problem? Von Wright’s view is that a 
philosopher is, above all else, interested in concepts –  and  it  is  especially  the  concepts  of  
everyday language which interest a philosopher. I want to emphasize that this is how von 
Wright describes his own interests  as  a  philosopher.  He  does  not  claim  that  this  is  what  
philosophy should be. A philosopher in the von Wrightian mold feels that the use of everyday 
concepts is often unclear and therefore in need of systematization. What is of the utmost 
importance is that, as in Davidson’s case as well, it is concepts and not phenomena which are 
of interest in philosophy.197 Philosophy aims at the clarification of meanings and, contrary to 
science, is not interested in finding out how things are. Philosophy is an activity which 
clarifies thoughts in cases when language leads us astray. The way that the use of concepts 
can be systematized is by clarifying conceptual relations in a certain field of concepts. 
Different  features  of  concepts  can  be  revealed  by  relating  concepts  to  each  other.  Both  von  
Wright  and  Davidson  think  that  a  clarification  or  explication  in  terms  of  understanding  is  a  
correct method of philosophy. Von Wright’s “logical analysis” thus resembles a Davidsonian 
“clarification”. 
 The expression “field of concepts” is a metaphorical one, which is meant to emphasize 
that concepts cannot be analyzed in isolation. In order to say something illuminating about the 
concept of mind, for example, something about a great number of other concepts must be 
said. According to von Wright, the systematization or clarification of concepts means placing 
these concepts in order so that philosophical problems will not occur anymore. How this is to 
be done is, in my opinion, anything but clear. I would suggest that if philosophical problems 
are partly personal perplexities, then the question of whether a philosophical clarification has 
succeeded can be answered only from a subjective perspective. On the other hand, the work of 
a certain philosopher – for example Wittgenstein – can be seen as showing one way of how to 
place concepts in order. Von Wright notes that the activity which aims to put the meanings of 
concepts in a certain order could be called “descriptive metaphysics” or, as he also likes to 
call it, “conceptual phenomenology”. Incidentally, “descriptive metaphysics” is the term that, 
                                               
197 Von Wright admits that the distinction between concepts and phenomena is not always easy to make. 
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according to a recent commentator, best describes Davidson’s approach to philosophical 
problems.198 
If concepts should be put in an order where philosophical problems do not occur, how 
is it possible to know what kind of order is to be searched for? Two suggestions were already 
given: On the one hand it could be claimed that the achieved order can be evaluated only 
subjectively; on the other hand, one could claim that works of different philosophers may 
show  different  examples  of  orders  in  which  philosophical  perplexities  vanish.  But  these  
suggestions are very vague, and perhaps only “Wittgensteinians” would agree that 
Wittgenstein managed to show how to put concepts in an order where perplexities have 
completely disappeared. It could also be claimed that the question “what kind of order should 
one look for?” is itself a queer question. Why? Because in the case of concepts which cause 
philosophical problems, the question of what these concepts exactly mean is often an open 
question. A philosopher should start by asking “What do we mean by the concept of mind?”, 
and then the task of philosophical clarification begins.  
Von  Wright’s  essential  point  is  this:  the  use  of  a  certain  concept  is  unclear.  A  
philosopher starts unraveling the vagueness by considering what we mean by the concept, by 
describing how it relates to other concepts. It is crucial that in doing so, a philosopher cannot 
appeal to the actual use of language because this use is imperfect. A philosopher cannot 
appeal to the rules of how to use language because, in the case of problematic concepts or 
their specific use, such rules do not exist. If there is anything to which a philosopher can 
appeal, it is her own intuition, which tells her what kind of rules will provide the clarity or 
systematicity that she is searching for. This reminds one of Wittgenstein’s view, which von 
Wright quotes with approval: “Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many 
respects – is really more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees things. 
(And what one expects from them.)”.199 A philosopher’s work consists of explicating or 
interpreting certain conceptual intuitions of her own.200 This  is  an  observation  of  crucial  
importance; it gives a certain specific view about the nature of the “philosophical method” 
and it is essential for understanding correctly von Wright’s philosophy of mind.201 Von 
Wright thought that a question is “logical” or “conceptual” – that is, philosophical –  if  the  
                                               
198 See Glock, 2003a. 
199 Wittgenstein, 1980a, 16. 
200 See,  for  example,  von  Wright  1985a,  1989a.  This,  once  again,  is  the  way  von  Wright  sees  the  nature  of  
philosophy. It is the way he sees his own work, but also the way in which he sees the nature of philosophy as a 
historical phenomenon. 
201 For one view about the role of intuitions in philosophy, see Knobe and Nichols (eds.), 2008.  
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answer is at least partly dependent on the answerer, on his suggestions and consideration. A 
“creative component” contributes to the solving of conceptual problems.202 
Whereas a philosopher must appeal to her own intuitions, the actual use of language 
provides a negative test. Von Wright claims that a philosopher should not say anything which 
would go against the actual use of language. The language of the everyday is in the end the 
foundation on which we all must stand, and therefore the criticism that the philosopher raises 
against language must be exercised in the language of the everyday, and not by using some 
philosophical terminology invented for this purpose. A philosopher should not say anything 
which sounds strange or paradoxical. Philosophy should not be in conflict with common-
sense.203 I think this is a very challenging requirement; it is difficult to achieve, and respecting 
the demand blindly will lead to bad philosophy. I also think that von Wright has nevertheless 
followed his own advice remarkably well; In the Shadow of Descartes is an excellent example 
of this. Just how strongly this kind of understanding of the nature of philosophy differs from 
the naturalistic conception of philosophy cannot be exaggerated. Especially, the claim that 
philosophy is the explication of the conceptual intuitions of the philosopher is something 
which would sound utterly wrongheaded from the perspective of naturalism.  
 If we agree with von Wright that – in the case of philosophical problems – how a 
certain claim should be understood is an open question, then the following observation 
follows.  As  von  Wright  notes,  no  matter  in  what  way  a  philosophical  problem  is  “solved”,  
certain assumptions must be rejected if others are accepted. A philosopher who defends 
eliminative materialism accepts certain assumptions, like the ideological assumption that 
results of science are privileged, and must therefore reject certain other “assumptions” like the 
existence of propositional attitudes. A philosopher who defends the common-sense 
conception of ourselves accepts, for example, that what is obvious has primacy and thereby 
rejects  the  view  that  science  could  eventually  describe  us  as  we  “really  are”.  But  what  
assumptions are accepted and what assumptions rejected – that is, in which ways the concepts 
are related to each other in a certain conceptual field – depends, partly, on the philosopher’s 
own decision. There is no way to determine which decision is the right one. The decisions that 
a philosopher makes are acceptable insofar as they provide a clear overall picture of the 
conceptual field to be clarified. Every attempt to clarify conceptual intuitions must accept 
certain concepts as basic, and other concepts are to be clarified in terms of these. But on what 
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kind of foundation the conceptual clarification is to be built depends on the philosopher’s 
choice, and certain choices are such that they cannot be proven to be correct. In von Wright’s 
case, the view according to which ordinary language is a “transcendental” foundation of all 
philosophical investigations could be an example of this kind of choice, which cannot be 
proven to be correct but which nevertheless needs to be made. 
 My claim is that what is important in von Wright’s case is that the philosophical 
decisions he makes are strongly influenced by his views concerning much broader issues, 
such as the nature of humanity and society. It seems to me that in von Wright’s case, his 
philosophy and way of philosophizing was more of a personal agenda than in the case of 
many modern philosophers. We can assume that Wittgenstein strongly influenced this aspect 
of von Wright’s philosophy; von Wright often noted that it was especially Wittgenstein’s 
personality which had a strong effect on him. The exact nature of Wittgenstein’s influence on 
von Wright is a question which must be left to those who knew von Wright personally.204 It 
seems obvious to me that in von Wright’s case, his “philosophical” and “non-philosophical” 
views cannot be clearly separated. He wanted to defend a humanistic conception of human 
beings against the manipulation of humanity, and it is therefore no co-incidence that his 
writings in the philosophy of mind emphasize the irreducibility of the mental and the 
autonomy of psychology with respect to the natural sciences. Von Wright noted that the 
problem of humanism was something which preoccupied him throughout his mature life. In 
the center of this problem was “a search for an attitude to life and to one’s fellow humans”.205 
Given von Wright’s will to defend humanism and his view that the answers that a philosopher 
provides affect his own judgments and the way that he relates to his fellow humans and 
society, it is a natural conclusion to think that von Wright’s arguments in the philosophy of 
mind are meant to have effects outside philosophy. Indeed, von Wright claims that insofar as 
the ideas of a philosopher influence the thinking of others, a philosopher influences the life of 
others. A philosopher is thus not only providing conceptual clarification, (s)he is also 
changing the nature of reality through changing the attitudes of humans. I believe the best 
way to understand von Wright’s mature conception of philosophy is that philosophy is a 
normative discipline; its results can and should have an effect on society. 
 Naturalists see philosophy as being a continuous effort with science. The purpose of 
philosophy is not the clarification of meanings but, together with science, to describe how 
things are. In order to understand von Wright’s philosophy in the right way, the most 
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important thing to realize is how alien von Wright’s conception of philosophy is to 
naturalistic conception. Likewise, from von Wright’s perspective the kind of philosophy 
which is done in the naturalistic spirit cannot address those questions which interested him. 
By claiming that in philosophy Russell has defeated Wittgenstein, von Wright was acutely 
aware that the naturalistic trend is currently dominant in philosophy. Philosophy has become 
scientific and thereby distanced itself from the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy. Von 
Wright was very skeptical  of  this  trend  as  well  as  towards  the  contemporary  way of  life  in  
general. In his intellectual autobiography, von Wright claims that it is important to distinguish 
the peculiar activity of a philosopher from that of a logician, a mathematician, a natural or 
social scientist.206 The way in which the activity of a philosopher differs from the activities of 
natural scientists has been discussed already. But we should acknowledge von Wright’s more 
general belief that a society or culture where knowledge is emphasized at the cost of 
understanding can lead to uncongenial results. An intellectual atmosphere which aims at 
methodological monism may blur or ignore “the conceptual features peculiar to humanistic 
study…” and result in the dehumanization of people, as von Wright notes.207 Of these dangers 
we should be aware. The conceptual confusions and problems resulting from the monistic 
tendency of which von Wright had warned already in his Explanation and Understanding are 
concrete now. Bennett’s and Hacker’s Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is an up-
to-date description of these conceptual problems. They would agree that it is the task of a 
philosopher to “give a truthful general account of the conceptual peculiarities of this mode of 
[humanistic] understanding”, as von Wright claims.208 They would also agree, as their whole 
project testifies, that the failure to recognize the distinct logical nature of this mode of 
understanding has, in von Wright’s words “[…] fostered a tendency to look for 
methodological ideals in a direction, viz., natural science, where they should not be 
sought”.209 With respect to methodological monism von Wright’s position is absolutely clear. 
Already in Explanation and Understanding he  subscribes  to  a  form  of  conceptual  dualism,  
and the belief in a certain kind of irreducible dualism of nature and humanity was a guiding 
principle guiding his work until the end.210 This dualism is one of the most essential points of 
von Wright’s work in the philosophy of mind. In one of his last writings, von Wright even 
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went so far as to describe his unquestioned basis as “Cartesian”. By the use of this label von 
Wright wanted to emphasize that in his view there are “two kinds of phenomena which are 
(conceptually) sharply distinguished and irreducible the one to the other.”211 This Cartesian 
standpoint von Wright describes as a form of non-reductive dualism.212 
 The position of methodological dualism stands opposed to a view which emphasizes 
the  role  of  knowledge  as  the  highest  cognitive  activity  of  human beings.  If  we  consider  the  
current intellectual atmosphere in Western societies, I believe we can conclude that von 
Wright’s  worry  –  according  to  which  hypertrophy of  knowledge  may happen  at  the  cost  of  
understanding – is legitimate and perhaps currently more relevant than ever. In von Wright’s 
opinion, a good intellectual education or intellectual culture is one in which the two cognitive 
aspects of humanity, knowledge and understanding, are in balance.213 In his view, there exists 
currently an imbalance because although we know more than ever, we do not always 
understand correctly what it is that we know. Von Wright thought that this was one sign of the 
overall sickness of modern society. We focus on increasing our knowledge without realizing 
that real spiritual progress comes only when knowledge is accompanied by understanding. I 
would like to think that the need for philosophy in addition to science is connected precisely 
to the need to understand the phenomena of our time. Those thinking that philosophy 
competes with science are apt to conclude that the relevance of philosophy is decreasing as 
the amount of scientific knowledge is accumulating. Philosophy’s progress pales when 
compared to the progress of science. Quantitatively, science rises above philosophy, but this 
is  because,  as  von  Wright  notes,  there  is  no  progress  but  “regeneration”  in  philosophy.214 I 
think Hacker captures very well the general view to which von Wright would subscribe: “[…] 
the form of science is progress, the structure of science is hierarchical, and advances in 
science are built upon prior achievements. Not so in the case of philosophy, which is ‘flat’. 
Achievement in philosophy is the attainment of understanding, not the acquisition of fresh 
knowledge.”215  
 With the increase in knowledge comes an increased need to understand what we 
know. As we will see, von Wright’s work in the philosophy of mind is an attempt to better 
understand, for example, the claims of neurophilosophers. In order to understand what it is 
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that is being claimed, a conceptual clarification is often required. Von Wright’s writings in the 
philosophy of mind are not hypotheses competing with the claims made by “scientific 
philosophers of mind”. His approach goes “deeper”, because the purpose is to understand to 
what extent these claims make sense. This is a straightforward consequence of von Wright’s 
understanding concerning what a philosopher should do. 
 
1.3 A methodological caveat 
 
I have suggested that von Wright and Davidson could resist the naturalist challenge for 
philosophy given their Wittgensteinian understanding about the nature of philosophy. I think 
there is, however, an inconsistency between their conception of philosophy and the way they 
actually practice philosophy or put forward philosophical theses. A “true Wittgensteinian” 
like Hacker would challenge the assumptions of modern philosophy of mind in a quite 
different way than Davidson and von Wright.  
The observations that must be made for the coming chapters are these: 1) Davidson 
and von Wright could have used their understanding about the nature of philosophy more 
effectively against reductive versions of naturalism, thereby emphasizing the need for a 
certain kind of philosophy and for certain kinds of philosophical arguments. They could have 
emphasized more strongly that philosophy differs from science and could have used this 
distinction to justify their philosophical theses. 2) Davidson and von Wright only rarely utilize 
their conception of philosophy and are actually often playing “the intellectual game” of the 
reductive naturalists. 3) Since I want to analyze the philosophies of von Wright and Davidson, 
I am not attempting to use the Wittgensteinian conception in order to challenge the scientific 
or scientistic philosophy of mind. My purpose is to show both situations: those on the one 
hand where von Wright and Davidson are not true to their conception of philosophy and seem 
to be playing the game of scientific philosophers, as well as those on the other, where they do 
seem to challenge contemporary philosophy based on their Wittgensteinian conception.  
In  this  work  I  am  willing  to  accept  many  of  the  assumptions  of  the  reductive  
naturalists. The reason for this is twofold; first, I want to show that reductive naturalism and 
its physicalistic ontology face serious problems even if we are willing to grant certain basic 
premises of the position instead of dismissing the claims simply as nonsense, like Hacker and 
many  other  neo-Wittgensteinians  do.   I  am  therefore  willing  to  let  the  reductive  naturalists  
choose the place where the fight over the human mind will be fought, and I am also letting 
them bring many of their own weapons with them. Another, more straightforward critical 
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strategy, would be to change the rules of the game as, for example, Hacker does. By following 
this strategy, one unfortunately also marginalizes one’s own position and thereby makes it 
less persuasive.  
I believe that the confusions besetting the modern philosophy of mind could be better 
tackled by the use of Wittgensteinian insights than is currently being done. This challenge 
must, however, be the topic of future work. The other reason why I am willing to grant many 
of the assumptions of my opponents is the fact that this is what Davidson and von Wright did 
as well. Despite their conception of philosophy, their positions were closer to a kind of 
naturalistic philosophy of mind than to the kind of position argued by Hacker. My purpose is 
to explore how Davidson and von Wright, while being critical of naturalism, manage to 
respond to the naturalistic challenge in the context of naturalism.   
 
1.4 Conclusions of chapter one 
 
In this chapter I have tentatively suggested that science is becoming an increasing threat for 
the philosophy of mind. I have clarified the intellectual landscape in which the contemporary 
philosophy of mind operates. The relevance of the kind of philosophy that Davidson and von 
Wright can be seen as practicing is challenged in this intellectual atmosphere, which 
encourages scientific philosophy. This raises the question of how philosophy in general, and 
von Wright’s and Davidson’s positions in particular, can resist empirical pressures. 
In section 1.1 and 1.1.1, the possible consequences of a naturalistic conception were 
considered and the general problems of eliminative materialism, which is a paradigm example 
of scientific philosophy of mind, were discussed.  In section 1.2, I made it clear how 
Davidson and von Wright could answer the challenge posed by science. This was done by 
considering what, in their view, the purpose of philosophy could be and by noting that science 
cannot fulfill this purpose. In clarifying von Wright’s and Davidson’s conceptions of 
philosophy, I have emphasized the similarities between their views and suggested that 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of the nature of philosophy has influenced both von Wright and 
Davidson. Their positions in the philosophy of mind cannot be properly evaluated if their 
conceptions of philosophy are not taken into account. 
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Chapter two: Non-reductive physicalism and its warrantability 
 
In this chapter I consider the following question: How should we understand the 
physicalism of ‘non-reductive physicalism’, and is such physicalism warranted? This 
question has been one of the most pressing questions in the modern philosophy of mind. My 
purpose is to discuss whether non-reductive physicalism is a satisfying answer to the classical 
mind–body problem. Many modern philosophers claim that the mind–body problem has been 
solved; mind is a physical thing, or at least a physical phenomenon. According to John Searle:  
 
The famous mind–body problem… has a simple solution. This solution has been available to any 
educated person since serious work began on the brain nearly a century ago, and, in a sense, we all 
know it to be true. Here it is: mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the 
brain and are themselves features of the brain.216  
 
This is the claim of naturalism. Science has solved the mind–body problem by showing that 
mental phenomena are features of the brain. “We all know it to be true”, as Searle claims. Yet 
there are philosophers who think that this conclusion of naturalism is rushed and 
oversimplified. Thomas Nagel claims that: “We do not at present have even the outline of an 
adequate theory of the place of the mind in the natural order…. Our knowledge is entirely 
empirical and ad hoc, not theoretical”217 and suggests that since “no one has a plausible 
answer to the mind–body problem, all we can really do is to try to develop various 
alternatives  one  of  which  may  prove  in  the  long  run  to  be  an  ancestor  of  a  credible  
solution.”218 Colin Mcginn notes: “We have been trying for a long time to solve the mind–
body problem. It has stubbornly resisted our best efforts. The mystery persists. I think the 
time has come to admit candidly that we cannot resolve the mystery.”219 There is thus 
disagreement among the most active philosophers of mind with respect to question whether or 
not the mind–body has been solved, or even whether it can be solved. Physicalism is one 
answer to the mind body problem, but many see its status as being that of an empirical 
hypothesis.220 My interest in considering the mind–body theories of Davidson and von Wright 
is to clarify whether they have plausible philosophical, i.e. in some sense non-empirical, 
arguments for physicalism. Because the problem persists, I believe that one should be open to 
different  views  as  Nagel  suggests.  What  I  want  to  find  out  is  whether  von  Wright  and  
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Davidson present something philosophically unique and important for the contemporary 
mind–body debate, and how they would answer the main question about the status of non-
reductive physicalism. In doing this, I will clarify several exegetical issues by showing the 
similarities  between  the  positions  of  von  Wright  and  Davidson.  This  exercise  demonstrates  
the current relevance of these philosophers by showing how they can contribute to the 
contemporary discussion. The sub-questions that will be considered are the following: What 
is the content of the physicalism to which Davidson and von Wright subscribe? What reasons 
do they give for this kind of physicalism? How do they address the problems that a non-
reductive physicalism faces? Would it be more correct to describe their non-reductive 
positions as versions of non-physicalism? The emphasis will be on Davidson’s view, given 
the influence of anomalous monism (AM) for the contemporary philosophy of mind and 
given the fact that he wrote more on the subject that von Wright. 
Most contemporary philosophers are physicalists. What a commitment to physicalism 
requires  or  implies,  however,  is  a  matter  of  current  disagreement.  How  the  position  of  
physicalism should be exactly defined is also a question under debate. The amount of 
literature discussing these very questions is a testament to how unsettled even the basic 
questions about the nature of contemporary physicalism are. One common way to describe 
physicalism is to say that this position claims that there exists only one substance and that the 
nature of this substance will be described, at least in principle, by the most general science 
that studies the nature of reality. This science is, by definition, physics. Everything that can be 
thought of as being constituted of something is somehow constituted of the basic entities that 
fundamental physics describes, and everything is governed by the fundamental laws of 
physics. Philosophers now widely accept that immaterial souls do not exist and nothing lies 
outside the spatio-temporal physical reality that physics studies.221 Seen from a historical 
perspective, this consensus about the truth of physicalism is a very recent (namely a 20th 
century) view. In the history of philosophy, substance dualism, idealism or some other non-
materialist position has often been seen as a real alternative by many first-class philosophers. 
What has convinced the majority of philosophers of the truth of physicalism? Fodor 
has noted that one reason to believe that physicalism is true is the fact that the alternatives are 
even worse. This humorous comment invokes a partial truth, but it is obviously not a good 
reason for a critical philosopher to think that physicalism is de facto true. Why is it the case 
that all non-physicalistic alternatives seem implausible nowadays? The currently existing 
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ontological consensus in the philosophy of mind is, at least partly, a straight result of the 
program of naturalism which has been dominant in analytical philosophy since the 1950s. As 
has been discussed in chapter one, the main claim of naturalism is that philosophy should be 
continuous with science. Scientific knowledge about the nature of reality, the “scientific 
world view”, suggests that the whole of reality is physical. Many philosophers think that there 
is no real evidence for dualism. By this they mean that there is no scientific evidence for this 
position. In the context of naturalism the interest in philosophical arguments for dualism has 
decreased. There is no point in defending or even exploring a dualistic position, because it 
would be at odds with the results of science. Because there allegedly is scientific evidence for 
physicalism, there is not much interest in defending physicalism by philosophical arguments 
either.  Physicalism  is  a  position  which  nowadays  is  often  taken  for  granted;  it  is  a  starting  
point from which considerations about the problems of the mind proceed.  
As far as ontology (the question of what there is) is concerned, dualism has been 
rejected and physicalism has been accepted. What does the acceptance of physicalism actually 
tell us about the nature of the mind? For many contemporary philosophers the mind–body 
problem, as traditionally understood, has lost its importance and appeal. Neurophilosophers 
are  a  paradigm  example  of  this,  because  their  work  is  done  completely  in  the  context  of  
physicalism. Whereas in the history of philosophy the mind–body problem has been the 
problem of whether mind and matter are identical, whether mind is matter or vice versa, the 
current problem is seen as one of how the physical mind fits to the physical world. The 
question is not whether or not mental phenomena are physical phenomena. In this sense, the 
ontological mind–body dichotomy has been erased. The resulting question is what kind of 
physical phenomena mental phenomena are. This, according to many naturalists, is best 
understood as an empirical question, which will be solved in terms of the sciences studying 
the brain.  
But what does it  mean to say that physicalism is true with respect to the mind? How 
should the content of physicalism be understood? What follows from the acceptance of 
physicalism? How well does a physicalistic position answer the question of what our nature as 
thinkers and agents is? Does the acceptance of physicalism mean something more than 
accepting the “mere” claim that the mind is identical with the brain and therefore beliefs, 
desires, hopes and wishes are states of the brain? With respect to these questions, two 
versions of physicalism – reductive and non-reductive – stand far apart, even though both are 
committed to the view that “everything is physical”. But, or so I would like to think, the claim 
that everything is physical is empty given that mind has not been reduced to matter. What 
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does it mean to say that the mind is a physical entity? It is not known how brains produce 
mental phenomena, if indeed they do. The relation between brains and mental phenomena, if 
there is such, is unknown. The occurrences of specific mental phenomena cannot be clearly 
located.  We cannot explain how mental phenomena can cause bodily movements. How the 
idea of free will fits into a physical world view is a mystery. The physical status of subjective, 
qualitative aspects of experiences remains puzzling. All these questions are more or less 
unresolved; yet the consensus view is that mind is a physical entity, as if this claim could be 
understood in any clear sense in the absence of answers to the previous questions.222 “Mind is 
nothing but the brain”, goes the famous slogan. What does this claim actually tell us about the 
mind or about our mental lives? Does this slogan tell us anything about the most important 
aspect of ourselves, of our mental lives? Does it offer anything more than an abstract 
suggestion that we are part of nature? But what does this mean? We, as persons, feel love, 
sadness, joy, jealousy, for example. We plan things, have hopes, act freely according to our 
wishes.  Sometimes  we act  against  our  better  judgments  or  do  things  that  we  should  not  do.  
We wonder what the “meaning of life” is and spend endless hours thinking about how we 
should live our lives, often wondering what the right choice in a given situation is. Does the 
physicalistic answer give us any advice on how to think about these essential aspects? 
These questions show that the position of physicalism, although a widely accepted 
view in the current philosophy of mind, is full of unresolved questions. What I will consider 
here is whether Davidson and von Wright give convincing arguments for physicalism. As will 
become clear, these philosophers share the view that everything there is, is physical. In this 
sense they are part of the physicalistic movement of modern philosophy, although it would be 
misleading to say that they belong to the naturalistic movement in any substantial sense.223 
Davidson and von Wright accept physicalism insofar as it is understood as a view opposed to 
substance dualism, i.e. a modern view according to which nothing exists except “physical 
particles”, their constitutions and forces, as recognized by physics. This position can be called 
O-physicalism.224 But the term “physicalism” is also often associated with a view that an 
adequate account of mental or other “problematic” phenomena must either be an explanatory 
theory from the natural sciences or be somehow vindicated by such a theory. This position 
                                               
222 It has to be admitted that the situation is not as straightforward and pessimistic as the claims above may 
suggest. Of course scientists already know or claim to know many things about the relation between mind and 
brain. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted among many philosophers that consciousness is still a very deep 
mystery and the problem of free will is as pressing as ever. 
223 As noted in chapter one, both Davidson and von Wright do express a commitment to naturalism by denying 
the existence of “super-natural” entities. This form of naturalism is so weak that it needs to be clearly separated 
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can be called M-physicalism.225 An essential  part  of  M-physicalism,  together  with  the  view 
that mental phenomena need scientific vindication, is that all problems about the mental can 
ultimately be explained in physical terms.  Contemporary  naturalism  accepts  the  truth  of  O-  
and M-physicalism, and claims that the problem of consciousness, the problem of mental 
causation  or  the  problem of  free  will  can  be  explained  in  scientific,  physical  terms.  On this  
kind of naturalism is based the view that physicalism should be thoroughgoing, thus 
encompassing ontology as well as methodology. According to this variety of naturalism, only 
truths entailed by the truths of the natural sciences should be believed, and what is 
inconsistent with these latter truths should be disbelieved. M-physicalism is something which 
von Wright and Davidson, by their rejection of this contemporary naturalistic view of 
philosophy, are willing to reject.   
 
2.1 One answer to the mind–body problem: Davidson’s anomalous monism  
 
In  the  following  three  sections,  the  question  of  whether  Davidson’s  theory  of  mind,  
anomalous monism, is a convincing physicalistic answer to the mind–body problem will be 
considered. Most critics have concluded that it is not. A general problem about Davidson’s 
position is that it is not clear whether it should be seen as a form of physicalism at all; if not, 
then, despite its other merits, it surely cannot be a physicalistic answer to the mind–body 
problem,  whether  in  its  traditional  or  in  its  or  contemporary  form.  From  a  critical  point  of  
view, AM may thus fail in two ways in being a physicalistic answer to the mind–body 
problem. First, it may fail by being an inadequate answer against dualism. Second, supposing 
that it is an adequate answer against dualism, it may fail as not being an adequate form of M-
physicalism. The latter failure would imply AM’s inadequacy as a naturalistic theory of 
mind. Davidson’ position would thus be hopelessly unscientific from the viewpoint of 
naturalism. 
Before the relevance of Davidson’s views about the mind–body problem can be 
evaluated, they need to be made clear. Given that Davidson’s position has been described at 
least as a form of “ontological monism of events (respectively things) and a psychophysical 
dualism of properties that corresponds epistemologically to a dualism of concepts- and 
descriptions”226, “emergent materialism”227, “neutral monism”, “transcendental physicalism”, 
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“property dualism” and “eliminative materialism”, there is a clear exegetical question to be 
solved. All the labels cannot be correct although, as will become clear, different 
interpretations of Davidson’s position are justified. In section 2.1.1 the general background of 
AM will be presented and the exegetical issues considered. In sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, the 
exact nature of the monism of AM will be discussed from the assumed perspective that AM is 
meant to be a physicalistic answer to the mind–body problem. This assumption will be 
justified in the next section.  
 
2.1.1 The place of AM in contemporary philosophy of mind 
 
With respect to philosophers who are no longer alive, there are two important questions to be 
considered.  First,  what,  if  any,  was  the  relevance  of  the  work  of  that  philosopher  when the  
philosopher was active? Second, what, if any, is the relevance of the work today? With 
respect to Davidson, who produced philosophical insights for decades, a widespread opinion 
seems to be that the ideas were original and relevant when they were put forward, but time 
has treated them unkindly. Here I will consider these two questions and aim for a conclusion 
about the relevance of AM based on the answers to them. Whereas some could argue that the 
first question is not interesting, I suggest that it is important to acknowledge how a position 
like AM has shaped, if at all, modern philosophy of mind. Moreover, following Nagel’s 
advice, I suggest that one should have interest in various kinds of mind–body positions. The 
materialist consensus should not entirely obliterate the interest of peculiar positions in the 
philosophy of mind. In the spirit of chapter one, I suggest that these positions may teach us 
more than most of the materialist positions. 
There are not many contemporary philosophers of mind who succeed in constructing 
an original and distinctive position. Davidson is one exception because AM, a well known 
and an original view, is associated entirely with him. Davidson really came up with his own 
theory of mind, which he saw as an alternative to nomological monism, like physicalism, to 
nomological dualism, like parallelism, interactionism and epiphenomenalism, and to 
anomalous dualism, like Cartesianism. In the contemporary discussion, AM is usually 
interpreted as a form of non-reductive, token physicalism. It is a version of physicalism which 
is meant to be an alternative to other physicalistic positions like type-physicalism and 
eliminative materialism. Davidson is thus often interpreted as the originator of non-reductive 
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monism.228 This is a noteworthy achievement given the importance of this position today. The 
historical origins of AM can be detected in Spinoza and Kant. Davidson himself notes that, 
before he presented the view, a similar kind of position is recognized as a possibility by 
Herbert Feigl, Sydney Shoemaker and Charles Taylor, accepted by Thomas Nagel and 
endorsed by Peter Strawson.229 There are thus certain historical influences, but the 
formulation of the position and the argument structure is Davidson’s own. AM, although 
found to be an interesting position by some, does not have many contemporary followers. The 
most notable philosopher who came to endorse AM is in fact Quine. Rorty is also influenced 
by  Davidson’s  view,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  same  seems  to  be  true  of  Nagel.  Some  
contemporary philosophers show positive interest in AM although they do not fully subscribe 
to it.  The general  view of the status of the status of AM is,  however,  critical  – and whereas 
there are, for example eliminative materialists discussing philosophical problems of the mind, 
there are no “anomalous monists” participating in the discussion. 
In order to evaluate AM correctly, the situation in the philosophy of mind at the time 
when Davidson presented his position needs to be recognized. Although the mind–body 
problem is currently formulated in the framework of O-physicalism, there was a time, not so 
long ago, when the mind–body problem, as traditionally understood, was precisely one of the 
main issues on which the truth of ontological physicalism hinged. The sudden swing to the 
truth  of  physicalism  is  a  surprisingly  recent  view.  Ullin  T.  Place,  one  of  the  originators  of  
type–type identity theory, noted in 1989 that:  
 
[…] whereas in 1956 every philosopher you met was quite convinced that whatever answer to the mind–
body problem, if there is one, is true, materialism must be false, today it is almost as difficult, at least in 
the English-speaking world, to find a philosopher who is prepared to defend any other position.230 
 
I would say that this sudden change in only a fifty-year timeframe is remarkable given the fact 
that what is at stake is an all-encompassing metaphysical position. Those who are not 
convinced that the truth of physicalism is an established fact of course still think that the 
mind–body problem is something which creates a serious obstacle to a physicalistic world 
view. According to the critical voices, the problem is not merely one of finding a place for the 
mind in the physical world. Given the unresolved mind–body problem, the very coherence of 
the physicalistic world view is problematic.231 I think that the current critical statements 
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against physicalism show that the basic questions about the coherence of this position are still, 
pace reductive and eliminative naturalists, in need of serious consideration.232 
When the  physicalistic  consensus  was  not  as  firm as  it  is  today,  it  was  unclear  how 
physicalism as a general view or as a view in the philosophy of mind could be argued for, 
shown to be true and defended. As Place notes, in the 1950s most philosophers thought that 
materialism was not an adequate answer to the mind–body problem, and an argument was 
required to change this opinion in favor of materialism. An interesting question, therefore, is 
what the factors that convinced so many philosophers about the truth of physicalism were. 
Jaegwon Kim, Tyler Burge and others have argued that certain scientific achievements were 
important for philosophers to start believing in this all encompassing metaphysical thesis.233 
This is, of course, partly a sociological story about the progress of philosophy in the 20th 
century,  the details  of which remain beyond the scope of this work. However,  the scientific 
evidence started to point towards the conclusion that no matter which part of reality is studied, 
the entities and phenomena that are encountered are ultimately physical. Burge suggests that 
success in biochemical research as well as in non-human animal neurophysiology during the 
1950s could be among such important scientific achievements. It seems to me that the 
increase in our scientific knowledge about the nature of reality created an atmosphere in 
which there was room – and also a need – for physicalistic theories in the philosophy of mind. 
David Papineau argues that physicalism came to prominence during the 1950s and 1960s in 
the philosophy of mind because there was enough evidence for philosophers to start believing 
in the completeness of physics.234 This, together with the kind of physiological evidence that 
Kim and Burge emphasize, convinced many philosophers. A metaphysical thesis was thus a 
result of scientific progress and not a result of philosophical reasoning, as many of the 
metaphysical conclusions in the history of philosophy had hitherto been. The consensus view 
concerned not only the general structure of the world but contained a specific view about the 
mind too, namely the view that since O-physicalism is true, the traditional mind–body 
problem will eventually be settled empirically through science. 
But can the truth of ontological physicalism be defended simply by declaring that 
everything there is, is what physics or some other natural science describes there to be? 
Somebody’s awareness of herself, of the fact that she is conscious, that she has feelings etc. is 
certainly not a scientific truth. Such facts are not known to an individual because of science. It 
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is  not a same kind of claim as,  for example,  the claim that water is  H20. Whereas the latter 
claim can be explicated in scientific terms, science cannot explain why I am aware of being 
conscious or what my being conscious consists in, and there are no scientific breakthroughs 
which were required for us to become aware of our own consciousness, whereas a scientific 
breakthrough was required for us to believe that water is H2O. Through self-observation, one 
may feel that the subjective point of view of an agent is so unique to the agent in question that 
the grasping of that point of view is forever beyond objective science. The problem of the 
point  of  view  of  an  agent,  the  problem  of  what  being somebody actually  means,  or  how  it  
should be understood, raises deep existential questions about the meaning of life which cannot 
be discussed here.  
If trust in scientific evidence is all that is required to believe that O-physicalism with 
respect to mind is unproblematic, why was the consensus not in place much earlier? For 
example, Darwin’s Origin of Species published in 1859 was for many a convincing proof that 
humanity is part of the nature in exactly the same sense as other animals are. Many think that 
the human soul was banished when it was shown that our ancestors were non-human 
primates. Yet, philosophers did not turn into physicalists after reading Darwin. But if the 
completeness of physics, an empirical claim which is a debated issue, is now thought to 
demonstrate the falsity of ontological dualism, why wasn’t the evidence that humans are 
sophisticated animals already enough? Without trying to solve, beyond the conclusions of 
Papineau, Kim and others, the puzzle of why philosophers started to believe in physicalism, I 
would like to suggest that the general prevailing attitude in a society at large is also a factor 
influencing also the direction of philosophical theories.  The latter part  of 20th century was a 
time when trust in scientific progress was high, and the same intellectual atmosphere still 
continues,  and  is  in  fact  stronger  than  ever.  Rorty,  who  often  has  the  ability  to  see  
philosophical problems in a wider perspective, noted already in 1972 that:  
 
[…] the reason Cartesian dualism is so unpopular nowadays is not because of any application of the 
powerful methods of modern analytical philosophy, but simply because we keep reading in Life and The 
Scientific American about cerebral localization, the production of any desired emotion, thought, or sense 
impression by the insertion of electrodes and the like.235 
 
If Rorty is correct, the exorcism of dualism had nothing to do with philosophical arguments. 
Whether the scientific mood and therefore also the nature of philosophical theories about the 
mind  are  going  to  change  during  this  century  remains  to  be  seen.  Pessimism  about  science  
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could also change the way how the autonomy of the mind with respect to scientific results is 
seen.  A  possible  revival  of  religions  could  also  cast  doubts  upon  the  prevailing  all-
encompassing materialism.  
As an observation about the history of philosophy of mind, it can be noted that once 
the general metaphysical assumption that everything is physical was in place, different 
versions of philosophical identity theories of the mind became quickly popular. Identity 
theories seemed reasonable given our increased knowledge about the nature of non-mental 
reality. In the 1950s and 1960s the prospects of type–type identity theory were widely 
discussed. According to this view, whenever a person has, for example, pain she is in a certain 
neural state, so that she is in this state whenever she is in pain. It can thus be asserted that 
“being in pain = being in a neural state N”. Another position which had many supporters was 
eliminative materialism. As has been discussed already, this view suggests that eventually the 
need to establish identities between brain states and mental states vanishes because mental 
terms do not refer to anything that is real. Both of these approaches were strongly influenced 
by the view that philosophical results should be continuous with scientific ones. Kim recalls 
the situation of that time. The approach of type–type identity theorists: 
 
[…] sounded refreshingly bold and tough-minded, and seemed in tune with the optimistic scientific 
temper of the times. It was an intriguing and exciting idea that mental events could just be brain 
processes, and that scientific research could show this, just as science showed us that light was 
electromagnetic radiation, and that genes were DNA molecules.236 
 
Once again, we should be astonished by the fact that only fifty years ago the view that mental 
events are brain processes was “exciting and intriguing”, whereas nowadays many 
philosophers, like Searle, find this view dull and uninteresting and a truism at best. 
Identity theories were thought to describe how the mind fits the scientific picture of the 
world which philosophers had already created for themselves. J.J.C. Smart, one main figure 
behind the type–type identity theory, notes that he sees it as necessary to defend a 
physicalistic world view for reasons of “scientific plausibility”.237 As a curiosity, it can be 
noted that von Wright wanted to argue against dualism on the same grounds, although he 
wasn’t especially interested in defending a physicalistic world view. Smart’s approach 
focuses on showing that mental states, the most difficult category for a physicalist of that 
time, can be incorporated into the broad physicalistic picture. His classic paper, “Sensations 
and Brain Processes”, begins with a very honest and sincere declaration that the author cannot 
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believe that consciousness would be something that could stay outside the physicalistic 
picture of the world. We are told: “That everything should be explicable in terms of physics… 
except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.”238 Smart admits 
that this is largely a “confession of faith” and goes on to say that a philosophical argument 
which would compel us to believe in “nomological danglers” would, in his opinion, most 
likely be flawed. But back in Smart’s times “scientific plausibility” was the only reason why 
dualism seemed implausible!    
Were physicalistic identity theories arguments for physicalism or consequences of a 
physicalistic world view? Was one motive behind them to provide an additional argument 
against substance dualism and in favor of physicalism? Philosophers tried to provide reasons 
why  physicalism  with  respect  to  mind  should  be  accepted,  but  whether  these  theories  were  
really required to defend physicalism as a general thesis is unclear given that a belief to 
general monistic position was reached on independent grounds, that is, by considering the 
empirical evidence and reading The Scientific American. This being said, it should be 
acknowledged that since a satisfying physicalistic theory of the mind remains to be discovered 
still, a convincing philosophical argument for physicalism would certainly be a good thing for 
a physicalist. No wonder philosophers keep writing books in which the physicalistic position 
is explicated and defended. Illustrative recent examples are John Bickle’s Philosophy and 
Neuroscience, a Ruthlessly Reductive Account, Andrew Melnyk’s A Physicalist Manifesto: 
Thoroughly Modern Materialism and  Thomas Polger’s Natural Minds.239 
Although the motivation to argue in favor of type–type identity theories increased as a 
result of scientific discoveries, many identity theories were nevertheless “philosophical” in 
the sense that they were not based on empirical discoveries about the relationship between 
mental and physical phenomena. They were proposals and they were speculative. These 
“theories” were not, and did not become, scientific theories which are supported by empirical 
evidence from scientific inquiry. Type–type theories held that mental phenomena could be 
reduced to physical phenomena, and that a successful reduction would show and thus 
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“guarantee” the identity between the two. What was central to this view was the thought that 
reduction between the mental and the physical would proceed through laws linking the two 
conceptual or ontological domains. Whatever differences there were in the details between 
versions of type–type identity theories, all were forms of nomological monism for which 
Davidson offered AM as an alternative. 
In 1970 Davidson offered an important contribution to the discussion of the time when 
he introduced his own theory of mind. It is a view which is meant to reconcile three principles 
which seem to be inconsistent, and yet, or so Davidson argued, all are true. They are: 
 
1) The Principle of Causal Interaction: At least some mental events interact  
causally with physical events. 
2) The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality: Events related  
as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. 
3) The Anomalism of the Mental: There are no strict deterministic laws on the basis 
of which mental events can be predicted and explained.240 
 
A realization that 1–3 can be true together opens the possibility for AM. What was the nature 
of the relation which Davidson took to exist between the mental and the physical? His view is 
that there is only one substance, thus the monism of his position. A fairly standard 
interpretation is that in this respect, the view which Davidson put forward was meant to be an 
argument in favor of physicalism. AM is a form of O-physicalism. However, the other part of 
the view, namely the anomalousness, suggested that there are no laws linking the mental and 
the physical domains. So, although Davidson’s view can be seen as a version of an identity 
theory, it differs from the standard versions in an important and in a radical sense. What are 
the differences? 
First  of  all,  it  seems  to  me  that  the overall motivation behind AM is quite different 
than the spirit which motivated the type–type identity theories of the 1950s. These theories 
were “tough-minded and in tune with the optimistic scientific temper of the time”. 241 Kim has 
noted: “The mental autonomy that Davidson wants is not the kind of autonomy that 
philosophers like Jerry Fodor have sought for psychology…. Rather, it is the autonomy of 
agency and the will, of the kind that Kant famously sought”.242 The speculative type–type 
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identity theories were the science-inspired philosophical views about the mind of their time, 
and  Fodor’s  speculative  view,  together  with  many  naturalistic  theories,  are  examples  of  
science-inspired philosophical views of our time. Whereas there is nothing distinctively 
unscientific in AM, scientific evidence plays no part in Davidson’s version of the identity 
theory  and  it  does  not  motivate  the  philosophical  position.  The  reason  for  coming  up  with  
such a position was philosophical: a need to answer the Kantian challenge. As is well known, 
the challenge is: if physical determinism holds for all of nature, how is freedom possible?243 A 
current formulation could be: since determinism holds for all of nature, how is freedom 
possible? This problem will be considered in chapter four. I believe that an adequate answer 
to this question requires the development of Davidson’s and von Wright’s insights and a 
rejection of their version of physicalism. 
The fact that AM has a deep philosophical aim distinguishes it from most 
contemporary materialistic theories of the mind and is part of its “attractiveness”.244 Davidson 
was not satisfied with the standard view in analytical philosophy according to which there is 
no conflict  between determinism and free will.  The claim was,  and is even more today, that  
they are compatible.245 According to Davidson, this answer is radically incomplete, although 
he does not give clear reasons for his critical view. Davidson’s purpose nevertheless is to 
unite the mind–body problem with the question of the possible compatibility of free will and 
determinism. One can here recall what Wilfrid Sellars famously claimed: “The aim of 
philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense 
of  the  term hang together  in  the  broadest  possible  sense  of  the  term.”246 If  these  words  are  
believed, then – or so I think – AM is a better philosophical view about the mind than most of 
its rivals. It serves philosophical aims better than scientific “philosophical” models of the 
mind, and is therefore an interesting philosophical position. AM is not merely a technical 
view about the relationship between mind and body, but part of Davidson’s general picture of 
the human condition. If we require, as I think we should, that a philosophical theory of mind 
should say something about human freedom, then Davidson’s theory ranks higher on the scale 
than even a detailed view about the relation between mind and matter that nevertheless 
remains silent about the problem of freedom. 
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Second, a more technical difference between AM and the identity theories of the 1950s 
and 1960s is Davidson’s claim according to which there are no laws linking the mental and 
the  physical  realms.  When  the  view  was  first  offered  its  novelty  was  that the argument for 
physicalism was given without the claim that there have to be laws linking the two domains. 
In fact, although “Mental Events” from 1970 is the classic paper to which references are 
always made in the subsequent literature, Davidson had already noted in 1963 that his 
position seemed to be identical with the views of Herbert Feigl and Smart if it were not for his 
claim about the anomalism of the mental.247 Feigl had offered his view in 1958 and Smart in 
1959. Their purpose was to defend physicalism. In my opinion, Davidson’s reference to these 
type–type theorists can be interpreted as suggesting that his theory was also meant to offer 
support for physicalism. Although AM has philosophical aims, perhaps one motivation 
behind it, as in the case of Smart, was to provide support for physicalism for reasons of 
“scientific plausibility”. But the distinctive aspect of AM is that monism was achieved even 
though the thesis of the anomalism or the irreducibility of the mental was taken to be true. In 
fact, since Davidson was “convinced” that the anomalism of the mental was true he could not, 
so to speak, allow the possibility of type–type reduction insofar as this requires laws 
connecting the mental and the physical. Such a reduction would have been in direct conflict 
with the thesis of anomalism. Given Davidson’s conviction that the anomalism of the mental 
is true, but so is physicalistic monism as well, one purpose of “Mental Events” was to “lay 
rest the view, common to many friends and foes of identity theories, that support for such 
theories can come only from the discovery of psychophysical laws.”248 This is an important 
claim insofar as it opens the possibility of O-physicalism without reduction. Those interested 
in defending physicalism should see this as a welcome result because reductive accounts of 
the mind have failed, and this raises the question of what reasons there might be to believe 
that O-physicalism with respect to mind is true. In other words, as long as successful mental 
to physical reductions are lacking, why believe that the mind is part of the physical reality in 
any substantial sense at all? 
Davidson’s view became one example of a theory which is meant to be a version of 
physicalism, but which is also meant to be non-reductive. In the subsequent discussion, AM is 
often referred to as the locus classicus of non-reductive physicalism. Other well known forms 
of non-reductive physicalism are functionalism and emergentism, although the latter’s status 
as a version of physicalism has been seriously doubted and debated recently. What these 
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positions share, according to the standard interpretation, is the view that mental properties 
will not reduce to basic physical properties. For this reason they are often described as forms 
of property dualism.249 Although these positions are seen as dualistic with respect to 
properties they, at least AM and functionalism, are meant to be versions of physicalistic 
monism since they hold that mental phenomena are token-identical with physical phenomena. 
With AM and functionalism the terms token-physicalism and non-reductive physicalism 
became part of the philosophical jargon, and they are usually referred to as the views which 
discredited type–type identity theories by showing their defects.  
Let us briefly conclude what the importance of AM has been and what its place in the 
contemporary philosophy of mind is. According to Place, philosophers used to think, before 
identity  theories  were  common,  that  materialism would  not  be  the  answer  which  solved  the  
mind–body problem. Then, for somewhat unknown reasons, the opinion changed and for a 
short period of time, either type–type identity or eliminative materialism seemed to be a 
correct description of the mind–body relation. This period came to an end when AM and 
functionalism challenged type–type theories. Token-physicalism became the orthodox view. 
Consequent interest in emergentism and explorations of a more direct move away from 
physicalism are, for some at least, welcome side-effects of the success of non-reductivism. 
However, recently the situation has been changing again. The coherence of non-reductive 
physicalism has been under serious debate ever since the position became part of the 
philosophical discussion. A philosophically motivated identity theory has received new 
support from Polger.250 In the works of the Churchlands eliminative materialism has been 
vigorously defended again. John Bickle, a “new-wave reductionist”, defending a thoroughly 
physicalistic approach to the mind, has noted that: “Much current ‘non-reductive physicalism’ 
is not physicalism at all.”251 In the case of Davidson Bickle contends that some of his central 
remarks fit better with the idea of dualism than physicalism. Similar remarks about 
Davidson’s position have been made by Kim, who has become an important critic of non-
reductive physicalism and has been identified as one of the modern supporters of 
reductivism.252 Kim argues that “robust physicalism” cannot tolerate a non-reductive position. 
His general message is: “Physicalism cannot be had on the cheap.”253 At the same time it 
should be noted that Kim’s latest book, Physicalism or Something Near Enough shows signs 
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according to which also he is willing to admit that a thoroughly physicalistic view of the mind 
is not a plausible view. According to David Chalmers’ interpretation Kim actually turns out to 
be that of a “closet dualist”254. Kim’s exact position is not important here. What should be 
noted is that although the interest in reductive physicalism or eliminative materialism has seen 
a rebirth the situation seems to be changing constantly, and how well physicalism reflects the 
current consensus view is therefore somewhat unclear after all. The very basic aspects of 
different views about the mind are undergoing a lively discussion, and philosophers are trying 
to find out who defends what kind of position and why. 
Despite the fact that AM challenged type–type theories, provided a novel argument for 
physicalism, and offered an interesting answer to the Kantian challenge, it is not a much 
supported view today. This is surprising because the three achievements were certainly not 
minor. The historical importance of AM should be obvious. Many would nevertheless claim 
that Davidson’s real philosophical legacy is not his contributions to the philosophy of mind 
but his achievements in the philosophy of language.255 I think this seriously downgrades the 
relevance of Davidson’s views. In the following I will turn to the details of AM before 
forming judgments about its contemporary relevance. 
 
2.1.2 The physicalistic monism of AM  
 
Recent general criticisms against non-reductive physicalism raise the question of whether the 
monism of AM should be thought of as physicalistic monism at all. The main criticism 
against non-reductive physicalism is, as Bickle’s view shows, that non-reductive physicalism 
is “not physicalism enough”. It is not robust physicalism because, although the non-reductive 
position accepts O-physicalism, it rejects M-physicalism. Some non-reductive physicalists are 
not moved by this charge because they are perhaps best thought of as antiphysicalists in a 
very strong sense.  
There  is  a  tendency  to  interpret  also  Davidson  as  a  true  antiphysicalist.  His  position  
has been given many labels. Bickle, for example, writes that there is an “antiphysicalist vein” 
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in Davidson’s thought.256 Against  this  claim  I  want  to  emphasize  that  an  important  motive  
behind Davidson’s theory of mind was to secure the status of physicalism, and in this respect 
AM can be seen as part of philosophical accounts of the 1960s and 1970s which were used to 
defend physicalism. When Davidson is described as an antiphysicalist, a question that needs 
to be asked is whether he is trying to argue against physicalism. There are after all 
contemporary philosophers who try to defend a substantial form of dualism by arguing 
against physicalism, and these philosophers would certainly count as antiphysicalists on any 
interpretation.257 In my opinion the correct answer with respect to Davidson is that he argues 
against certain understandings of what physicalism requires or implies. I suggest that the 
argument structure should be seen in the broader context of Davidson’s philosophy as an 
attempt to defend certain very basic intuitions about ourselves, while at the same time 
criticizing  some of  the  abstract  demands  that  the  contemporary  naturalistic  program has  set  
for philosophy. The questions of what physicalism requires or what it implies are connected 
to the question of the reducibility of the mental. The reductive understanding of physicalism, 
M-physicalism in its various forms, is currently making a strong comeback. According to this 
understanding, physicalistic monism requires either the definitional or nomological reduction 
of higher level phenomena, or at least an explanation of them in physical terms. For those 
phenomena that have not yet been reduced, O-physicalism implies their reducibility or 
elimination. These requirements are expressed in different ways in the views of Fodor, 
Churchlands and other naturalists. 
The view that questions of ontology must turn on the possibility of reduction is widely 
shared among naturalists. The possibility of reduction and its success dictate the right 
ontological status of the mind, i.e. whether it is reducible, eliminable or emergent. For a 
serious naturalist, emergence is not a real option because emergent phenomena would amount 
to nomological danglers which do not fit to the scientific picture of the world.258 These 
phenomena would amount to a mystery, which cannot be tolerated on this perspective. When 
natural science is given the role of ontology-maker the possibility of emergence has to be 
rejected,  because  the  phenomena  that  a  non-reductive  physicalist  or  dualist  would  count  as  
emergent would turn out to be candidates for elimination from the perspective of a reductive 
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physicalist.  Many  see  that  the  merit  of  AM  is  that  it  shows  how  a  physicalistic  monism  is 
possible without reduction. In this sense, it should be counted as a very important contribution 
for physicalism. Björn Ramberg, a commentator whose interpretations Davidson appreciated, 
notes that one of Davidson’s great achievements is that he has shown how to dissociate 
reduction and ontology, thereby reducing the philosophical significance of both.259 Ramberg 
and others260 think that Davidson is, above else, offering a description of how it is possible to 
be a naturalist with “good conscience”, that is, without being a reductionist. Many naturalists 
worry that this is not possible. Fodor, for example, claims: “It’s hard to see… how one can be 
a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent, or other, a Reductionist.”261 
This is the central claim of M-physicalism and, as I see it, it describes an absurd contention: 
something is not real if it cannot be reduced to the specific “natural” order that naturalism 
describes. Davidson does not subscribe to this form of physicalism or its ideology. The main 
reason for this is his conviction that the truth of physicalism can be established without 
reduction.  
The disagreement between reductive and non-reductive physicalists reflects a more 
general disagreement about the nature of the philosophical method and about the relationship 
between philosophy and science. This is one of the reasons why I have explicated Davidson’s 
and von Wright’s conceptions of philosophy by comparing them to the ideology of 
contemporary naturalism. Rorty’s conclusion is that Davidson’s work is “a culmination of a 
line of thought in American philosophy which aims at being naturalistic without being 
reductionistic….”262 He  sees  Davidson  as  a  pragmatist  who  has  displayed  no  interest  in  a  
physicalistic ontology. Rorty thinks that this most clearly distinguishes Davidson from Quine, 
since the latter was explicitly anti-pragmatist in propounding a physicalistic ontology. That 
Rorty sees Quine’s commitment to a physicalistic ontology as the main difference between 
Davidson  and  Quine  is  interesting  given  that  Quine  came to  accept  AM.  If  both  Quine  and  
Davidson are anomalous monists, I cannot see how there could be a difference in their 
respective ontologies. I think Rorty’s statement that Davidson has not displayed interest in a 
physicalistic ontology is unclear, since it is obscure how this kind of interest is meant to be 
displayed. Rorty’s claim is suspicious also because the motivation behind AM was to give an 
argument for physicalism. Davidson has noted that: “Anomalous monism says that mental 
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entities add nothing to the furniture of the world that is not treated in physics.”263 He states 
also: “[…] my argument for anomalous monism… is designed to show that the ontology of 
any science that is not reducible to physics shares its ontology with physics.”264 The latter 
point captures the essence of Davidson’s argument: all sciences and, indeed all “levels of 
reality”, share their ontologies with physics. Physics is thus ontologically basic. This, together 
with Davidson’s view that “perfect explanations” are those given in physics, surely raises the 
question of whether this does not show, pace Rorty, a bias towards a physicalistic ontology. 
According to Rorty, Davidson should be seen as a pragmatist. A pragmatist “should not say... 
that physics tells us all we need to know about the way the world is, but rather should follow 
Goodman and Putnam in saying that there is no ’Way the World Is’”.265 Davidson certainly 
denies that physics tells us all we need to know about the world but, as will become obvious, 
some of his views suggest that physics nevertheless can describe, and does describe, the “Way 
the World Is”.  
Davidson has offered an argument which should dispel naturalistic worries, and in this 
sense he should be thought as contributing to secure the status of O-physicalism. Is this a 
relevant contribution? Fodor has claimed that there exists a “naturalist consensus” according 
to which: “something has to be said about the place of the semantic and the intentional in the 
natural order....”266 It is clear that Davidson does say something important about the place of 
the intentional in the natural order. In fact he says something which is philosophically very 
important. On the one hand, Davidson claims that any higher level science shares its ontology 
with physics. On the other hand, he claims that although mental phenomena are part of the 
natural order, they cannot be strictly reduced to that order as described by physics. Why 
shouldn’t this count as a positive contribution to the mind–body problem?267 It is a  positive 
contribution, since it says something specific about the nature of the mental and the physical.  
Davidson’s wants to show the truth of monism and dispel the common-sense (if such it 
is) intuition that mental phenomena will not reduce, in the ontological sense, to the natural 
order. But Davidson can relieve this “naturalist guilt”268 only if his philosophical argument for 
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monism succeeds. If there is no need for a philosophical argument for monism, I think one 
can accept, for example, Searle’s biological naturalism, which is described as a form of 
“scientifically sophisticated common sense”.269 According to this view mentality does not 
need naturalizing because, being a “biological phenomenon”, it is already part of nature. The 
mind–body problem has a simple solution. It is this: “Mental phenomena are caused by 
neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain.”270 
Astonishingly, contemporary philosophers have missed this point.271 It  seems  to  me  that  if  
Searle’s view is enough for monism then philosophers should have turned into biological 
naturalists already after reading Darwin. Some of course did but many did not.272 An 
illustrative example is Huxley, a faithful follower of Darwin, who was nevertheless deeply 
troubled by the mystery of consciousness. 
It  is  difficult  to  interpret,  pace Bickle  and  others,  Davidson  as  an  antiphysicalist 
because AM is meant to show that mental entities add nothing to the furniture of the world 
that is not treated in physics. This view clearly suggests that a substantial form of 
emergentism is not a consequence of AM. In fact, since physics is given an ontological 
privilege, there is a sense in which it can be said that micro-physical entities are more basic 
than others, at least in the sense that everything is composed of them, and their behavior 
governs the behavior of the entities they constitute. The actual physical story is obviously not 
simple, but this compositional picture of reality suffices as a very broad description of the 
privileged status of physics.273 On this reading Davidson’s physicalism, in its ontological 
respect, resembles Quine’s position. 
One of Davidson’s important contributions to the philosophy of mind was the 
introduction of the concept of supervenience. Most commentators trace Davidson’s first use 
of  this  term  to  “Mental  Events”.  In  fact  Davidson  entertained  the  idea  already  in  his  paper  
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“On Mental Concepts and Physical Concepts” from 1964 without using the term.274 The basic 
idea of supervenience, at least of its modern version, is the dependence of higher level 
properties on lower level properties, and of the determination of the former by the latter. 
Discussions of supervenience have been notable in the recent literature and the notion is used 
in a variety of ways.275  The subsequent discussion of this concept and the ways it has been 
used in the contemporary philosophy of mind gives, in my opinion, the impression that the 
introduction of this concept to the discussion was perhaps a mistake. Supervenience has 
turned  out  to  be  a  mysterious  relation  which  raises  more  questions  than  it  solves.276 David 
Lewis notes: “We have supervenience when there could be no difference of one sort without 
differences of another sort.”277 But why such a correlation holds is usually left as a mystery in 
the discussion; supervenience has become a relation which simply holds, but for which there 
is no explanation. It has become a very technical notion and in the current discussion 
philosophical insights deriving from its use are few. The way in which supervenience has 
become an important notion in the contemporary discussion provides one example of how 
certain philosophical problems are treated in the spirit which is blind to any “Wittgensteinian” 
insights. The suggestion that philosophers should look to how words are used and learn from 
that has been completely ignored in these discussions. This makes the discussion and the 
“philosophical industry” that is continuing it quite frustrating.  
The way in which Davidson has used the concept of supervenience suggests that he 
thinks that the basic physical facts determine, in some rather unexplained sense of the word, 
all higher level facts as well. Davidson writes:  
 
Although… psychological characteristics cannot be reduced to the others… they may be (and I think 
are) strongly dependent on them…there is a sense in which the physical characteristics of an event (or 
object or state) determine the psychological characteristics….278 
 
Given Davidson’s claim that all sciences share their ontologies with physics, he thus endorses 
the metaphysical thesis that, ultimately, all facts supervene on the facts of the most basic of 
the sciences, physics. Supervenience implies monism, as Davidson concludes.279 It assumes 
mental–physical identity; so, as far as I see it, supervenience cannot be used to defend such 
identity and the argument for physicalism has to be established independently. Davidson’s use 
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of supervenience nevertheless shows how, in the context of AM, the relation between the 
mental and the physical should be understood; as a dependence relation of the former on the 
latter. This dependence or determination implies a mild form of physicalism since, according 
to Davidson, it is “obvious” that supervenience does not entail reducibility. This obviousness 
is nowadays strongly questioned, especially by Kim. His latest suggestion is that the best way 
to understand supervenience is to see it precisely as a reductive relation.280 
Although Davidson has made a contribution to physicalism, his attempt to show that 
O-physicalism can be achieved without M-physicalism is something that amounts to dualism 
for many. A contemporary naturalist argues that one cannot be a conceptual or 
methodological dualist and an O-physicalist at the same time. Fodor claims: “Psychologists 
have no right to assume that there are intentional states unless they can provide… naturalistic 
sufficient  conditions  for  something  to  be  in  an  intentional  state.”281  Intentional realism 
requires showing how mind, as a material object, can have the properties it has. Davidson has 
not shown this, according to critics. In my view this criticism misses the point that Davidson’s 
purpose is to show the implausibility of any mind–body reduction. This reply does not move 
naturalists, who would complain that although AM, by establishing monism, perhaps very 
loosely integrates mentality into a physicalistic world view, it is by no means a satisfying 
theory of mind because it does not say anything specific about how the mental aspects of 
humans  are related to their bodily nature. Perhaps the relation is accidental or a result of pre-
established harmony. Although one could have thought that Davidson’s use of supervenience 
already shows a substantial commitment to physicalism and makes a suggestion about the 
nature of the mind–body relationship, many have argued that supervenience is a problematic 
concept through which to express this kind of commitment – precisely because it tries to 
combine determination or dependence with non-reducibility.282 Supervenience is thus a 
perfect, yet incoherent and therefore useless notion for a non-reductive physicalist. Many, 
Davidson among them, trace the notion of supervenience back to the writings of G. E. Moore. 
But as Bickle, who criticizes supervenience as a satisfying relation for a physicalist, notes: 
“Moore was unabashedly a dualist about descriptive and normative properties. Goodness 
supervenes on natural properties but is nonetheless – and, I might add, thereby – a nonnatural 
property.”283 Reductive naturalists claim that supervenience, far from providing support for 
robust physicalism, actually shows a commitment to a sort of dualism. The solution it 
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suggests for the mind–body problem is negative; supervenience merely states the way in 
which the mental and physical natures of humans are not related. As a curiosity I want to note 
that Moore never used the term supervenience, although he of course uses the notion (which 
Davidson, among others, attributes to him). It was in fact Richard Hare who in his The 
Language of Morals from 1952 introduced the term to general philosophical public.284 Hare 
himself notes, however, that he did not originate the term but was only following a use which 
was  already  familiar.  It  is  possible  that  he  is  referring  to  the  article  “On  Grading”  by  J.O.  
Urmson, which was published in 1950.285 Urmson writes: “Having rejected naturalism, but 
recognizing  the  close  connexion  between  X  and  A  B  C,  we  shall  say…  that  X-ness…  is  a  
non-natural, intuitable, toti-resultant character supervening on situations in which A B C are 
present, necessarily, but synthetically, connected with A B C.”286 Whatever the exact history 
of supervenience, it is interesting to notice that Hare, who is often seen as the figure behind 
supervenience, criticizes Davidson on the grounds that he has turned a perfectly clear and 
non-mysterious relationship into a mysterious relation.287 
Some M-physicalists argue that since everything is physical, they are entitled to say 
that all apparently “non-physical” facts are completely determined by physical facts and, this 
being the case, they are nothing “over and above” physical facts. This is firmly denied by 
Davidson, since he claims that even a mature physical science could not exhaustively explain 
the essence of the mental. This is one important sense in which mental phenomena, although 
identical with physical phenomena, are something over and above physical phenomena: they 
cannot be given purely physical explanations. This would be denied by most M-physicalists. 
Although many of them come out as non-reductivists because they reject the possibility of 
type–type reduction, or even actual token-token reduction, they nevertheless insist that some 
kind of explanation of mentality in non-mental terms is required for the vindication of 
mentality. In the words of Fred Dretske, the question is: “Can you bake a mental cake using 
only physical yeast and flour?”288 If you can’t in principle, then their conclusion is the 
elimination of the mental.  
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It is understandable that from the perspective of robust M-physicalism, Davidson can 
perhaps be described as being “antiphysicalist” and a property dualist. This accusation of 
dualism is based on the conviction that physicalism and non-reductivism cannot co-exist. I 
think that one way to explore the coherence of this position is through a consideration of 
whether Davidson’s argument for monism succeeds. There are also other reasons to accept the 
compatibility of non-reductivism and physicalism, but my interest is to find out whether 
Davidson’s argument for such a position is satisfying because the purpose is to evaluate the 
coherence of non-reductive physicalism as understood by Davidson and von Wright. In 
Davidson’s case, the dilemma is that if his argument for monism succeeds, it is because the 
irreducibility of the mental has been established. In the context of a monistic world view, as in 
the picture described by naturalism, predication and explanation are important notions. The 
extent to which prediction and explanation succeed show how well the nature of reality has 
been grasped. In this context, Davidson’s claim that human behavior cannot be explained or 
predicted  in  the  same  way  as  everything  else  amounts  to  substantial  dualism,  to  a  form  of  
mysticism. From the perspective of M-physicalism, this position is dualist because it locates 
the  mental  aspect  of  humans  on  a  wholly  different  level  than  everything  else.  This  kind  of  
ineliminable irreducibility would mean that mental phenomena would end up being 
nomological danglers, just as the type–type theorists of the 1950s had feared.    
In the next section, the physicalistic content of AM is discussed. In this section I have 
presented textual evidence showing that AM is, or is at least meant to be,  a  version  of  O-
physicalism. How Davidson himself saw his position is relevant when considering what the 
nature of the position in fact is, and how it should be understood. I think it is important to 
consider the textual evidence, because AM has been interpreted also as a form of neutral 
monism. Davidson’s position can be described as a form of physicalism or a form of dualism, 
and  it  is  important  to  see  the  reasons  for  both  interpretations.  My  view  is  that  it  is  hard  to  
challenge the assertion that Davidson argues for a physicalistic monism given his claims that: 
“[…]  there  is  only  one  set  of  entities  in  the  world”289 and all of its members are physical. 
What something’s being physical means is a question for the next section, but one should note 
that Davidson is searching for quite a strong form of physicalism, one which lies somewhere 
between mere O-physicalism and strong M-physicalism. The argument for AM is meant to 
show how this kind of metaphysical view is possible. In “Mental Events” Davidson stated his 
position by saying:  
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Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical…Anomalous 
monism shows an ontological bias only in that it allows that not all events are mental, while insisting 
that all events are physical.290 
 
This is a delicate formulation. AM resembles materialism because it insists that all events are 
physical and allows that there are non-mental events. However, the monistic point is made 
more strongly in “The Material Mind”, where Davidson writes: “psychological events simply 
are (in the sense of are identical with) physical events. If this is materialism, we are 
committed to it….”291 In  “Psychology as  Philosophy”  it  is  claimed that  ”[…] psychological  
events  are  describable…  in  physical  terms,  that  is,  they  are  physical  events…  this  position  
deserves to be called… monism, because it holds that psychological events are physical 
events….”292 Finally, a clear statement which leaves no room for non-physicalistic 
interpretations: “Monistic my view is, since it holds that mental events are physical 
events.”293 These statements point toward physicalism in a straightforward sense; they express 
an “ontological bias”. This will not surprise those who are familiar with Davidson’s 
philosophy. Yet, for two reasons it is important to emphasize that Davidson is trying to defend 
ontological physicalism and explicate the nature of it.  
First,  some  commentators  have  suggested  that  Davidson  is  arguing  for  a  kind  of  
neutral monism which claims that events in themselves are not physical or mental. Thus one 
commentator, Louisa Röska-Hardy writes: “What exists is non-abstract particulars…. They 
are neither mental not physical in themselves….”294 In a similar spirit, Marc Joseph claims: 
”Davidson eschews the mental and physical as ontological categories”295 and “the natural cuts 
across the mental and the physical, which are conceptual (and not ontological) categories.”296 
This view agrees with the suggestion that Davidson has tried to show how one can be a 
naturalist without being a reductionist.297 The view is a correct description of the Davidsonian 
position insofar as it identifies “the natural” as an all-encompassing category which cuts 
across the mental and the physical; yet, or so I believe, the claim misfires by attributing to 
Davidson the view that the physical is a conceptual category. Simon Evnine concludes with 
respect to Davidson’s view that:  
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[…] events, in themselves, are neither physical nor mental. What makes an event a mental, or 
physical…is whether or not it has a mental, or physical, description. Davidson’s choice of the term 
‘monism’, rather than, say, ‘materialism’, to describe his theory, is a good one. What is important is not 
so much that all events are physical as that events form a single, and ontologically neutral, class of 
entities.298  
 
But how could these interpretations be taken seriously? To say that “physical” is not an 
ontological category or that Davidson has chosen to call his position “monism” rather than 
“materialism” certainly seems to conflict directly with the textual evidence that I have 
presented. To say, as Evnine does, that it is not “important” to claim that all events are 
physical seems to be a serious misinterpretation concerning Davidson’s intentions. 
Davidson’s events are not “ontologically neutral”, as Evnine seems to think. 
The second reason why Davidson’s purpose should be emphasized is this. One should 
be interested in Davidson’s argument for physicalism as long as the truth of ontological 
physicalism is not taken for granted. Many contemporary philosophers accept physicalism 
because they simply agree that the ultimate ontology should be continuous with the current 
scientific ontology. Davidson’s philosophical, a priori, argument for physicalism is 
interesting, because it gives an additional reason to think that physicalism is, or could be, true. 
In my opinion it is curious that Davidson’s statements emphasizing the physicalistic aspect of 
AM  are,  more  or  less,  from  the  same  time  period.  At  that  time,  the  need  to  stress  the  
physicalistic content of AM seems to be at the forefront. The reason for this is perhaps the fact 
that, as I have shown, AM was meant to be an argument for physicalism, and it was meant to 
back up other identity theories of that time. Whereas it is important to consider the 
correctness of  AM,  it  is  also  important  to  place  AM to the context of its time. In the 1970s 
there was a need for a physicalistic view about the mind, a need which arose from the fact that 
the truth of physicalism was still under debate although the empirical, if not philosophical, 
evidence had started to turn in its favor. 
There is thus clear textual evidence that allows the conclusion that Davidson’s position 
is a form of monism, because it holds that all events, or more broadly “entities”, are physical. 
It is usually emphasized that Davidson’s physicalism concerns, above else, events. I extend 
the discussion more broadly to entities, because Davidson himself has, from time to time, 
used this expression. He writes, for example: “[the premises of anomalous monism] imply 
that mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world.”299 Although Davidson 
officially claims that he is defending only the view that mental events are physical events, I 
                                               
298 Evnine, 1991, 64, my emphasis. A similar view is suggested by Leonardi, 1999. 
299 Davidson, 1994a, 231. 
106 
 
think it is clear that the spirit of his position aims for an all-encompassing metaphysical 
position. O-physicalism claims that there is only one set of entities in the world, and this 
claim is accepted also by Davidson. Physicalism is the important philosophical and 
metaphysical thesis  to  which  we are  committed  as  a  conclusion  of  Davidson’s  argument.300 
Depending on one’s other views about what there is, the furniture of the world may or may 
not include entities like states, processes, and properties. In addition to mental events, 
Davidson accepts at least the existence of mental objects –  the  nature  of  which  remains  
unclear  in  his  writings.  It  seems  to  me  that  his  position,  insofar  as  it  accepts,  for  example,  
processes, must hold that also these entities are physical. In the following I shall use the 
expression mental phenomena (which includes everything that is intuitively called mental). 
What I want to determine is whether Davidson and von Wright give reasons to believe that 
these phenomena should be thought as physical. 
Given that Davidson presents a non-empirical philosophical argument in favor of 
physicalism, it is not surprising that he describes the result as being a philosophical thesis. 
This certainly differs from the view of, for example, Place who thinks that the type–type 
identity theory is a “scientific hypothesis.”301 The view that physicalism is a scientific 
hypothesis is generally shared among contemporary naturalists. The wide acceptance of this 
postulate seems to have granted physicalism almost something like an a priori status  in  the  
current discussion. It has become like a necessary feature of reality, even though its origin is 
empirical. 
 
2.1.3 Davidson’s physicalism 
 
So far I have claimed that AM is (meant to be) a form of physicalistic monism. It belongs to 
the category of physicalistic accounts of the mind, and solves the traditional mind–body 
problem by arguing for monism and suggesting that mental phenomena (Davidson’s “mental 
entities”) are token-identical to physical phenomena. Davidson’s answer to the traditional 
mind–body problem is thus clear: Mental and physical phenomena are identical; ontologically 
speaking, whenever one speaks of something mental there exists only something which is 
physical. But what does it also mean to claim that reality contains only physical entities? The 
answer is not easy to give, because the exact nature of Davidson’s physicalism is unclear. 
What does Davidson mean when he argues that everything is physical? I believe there are two 
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ways to understand the claim that there exists only one kind of phenomenon. These two ways 
are intertwined in a confusing manner. The two alternatives are an ontological reading of 
physicalism and a conceptual reading of physicalism respectively. 
Physicalistic monism claims that every event and every substance is physical. This is 
not an illuminating clarification unless one is told what something’s being physical means. 
Noam  Chomsky  has  claimed  that  as  soon  as  we  come  to  understand  something  we  call  it  
physical.302 This is a perspicuous formulation which captures the scientific mood of our time; 
yet it obviously leaves out a detailed description of what being physical means: it does not 
give a criterion of the physical.303 The  criterion  of  the  physical  has  been  difficult  to  define,  
and currently there is no definition which is generally accepted among philosophers. It is also 
clear that scientists doing research in physics or in other physical sciences have different 
views about the nature of the physical from philosophers who are searching for a general 
criterion. However, most contemporary physicalists (that is, philosophers) refer to physics 
when judging what something’s being physical should be taken to mean, and therefore see 
physics as the final arbiter for declaring what should or can count as a physical entity. This 
conclusion rejects the need for further philosophical attempts to define the meaning of 
“physical”.  
The view that science,  or more specifically physics,  tells  us what there really is,  is  a 
result of the naturalistic attitude which can be summarized in Quine’s words: “The world is as 
natural science says it is….”304 The consequence of this, at least according to some 
interpreters, is that: “If natural science cannot tell us more about how [something] works, then 
it does not exist.”305 It is not surprising that many, von Wright among them, have seen 
modern philosophy as being partly in the grip of scientism. According to many naturalists, 
physics is the purest of the natural sciences because it attempts to describe the most basic 
level of reality. What really exists is a question for physics. In Quine’s case, for example, his 
“[…] ontology continues to consist of quarks… and the like.”306 Kim has recently noted that 
Quine’s view – according to which physics is, by definition, the science which aims at full 
coverage – has interesting implications for what it is to count as physical.307 By definition, 
nothing can lie outside the reach of physics. The sphere of “physical” could be extended if 
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deemed necessary by physics, but our ontology – our catalog of what there really is – would 
still be continuous with the discoveries of the most basic part of physics. 
If  physics  ultimately  provides  the  criterion  of  the  physical,  it  seems to  follow that  if  
mental phenomena are physical phenomena, then they should have a property which all 
physical phenomena have – and this most basic property would be whatever physics declares 
it to be. Given the current state of physics, it is unclear whether there in fact exists such a 
property. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there is such a property – a property 
which entities must have if they are to count as physical – and physicists can tell us what this 
property is. Obviously, this property must be something which can change as physics 
develops.  This  means  that  in  the  future  it  may  turn  out  to  be  the  case  that  not  all  physical  
phenomena have this currently attributed property, or that a more fundamental property is 
discovered – a property which again all physical phenomena are required to have. Should we 
thus settle for the view that the criterion of the physical is what the physics of any given time 
declares it to be? Something like this seems to be Quine’s view, since he claims that 
ontological commitments should be continuous with the discoveries of physics, whatever they 
are. Whatever conclusions physics draws about the nature of reality, a situation in which our 
ontology would turn out to be non-physicalistic is not an option. Forces which would now 
count as obviously non-physical may be explained in terms of some future physics. 
If we ignore the problem that the criterion of the physical is apt to change and settle for 
the view that our ontology should be continuous with the ontology of physics, then what can 
be said, given our current knowledge, about the nature of physical entities? It is often said that 
material (or physical) entities can be located in space and time. Perhaps a space-time location 
property could give one acceptable criterion that an entity must satisfy if it is to count as 
physical. This criterion goes well with the idea that physical entities should be observable or 
measurable and, in this sense, objective. They are located in a “common space” which, in 
principle, is accessible to all.308 Macroscopic material objects are extended in space and they 
occupy the space in which they are. They can be observed objectively. It is not clear whether 
this is the case with abstract physical phenomena or with phenomena at the sub-atomic level. 
Whether or not spatio-temporal location is an acceptable criterion of a physical entity, 
modern science nevertheless puts forward a compositional picture of reality. Macroscopic 
objects are “made up of” smaller particles, which in turn are composed of even smaller 
particles until the base level of elementary particles like quarks and leptons is reached. 
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Perhaps this could be used as a criterion of the physical: everything physical that is composed 
of anything is composed of elementary particles. This seems to be true – at least with respect 
to those entities that can be thought of as being composed of something. Physicalistic 
monism,  which  endorses  a  compositional  view  of  reality,  ontologically  privileges  to  the  
entities described by physics. Microphysical entities are fundamental entities, because 
everything else is composed of them – and the nature of higher level phenomena and their 
behavior,  so  one  suggestion  goes,  could  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  most  basic  entities  by  
referring  to  laws  which  govern  the  behavior  of  these  entities.  How  well  this  simplistic  and  
rather mechanistic view reflects the current thinking in physics is unclear, but philosophers 
often use this kind of picture quite unhesitatingly. When we apply these considerations to the 
mind–body problem, it  seems that in order for mental  phenomena to count as physical,  they 
must be composed of physical particles. This is what most modern philosophers of mind 
conclude. As a physical criterion of the mental, this is perhaps acceptable. 
Physics is thus the final judge regarding the criterion of the physical. This view is not 
as interesting for the scientist as it is for the philosopher. Quine’s interpretation or definition 
of physics is that physics is “factual”, whereas inside other discourses there may be not a fact 
of the matter regarding what there is  or what there is  does.  For Quine,  the notion of such a 
‘fact of the matter’ is an ontological one, “a question of reality”, as he says309. The question of 
what  there  really  is  will  be  decided,  as  we  have  seen,  via  a  scientific  theory  of  the  world.  
Although Quine has been somewhat ambivalent in his views about ontology, his position can 
be summarized by stating that the ultimate facts of the matter are decided in terms of the most 
basic elementary particles, or microphysical states, to use Quine’s favorite expression. 
Matters of fact will depend on the distribution of microphysical states, and these states will be 
identified  according  to  the  physics  of  the  moment.  To  say  that  the  states  identified  are  
microphysical states is merely a consequence of the fact that the states in question are 
identified by physics – which, by definition, gives the criterion of the physical. According to 
the Quinean view the “amount of factuality” – that is, the extent to which statements refer to 
extra-linguistic, non-human, physical reality – is greater the “closer” these statements are to 
physics. Physics is more factual than chemistry, which is more factual than biology, which is 
more  factual  than  psychology  and  so  on.  The  non-factuality  of  psychology  forces  Quine  to  
draw  eliminativist  conclusions  about  the  status  of  mental  phenomena.  This  is  one  clear  
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example of the way in which the ontology of physics is privileged: higher level ontologies 
may face elimination if they do not smoothly reduce to the ontology of physics.  
Given that a physicalist (philosopher) is committed to accepting the changing ontology 
of physics it is useful, instead of trying to give a criterion of the physical, to ask what it is that 
a physicalist claims about the world. The general claim of O-physicalism is clear: there is 
only  one  set  of  entities  in  the  world.  But  a  more  detailed  answer  is  bound  to  have  more  
specific  ontological  consequences  given  that  it  is  physics  –  the  science  –  whose  path  a  
physicalist has to follow. According to Quine and Davidson, physics aims at “the full 
coverage” of reality. Quine claims that this has the following consequence: “If the physicist 
suspected there was any event that did not consist in a redistribution of the elementary states 
allowed for by his physical theory, he would seek a way of supplementing his theory.”310 This 
is a philosopher’s view about the situation; it is not obviously the view that a physicist would 
hold.  If this advice of a philosopher is to be followed, the question is how the theory should 
be supplemented? No matter what the answer is, the modifications would still concern, by 
definition, microphysical states. But to say that physics has the aim of completeness and that 
whatever physics postulates is physical by definition is not a very interesting claim. It may be 
certainly something to which a physicalist is committed, but it is hardly a reason to believe 
that physicalistic monism is true. The problematic philosophical question has always been 
whether mental phenomena are physical phenomena. If they are and if the completeness of 
physics (all events are determined, or have their chances determined, entirely by prior 
physical events according to physical laws311) is true, then there are no obstacles, in principle, 
for giving physical explanations of mental phenomena. If mental phenomena are physical 
phenomena, then a major – perhaps the most serious – obstacle for a physicalistic world view 
is removed. Then one is can agree with Quine that “nothing happens in the world, not the 
flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of microphysical 
states.”312 But this kind of supervenience assumes physicalistic monism, as was already noted 
by Davidson. It seems to me that talk about the supervenience of the mental on the physical – 
or of the former being “realized” or “constituted” or “determined” by the latter – all this talk 
is appropriate only after the general metaphysical assumption of physicalism is in place. But 
one first needs a reason to believe that physicalism is true. Once there exists such a reason, the 
details of a physicalistic world view can be discussed more seriously.  
                                               
310 Quine, 1981, 98. 
311 This formulation is from Papineau, 2001. 
312 Quine, 1981, 98. 
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Davidson expresses the monism of AM by claiming that everything that exists can be 
given a physical description – and ultimately a description in the vocabulary of physics. The 
fact that an event can be given a physical description is what “makes” it a physical event. But 
I think we should ask why we should believe that everything can be given a physical 
description. A reason to believe that physicalistic monism is true would be a reason to think 
that, in principle, everything can be described in the language of physics. If one had a criterion 
of the physical which was independent of physics and if one had reasons to believe that 
mental phenomena satisfied this criterion, then one would have a reason to think that mental 
phenomena could be given a description in the language of physics if it was further assumed 
that physics can describe everything physical. It seems to me that the claim that physicalistic 
monism is true (and therefore everything can be given a physical description) and the claim 
that everything can be given a physical description (and therefore physicalistic monism is 
true) are just two different ways of expressing the position of monism. But, as far as I can tell, 
one would need an independent reason to believe either one of these claims. Describability in 
the language of physics can be taken to be a criterion of the physical, but whether or not 
everything can be described in this language is unclear from such a criterion. If something 
remains indescribable in the language of physics, it cannot be counted as a physical entity. 
 According to this view, it seems to be the case that if mental phenomena (the 
existence of which is a given for us) turn out to be indescribable in the language of physics, 
then they simply are not physical phenomena. This approach, according to which everything 
can be given a physical description, does not give an argument for physicalism; it merely 
states quite broadly what physicalism means. This is the approach of Quine, who accepts 
physicalism  as  the  most  plausible  theory  about  the  nature  of  reality.  His  answer  to  the  
question of why everything must be describable in the language of physics would thus be that 
this is the situation according to our best scientific knowledge; nothing can remain outside the 
reach  of  physics,  which  aims  at  full  coverage  of  reality.  Given  Quine’s  commitment  to  the  
ontology of science, it is unclear whether the kind of physicalism that he defends could be 
refuted in any way.  
As I have argued, Davidson’s purpose is to give a philosophical defense of 
physicalism – and in this respect his approach is more philosophical than Quine’s, whose 
“argument” is his naturalism. Quine has no need for the kind of argument that Davidson is 
intending to provide, and he did not attempt to provide such an argument in his philosophy of 
mind. Davidson, on the other hand, says things like: “Each mental event has… (must have, if I 
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am right) a physical description…”313 or “… every… action… is also, if I am right, a physical 
event….”314 This gives the impression that, according to Davidson, the truth of physicalism is 
something which has to be argued for, and that he has provided an argument. I think we 
should agree that if no philosophical argument is needed for physicalism, then mental 
phenomena should be counted among physical events. One can just accept biological 
naturalism. But Davidson’s argument is not based on the claim that the truth of physicalism 
seems  to  be  a  scientific  truth,  “a  plausible  view”,  and  should  therefore be accepted. If one 
accepts Davidson’s argument, it follows that everything can be described in the language of 
physics. But it is not clear what this implies about the nature of the entities so described. If an 
entity can be described in the language of physics, does it then have a spatio-temporal 
location – and if so, should this then be the actual criterion of the physical? If an entity can 
described in the language of physics, then this – so we could argue – says something 
substantial about the entity. But according to Davidson, this – whatever physics says about 
physical entities – is not the final criterion of the physical; the criterion is that the entity can 
be  described  in  the  language  of  physics.  In  “Mental  Events”  Davidson  asks:  “What  does  it  
mean to say that an event is mental or physical?”315 The answer is: “[…] an event is physical 
if it is describable in a purely physical vocabulary, mental if describable in mental terms.”316 
So, if an event or object has a physical description, it simply is a physical event or object. This 
is the criterion. 
Some have argued that if the mere possibility of being amenable to a physical 
description makes an entity physical, then the resulting form of physicalism is so weak that it 
should be not called physicalism at all. Skillen claims that if events are physical “only as 
described” then Davidson’s notion of an event is “hopelessly minimal”317. Skillen does not 
claim that Davidson would clearly subscribe to this minimalistic notion of an event. He would 
thus  agree  with  those  commentators  who  argue  that,  according  to  Davidson,  there  is  a  
“substantial difference” between mental and physical events due to the fact that events are 
mental only as described, but physical intrinsically. Emiliani, for example, claims that: “The 
most striking consequence of Davidson’s view that ‘events are mental only as described… is 
that the very existence and nature of mental events is made language-dependent and 
                                               
313 Davidson, 1990b, 92, my emphasis. 
314 Davidson, 1999t, 335, my emphasis. 
315 Davidson, 1970, 210. 
316 Ibid. 
317 See, Skillen, 1984, 523.  
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contrasted with the language-independent… existence of physical events.”318 But what does 
the ‘language-independent existence of physical events’ mean? What, on Davidson’s view, is 
the criterion of the physical which does not depend on language? 
Also Kim319 notes that Davidson’s view is an example of very weak form of token-
physicalism, whereas other critics, like Latham320 and Antony321 argue more strongly that 
Davidson’s physicalism does not exclude the possibility of substance dualism – and thus 
cannot be considered physicalism at all. I think their criticism is sound, since it seems 
possible that an entity could get a physical description, thus becoming a physical entity, even 
though it could include (as a part of it) the thinking of an immaterial mind, for example. This 
is a fanciful example, but I think it makes the point. A substantial criterion of the physical is 
lacking if the property of being describable in a physical language suffices for something to 
count as physical. But perhaps one can settle for the view that whatever physics tells us about 
basic entities constitutes “what they really are”. A realist understanding of physics suggests 
such a view. If something can be described in the language of physics, then this something is 
really made of elementary particles, has a spatio-temporal location, and can be measured – 
whereas a statement that something is beautiful or good does not express any fact of the 
matter, although it is based on the interpretation of objective facts that depend on the nature of 
agent-independent reality.   
 Although Davidson is unsure whether a satisfying criterion of the physical can 
ultimately be given, there is one important passage where he says something essential about 
the nature of the physical. For something to count as physical, it must be describable in a 
“physical vocabulary”. But how is this physical vocabulary to be characterized? Davidson 
does it in two ways. On the one hand, he claims that physical entities are those entities which 
are describable in the vocabularies of the natural sciences. Sometimes Davidson refers to the 
language of physics,  and  sometimes  he  notes  that  “a  particular  physical  event,  state,  or  
disposition is one that can be picked out… using a vocabulary from some physical 
science.”322 On the other hand, Davidson often uses the term “physical” in a wide sense, 
according to which all statements without intentional terms are physical. His use of the term 
“physical” involves an amount of indeterminacy. In one of his earliest articles Davidson 
writes that “physical concepts… are tied to the common sense notion of a physical object 
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which has a location in space and time, which undergoes changes which are physical events, 
whose changes are governed by laws, that is, physical laws.”323 The point is that in order to 
discuss physical phenomena meaningfully, there must be some agreed principles which 
govern our physical vocabulary. We obviously mean and must mean something when we 
describe an entity as “physical”. In this important passage, Davidson suggests that physical 
concepts are tied to the “common sense” notion of a physical object. There is no mention of 
physics or any of the other natural sciences. But if it is the common-sense notion of a law-
governed object in space and time to which our understanding of the physical is tied, what 
should we then say about the property that all entities share (supposing that there is only one 
set of entities in the world)? I would suggest that the most important characteristic of physical 
entities, according to Davidson, is that their behavior is law-governed. If the relevant laws 
were known, everything physical could be explained and predicted accurately. This, then, is 
the essence of the physical: it is strictly law-governed. Every physical entity and phenomenon 
has this property. However, this is not a criterion straightforwardly suggested by physics; it is 
not an independent criterion. 
Since I am interested in Davidson’s reasons for adopting physicalistic monism, I shall 
not consider the many arguments which have been offered by other philosophers in favor of 
the view that everything is physical. As Papineau, Kim, Burge and others have argued, it is 
plausible to think that scientific achievements during the 20th century created a favorable 
intellectual climate for physicalism. Therefore the amount of philosophical argumentation for 
physicalism has been decreasing as science has revealed ever more details about the nature of 
reality. What is interesting about Davidson’s argument is that it is a philosophical argument; it 
is not directly based on empirical evidence and it is not based simply on the naturalistic view 
that our fundamental ontology should be dictated by science. Davidson’s argument is simple, 
and  in  my  opinion  it  is  clear  that  it  fails.  How  does  Davidson  reach  the  conclusion  that  
everything is physical? Monism is reached from three premises that we have already seen:  
 
1) The Principle of Causal Interaction: At least some mental events interact causally 
with physical events. 
2) The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality: Events related as cause 
and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. 
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3) The Anomalism of the Mental: There are no strict deterministic laws on the basis 
of which mental events can be predicted and explained. 
 
Here I shall not discuss principles one and three in detail. Principle three will be discussed and 
defended in the following sections. Principle one will here be accepted for the sake of 
argument. In chapter four its correctness will be questioned.  
 Davidson’s argument for physicalism is based simply on the view that causal 
interactions between events must fall under strict deterministic laws. If principles one and 
three  are  true,  then  principle  two  is  crucial  for  monism.  But  how  do  these  three  principles  
imply monism? The “demonstration of identity”, that is, the demonstration that each mental 
event  is  a  physical  event,  is  easy.  According  to  the  principle of causal interaction, at least 
some mental events interact with physical events. Whenever there is causal interaction, there 
must  (according  to  Davidson)  be  a  strict  law  covering  the  case,  as  the  principle of the 
nomological character of causality claims. Since, according to the anomalism of the mental, 
there cannot be strict laws which involve mental terms, the law covering such a case must be 
a physical law. In order for an event to fall under physical law it must have a physical 
description, which, on Davidson’s criterion, means that it is a physical event. The 
demonstration thus shows that if a mental event causally interacts with a physical event, the 
former must have a physical description and must therefore be a physical event.324 
Because there must be a strict law covering causal interaction, and given that there 
cannot be strict laws involving the mental, the lawlessness of the mental is used (of course 
together with the principle of the nomological character of causality) to establish the identity 
of the mental and the physical. What makes AM’s case special among identity theories is that 
whereas previous identity theories were based on the view that empirical investigation and 
evidence can provide support for the formulation of laws between the mental and physical 
(and are therefore needed for the establishment of identities), Davidson claims that a token-
identity theory does not require such evidence – and in fact that the truth of token-identity 
theories actually depends on there not being such law-like relations. This raises very 
interesting questions about the relevance of empirical evidence for Davidson’s monism. 
Empirical evidence is not needed for Davidson’s argument – but if there were evidence 
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according to which the mental realm is not law-governed, would this then strengthen 
Davidson’s argument for monism?325 This is a question worth considering. 
The problematic principle of the nomological character of causality is crucial for 
Davidson’s argument. What are the problems involved with this principle? First of all, it is 
not an empirically verified principle. This raises the question of what the reasons to believe its 
truth are. Second, many think that current physics does not guarantee that causation is 
deterministic. Davidson may be thus be mistaken in his claim that strict laws are 
deterministic. Of these problems, the first is more serious. If the principle of the nomological 
character of causality cannot be shown to be true, the philosophical argument for monism fails 
and AM, as a physicalistic position, is doomed. What reasons are there to believe that singular 
causal statements are backed up by strict laws? Davidson notes that:  
 
[…] if there is a reason for holding the cause-law thesis [the principle of the nomological character of 
causality], the argument must in some sense be a priori, for the thesis clearly is not a pronouncement of 
ordinary logic, nor can it be established empirically.326 
 
Davidson’s reference to an a priori argument is interesting given what has been said about his 
conception of philosophy. The idea that there is a law, deterministic or not, which backs up 
singular causal claims must be given an a priori argument.  The  task  of  a  philosopher  is  to  
provide such an argument. But what is it? Many commentators have concluded that there is 
no reason to believe that the principle of the nomological character of causality is true and, if 
there are reasons to believe in its truth, Davidson has not offered them. Elisabeth Anscombe 
notes: 
 
Davidson, will say, without offering any reason at all for saying it, that a singular causal statement 
implies that there is such a true universal proposition [Always when this, then that] – though perhaps 
we can never have knowledge of it. Such a thesis needs some reason for believing it! ‘Regularities in 
nature’: that is not a reason.327  
 
A more recent observation comes from Robert Van Gulick:  
 
That an event C of a given type should produce an effect E on one occasion and that another event C* 
physically indistinguishable from C in all respects should none the less fail to produce any event similar 
                                               
325 Could there be such empirical evidence? Evidence according to which the brain would be some kind of 
chaotic system would not be helpful because, in order for this evidence to be relevant for premise three, the 
identity between mind and brain would have to be assumed beforehand. It is hard to think of any kind of 
scientific empirical evidence which does not assume mind-brain identity but shows that the mind is not law-
governed. 
326 Davidson, 1995c, 202. 
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to E may strike us as odd and perplexing, but it should not strike us as impossible given the empirical 
indications that such situations are not only possible but actual.328  
 
According to van Gulick empirical evidence goes against Davidson’s view. Brian 
McLaughlin is explicit in his criticism: “Davidson has never offered any reason to believe the 
thesis. Nor… has he ever argued for the principle of the nomological character of 
causality.”329  
I  believe  these  criticisms  were  in  order  at  the  time  when  they  were  presented.  As  a  
reply to this kind of criticism in “Laws and Cause”, published 25 years after “Mental Events”, 
Davidson explains his reasons for believing the cause-law thesis. I have to say that his 
reasoning in this paper is unfortunately quite obscure and confusing. In the subsequent 
discussion, commentators have not stated whether the argument convinces them.330 It seems 
to me that the argument has not convinced the critics. Kim has recently noted, repeating 
Mclaughlin’s  earlier  complaint,  that  “Davidson  never  stated  a  clear  reason,  much  less  a  
detailed argument, for his requirement of strict laws for causal relations.”331 Walter Freeman 
claims that developments in physics have shown that brains are not material systems for 
which the laws of physics support accurate prediction. According to him, this empirical fact 
undermines AM.332 Freeman writes that brains are “capable of self-organizing chaotic 
dynamics that lead to unpredictable and complex new behavior.”333 I cannot evaluate the 
correctness  of  this  claim,  but  if there  is  evidence  in  its  favor  then  this  would  seem  to  
undermine Davidson’s reasons for both monism and for the anomalism of the mental. If the 
brain is a physical system,  the  behavior  of  which  cannot  be  strictly  predicted,  then  the  
argument that all causal relations between physical events are governed by strict laws is false. 
If the brain is capable of producing unpredictable and complex new behavior, then the 
argument according to which mental events cannot be predicted is false. Empirical evidence 
thus threatens Davidson’s argument structure. What makes things worse is the critics’ 
suspicion that a conceptual argument for the principle of the nomological character of 
causality cannot be given. This would, of course, seriously undermine the monism of AM. 
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Davidson nevertheless claims, along Kantian lines, that it is a conceptual truth that if a 
singular causal statement is true, then there must be a covering law which is strict. Here we 
should again note Davidson’s views about the nature of philosophy. Philosophical truths are 
results of conceptual investigations; perhaps the best philosophical conclusions amount to 
conceptual truths. According to Davidson, accepting the conceptual truth for which he argues 
does not amount to accepting the regularity of nature. So, I think that against Anscombe 
Davidson can reply that “regularities in nature” are indeed not the reason for the cause-law 
thesis. But what does it mean to say that the acceptance of a conceptual truth does not amount 
to acceptance of the regularity of nature? Davidson gives the impression that physics 
discovers objective facts about reality; the regularities of physics are objective regularities of 
nature. This is a realistic understanding of physics, and there are no good reasons to doubt that 
Davidson would not subscribe to it. If the connection between laws and cause is conceptual, 
how is this claim used to establish physicalistic monism? The monistic view is about the 
nature  of  reality;  it  is  a  claim about  the  ontological  constitution  of  the  world  and  should  be  
separated from epistemological considerations. But how can a conceptual truth establish 
something about the nature of the extra-linguistic reality? 
The conceptual nature of the cause-law thesis has been challenged, for example, by 
Armstrong and Heathcote. They suggest:  
 
Consider a world that is a world of causes and effects-where, perhaps, every event has a cause and in 
turn is a cause-but where causes of the same sort do not give rise to the same sort of effects. It sounds 
quite wrong. But can it be shown purely by analysis of the concepts involved that such a world is 
impossible? We do not think it can.334 
  
Of course this statement does not show that a conceptual connection between laws and cause 
could not be established. It merely describes Armstrong’s and Heathcote’s intuitions about the 
matter. Yet, there is something behind this intuition. Can conceptual analysis provide truths 
about the world, or does it only tell us about the use of concepts? This was questioned in 
chapter one when discussing Davidson’s conception of philosophy. Most contemporary 
philosophers are doubtful that such truths could be established.  
I think that against Armstrong and Heathcote, Davidson could nevertheless argue that 
imagining a world in which causes of the same sort do not give rise to the same sort of effect 
does  not  help  if  we  want  to  consider  the  nature  of  causation  in  this world. The concepts of 
cause and law under discussion apply in this world, and the question whether a world where 
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causes are not backed up by strict laws is possible, is not relevant for the analysis of our 
concepts and thus not relevant for our world.335 However, since Armstrong and Heathcote 
argue that the truth of cause-law thesis is empirical, there nevertheless remains the question of 
how, on conceptual grounds, the necessary connection between a singular cause and 
underlying law can be proved. According to Davidson, the connection between cause and law 
is  simply  due  to  the  fact  that  “Our  concept of a physical object is the concept of an object 
whose changes are governed by laws.”336 This being the case, it follows that “The ground 
floor connection of causality with regularity is not made by experience, but is built into the 
idea of objects whose changes are causally tied to other changes.”337 These formulations refer 
to the important suggestion which Davidson put forward at the very beginning of his career, 
namely:  
 
I believe the concepts of physical object, of physical event as a change in a physical object or physical 
situation, and the concepts of physical law are completely tied up with one another. It would be quite 
misleading  to  say,  first  we  know  what  physical  objects  are,  and  then  we  notice  what  changes  they  
undergo, and then we discover, if we can, whether these changes are governed by laws. I would say 
rather a physical object is an object whose changes are governed by laws and this is something which is 
a priori, as Kant said. After all we must mean something by calling something a physical object and I 
would  say  this  is  a  very  rough  sketch  of  part  of  what  we  do  mean  by  calling  something  a  physical  
object.338 
 
Two points are of interest. First, Davidson’s use of the notions “object” or “change” or 
“situation” refers to the notions as they are being used in everyday contexts. The cause-law 
thesis is thus grounded in conceptual investigations the target of which is the language of 
everyday. Second, here Davidson again notes how his understanding of a physical object is a 
priori, and this in turn is connected to the claim that we must mean something by the concept 
“physical object” – and what we actually mean by it, in the language of everyday, can be 
analyzed or clarified. This clearly connects to Davidson’s view according to which something 
may be “a priori” to us because it is we who decide how concepts are used.339  
 Anscombe and others who wondered what Davidson’s reason for cause-law thesis was 
would have benefited from reading the lines from 1963, because “Laws and Cause” does not 
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add much to the point which was already in place very early. Ramberg’s interpretation, which 
Davidson applauded, of the reason for holding the cause-law thesis is that we, as biological 
creatures, have an interest in construing our environment in terms of generalities. The 
capacity to observe regularities is one that we possess, and what kind of regularities we detect 
is a result of our biological nature. We cannot help but see the world in terms of regularities. 
This could perhaps be seen as a naturalistic suggestion of why the cause-law thesis “holds”; it 
is rooted in our biological nature. Ramberg claims that his point backs up the thesis and 
concludes:  
 
When we take two events as causally related, we thereby take them as nomologically related, because to 
recognize a change in the state of a physical object just is to recognize an event which is susceptible to 
explanation in terms of empirical laws.340 
 
Now, whereas Davidson may be correct in his view that our concept of a physical object is an 
object whose changes are governed by laws and that this conception has its roots in our 
biological nature, it is mysterious how this could have any relevance if the goal is to give a 
general argument for monism. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that consciousness is 
a non-physical phenomenon in the sense that consciousness does not occur in space and that it 
does not obey the laws of physics. If this sounds too wild, one could instead suppose that 
conscious states are states of the brain, but that they are very strange kinds of physical states 
because they do not obey the laws of nature, i.e. the fundamental laws of physics, and they 
thus cannot be described in terms of physics. The brain as described by Freeman would 
perhaps be the bearer of these kinds of queer physical states. Despite the strange nature of 
brain states, let us also suppose that consciousness is causally connected to the physical 
world. Is there anything in Davidson’s argument for monism which would actually challenge 
the possibility of this kind of dualism? It is hard to see how the argument for AM could show 
the  truth  of  physicalistic  monism.  If  the  reason  to  hold  the  cause-law  thesis  is  the  claimed  
conceptual connection between laws and cause, it is difficult to see how this could have any 
relevance for the question of whether there actually could be causal interactions between 
physical and non-physical events. As Ramberg points out, it is due to our human nature that 
we observe regularities in nature and thus, so we think, causal connections. But what is the 
reason  to  think  that  singular  causal  claims  and  the  regularities  that  we  infer  from  them  are  
supported by the strict laws of physics? Davidson’s claim is that there is a “conviction” that 
singular causal claims can be sharpened, so that a perfect explanation will eventually be 
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reached. The explanation would be perfect in the sense that all the laws to which the 
explanation refers will be strict. This claim cannot be a conceptual truth,  because when one 
starts referring to actual physics the question what the nature of reality at the bottom level is 
seems clearly to be an empirical one. The “conviction” is nothing more than a dogma of 
physicalism, and as such it certainly cannot be used to establish the truth of physicalistic 
monism. Is it rational to hold this kind of conviction? If there is a perfect physical theory, it is 
possible that we will never discover it. What is potentially more fatal is, of course, the simple 
possibility that nature is not deterministic. If there are truly random events, then we can never 
come up with a theory which could predict them, even if we knew everything about the 
history of the universe and every physical detail about the nature of reality there was to know. 
 What justifies the step from the conceptual connection between physical objects, 
changes and physical laws to the conclusion that causal relations between token-events are 
such that they can be brought under the strict laws of physics? Whereas the cause-law thesis is 
a priori and conceptual, Davidson’s views about the status and scope of physics are 
influenced by empirical evidence, that is, by evidence which is a result of actual research in 
physics. Although Davidson is hesitant to analyze causation as such, he notes that “[…] if 
causal relations are ‘in nature’, it makes no sense to classify them as logical or contingent”.341 
But if causal relations are “in nature” then the questions of under what kind of laws they fall, 
how deterministically they can be predicted or explained, and so on, cannot be decided a 
priori,342 The  original  formulation  of  the  thesis  was:  events  related  as  cause  and  effect  fall  
under strict deterministic laws. But how could it be decided, on a priori grounds, whether or 
not cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws? If this cannot be decided a priori then 
the claim that events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws is 
empirical. If it is empirical, then the evidence for monism is empirical. The possibility of 
ontological dualism cannot be denied a priori. But this would then mean that Davidson’s 
argument for monism, his theory of mind, would become empirical. Then it would be 
legitimate to criticize it on empirical grounds. 
If the conceptual argument does not give a reason to think that causal relations are 
backed up by strict laws of physics, then what does? Here Davidson’s somewhat constructive 
view  about  physics  needs  to  be  noted.  He  claims,  in  a  Quinean  spirit,  that  it  is  the  aim of 
physics to find a vocabulary which is complete in the sense that whatever can be described in 
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suggests that the question how strict the basic laws turn out to be depends on the nature of reality. But if this is 
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that vocabulary can also be explained in that vocabulary. According to Davidson, physics is in 
this sense “all-encompassing”. This resembles the view of Quine who also claimed that: “Full 
coverage… is the very business of physics, and only of physics.”343 But even if physics aims 
at this kind of coverage, there remains the question – and this is obviously the essential point 
– of whether the nature of reality can be described in the language of physics. Let us suppose 
that it could never be explained in physical terms why a conscious thought arises in the brain; 
there seems to be no physical cause for it whatsoever. This is certainly imaginable; it is not a 
conceptual impossibility. Or let us suppose that we encounter some other events in nature for 
which no physical cause can be found. How should these situations be understood from the 
perspective of physicalism? There would be an event, a conscious thought, the occurrence of 
which would be inexplicable – and thus physics would not have covered reality in full. 
Davidson himself notes that what the Nomological Character of Causality says is that: 
“[…]events correctly said to be related as cause and effect would be seen to be covered by the 
laws of physics if the cause and effect were identified in the vocabulary of physics.”344 But 
what argument shows that all causes and effects can be identified in the vocabulary of 
physics? One way in which this problem can be solved is just by defining “physical” in terms 
of physics. This has the consequence that there is nothing physical which could lie outside the 
reach of physics because, by definition, what cannot be identified in the vocabulary of physics 
is not physical. But, once again, how could this definitional trick convince us of the view that 
everything is physical? If a conscious thought remains unexplainable and unidentifiable in the 
vocabulary of physics, do we therefore accept that it is something non-physical? If so, then 
the point of dualism is made. It would be absurd to say, as naturalists would, that conscious 
thought becomes non-existent at the moment its nature becomes scientifically unexplainable. 
According to Davidson, the vocabulary of physics is the only vocabulary in which 
strict laws can be expressed, because physics treats reality as a closed system. But the crucial 
question for physicalistic monism is precisely whether or not reality is causally closed, in the 
sense that all physical events have physical causes. If a physical cause for a conscious thought 
cannot be found, then the thesis of the causal closure of the physical is incorrect – at least if 
there are reasons to believe that such a cause can never be found. Davidson claims: “It is 
plausible that there is a set of concepts which lend themselves to the formulation of a closed 
causal system.”345 But what are the reasons to think that the existence of this kind of set  of 
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concepts is “plausible”? How should the term “plausible” be understood in this context at all? 
Either the physical realm is causally closed or it is not. If Davidson is saying that according to 
current empirical evidence it seems that physical realm is causally closed, and that the view is 
therefore ”plausible”, then he should have said that.  But  he  does  not  refer  to  empirical  
evidence at all. What is the reason to believe that when events are truly related as cause and 
effect, then: “[...] there exists a closed and deterministic system of laws into which these 
events, when appropriately described, fit.”346 This  certainly  cannot  be  a  consequence  of  the  
cause-law thesis as it is explicated in “Laws and Cause”. This cannot be a consequence of any 
conceptual argument. Why accept the view that: “There is no event that is not fully 
determined by what goes before, and no state of the universe that does not fully determine 
what follows... every natural event can be fully explained by the laws of nature and any total 
prior state of the universe.”347 This is one way to formulate the causal closure of the physical 
order. Instead of claiming that everything physical must have a physical cause, one could 
claim that any event can be explained. But why believe this either? Are there good reasons to 
believe, as Davidson does, that: “everything in the universe and its history can in principle be 
described in the language of physics...”?348 All these views are no more than dogmas of 
physicalism. If they are meant as empirical claims, Davidson should have made this clear. If it 
should be obvious to the reader that these claims are meant as empirical suggestions, then one 
is left wondering whether the claims are empirically correct. As has been noted, Papineau’s 
claim is that philosophers started to believe in the causal closure of the physical because there 
was empirical evidence in its favor. Davidson, however, does not ever refer to such evidence. 
He does not refer to evidence which would back up his view. On the other hand, if the claim 
is empirical, then one is left wondering what its relevance for a priori monism is. The point 
that needs to be emphasized vigorously is that the philosophical relevance of Davidson’s 
argument is lost if the claim that everything in the universe and in its history can be described 
in the language of physics is accepted at face value. One way in which the argument could be 
understood is that if the nomological character of causality is accepted, then monism follows. 
This, however, would beg the question for physicalism, which is meant to be the 
philosophical and metaphysical conclusion of the argument. 
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In one of his early articles, Davidson mentions that ontological monism is a view 
towards which he “announces his adherence” although he does not argue for it.349 In 
retrospect, it is possible to see that in “Mental Events” the argument for monism was given, 
and as Davidson notes, the argument for monism was a result of his believing both to the truth 
of determinism and to the truth of the irreducibility of the mental.350 But, as for example von 
Wright reminds, if one “accepts pure chance in nature one cannot at the same time postulate 
strict determinism.”351 Von Wright refers to the work of physicist Ilya Prigogine, who came to 
the conclusion that the more we know about the universe, the more difficult it is to believe in 
determinism.352 It remains a mystery what Davidson’s reasons for believing in determinism 
were since the quoted views – according to which all events are strictly determined and can be 
fully explained – do not show anything more than the acceptance of physicalistic principles. 
These  kinds  of  principles  were  expressed  already  in  the  views  of  the  materialists  of  the  
previous centuries. Whether they reflect the current scientific understanding of the nature of 
the reality is doubtful. They nevertheless show Davidson’s commitment to the view that the 
physical causal realm is closed, which is the cherished dogma of modern physicalism.  
The problem is that if one assumes this, then there is no need for any argument to 
establish monism, given the acceptance of premise one in the argument for AM. If the 
completeness of physics is true and if mental phenomena causally interact with physical 
phenomena, this can be only because mental phenomena are physical phenomena. The thesis 
of the completeness of physics is  often used to ground other physicalistic intuitions as well.  
Papineau argues that supervenience follows from the completeness of physics. 353 Kim uses  
this principle as an argument for physicalism and for the claim that mental causation is 
possible only if mental phenomena are physical phenomena.354 This thesis alone thus carries 
great weight in the argumentation for physicalism. If Davidson accepts it without argument, 
then what does he need a philosophical argument for? Davidson himself has claimed that 
monism  does  not  follow  from  the  nomological  character  of  causality  alone,  since  it  is  only 
when this premise is combined with premises with which it is not usually combined that 
monism follows.355 I think, however, that Michael V. Antony has convincingly argued that 
Davidson is able to establish the truth of monism easily without the anomalism of the mental 
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– that is, i.e. without premise three which was meant to be the distinctive contribution to the 
discussion in the original argument.  
Let us consider Antony’s claim and suppose that a mental event M causes a physical 
event P. In the following claim put forward by Antony, P1, P2, and P3 refer to the original 
premises given in “Mental Events”. P4 is the thesis according to which there are strict laws 
only in physics. We should note that, as Antony claims:  
 
[…] if all strict laws are physical, then since all causal interactions require subsumption under strict law 
(by P2), it follows that all causal interactions, including m’s causing p, involve only events that are 
physical. So m is physical. We have reached monism from P4 and P2! Such an argument, however, 
leaves no work for the anomalism of the mental (P3) in deriving the identity theory, which is proved 
before P3 is even mentioned.356 
 
Although Davidson does not explicitly argue for P4, he clearly seems to accept it.357 It  is  a  
view which Davidson has defended on independent grounds; yet as we have seen, his reasons 
for holding it have remained obscure. The point of Antony’s criticism is that if Davidson 
accepts P4, then taking it together with P2 monism is already established. Then the principle 
of the anomalism of the mental is unnecessary to establish monism. Kim has earlier made the 
same observation.358 Worse still, a second way to establish monism without P3 is to assume 
the causal closure of the physical. As Antony notes:  
 
[…] if Davidson assumes closure, notice how quickly monism follows. All he needs is P1, the premise 
that at least some mental events interact causally with physical events. For suppose m, a mental event, 
caused p, a physical event. By closure, all events with which p causally interacts are physical. So m is 
physical,  and we have  reached the  token identity  theory  without  P3 (or  P2 for  that  matter,  if  closure  
turns out to be independent of P2).359 
 
Antony seems to be correct in all of his main points. First, Davidson can establish monism 
easily given P4 and P2. Second, P3 is thus unnecessary in his defense of physicalism. But the 
novelty  of  the  argument  was  meant  to  be  precisely  the  claim  that  P3  is required for the 
establishment of monism. A further problem is that monism seems to follow straightforwardly 
from the acceptance of causal closure. This, I would say, is a problem for physicalists 
generally. If cause and effect must be related by a strict law and if all strict laws are physical, 
it follows that cause and effect must have physical descriptions which satisfy physical laws. 
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There are good reasons to think that Davidson’s argument for monism is based on 
assumptions which already show a strong commitment to a broadly physicalistic world view 
and which remain without convincing arguments. This creates the question of what the whole 
point of the argument for anomalous monism is.  Kim has noted that the causal closure of the 
physical “[…] isn't an empirical issue for the physicalists. Or, rather, the point should perhaps 
be put this way: it is not an empirical issue that physicalism involves the causal closure of the 
physical domain.”360 It is no wonder that Davidson’s physicalism involves the idea of the 
causal closure of the physical, for which he does not give an argument, since once you accept 
a physicalistic view you accept the causal closure of the physical as well. If the view that 
physics is able to describe everything is accepted, then the regulative principles of physics 
may start to seem like a priori features  of  reality.  A  problem  related  to  this  is  that  the  
speculations which Davidson offers about the possibilities of physics may in fact conflict with 
our current, not to mention future, knowledge about the nature of reality.   
As I have noted already, Davidson once admitted that the motivation for the argument 
for AM was partly based on his belief that  “determinism” is  true.  As  we have  also  seen,  in  
“Mental Events” Davidson’s claim was that there are strict deterministic laws. John Dupre 
has complained that “the notions of causality and natural law involved in Davidson’s 
argument are so restrictive that it may legitimately be doubted whether anything whatever 
satisfies them.”361 Cartwright and Kim have raised similar worries. Later the requirement of 
determinism was however dropped by Davidson. We hear: “Since it allows probabilistic laws, 
the cause-law thesis does not… imply determinism. Neither, then, does it imply complete 
predictability, even in principle, nor retrodictability.”362 I have asked what the rationale is for 
believing that physics would ultimately constitute a closed system. Here we see that Davidson 
himself admits that physics may actually be incurably non-deterministic and may not deal 
with  closed  systems.  This  view,  in  contrast  to  the  view  that  there  is  a  system  of  strict  
deterministic laws, is perhaps a result of the progress in quantum physics, of which Davidson 
became aware. The content of the cause-law thesis is thus subject to the development of 
physics, and therefore it is unclear how the reason for holding it could be a priori. If 
Davidson accepts that physics may deal with non-closed systems, then it is unclear how he 
could answer criticisms like Freeman’s, which was described earlier. 
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Davidson claims that the conceptual connection between the concept of causality and 
the concept of a law may be tight enough to support completely deterministic laws.363 But if it 
turns out that the ultimate laws of the universe are probabilistic, then also causality must be 
seen as probabilistic. Singular causal statements still entail the existence of “strict” laws, but 
probabilistic ones instead of deterministic ones. The question about the “amount of 
determinism” in reality seems to be empirical and, without having any specific knowledge 
about this, I believe one could argue that current results in quantum physics raise worries for 
the idea of determinism and for the meaning and nature of “existence” in general. Can 
Davidson’s conceptual argument ignore the possible consequences of quantum physics? After 
speculating on whether strict laws should be seen as deterministic or probabilistic, Davidson 
gives a rough example of a possible strict law: “[…] whenever there is a certain distribution 
of forces and matter in a field of a certain size at time t, it will be followed by a certain 
distribution of forces and matter in a field of a certain size at time t’”.364 It seems to me that 
the term “certain” here must mean that if there were to occur twice the same distribution of 
forces and matter in a field of size S, each instance would be followed with identical 
distribution of forces and matter at time t’. I assume that Davidson intends that the expression 
“certain distribution of forces and matter” can, in theory at least, be replaced by a perfect 
description, which is formulated in the language of physics. Then the claim would be that 
from a physical situation A (a certain slice of space time) follows a physical situation B (a 
different slice of space time), and it would be possible to tell, in physical terms, why this is 
the case. 
Let  us  suppose  that  this  applies  to  a  case  where  a  mental  event  M causes  a  physical  
event P, which can be described also as action. M has been re-described in the language of 
physics  in  a  way which  allows  the  description  of  this  event  as  certain  distribution  of  forces  
and matter at time t. In order to explain “the causal nexus” between M and P, we have to 
include everything in the universe “within the sphere defined by the distance light travels in 
the interval from t to t’ from the region of the cause to the region of the action.”365 From a 
physical perspective, “the cause” would thus be the totality of distribution of forces and 
matter inside a field of a certain size. In my opinion all this sounds very mechanistic and it is 
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not at all certain that every instance of causation could be explained, even in principle, by this 
kind of model.  
Davidson’s views about causality may be at odds with current scientific knowledge 
about the nature of causality. It needs to be acknowledged that Davidson was hesitant to 
analyze the nature of causation, although the example above gives a clue about his view. 
Since we do not know how Davidson saw the current state of physics, there is little need to 
discuss the problems of quantum mechanics but it should nevertheless be noted that, 
according to many physicists, the results of current physics may create serious philosophical 
problems. For example, a fundamental principle of present day quantum mechanics is that the 
quantum predictions are statistical. John Bell, one of the major figures in 20th century physics 
wrote that quantum mechanics is simply not able to explain why specific events happen.366 As 
we have seen, this claim does not count against Davidsonian strict laws, which are allowed to 
be statistical.  But even if  it  were possible to say, with respect to any event,  that  the event is  
going to happen with such and such probability, it is not possible, not even in principle, to 
arrive at accurate complete and detailed prediction and description of the particular process 
resulting in a particular event. As the distinguished physicist Anton Zeilinger writes:  
 
I propose that [the] impossibility of describing the random individual process within quantum 
mechanics in a complete way is a fundamental limitation of the program of modern science for arriving 
at a description of the world in every detail. In other words, I propose that this is evidence of an element 
in the description of nature which escapes rational dissection in detail into constituent parts.367 
 
There is thus evidence from scientific research showing, pace Davidson, that it is not the case 
that the nature of reality can be described in every detail. It also seems that the simplistic 
compositional picture of reality, dear to many philosophers, is something which does not 
make sense at the deepest level of reality. In an attempt to find the physical causes of physical 
phenomena, it is tempting to think that the most fundamental causes are to be found at the 
most fundamental level. But as another famous theoretical physicist John Archibald Wheeler 
writes: “Why demand of science a cause when cause there is none?”368 According to Wheeler, 
the individual process in quantum mechanics, the quantum phenomenon, involves an 
elementary act of creation. This is result of the fact that, at least on some interpretations of 
quantum  physics,  the  measurement  of  quantum  phenomena  affects  the  phenomena  to  be  
measured. According to these interpretations we decide, by choosing the measuring device, 
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which phenomenon can become reality and which cannot. This should not be understood only 
as an epistemological claim according to which we cannot know what the nature of reality is 
before we measure it. The claim is that there is no such reality, that the notion of such a reality 
does not make sense. 
Many physicists have been participating in philosophical speculations when trying to 
explain the findings of quantum mechanics. What the possible consequences, if any, of 
quantum mechanics will be for the mind–body problem remains to be seen, although the 
philosophical discussion about the relation of quantum mechanics and consciousness or free 
will is already active among philosophers. Quine claimed that: “Quantum mechanics today, 
indeed, in its neoclassical or Copenhagen interpretation, has a distinctly mentalistic ring”369 
and suggested that current understanding of physics questions the meaningfulness of the 
question of “what there is.” Quine’s view is in conflict with his earlier position, which was 
accepted also by Davidson. According to this position, physics describes the world “as it is”. 
Perhaps  there  will  come  a  time  when  the  view  that  science  can  describe  the  true  nature  of  
reality must be abandoned also by philosophers. Zeilinger, describing the conclusions of his 
research, writes:  
 
It’s all pretty crazy. The spooky effect at a distance is a process outside time and space that even I can’t 
really imagine. But I believe that quantum physics tells us something very profound about the world. 
And that is that the world is not the way it is independently of us. That the characteristics of the world 
are to a certain extent dependent on us.370 
 
Given the debate about metaphysical realism among philosophers, it is interesting that many 
of those philosophers who vigorously defend realism, because of its “scientific plausibility”, 
ignore the views of those scientists who actually study the most fundamental nature of reality. 
When the empirical evidence is applied to Davidson’s view about causal relations in nature, it 
simply may turn out that there are no such relations. 
As far as Davidson’s argument for physicalistic monism is concerned, I think we have 
to conclude that there is no way that it could succeed without being circular and relying on 
broadly physicalistic assumptions. Davidson’s argument allows an insufficient amount of 
monism. First of all, as Antony notes, the possibility of establishing monism without the 
argument  structure  for  AM  seems  clear.  It  can  be  admitted  that  part of  the  novelty  of  
Davidson’s argument still stands. His purpose is to show that mental events are physical 
events, even though they cannot be reduced to them. If the anomalism of the mental stands, it 
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is shown that ontological reduction does not imply definitional reduction. Moreover, one may 
have interest in the argument because it tries to show how three principles which appear to be 
true can be combined despite their apparent inconsistency. Nevertheless, the argument is not 
required for monism if the causal closure of the physical is assumed. Second, the explication 
of the cause-law thesis which is given in “Laws and Cause” remains obscure and the question, 
posed  by  many  critics,  of  why  the  thesis  should  be  accepted  still  remains  without  a  clear  
answer. I believe it is legitimate to say that Davidson never gave a convincing reason why the 
cause-law thesis should be accepted. The conceptual argument which he gives in “Laws and 
Cause” does not explain why causal relations in nature would be such that they entail the 
existence of strict laws.  Third, it seems that Davidson’s view of physics does not fit well with 
the actual state of modern physics. All the speculation about the full coverage of physics and 
the vision of a closed deterministic system remains without good arguments. Actual physicists 
see the task of physics quite differently. It is thus easy to agree with Fodor when he says:  
 
..I don’t pretend to do what Davidson seems to think he can, viz., get physicalism just from 
considerations about the constraints that causation places on covering laws together with the truism 
that psychological laws aren’t strict. That project was breathtakingly ambitious but maybe not 
breathtakingly well advised. My guess is, if you want to get a lot of physicalism out, you’re going to 
have to put a lot of physicalism in.371  
 
Davidson’s “breathtakingly ambitious” project to give a philosophical argument for 
physicalism stands or falls with the claim that causation must be backed up by strict laws and 
the problems of this view are evident.  
As I have emphasized, Davidson’s argument for monism differs from the arguments of 
the type–type identity theorists in the important sense that whereas the latter offered monism 
as a scientific hypothesis, Davidson wanted to give monism an a priori status. This being the 
case, I think that those critics accusing Davidson of half-hearted physicalism neglect that even 
an attempt to give an a priori argument for physicalism shows a radical bias towards a certain 
kind of view about the nature of reality. Davidson’s argument would be an important 
contribution to physicalism – if it succeeded. Those interpretations which emphasize that 
Davidson can be seen as an eliminativist about the mental, sharing in essential respects 
Quine’s physicalistic intuitions, are not completely mistaken. Although Davidson’s reasons to 
argue for the anomalism of the mental are “Kantian”, in the sense that he wants to show how 
human freedom is possible, I suggest that Davidson’s conclusion is actually the mirror image 
of Kant’s conclusion. Davidson acknowledges, as his defense of the anomalism of the mental 
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clearly shows, that there are important differences between the mental and physical domains, 
but he also shows his special allegiance to one ontology, that of natural science, or more 
precisely, that of physics. By doing this he, in my opinion, unfortunately retains some of 
Quine’s scientism, which is expressed also in the views of contemporary naturalists.  
On the Davidsonian–Quinean view, the autonomy of the mental must be sought within 
the  constraints  of  a  physicalistic  ontology.  It  could  be  said,  tongue  in  cheek,  that  whereas  
Kant assumed freedom and tried to defend the autonomy of the mental within the framework 
of experience, Davidson assumes determinism without much argument and tries to defend the 
autonomy of the mental in the framework of physicalism. The starting point is a commitment 
to the ontology of physicalism, and the subsequent attempt is to place mental phenomena 
within this ontology. In this sense Davidson, after all, quite simply follows the naturalistic 
consensus according to which something must be said about the mind’s place in a physical 
world. I have to conclude that there is thus an intrinsic conflict in Davidson’s views. On the 
one hand, as I have argued, his position could be interpreted as coming close to classical 
naturalism, which does not subscribe to the view that the ontology of physics (or any 
ontology) would be in any sense privileged. On the other hand, Davidson’s position shows a 
bias toward a strict physicalistic ontology. The threat which mental phenomena could pose for 
the completeness of physical explanations is resolved by insisting that mental phenomena are 
physical. Although Davidson’s argument for physicalism fails, it can be concluded, in 
Skillen’s words, that Davidson is “an empirical idealist but a transcendental physicalist.”372 I 
agree with this definition while noting that there are reservations which I will discuss in 
section 2.6. 
I have described the general nature of Davidson’s physicalism and the insuperable 
problems facing it. The argument structure of AM is meant to be a strong argument for 
physicalism, but the physicalistic content of Davidson’s non-reductive physicalism is vague 
and the argument itself is problematic. In the next section, I consider von Wright’s 
physicalistic view in order to find out whether a general argument for physicalism and a 
plausible version of non-reductive physicalism can be found within it. Both von Wright and 
Davidson accept physicalistic monism, but their respective reasons for accepting it are 
interestingly different. 
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2.2 Von Wright’s physicalism and its relation to Davidson’s position 
 
In this section I clarify von Wright’s views and discuss the sense in which von Wright can be 
interpreted as a physicalist. I emphasize those aspects of von Wright’s views which bear 
similarities to Davidson’s. The connection is interesting given the fact that Davidson and von 
Wright basically never mention each other; yet they have reached similar kind of conclusions, 
as far as we can tell, on independent grounds. It is also interesting that commentators have 
interpreted their views as being diametrically opposed on many issues about the mind.  
Classical philosophical questions about the mind stimulated von Wright’s interest in 
philosophy already in his early youth. At the end of his career von, Wright became 
preoccupied with the mind–body problem. The result was his book In the Shadow of 
Descartes, containing essays dealing with several problems in the philosophy of mind. 
Apparently, the book contains texts which von Wright did not originally plan to publish.373 It 
is fortunate that the book was published; I agree with Hertzberg that the work contains some 
of von Wright’s deepest ideas.  
Von Wright did not write much about the mind–body problem or about the questions 
which fall under the label “philosophy of mind” through most of his career.374 Consequently, 
his view has received little attention or discussion, and therefore von Wright’s position in the 
mind–body debate does not enjoy anything like the established status of Davidson’s AM. 
There are literally only a handful of subsequent commentaries on von Wright’s work in the 
philosophy of mind.375 Von Wright is not putting forward a detailed theory of the mind, and 
in this sense his contribution to the contemporary discussion is somewhat feeble. The insights 
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind or psychology are largely ignored in contemporary 
philosophy, and the same can be said in von Wright’s case. An interesting question is that of 
whether the fact that von Wright’s views go largely unnoticed has anything to do with the fact 
that in the eyes of many he is a “Wittgensteinian.” I shall not speculate about this, although it 
can be noted that modern philosophy of mind seems to be hostile towards a “Wittgensteinian” 
point of view. What are the other possible reasons why von Wright has stayed outside the 
contemporary discussion, i.e. why has he remained in the “shadows” of modern philosophy of 
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mind? One possible reason is that, as von Wright himself noted, the direction in which 
modern philosophy was heading was not to his taste.376 Staying true to his understanding of 
what philosophy is and believing that there are no final solutions to philosophical problems 
made von Wright feel that: “Many things which philosophers say, naively simplifying 
matters, I could never say….”377 It was the unhealthy materialist trend of modern philosophy 
of mind which led von Wright to keep a distance between his views and the current debate. 
Although von Wright described eliminative materialism or physicalistic reductionism as the 
most vulgar examples of the scientistic tendencies in the modern philosophy of mind, he did 
not challenge these or other positions actively in his writings.378 This I take to be unfortunate; 
perhaps it could be counted among the responsibilities of a great philosopher that he should 
comment on the trends of time which he sees as troubling. Bennett and Hacker’s invocation of 
Wittgensteinian insights against the conceptual confusions of neuroscience provides an 
example of contemporary philosophers of mind carrying on this kind of project. But the 
requirement to participate cannot be forced on anyone, and perhaps von Wright felt too 
alienated from the mood of our times to participate; he noted that even reading the 
newspapers was painful because they reminded him of the world’s suffering and contained so 
much  miserable  material.  On  the  other  hand,  von  Wright  actively  participated  in  public  
discussions concerning societal issues, and these contributions ranked certainly higher than 
the public comments of most philosophers of his home country. I think it is clear that In the 
Shadow of Descartes contains a “wealth of distinctions and observations which may prove 
productive”, as Stoutland has suggested.379 A Finnish commentator, Jarkko Tontti, has 
claimed that von Wright’s production is not relevant any longer and that, truth be told, 
Explanation and Understanding is a completely insignificant contribution to the current 
philosophical discussion.380 By exploring further the views of von Wright, my purpose is to 
show that, pace Tontti’s  sensationalist  claim,  von  Wright’s  work  is  still  relevant  and  an  
important contribution to the philosophy of mind. 
Von Wright’s views are problematic if seen in the context of naturalism. Those who 
expect a technical view about the relationship between mind and brain will certainly be 
disappointed by von Wright’s views; given his conception of philosophy this was, of course, 
to be expected. But von Wright’s remarks on the problems which are being currently 
                                               
376 In an interview by Lahtinen, Pihlström and Tuusvuori, 1995. 
377 Von Wright, 1989a, 16. 
378 See von Wright, 1995. 
379 Stoutland, 2009, 9. 
380 Tontti, 2004. 
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discussed in the philosophy of mind serve as a valuable starting point from which the 
consistency and possible problems of the dominant naturalistic views can be considered. Von 
Wright’s position is an interesting alternative, and its merits and defects deserve a discussion. 
His views are fresh and invite the reader to think by offering suggestions instead of 
compelling knock-down arguments. When considering the relevance of von Wright’s views 
on the mind–body problem, his views about the nature of philosophy (as described section 
1.2.3) must be taken into account; the discussion must be understood against this background. 
Von Wright does not think that the task of a philosopher is  to  come  up  with  the  kinds  of  
explanatory theories which are now so common in the naturalistic philosophy of mind. Yet, as 
I have noted, von Wright is not always true to his conception of philosophy and – when this 
happens – his views face serious empirical challenges.  
Von Wright thinks that the mind–body problem is, above else, a problem which, 
instead of an empirical solution, is in need of conceptual clarification.  As he writes: “[…] no 
future  ‘brain  research’  will  –  contrary  to  what  many  enthusiasts  now  seem  to  expect  –  
eventually solve ‘the riddle of consciousness’. This… is a philosophic muddle which no 
findings of a scientific nature will ever clarify”.381 This kind of very provocative claim sounds 
astonishing, or simply false, to those scientists and naturalistic philosophers who see the 
mind–body problem as nothing other than an empirical issue. Searle, for example, with his 
biological  naturalism,  would  see  this  kind  of  approach  as  utterly  wrong-headed.  Those,  like  
Nagel and McGinn, who see the mystery of consciousness as more of a philosophical problem 
would perhaps have more sympathy for von Wright’s views. I think it is important to 
acknowledge that von Wright has his own reasons for making this challenging claim, reasons 
which result from his conception of philosophy. 
Von Wright’s views are sometimes obscure. The presentation of In the Shadow of 
Descartes shows, in my opinion, how the author tries to clarify the issues, above else, to 
himself. This is not surprising because, as I described in chapter one, von Wright’s view is 
that in the end a philosopher can appeal only to his own intuitions when seeking relief from a 
philosophical problem. Whereas easily-followed arguments or conclusions are sometimes 
lacking in the views of von Wright, deep philosophical insights are always present. In section 
2.1, Davidson’s physicalistic monism as an answer to the ontological mind–body problem 
was discussed. An acceptance of physicalistic monism can be detected also in the writings of 
von Wright. He, in a similar spirit as Davidson, would suggest physicalism as an answer to 
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the mind–body problem. A critic could claim that (because of their non-reductive views) 
neither Davidson nor von Wright is happily seen as a pure physicalist, and that they subscribe 
to a form of monism of a non-physicalistic variety. As will become clear, there are reasons to 
think that the position of these philosophers could be described also in this way. Nevertheless, 
both Davidson and von Wright reject ontological dualism and are, in this sense at least, 
physicalists and do not belong to the group of the (few) modern dualists. Although von 
Wright’s  position  is  not  a  form  of  dualism,  it  is  true  that  his  work  is  alien  to  the  kinds  of  
positions which are usually identified being part of the physicalistic ideology.  
I suppose that von Wright saw most of the contemporary work in the philosophy of 
mind as being very different from the kind of conceptual considerations which interested him. 
He thought that the materialistic spirit of modern philosophy of mind was unhealthy and that 
this kind of philosophy contained some grave errors.382 This being said, von Wright’s position 
can justifiably be described as a form of physicalism, and in my opinion it is clear that he, like 
Davidson, fails to give a convincing argument for its support. My claim is that insofar as von 
Wright’s view is interpreted as a form of physicalism, his position clearly resembles 
Davidson’s position. According to my interpretation, the similarity of von Wright’s and 
Davidson’s versions of physicalism casts doubt on the claim, made by certain commentators, 
that an important difference between them is that the latter endorses the idea of supervenience 
whereas the former does not.383 This claim, which I believe to be incorrect, makes Davidson 
“more of a materialist” than von Wright, according to the critics. However, despite the 
similarities I argue that von Wright’s and Davidson’s arguments for physicalism differ in an 
important way.  
Both von Wright and Davidson are ontological monists. In the previous section it was 
argued that Davidson’s position is a form of monism, and the question which required 
clarification was what sort of monism it is. So far my interpretation has strongly emphasized 
the physicalistic aspect of Davidson’s monism. What remains to be considered in the next 
sections are the questions of what this monism implies about the nature of properties and their 
reducibility, about the nature of token-states or events and their reducibility, and about the 
relation between mentalistic and physicalistic explanations. The answers to these questions 
reveal the exact nature of Davidsonian non-reductive physicalism. Although non-reductive in 
spirit, the physicalistic monism of von Wright and Davidson is committed at least to this: 
“[…] destroy the physicalistic and you destroy everything else though the contrary is not 
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true....”384 This, according to Stoutland, is one way to express the idea of the global 
supervenience of the mental on the physical. Stoutland, who knows the work of Davidson and 
von Wright very well, would say that both of these philosophers are best understood as non-
physicalists.385 This, I think, is because according to him almost any philosopher, apart from 
the “supernaturalists”, would subscribe to minimal physicalism (which is equivalent to what I 
have labeled O-physicalism). The fact that a philosopher accepts minimal physicalism is not, 
according to Stoutland, a sufficient reason to label him as a physicalist. The question of when 
a position is physicalistic enough to be called “physicalism” is controversial, and is partly a 
terminological question. Kim, for example, claims that mind–body supervenience, the anti-
Cartesian principle and mind–body dependence define minimal physicalism, and that if one 
accepts them all then one may be properly called a physicalist.386 Consequently, a rejection of 
one or all  of them means the rejection of physicalism. As far as I  can see,  both von Wright 
and Davidson accept the three theses which capture the essence of minimal physicalism 
according to Kim. Both Stoutland and Kim would thus describe Davidson and von Wright as 
minimal physicalists, but both would also claim that this is not “physicalism enough”. 
Coming  from  Kim  this  is  criticism,  whereas  I  suspect  that  Stoutland  would  not  see  it  as  a  
defect but a virtue of von Wright’s or Davidson’s position. 
With respect to Davidson, Stoutland notes that there is no question that Davidson is a 
physicalist in the minimalist sense, but he also rejects all the claims of robust physicalism. 
Stoutland concludes that Davidson’s philosophy of mind goes, in “all major respects”, against 
robust physicalism.387 This is reminiscent of Rorty’s interpretation of Davidson as a 
pragmatist showing no interest in a physicalistic ontology.388  But we have seen that 
Davidson’s statements about the task and possibilities of physics make it far from certain 
whether it is correct to claim that his view goes, “in all major respects” against robust 
                                               
384 Stoutland, 2005, 147. 
385 At least this is the feeling that I have from a personal discussion. According to Stoutland, both von Wright 
and Davidson have a monistic view which is not physicalistic. 
386 Kim, 1996, 12. Mind–body supervenience says that two things exactly alike in all physical properties cannot 
differ in respect of mental properties. The anti-Cartesian principle says that there can be no purely mental beings. 
Mind–body dependence says that mental properties are determined by physical properties.   
387 Stoutland, 2008. Robust physicalism I take to be something like M-physicalism. 
388 I am not suggesting that Stoutland would agree with Rorty’s view but merely noting that their views about the 
nature of Davidson’s physicalism seem similar. I believe Rorty's comment is best understood as a description of 
the intellectual camp in which he takes Davidson as belonging. That is, Davidson is a pragmatist whose aims in 
philosophy differ from those of contemporary physicalists. Stoutland would quite likely agree with the view that 
Davidson understands the nature and purpose of philosophy in a different way than contemporary physicalists. 
This is, of course, the point I wanted to stress in section 1.2.2.  
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physicalism.389 It certainly does not go against robust physicalism as radically as openly 
dualistic views, and Davidson’s claim that physics is capable of giving full coverage and 
perfect explanations does not sound very anti-physicalistic. The question that I want to raise is 
precisely  that  of  what the reasons to accept minimal physicalism ultimately are, and more 
specifically, what the reasons that Davidson and von Wright give for minimal physicalism 
are. Does von Wright offer better reasons for physicalism than Davidson?  
“Minimal physicalism” or not, non-reductive physicalism is nevertheless physicalism, 
at least by name, and the pressing question is whether even the minimal physicalism of this 
position is coherent and justified. To say, as Stoutland does, that “almost any philosopher” 
would accept minimal physicalism obviously does explain why a certain philosopher accepts 
such a position or why the position of minimal physicalism should be accepted. Whether this 
claim is true is worth considering. Ignoring the vague expression “almost any philosopher”, 
the  claim  is  false  since  there  are  quite  a  few  modern  dualists  as  well  as  philosophers  with  
religious backgrounds.390 All these philosophers with different arguments can be brought 
under the (possibly) somewhat pejorative label “supernaturalists”, but doing this does not 
clarify the question of whether physicalism or dualism is the correct answer to the mind–body 
problem.391 Why is it that certain philosophers reject physicalism? 
It could be debated whether von Wright would have accepted the term physicalism as 
a  correct  description  of  his  position,  but  it  is  clear,  as  I  will  show,  that  the  idea  of  global  
supervenience expresses well von Wright’s view about the overall relationship of mind and 
matter. Von Wright uses the concept of supervenience also in a more substantial sense. This 
being the case, the following interpretation by Emiliani, who knows von Wright’s work well, 
should be treated with caution: “Von Wright’s conception basically departs from Davidson’s 
– as well as from several approaches to the mind–body problem focusing upon the notions of 
supervenience and emergence….”392 According to Emiliani, von Wright’s view departs from 
these approaches precisely because it does not focus upon the notion of supervenience and / or 
                                               
389 In most respects I agree with Stoutland’s view. My claim is merely that some of Davidson’s own views give 
the impression that he would not reject all the claims of robust physicalism. I claim that a Davidsonian 
conception of the mind is anti-physicalistic, but it is possible that I am reading more “dualism” in Davidson’s 
position than what he himself intended. 
390 What is true is that almost any modern philosopher with a naturalistic view accepts minimal physicalism. 
With respect to all philosophers one should note, for example, the claim of Chalmers (2005) who writes: “If I 
had to guess, I’d guess that the numbers within philosophy of mind are 50% materialist, 25% agnostic, 25% 
dualist.” It is questionable whether the physicalistic consensus is as established as Stoutland claims. The view is 
challenged by notable philosophers working on the field. Stoutland himself does not offer arguments for minimal 
physicalism and merely states that he accepts global supervenience. Perhaps he thinks that the position needs not 
to be argued for. 
391 I do not mean to suggest that Stoutland uses this expression in a pejorative manner. 
392 Emiliani, 2001. 
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emergence. Emiliani also claims that von Wright rejects the view that mental and physical 
phenomena are token identical, and thus his position is a very weak form of materialism if it 
can be described as materialism at all. Kim described Davidson’s position as a weak form of 
token physicalism because while token-identity is argued for, the possibility of actual token-
reduction is questioned.393 If Kim’s description is correct, it is plausible that Emiliani fails to 
see the similarity between Davidson and von Wright because, on the one hand, he interprets 
Davidson’s views as implying a strong form of token physicalism, which includes the idea 
that tokens of mental events could be actually reduced to tokens of physical events and, on the 
other hand, he thinks that von Wright rejects the token-identity thesis altogether. As the 
different interpretations of Davidson’s position show, the strength of Davidson’s physicalism 
is not easily determined, and therefore Emiliani’s interpretation cannot be straightforwardly 
dismissed. My claim is that with respect to von Wright’s views about token-identity 
Emiliani’s claim is however incorrect.394 
As I understand him, Emiliani thinks that an approach which “focuses” upon the 
notions of supervenience and emergence is a form of strong materialism, because on this kind 
of approach the materialist conceptualization constitutes the most basic level of descriptions. 
What it means to say that a position “focuses” upon the notion of supervenience is in my 
opinion unclear, as well as the question of how the notion of “basic level” should be exactly 
understood. When is one description more basic than another? Perhaps one way to clarify the 
view that descriptions form a hierarchy in which some descriptions are more basic than others 
is just by invoking the concept of supervenience.395 Davidson’s acceptance of supervenience 
is indeed one important reason to see him as a materialist, because according to him physical 
facts determine mental facts and the latter are dependent on the former. But Davidson does 
not put any special emphasis on the concept of supervenience; his view about the relationship 
between mind and body does not “focus” on the concept of supervenience. If the view focuses 
on anything, it is on the irreducibility and the anomalism of the mental.396 Emiliani argues 
that on Davidson’s view “matter is ontologically prior to the mind”, and that the existence of 
physical events is language-independent whereas the existence of mental events is not.397 I 
think that the distinction between language-dependent and language-independent events 
                                               
393 Kim, 2005. 
394 I return to this question in section 2.4 where the problem of token-identity will be considered. 
395 Although as we have seen in section 2.1.2, it is questionable whether the notion of supervenience offers any 
substantial clarification with respect to the mind–body problem.  
396 Of course, as I have argued, Davidson also focuses on establishing the truth of monism. However, in this line 
of argumentation the concept of supervenience does not play a significant role either.  
397 Emiliani, UP. It seems to me that, according to Emiliani, Davidson is an eliminativist claiming that mental 
phenomena are mere constructs.  
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describes Davidson’s position rather uneasily, because at times he argues that events are 
mental or physical  only  as  described.  Therefore  it  is  correct  to  say  that  the  form  of  
supervenience which Davidson seemingly accepts implies no more, and no less, than what 
Stoutland notes – that is, destroy the physical and you destroy everything else.398 If this is all 
that the supervenience thesis should be understood to mean, then, pace Emiliani, both von 
Wright and Davidson should be seen as holding the thesis of supervenience. If one interprets 
von Wright as claiming that mental phenomena are not token identical to physical 
phenomena, then one is apt to see him as a substantial anti-physicalist – even as a dualist – 
which, so I argue, is an incorrect description of his position. 
To say that von Wright accepts a form of materialistic monism does not clarify much if 
the content of this monism is unclear. How does the irreducibility of the mental, which von 
Wright surely accepts, go together with materialistic monism? This question, which is a 
problem for Davidson’s position, is a problem also for von Wright. As the title of von 
Wright’s last book suggests, his view is that the contemporary philosophy of mind has been 
pursued “in the shadow of Descartes”. Descartes made a sharp distinction between the mental 
and physical aspects of reality. Yet, the two realms seem to interact. The now all-too-familiar 
question, which is asked in the shadow where the mental and the physical have been 
separated, concerns the relation between the mental and the physical. If the starting point is 
the intuition that “here” is mind and “there” is matter and that they are intuitively two kinds of 
different “things”, then the question about their relationship arises. A sharp distinction results 
in a situation where either a form of interactionism or a form of idealist, materialist, or neutral 
monism (reductionism) must be accepted. From among these alternatives, it is clearly 
materialist reductionism which is favored among modern philosophers. The naturalistic 
attitude in philosophy is a major reason for this. Real alternatives to physicalism or dualism 
are few.  
Von Wright, however, rejects both alternatives as successful answers to the mind–
body problem. He claims that both solutions, interactionism and reductionism, belong within 
the Cartesian frame and thus err right in the beginning by accepting the sharp distinction that 
Descartes made famous. This criticism bears an interesting resemblance to the view discussed 
in connection with Searle’s biological naturalism. His claim is that the main mistake of 
contemporary philosophy of mind is its inability to free itself from the Cartesian grip. Von 
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why he emphasizes that this is peculiar to Davidson’s position if global supervenience is something that almost 
any philosopher would accept. 
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Wright agrees with this claim, and describes his own approach in the philosophy of mind as 
an independent track in the direction pointed out by Heidegger, Husserl, and Wittgenstein 
who all attempted to break free from the shadow of Descartes.399 As a personal voyage, 
philosophy of mind was for von Wright an attempt to release himself from the Cartesian ghost 
which has haunted philosophy. It could be claimed, as Searle does, that the philosophical 
problems of the mind are still formulated in surprisingly Cartesian terms. The formulations 
mind and body, or mind and brain, are very common. The self-image of the human is still 
dualistic, even though the scientific image of the human may points towards monism.400 Von 
Wright’s claim is that contemporary physicalism in fact maintains a Cartesian-like distinction 
between an inner mind and the outside world, or between persons and brains. The same claim 
has been made recently by Bennett and Hacker.401 Von  Wright  thinks  that  the  sharp  
distinction between mind and body should be removed, but at the same time he claims that 
there is an obvious conceptual difference between mind and matter. An attempt to remove or 
reject mind–body dualism through reduction or identification would ignore the conceptual 
subtleties which make up this very dualism. I think it must be noted that von Wright’s final 
views about the legacy of Descartes are somewhat unclear. On the one hand he notes that in 
his opinion the body–mind distinction is not, pace Descartes, a sharp divide.402  On the other 
hand, in an unpublished manuscript where von Wright states his last remarks on the subject, 
he writes: “The unquestioned basis of my paper could be called Cartesian. It assumes that 
there are two kinds of phenomena which are (conceptually) sharply distinguished and 
irreducible the one to the other.”403 In another unpublished manuscript von Wright concludes: 
“Perhaps one could call my position a revindication of some Cartesian intuitions.”404 These 
are curious remarks, which may reflect merely the fact that von Wright changed his mind 
about the question of how Descartes’ challenge or shadow should be faced.  
Von Wright’s provocative view is that modern philosophy of mind goes astray in two 
fundamental aspects. First, it maintains the sharp Cartesian-like separation of mind and world; 
and second, it is based on the assumption that this separation can be dispelled through 
reduction. By making these two false assumptions, the program of reductive physicalism is 
committing a grave mistake and heading in the wrong direction from the beginning. Von 
                                               
399 Von Wright, 1999, 2000. 
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401 Bennett and Hacker, 2003. For similar worries see also Putnam, 1999, Stoutland, 2005. 
402 See von Wright, 1999, 31. 
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Wright thought that contemporary philosophy of mind was losing itself to the jungle of 
metaphysics, which is a view shared among recent anti-naturalists like Putnam and Rorty. But 
if a reductive view about the mind is fundamentally flawed then what, according to von 
Wright, are the reasons we might give to reject interactionism? What are the reasons one 
might have to argue against the view that mental and physical phenomena are ontologically 
distinct? This question is the reverse side of the question of why materialistic monism should 
be accepted in the absence of reduction. Philosophers’ reasons to accept materialistic monism 
are various, but a convincing argument for monism is lacking. Davidson tried to provide such 
an argument, but failed. Whereas Davidson attempted to come up with a philosophical 
argument,  von  Wright  does  not  give  this  kind  of  argument  for  monism.  His  reason  for  
rejecting interactionism is straightforward and actually reflects quite simply the attitude of 
naturalism. Von Wright writes: “[I am]… reject[ing] the idea of interactionism as contrary to 
a  scientific  picture  of  the  world.”405 The view that something material could have an 
immaterial cause, or that something immaterial could cause something material, goes against 
our  ‘scientific  picture  of  the  world’.  In  a  similar  way  as  we  observe  in  the  views  of  many  
physicalists, the causal argument is used to reject the possibility of dualism in von Wright’s 
reasoning as well. Von Wright does not discuss the details of why, with respect to causation, 
the situation should be so.406 He merely notes that he cannot understand how something 
immaterial could cause a material event; for von Wright this puzzlement seems to be both 
philosophical and scientific. In von Wright’s case, as in the case of most modern philosophers 
of mind, the problem of mental causation is nevertheless the problem which calls for an 
analysis of the mind–body relation, and which points towards a monistic solution. A further 
question is arises as to why von Wright is willing to defend a “scientific picture of the world” 
even though he at the same time is very critical of scientific progress and scientism. The only 
answer I can propose is that von Wright inherited from his teacher Eino Kaila a deep respect 
for the results of exact sciences, especially physics, and for the idea that one of the pillars on 
which monism rests is the unity of the scientific world picture. To this view von Wright 
certainly subscribed in the beginning of his career.  
What I want to emphasize is that that von Wright’s reason for accepting monism 
differs in an interesting way from Davidson’s. Whereas Davidson wanted to give an a priori 
philosophical argument for physicalism, von Wright seems to take a form of materialist 
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406 Perhaps the empirical evidence for the completeness of physics is strong enough evidence for von Wright. If 
this is so, he does not mention it. 
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monism for granted. He notes that interest in reviving a form of interactionism can be 
detected in the contemporary philosophy of mind but, as far as he can tell, taking the situation 
back to the “neighborhood of Descartes” can be a result only of accepting a kind of pre-
scientific, “animistic” or “magical” way of thinking. This way of thinking should be avoided 
and opposed. As an example of an “atavistic attitude” towards the mind–body problem, von 
Wright refers especially to the work of Eccles and Popper who subscribe to a substantial form 
of dualism which, in my view, certainly cannot be interpreted as a form of physicalism at 
all.407 An important metaphilosophical question is at what point interactionism became a form 
of this magical way of thinking. Already Descartes was challenged with the question of how 
body and mind can interact, but this challenge was not as much scientific as it was 
philosophical. When did the challenge become a scientific challenge? As I showed in section 
2.2.1,  the  physicalist  consensus  was  not  as  firmly  in  place  in  the  1950s  as  it  is  today.  The  
progress of science and the belief in the completeness of physics were among the reasons why 
philosophers started to believe in the material mind. It would be interesting to consider what 
kind of evidence von Wright saw as showing that interactionism is unscientific. If he had 
developed a theory of mind in the 1950s, would he have been together with Smart and others 
who defended a type–type theory because of its scientific plausibility? Or was it only at the 
end of the 20th century that interactionism looked implausible from the scientific perspective? 
On this question I shall not attempt to speculate. It can nevertheless be noted that according to 
von Wright, it was the growing significance of brain research in the 1970s which partly 
caused his interest to gradually move towards the philosophy of mind.408  
It should also be emphasized that von Wright’s view about the mind–body relationship 
bears a striking resemblance to Kaila’s view. It seems to be the case that von Wright acquired 
not only his respect for scientific world view but also his position in the philosophy of mind 
largely from his teacher. Von Wright notes that for Kaila: “dualism was ‘out’, once and for 
all. This attitude is, I think, a reflection of the situation in philosophy when he grew up.”409 
He goes on to speculate that Kaila would have seen the revival of dualism in the latter part of 
the 20th century as :“[an] …aberration and relapse into already conquered positions.”410 Von 
Wright seems to follow Kaila’s path, who in the words of von Wright, “succeeded in showing 
that the body–mind separation is an unfortunate instance… and that the two Cartesian 
substances are conceptually inseparably bound together. It does not seem to me certain that 
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monistic philosophy can go much further to their unification.”411 This is an interesting 
statement because I believe it tells us something also about von Wright’s own position. On the 
one hand, as we have seen, von Wright thinks that mind and body are conceptually sharply 
distinguished. This is contrary to Kaila’s view. On the other hand, von Wright accepts Kaila’s 
claim that mind and body are conceptually inseparably bound together. It should be noted that 
von Wright has as negative a view of the recent interest in reductive views about the mind as 
he does towards interactionism. I would therefore claim that von Wright opposes those views 
which he sees as not scientific enough as well as those which he interprets as being scientistic. 
In doing this, he tries to steer a middle course; this of course is essentially the position of non-
reductive physicalism. A paradox is that the position of von Wright – who accuses 
interactionists of being pre-scientific – is subject to the same criticism, according to most 
modern philosophers of mind. This, the “unscientific” nature of von Wright’s work can be 
counted among reasons why his position has remained in the shadows of modern philosophy 
of mind.  
But the scientific picture of reality has not yet described mind’s place in the physical 
world. Therefore it is better to say, as von Wright in fact does, that if materialist monism is 
true, it is contingently true. His view is that an attempt to argue that physicalism is necessarily 
true would be a hopeless task.412 Von Wright claims that it is logically possible that there 
might be mental phenomena without physical correlates, and this possibility is what 
demolishes the philosophical interest of identity theories. I think most contemporary 
philosophers of mind would likely agree with the view that materialism is contingently true, 
although von Wright notes that in modern philosophy the main question about the status of 
psycho-physical parallelism has been the question of whether such a parallelism is a logical 
necessity.  In  this  work  I  shall  not  take  a  stance  on  the  question  of  how the  modal  status  of  
psycho-physical identity claims should be understood. I acknowledge that the question about 
the modal status of identity claims has been under debate, and that many see this discussion as 
an important part of the problem. I choose to largely ignore this discussion in considering the 
views of Davidson and von Wright.413 Davidson repudiates all other forms of necessity than 
the natural kind and has expressed doubts about the idea that identities should be understood 
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as being necessary in Kripke’s sense.414 I  shall  not  here  consider  the  question  of  how  
Davidson understands “natural necessity”; it is an issue which did not play an important part 
in Davidson’s philosophy, and it certainly did not have an important role in his philosophy of 
mind. Whereas von Wright considers the modal status of identity theory, it is clear that his 
view about its truth or falsity is based on empirical evidence. I think that the question of 
whether mental states are physical states in this world is an interesting and a difficult enough 
question already. To this issue philosophy can make a contribution, for example, by 
considering whether there are principled obstacles preventing the possibility of an empirical 
answer to the question.  
Von Wright’s emphasis on the contingency of psycho-physical identity nevertheless 
differs from Davidson’s view. Davidson’s argument is meant to show that, given certain non-
empirical assumptions like the nomological character of causality, the truth of monism is not 
based on empirical evidence in any clear sense.415 Von Wright, on the other hand, thinks that 
the psycho-physical identity theory is best understood as a scientific hypothesis and not as a 
philosophical view. The question of whether or not mental phenomena are identical with 
physical phenomena is an empirical and not a philosophical question and, according to von 
Wright, the empirical evidence seems to point towards the conclusion that mental phenomena 
are physical phenomena. O-physicalism is true, or there are at least good reasons to believe in 
its correctness. The philosophical question would be whether mental phenomena have to be 
physical, and to this question von Wright’s answer is negative. Davidson, contrary to von 
Wright, can be interpreted as answering this question affirmatively. Von Wright claims that 
the interesting philosophical question is not whether physicalistic monism is true or not, but 
whether the idea of monism can be made intelligible.416 As I see it, this is due to von Wright’s 
conception of philosophy and his view concerning the philosopher’s task.417 I  would  claim  
that von Wright’s main task in the philosophy of mind can be described as an attempt to 
explore the intelligibility of a reductive view. The measuring stick against which the 
intelligibility is judged is the language of everyday.  
Although von Wright provides his own unorthodox theory of the mind, it seems to me 
that this, in his opinion, is not really the task of the philosopher. The task of the philosopher is 
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to evaluate the intelligibility of empirical mind–body theories. As a lucky consequence, a new 
view may occur. When discussing the question of whether a philosopher should be fully 
acquainted with the previous philosophical landscape when he addresses a philosophical 
problem, von Wright notes: “[…] it has seemed to me that a new solution to an already solved 
problem can be of value both because it may have been reached through a new type of 
approach and because it may direct future research towards a new direction.”418 In the preface 
of In the Shadow of Descartes, von Wright admits that in the philosophy of mind he often 
“had to go his own lonely way” because the already explored positions were something with 
which he simply could not agree. In hindsight, it can be seen that von Wright arrived at 
conclusions which have been suggested also by other philosophers of mind. It could be 
claimed that many philosophers of mind are exploring the intelligibility or unintelligibility of 
different positions. But there are essential differences in the background assumptions from 
which  these  philosophers  proceed,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  von  Wright’s  approach  also  
challenges these assumptions in a productive way.  
Through conceptual analysis, a philosopher attempts to determine whether the 
acceptance of physicalistic monism leads to incoherence, to a situation where some claims 
about the mind do not make clear sense. If this happens, the conclusion should be that the idea 
of monism is not intelligible because no sense can be made of what it means for such a 
position to be true. Even though von Wright’s main project in the philosophy of mind seems 
to  be,  in  a  somewhat  Wittgensteinian  spirit,  the  exploration  of  the  intelligibility  of  different  
positions, he also wants to provide a general view which is not based on idle neuroscientific 
speculation but respects scientific facts. He argues that on such a scientific foundation a 
philosophical view which is fresh and healthy should be built. Such a view is free from 
metaphysical speculations. Needless to say, from a more empirically oriented perspective von 
Wright’s own views would most likely amount to hopeless speculations without much value 
for  the  modern  philosophy  of  mind.  Indeed,  sometimes  von  Wright  seems  to  offer  
speculations which do not fit well with his Wittgensteinian view according to which 
philosophy should not be speculative.419 Von Wright says things like: “The 
neurophysiological details… are… for all I know, largely obscure even to science. I have no 
idea what they are. Nevertheless I shall give free reign to my imagination in trying to think 
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what they may be.”420 Or, with respect to these neurophysiological details: “I do not say that it 
is so – only that I fail to see why it could not be so”, and “Again, I do not say that it is so – 
only that it may be so.”421 It  is  unclear  to  me  what  the  purpose  of  these  speculations  is  
supposed to be; they cannot seriously compete with empirical views. Of course, on von 
Wright’s understanding about the purpose of philosophy, philosophical views should not 
attempt to compete with empirical theories. But how do these speculations relate to empirical 
mind–body views? They certainly appear frustrating or irrelevant to philosophers who 
approach these problems in a more empirical vein. Those philosophers who insist that one 
should get out of “the narrow canyons of the commonsense conception of the world”,422 and 
that in philosophy there has been too much thought and too little experiment, do not value von 
Wright’s work due to its speculative and conceptual character. Likewise, von Wright claims 
that the modern trend in the philosophy of mind based on the findings of neuroscience is 
metaphysical, scientistic, and violently speculative. It is empirical metaphysics without real 
grounding except the scientific facts, which give rise to the very philosophical speculations it 
deplores. The facts do not justify all the philosophical conclusions which are drawn from 
them. 
If a form of materialist monism is accepted, then its “postulational nature”423 and its 
status as a “scientific research program or heuristic idea”424 should also be recognized. Von 
Wright claims that there is and cannot be any proof for materialism; its truth or falsity remains 
beyond empirical evidence. Materialism is immune to criticism only in virtue of its being 
accepted as a postulate concerning the constitution of the world and concerning what should 
count as a scientific view of things. This is certainly not the way that Davidson would see the 
issue. It is perhaps somewhat surprising that von Wright seems to be closer to the type–type 
identity theorists than Davidson, although only in the sense that for him the truth of monism is 
an empirical issue. Von Wright agrees with identity theorists such as Smart and Place in their 
view that the identity theory is, above else, a scientific theory,  or better still,  a hypothesis. I 
have  shown how Place  himself  contrasted  this  view with  that  of  Davidson.  But  von  Wright  
does not subscribe to materialism, as the type–type theorists do, just because  it  is  the  most  
plausible view from the scientific perspective. Kaila’s influence is thus not the only reason to 
defend monism. Von Wright mentions also the conceptual convenience which comes from the 
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identification of the mental with the physical. He notes that by accepting materialism one does 
not need to “tamper with the principles of physical science, i.e. with  what  I  shall  call  the  
Causal closedness of the physical order of things.”425 But, as I see it, this conceptual 
convenience is something which can be gained only after the principles of physical science 
have been accepted. In this sense, it could be claimed that an important part of the 
“conceptual convenience” is particularly the avoidance of conflict with a scientific world 
view. Should the resulting convenience actually be understood as showing the acceptance of a 
naturalistic view? For example, the problem of mental causation is a problem against the 
background of physicalism, and an attempt to fit mental causation conveniently into this 
context already assumes the truth of physicalism. The problem becomes real only if the truth 
of  physicalism is  assumed.  One  benefit  of  robust physicalism is that the problem of mental 
causation vanishes. There cannot be a problem of mental causation in the framework of 
physicalism.  Should  this  count  as  a  convenience?  Kim,  for  example,  has  noted  that  the  
problem is not whether mental causation is true. The problem is how mental causation is 
possible.  
Von Wright seems to accept the principle of the causal closure of the physical, 
although he does not explain why such a view should be accepted. A hint can, however, be 
found: von Wright talks about the assumed causal closedness of the physical world-order.426 
This is a wise choice of words; there certainly is no proof that causal closedness is true. The 
principle of causal closure has the same postulational status as materialism. The assumptions 
are closely connected; it could be argued that the assumption in favor of materialism follows 
from  the  assumption  that  closure  is  true.  One  commentator,  Friedrich  Kambartel,  has  
suggested  that  on  von  Wright’s  view  the  Principle  of  Causality  is  a  norm for scientific 
research and not an empirically confirmed statement about the structure of the world as it 
really is.427 This resembles Kim’s observation that it is not an empirical issue that physicalism 
involves the idea of the causal closure. I believe we can agree with Kambartel’s interpretation 
given von Wright’s view:  
 
That every phenomenon has a cause, or that nothing can happen if not caused by something else is not 
an empirical truth to be established by observation or experience. Nor is it a necessary (conceptual or 
logical) truth established by rational argumentation… search for the causes of things has turned out 
immensely profitable….428 
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This clearly resembles Davidson’s view, although Davidson would perhaps claim that the 
truth of the nomological character of causality can be established by rational argumentation. 
But, as I have shown, the consequent conceptual truth which Davidson arrives at concerns the 
relationship between the concept of  cause  and  the  concept of law. Whether something can 
actually happen in nature without a cause is a question to which Davidson’s argumentation 
gives no answer. Is an event without a physical cause an impossibility on a Davidsonian 
account? I shall not take a stance on this, but a question worth considering is: what actually 
speaks against events without causes?  
 What  is  the  step  from  the  principle  of  causality,  understood  as  a  norm,  to  causal  
closure? Why could there not be non-physical causes or non-physical effects? Von Wright’s 
simple answer is that their existence would conflict with our current scientific understanding 
concerning the structure of reality. The principle of causal closure has been used, often in a 
straightforward manner, in the argument for physicalistic monism. Von Wright writes, for 
example: “Sensations… have a causal origin in some physical event.”429 Often this of course 
seems undeniably to be the case and a reasonable minimal physicalist would claim that this is 
always the case. But, if an argument for physicalistic monism is lacking, then the general 
claim is unwarranted, at least with respect to those sensations which, like hallucinations, seem 
not to have a clear physical cause. The view that the origin of sensations is a physical event is 
a view well confirmed by common-sense and science. But the philosophical question of 
whether sensations must have such an origin remains unresolved. 
People often have sensations which seem not to, and sometimes do not, have any 
identifiable cause outside their bodies. These sensations do not have a cause which could be 
described as physical without begging the question.430 A sensation without an extra-bodily 
cause is perhaps the best example of a non-physical event; such an event does not fulfill the 
criteria which have been set for physical phenomena. If it is accepted that sensations 
themselves are physical phenomena, and if the causal closure of the physical is also accepted, 
then the assertion of the causal origin of all sensations can be given as a conclusion. But this 
is not an argument for monism, since the physical nature of sensations is already assumed. A 
different strategy is to follow the easy route of AM. If mental–physical interaction and closure 
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are accepted, monism follows. If it is accepted that sensations have a physical cause and 
whatever has a physical cause must itself be physical, then monism follows. 
Although von Wright does not have a special interest in giving an argument for 
physicalistic monism (and nor is he especially interested in defending such a position), he 
notes that there is a way to argue for its a priori nature. This is done by sticking to the 
postulate concerning the “constitution of the world” – in this case concerning the relationship 
of mind and matter. If this is done, the postulate becomes “(like a) logical necessity or an a 
priori feature of reality.”431 In my opinion it is not entirely clear how the expressions “logical 
necessity” or “a priori” should be understood here, but von Wright’s suggestion that the 
postulate should be thought of as “a demand of reason” that is not an empirical truth 
established by observation or experience nor a necessary (conceptual or logical) truth gives 
the  best  suggestion  for  how  the  a priori nature of psycho-physical identity should be 
understood.432 The “demand of reason” is something the nature of which, as far as I can tell, 
cannot  be  clearly  defined.  It  seems  to  me  that,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  the  mind–body  
problem there could certainly be conflicting “demands of reason”, and it is not easy to say 
how a conflict between them could be settled. Von Wright’s suggestion is nevertheless 
interesting because according to it, psycho-physical identity cannot be a logical necessity; yet 
it is not an empirical truth either. In a sense, this leaves the truth of physicalistic monism 
hanging in the air. If the question about the truth of monism is an empirical question, the 
problem loses its appeal as a philosophical problem. Perhaps this would demonstrate that a 
problem which once was philosophical has been converted into an empirical problem. But 
empirical research has not shown decisively whether or not mental phenomena are physical, 
and there are issues related to the mind–body problem which seem to resist, in principle, an 
empirical solution – like the question of whether humans have immortal souls which survive 
the death of their bodies or whether freedom of the will is possible. The question about the 
existence of soul is not a scientific question, which is not to say that it could not become a 
scientific problem. The question about the possibility of immortal souls is (perhaps) a 
philosophical question and a dismissal of its relevance on scientific grounds shows a narrow 
understanding  of  the  problematic  human  condition.  Deep  problems  which  are  not  scientific  
problems are nevertheless real problems.  
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What has been said has provided a grasp of the nature of physicalism that von Wright 
can be interpreted as supporting. He accepts a form of monism because it is in harmony with 
the current state of scientific knowledge. He does not give other arguments as to why monism 
should be accepted. Von Wright does not provide the kind of argument structure that 
Davidson does. He merely states how things are, or have to be, if a scientific world view is to 
be accepted and further suggests – without much argument, but following Kaila’s lead – that 
such a view should be accepted. I believe that the details of von Wright’s position, however, 
need clarification. He rejects interactionism and thereby agrees with “various forms of 
materialism”.433 But it has become clear that materialism comes in many forms. Von Wright 
thinks, for example, that there is a necessary simultaneity between mental and physical 
phenomena and thereby calls his position “a kind of materialism.”434 As I will show in the 
next section, the necessary simultaneity between the mental and the physical is best 
understood in terms of supervenience. The reasons for arguing for such simultaneity are the 
ones mentioned already; conceptual convenience and the existing empirical evidence.435 For 
these reasons, von Wright would accept the claim of “no mental difference without a physical 
difference”, and I believe that how this claim should be understood can be explicated by 
invoking the concept of supervenience.   
We can conclude that von Wright shows an ontological bias towards materialism, just 
as Davidson does. He has sympathy for a view that the world is made of one “stuff.” But then 
the relevant question becomes: What form of materialism does von Wright propose? What is 
the nature of this “stuff”, and what follows for the philosophical questions about the mind if 
the world is made of it? Some commentators have noted von Wright’s clear bias towards 
materialism. De Caro writes: “From an ontological point of view von Wright is a monist (a 
physicalist or materialist monist)…”436 and lists the physicalistic assumptions made by von 
Wright, namely: “[…] ontological monism; the idea that there is some kind of neurological 
correspondent of every mental event; the thesis that only physical properties can be involved 
in causation.”437 These, incidentally, are exactly the assumptions made also by Davidson. 
Emiliani agrees with de Caro when he notes that von Wright’s view the world of the mind is 
the same as the world of the body;438 yet he claims that von Wright’s overall position is best 
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described as “neutral stuff monism”.439 Both de Caro and Emiliani note that von Wright 
succumbs to conceptual dualism or to dualism in relation to properties. This shows that the 
way in which von Wright’s position is interpreted is essentially the same as Davidson’s; 
physicalistic or neutral monism combined with a dualism of concepts or properties. It is 
curious that whereas Davidson’s reasons for monism have been under live discussion, von 
Wright’s reasons for monism are not considered by the few commentators who have studied 
his work. Davidson has been variously charged with the claim that his position is overtly 
physicalistic or not physicalistic enough. In von Wright’s case, no such charges have been 
presented. One reason for this is, of course, that von Wright was not a real participant in the 
discussion which is active in the modern philosophy of mind; his views were treated with 
silence, and perhaps they were considered not worth addressing. What I find surprising is that 
those who are interested in von Wright’s philosophy have not considered his reasons for 
monism. I suspect that these commentators uncritically accept a form of physicalistic monism, 
which needs no further argument than the remark that all other alternatives would amount to 
“supernaturalism”.  
 
2.2.1 Von Wright’s supervenience  
 
Von Wright defends the view that reality consists of one kind of stuff, and yet he argues for 
the irreducibility of the mental. The acceptance of mental–physical supervenience suggests 
that  a  form  of  token-physicalism  comes  closest  to  the  best  description  of  von  Wright’s  
position. Against the interpretations of Emiliani and, for example de Caro, I argue that von 
Wright accepts supervenience and that it has an important role in his argumentation. There is 
actually clear textual evidence for this conclusion, but it is ignored by the commentators. De 
Caro is among those who claim that von Wright rejects supervenience. I agree that this is also 
a  sensible  interpretation.  Von  Wright  for  example  explicitly  says:  “I…  reject  the  quasi-
causalist idea of the mental as something ‘supervenient’ on the material.”440 My claim is, 
however, that if von Wright really rejected supervenience, the nature of his physicalism would 
be a mystery, since supervenience is often interpreted capturing the essence of minimal 
physicalism. Rejecting supervenience would mean that there could be a mental difference 
without a physical difference, and what would be left of physicalism if this were true? Being a 
pedantic reader of von Wright, I want to note that in a reprint of the above article (in which 
                                               
439 Emiliani, 2001. 
440 Von Wright, 1994a, 109. 
152 
 
the idea of supervenience is denied), that very passage is removed, perhaps suggesting that 
von Wright changed his mind.441 Of course this in itself does not show that von Wright came 
to accept the idea of supervenience. However, von Wright’s last statement on supervenience 
is:  
 
[…] one can replace talk of body–mind and mind–body interaction by talk of causal connections 
between physical events only. Using terminology now in fashion, one can say that… causal relations 
between mental and the physical phenomena are supervenient in time on causal relations the terms of 
which are physical phenomena only. The suggested position comes as “near” the psycho-physical 
identity theory as is, in my opinion, “logically permissible.”442 
 
Von Wright also notes that the causal closedness of the physical world-order (nature) can be 
safeguarded by accepting the following: “Whenever a physical event P can be correctly called 
cause (effect) of a mental event M, there exists another physical event F such that the duration 
of M is included in the duration of F, and such that F is the effect (cause) of P.”443 In essential 
respects, this is how reductive materialism would formulate supervenience and how this 
position would treat the problem of mental causation.  
But how should we understand these claims given that von Wright seems also to reject 
the idea of supervenience? A simple explanation would be that von Wright changed his mind. 
This could be a possible explanation, given von Wright’s own admission that with respect to 
certain questions his views went through significant revisions. I claim, however, that by 
rejecting the quasi-causalist idea of supervenience von Wright criticizes those, targeted also 
by Kim, who claim that the causal efficacy of the mental could be simply and non-reductively 
explained by invoking the concept of supervenience. Davidson, for example, seems to be 
among these philosophers.444 Kim has suggested that perhaps supervenient causation would 
be something which could explain the mystery of mental causation in a non-reductive way.445 
If supervenience explains the mind–body relation non-reductively, why not invoke 
supervenient causation to explain non-reductively the relation of mental causation? Why not 
say  that  a  mental  event  M  is  a  derivative cause of  a  physical  event  P  in  virtue  of  its  
supervenience on P1, which undeniably is the cause of P? This would be an easy solution, but 
would it grant “real causal powers” to M? Kim has become critical towards his earlier view 
and has later claimed that this kind of “trick” would not secure the causal status of M. He now 
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claims that supervenient causation could as well be called “pretend” or “faux” causation, and 
that  a  model  in  which  the  causal  powers  of  M  are  meant  to  be  secured  on  the  basis  of  its  
supervenience on P1 “could… be philosophically pernicious if it should mislead us into 
thinking that we have thereby conferred on M, the mental event, some real causal role”.446 I 
think von Wright’s rejection of quasi-causalist supervenience is motivated precisely by his 
belief that its acceptance would lead to philosophically pernicious results. He argues against 
the idea of supervenient causation on the same grounds as Kim, who is a robust physicalist. 
Kim now claims that supervenience is best understood as a reductive relation, and von Wright 
– although highly critical towards reductive positions in the philosophy of mind – seems to 
come very close to this view. 
Although quasi-causalist supervenience should be rejected, von Wright claims that 
supervenience nevertheless describes the most “permissible” psycho-physical relation. The 
expression “supervenient in time” is not used in the discussions of supervenience, and 
therefore it would be a matter of speculation to say how von Wright’s formulation of 
supervenience should be exactly understood. Besides von Wright I have not come across 
other philosophers who have used the expression “supervenient in time”. Von Wright’s views 
about supervenience remain brief and vague. He formulates supervenience in terms of 
temporal and not spatial coincidence, and does not discuss concepts like “realization”, 
“determination” or “constitution” that are usually associated with supervenience. In von 
Wright’s case, the notion does not explain much. The same can actually be said of Davidson’s 
use of the concept. The best description that can be found from the writings of von Wright 
about the relation of mental and physical event is the claim that it is a part-whole relation; the 
mental is (concretely) part of the physical, but the relation cannot easily be understood as a 
relation of causality or a relation of identity. What von Wright above all seems to emphasize 
by his use of the concept of supervenience is that “mental things” are not extended in space, 
yet they last over a period of time. He notes that it is common to say that mental things may 
be located in time but have no extension in space.447 This being said, von Wright’s 
supervenience sometimes has a more substantial, ontological, aspect when he writes, for 
example,  that  a  volitional  act  is  included in cerebral processes (in my view this suggests a 
spatial simultaneity) – or when he defines a reason as a mental episode which is a temporal 
segment of a neural cause of a bodily movement.448 Whatever claims about supervenience von 
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Wright makes, it is clear that his views on are not based on empirical evidence. The claim 
about the part–whole relation is not a result of brain-research; von Wright’s view is based on 
conceptual investigations. Likewise, the claim that a mental thing is not extended in space 
would sound obscure to philosophers inspired by cognitive neuroscience. But here again, von 
Wright is making a conceptual point by claiming that the concept of a mental state is such that 
spatial location is not part of it. The exact location of a mental state does not make sense if 
“mental  state”  is  understood  in  a  certain  way  –  that  is,  in  terms  of  the  language  of  the  
everyday. Ontologically speaking, a mental thing’s extension in space is nevertheless 
something that von Wright, because of his rejection of dualism, cannot in my view deny. 
Von Wright’s views about supervenience have been largely neglected by 
commentators. De Caro speculates that von Wright could accept “Davidson’s 
epiphenomenalism” if it weren’t for Davidson’s acceptance of the supervenience thesis.449 
Emiliani claims that according to the usual understanding of supervenience: “Descriptions in 
mental terms… are held to supervene on physical ones…”, but that in the case of von Wright: 
“an ascription of a mental state is not a description of states and processes of [a neural] kind” 
and that “token-identity is rejected – not even an individual action is identical to a set of 
physical processes….”450 As I have noted, it is difficult to say how the claim that causal 
relations between the mental and the physical are supervenient in time on the relations the 
terms of which are physical phenomena only should be understood. But it is not clear, pace 
Emiliani, that this way of stating the situation differs in any important respect from the view 
that “descriptions in mental terms supervene on physical ones”. 
Von Wright’s emphasis is on the temporal identity of a mental event M and a physical 
event P. “Supervenience in time” means that events temporally coincide or  that  event  M’s  
temporal duration is “included” in that of P.451 These expressions are rather obscure – how to 
understand the inclusion of temporal duration? I think this view does not imply that M would 
have to be spatio-temporally identical with P; that is, it does not imply that “supervenience in 
time” is compatible with the view that M is mysteriously spatially distinct from P. It is 
possible that M and P do not occupy exactly the same region of space, or more dramatically, 
that M does not occur in space at all. This would be a version of Cartesian dualism. Von 
Wright notes that:  “The nervous and the sensational (physical  and mental)  coincide without 
                                               
449 De Caro, 1999, 128, fn. 9. 
450 Emiliani, 2001. 
451 Von  Wright  even  claims  that  the  duration  of  mental  states  is  necessarily included  in  the  duration  of  the  
corresponding physical states and events. See, von Wright, UPd. 
155 
 
being identical.”452 But what this “coincidence without identity” precisely means is unclear, 
because von Wright also writes that if there exist a “chain of reasons” and a “chain of causes” 
which converge in an action, then “[F]rom the point of view of their ‘substrate’, i.e. their 
robust, spatio-temporal reality, there is only one ‘chain’”.453  I think that the expression 
“robust, spatio-temporal reality” sits uneasily together with von Wright’s conceptual dualism, 
and shows a certain kind of bias towards the physical. If there is only one chain, the result is 
that action is nothing over and above its physical aspect, if by “over and above” we 
understand some event or entity in the physical world.454 Doesn’t this imply the identity, and 
not a mere coincidence, of the chains because there is only one chain? It  is  obvious that the 
“one and only chain” of which von Wright speaks is physical, since he claims that the idea of 
mind–body interaction can be replaced with the idea that causal connections occur only 
between physical events. This sounds similar to the position of physicalism that is usually 
attributed to Davidson. It can be concluded that it is plausible that M’s supervenience in time 
on P should be understood as implying a spatial supervenience as well, although this way of 
formulating the idea of supervenience is perhaps also compatible with the view that M and F 
are spatially distinct “entities”. Supervenience in time leaves room for the possibility that the 
“base” entity and the supervening entity are spatially distinct, although if a change in the base 
entity is required for the change in the supervening entity, then there has to be (if we exclude 
the possibility of pre-established harmony and mere co-incidence) some kind of causal 
interaction (or identity) between the entities. Could it be claimed that all events which occur 
at the same time are “supervenient in time” with respect to each other? No, at least not 
according to the usual understanding of supervenience, which sees supervenience as a relation 
of dependence or determination. This being the case, the supervening entities must be in some 
kind  of  hierarchical  relation  to  one  another.  On  the  other  hand,  all  the  talk  about  “base  
entities” and “supervening entities” sounds obscure if supervenience is thought to concern 
predicates and not properties. If the predicate of goodness supervenes on natural properties, is 
“goodness”  an  entity  distinct  from  the  properties  on  the  basis  of  which  this  predicate  is  
applied? These problems will be discussed in section 2.3. 
How should we understand the claim that an ascription of a mental state is not a 
description or ascription of a brain-process? This claim, put forward by Emiliani, is of course 
                                               
452 Von Wright, 1998, 165. 
453 Von Wright, 1998, 37. 
454 As one commentator (Kivinen, 1998) has noted, the “exorcism of Descartes” is not so easy because Descartes 
could counter: The action may not be anything over and above its physical aspect in the physical world, but how 
about the mental world? 
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difficult to understand if one accepts minimal physicalism and accepts that, whether or not it 
can be shown, “deep down” mental states are brain-states. It is equally clear that whether they 
are is one of the important questions under consideration, and the search for a philosophical 
answer to this question continues. Von Wright’s agreement with various forms of materialism 
is a good, perhaps compelling, reason to think that he would take mental states to be states of 
the brain. Given this, the claim that von Wright rejects the thesis of token-identity is 
problematic. From the fact that a particular mental phenomenon cannot be identified with a 
physical phenomenon it does not follow that the former, when it occurs, is not identical with 
the latter. But sometimes von Wright draws exactly the conclusion that M cannot be identical 
with P because no description of P would be sufficient to identify M conclusively.455 Yet, von 
Wright suggests that it is “plausible”, although a “sheer hypothesis”, that there is a difference 
at the neural level – for example, between cases when a person feels pain and when he does 
not.456 The feeling of pain is a mental phenomenon; it is supposed to have a counterpart at the 
neural level, and as the standard formulation of supervenience claims, any change in the 
feeling  requires  a  change  at  the  neural  level.  I  believe  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  von  
Wright would deny the correctness of this formulation. A naturalist would, of course, argue 
that the claim that a neural difference is required for a mental difference is more than a “sheer 
hypothesis”: there has to be a difference. Von Wright’s reply is that this claim is a 
philosopher’s dogma, one dogma of materialism. 
The talk of the neural “counterparts” of mental phenomena causes confusions as long 
as  we  stay  in  the  context  of  an  all-encompassing  materialism.  If  O-physicalism  is  accepted  
there does not – ontologically speaking – occur any mental phenomenon M which would be 
something “over and above” a neural phenomenon N. There are no distinct entities to be 
correlated. But I think it is possible to understand what all the talk about “counterparts” 
means, because in the course of everyday life, beliefs and other mental phenomena are 
attributed to others without any knowledge about their brains. There seem to be two distinct 
phenomena, mental and physical, and mental phenomena exist, so to speak, in their own right. 
Their  relation  to  the  physical  world  can  be  considered.  It  is  a  plausible  view,  according  to  
naturalistic philosophy at least, that the phenomena attributed take place in the brain. Von 
Wright notes:  
 
                                               
455 This seems to be Emiliani’s reason for claiming that von Wright rejects token-physicalism. 
456 Von Wright, 1998, 54. 
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Sensations and perceptions, recollections and thoughts, reasons for action may all have distinct physical 
“counterparts” in the neural system without which those psychological phenomena would not occur [in] 
the person who has them.457  
 
Here von Wright notes merely that mental phenomena may have distinct physical 
counterparts.458 This modal claim, which can be formulated as “it is possible that…” should 
be understood in the context of von Wright’s view, according to which the logical necessity of 
mind–body identity cannot be established. By emphasizing that it may be so, von Wright is 
asserting his “negative point” according to which it does not have to be the case that the 
identity-claim is true. But, or so I think, von Wright is also hinting at a more “positive point”, 
according to which it is possible that mental phenomena may turn out to be distinct, clear or 
specific physical phenomena. Isn’t this precisely the view that mental is something 
supervenient on the material, and does it not assert the claim of token-physicalism? Yes. 
Something in the brain is required for the occurrence of psychological phenomena; no mental 
difference without a physical difference. This being the case, it is no wonder that von Wright 
writes: “I would like to say that in feeling pain we immediately experience (sense) something 
that goes on in our nervous system”,459 and  that  “Could  we… not  say  that  pain  as  physical  
phenomenon is the nervous processes which (or part of which) we experience as pain?”460 
This  certainly  gives  the  impression  that,  pace the non-physicalistic reading of Emiliani, an 
ascription of a mental state is exactly a description of states and processes of a neural kind.  
Von Wright’s criticism of supervenience does not show that he would reject the idea 
of mind–matter supervenience, and the textual evidence shows that it actually has an 
important role in his argumentation. Because many modern philosophers want to avoid 
dualism, they may accept mind–matter supervenience while claiming that such a relation does 
not make good sense since it is not clear what the concept says about the relation between 
mind and body. This “solution” is expressed in Hilary Putnam’s views when he claims that 
                                               
457 Von Wright, 1989b, 29. 
458 As noted already, “distinct physical counterpart” is an obscure statement if the position is meant to be a form 
of physicalism. It should be noted, though, that the obscurity of the claim depends on the meaning of the term 
“distinct”. Does it mean something like “clear” in this context ,or is it meant to mean something like “separate”? 
A clear physical counterpart of a mental phenomenon does not sound as obscure as a distinct physical 
counterpart. 
459 Von  Wright,  1998,  165.  Consider  also:  “When  we  hear,  see,  feel,  taste  or  smell,  we  sense the nervous 
processes, or a part of them which are caused by the sensory stimulus… in a sense, the primary objects of 
sensations are nervous processes.” (Von Wright, 1997a, 152.) This being said, it must be stressed that von 
Wright apparently went through a change of mind, since in von Wright, 2000 he claims that what we hear is the 
source of the sound in the outer world, not the nervous processes which are produced by the sound. As far as I 
can tell one can advance either one of these theses, that we hear the nervous processes or their source. Moreover, 
in von Wright 2000a the sensation under discussion is exclusively hearing. It is therefore not clear whether the 
views would apply to all sensations, not to mention “higher” mental phenomena like beliefs. 
460 Von Wright, 1998, 167. 
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“mental events aren’t ‘identical’” or ‘not identical’” with physical events”.461 This  is  an  
obscure statement, but the rationale behind it seems to be that the notion of identity has not 
been given a clear sense in the mind–body context, and that therefore the apparent identity 
between the mental and the physical is “a criterionless and sui generis sort of “identity””.462 
This resembles Malcolm’s Wittgensteinian view when he notes that the claim according to 
which mental phenomena have neural counterparts is “without sense until it is given a sense – 
and giving it a sense will not be easy”.463 It is, so to speak, up to us what kind of sense will be 
given to this view and what kind of status will be granted to it in our conceptual scheme. The 
sense that can be given to the idea that mental phenomena have physical counterparts is 
constrained by certain facts; whether the constraining facts are taken to be essentially 
scientific facts or the facts of everyday life is based on a choice which is not easy to defend.  
The position of Putnam and Malcolm captures part of von Wright’s view, since 
according to him the assertion that mental states are identical with their physical counterparts 
is “a serious confusion”. In some sense,  the  mental  and  the  physical  are  parts  of  the  same  
reality; mental and physical ascriptions capture the same part of reality, the same spatio-
temporal region or, as von Wright would say, at least a part of the same temporal region. Von 
Wright asserts that the view according to which mental states and events are identical with 
their  counterparts  in  the  neural  system  has  some truth in it. But the obscurities of token-
identity make it problematic to say that M and P are identical. Non-reductive physicalism 
faces serious problems in its claim that mental phenomena are token-identical to physical 
phenomena. I will return to this problem in section 2.4, where the details of von Wright’s and 
Davidson’s views about token-identity are discussed. 
As far as von Wright’s physicalism is concerned, there is enough textual evidence to 
warrant the conclusion that he would accept the idea of supervenience, and thus a form of 
minimal physicalism. This may not come as a surprise to commentators, although the general 
view seems to be that, because of his conceptual dualism, von Wright should not be described 
as a physicalist at all. What may be surprising is that von Wright’s acceptance of monism has 
in fact robustly physicalistic, or even eliminativist, consequences, the most evident of them 
being the denial of mental–physical or physical–mental causation. I would thus argue that, 
                                               
461 Putnam, 1999, 75. 
462 Putnam, 1999, 37. Putnam criticizes especially Davidson’s criterion, which he takes to be circular. How the 
intuitions of philosophers differ is shown well, for example, by the fact that Fodor complains of not 
understanding Putnam because the former has “no clue what it is to give a sense to a notion; the notion of giving 
a sense to a notion hasn’t been given a sense….” (Fodor, 2000). Fodor does not problematize the question of 
whether a satisfactory identity criterion can be given for mental phenomena. According to him, the question 
where in the brain mental phenomena occur is not interesting. 
463 Malcolm, 1989, 36. 
159 
 
pace Emiliani, there are reasons to think that von Wright’s conclusions are in fact more 
physicalistic than Davidson’s. Indeed, in an unpublished manuscript von Wright himself 
speculates that his position, by eliminating the mental, has some likeness to the position of 
eliminative materialism that he associates with Patricia Churchland. This is a very interesting 
claim, which I nevertheless find extremely puzzling.464 The claim is especially puzzling given 
that von Wright identifies eliminative materialism as one of the most vulgar examples of the 
scientistic tendency in the modern philosophy of mind.465 What  von  Wright’s  view  shows,  
however, is that the interpretation according to which he stands firmly against robust 
physicalism is at least partly incorrect; von Wright cannot be thoroughly non-reductivist if he 
sees a similarity between his own views and those of Churchland. One way to arrive at an 
epiphenomenalist conclusion, which claims that the mental aspect of human life is causally 
inefficacious, is through defending the view that only physical properties can participate in 
causal relations.466 This, the causal primacy of physical properties, is one of the features of 
von Wright’s physicalism. My claim is that there are reasons to think that the strength of von 
Wright’s physicalism is actually quite high. He says things like: “It would be surprising if… 
variations  of  our  experience did not answer to determinate variations in some neural 
processes.”467 Or: “Could not all… different ‘“states of mind’ be reflected in characteristically 
different neural states? The idea seems (to me) very natural, empirically plausible – maybe 
even logically compelling.”468  
The first quote raises an interesting question concerning von Wright’s physicalism. If 
variations of experience answer to determinate variations in neural processes, is the position 
actually closer to type-physicalism than token-physicalism? Does the view mean that a mental 
state M is always, or at least with high frequency, correlated with a specific (“distinct”) neural 
state N? This would be a stronger claim than Davidson’s, who argues explicitly against 
psycho-physical laws and therefore against the view that there are determinate variations  at  
the neural level corresponding to the variations of experience. Given von Wright’s other 
views on the subject it is unclear how the expression “determinate variations” should be 
taken, but the formulation definitely raises questions. Whether generalities at the level of 
correlations between mental and physical phenomena can be found seems, in the end, to be an 
                                               
464 Von Wright, UPa. The reference is made in a sketch which eventually came to be the paper “On Mind and 
Matter” (von Wright, 1994). 
465 See von Wright, 1995. 
466 This is the standard accusation of epiphenomenalism laid against Davidson. I will consider its plausibility in 
chapter four, where I discuss the question of why, according to my interpretation, von Wright’s views are closely 
related to epiphenomenalism. 
467 Von Wright, 1998, 117. 
468 Von Wright, 1998, 133. 
160 
 
open question according to von Wright. He often emphasizes that only empirical research can 
provide an answer to this question.  
The second quote is also interesting. A view that states of mind may be reflected in 
characteristically469 different ways may be empirically plausible, but what does it mean to say 
that this view is “very natural”? It is certainly not a truth of everyday language, which is the 
transcendental bedrock that, according to von Wright, must be respected. The same question 
can be raised with respect to expression “logically compelling”. In what sense can the idea be 
logically compelling? At times von Wright seems to claim just the opposite: monism is 
contingently true. It is not a contradiction in terms to think that a contingent position is 
logically compelling, but it  is  also unclear what the expression can be taken to mean in this 
context. Perhaps in von Wright’s view the claim that mental phenomena are reflected in 
characteristically different neural states is something that it is rational to accept. This, it seems 
to me, would nevertheless undermine some other claims of von Wright – especially his 
emphasis on the “primacy of the obvious”. 
Von Wright accepts the token identity thesis to the extent that, because of physicalistic 
monism, it is either trivially true or, because of conceptual dualism, it is nonsense. The claim 
that token-identity is trivially true seems to be an acceptance of global supervenience, 
whereas the claim that token-identity is “nonsense” resembles the views of Putnam and 
Malcolm. To say that the token-identity thesis is trivially true is to assert that whenever 
something mental occurs, something takes place in the brain. This von Wright accepts, 
because the alternative would amount to accepting a “magical”, non-scientific view of the 
mind–brain relationship. But an attempt to go beyond this, an attempt to identify mental states 
with physical states, would lead to nonsensical claims. I believe it must be concluded that in 
von Wright’s philosophy of mind, there is no room for a view according to which a mental 
phenomenon would not be token-identical with a physical phenomenon in the trivial sense. 
This is, of course, no wonder given von Wright’s materialism; token-identity captures the 
essence of non-reductive physicalism. From what has been said, I cannot but conclude that 
those who see an important difference between von Wright’s and Davidson’s versions of 
materialism  are  wrong.  Their  forms  of  materialism  are  equally strong or equally weak. 
Moreover, the view that von Wright rejects the idea of mental–physical supervenience does 
not capture the “spirit” of von Wright’s views on the relationship between mind and matter. 
Incidentally,  Emiliani’s  claim  that  “[…]  von  Wright’s  conception  basically  departs  from  
                                               
469 Should this term be understood in the same sense as “determinate variations”? If so, this again suggests that 
the correspondences between the mental and the neural would be closer to type-identities than token-identities. 
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Davidson’s – as well as from several approaches to the mind–body problem focusing upon the 
notions of supervenience and emergence”470 is  suspect  –  not  only  with  respect  to  the  claim 
about supervenience, but also with respect to the claim about emergence. Von Wright 
specifically notes:  
 
I  am…  inclined  to  speak  of  the  sensation  as  neither  caused  nor  causally  efficacious  but  as  being  a  
‘byproduct’ which emerges as a concomitant of the nervous process…On this view mental states and 
events are kind of… ‘emergent qualities’ of their ‘physical substrate’.471 
 
This formulation sounds paradoxically both very physicalistic and very anti-physicalistic. On 
the one hand, a view which denies the causal efficaciousness of sensations is a form of 
eliminativism, and such a position is usually interpreted as being the strictest form of 
physicalism. Von Wright’s reference to Churchland, who is openly eliminativist, cannot be 
ignored. On the other hand, a view which mentions a physical substrate and emergent 
qualities sounds like a form of emergentism, and is thus not a version of physicalism at all. If 
von Wright did subscribe to a form of genuine emergentism, this could also explain his non-
standard use of the concept of supervenience. Supervenience was used by the British 
emergentist Samuel Alexander to describe a relation which holds between emergent 
properties and base properties. In 1920, Alexander writes:  
 
The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges 
therefrom, and it does not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent 
with its special laws of behaviour.  The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to 
be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I would prefer to say 
in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the “natural piety” of the investigator.  It admits no 
explanation.472  
 
According to the emergentists, the emergent properties are genuinely distinct and additional to 
the base properties; there was a time when “supervenience” referred to the occurrence of 
emergent properties. Given von Wright’s use of the term “emergent qualities”, it could be 
thought that his understanding of supervenience would agree with Alexander’s formulation.473 
However,  we  have  seen  that  von  Wright  emphasizes  the  primacy  of  the  physical  in  his  
                                               
470 Emiliani, 2001. 
471 Von Wright, 1997a, 155. 
472 Alexander, 1979, 46. 
473 Whereas, for example Davidson, describes supervenience as a relation which guarantees that mental 
properties matter to causal relations, von Wright (UPb) describes supervenience as a relation which allows for 
the existence of supervenient properties, but only as shadows which neither have influence on the base 
properties, nor are influenced by them. How this understanding relates, for example, to Alexander’s 
understanding is an interesting further question, which I shall not consider here.  
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explanation of how the relation of supervenience should be understood. I believe that the 
interpretation according to which von Wright is very physicalistic instead of anti-physicalistic 
must therefore prevail. Yet, I am tempted to note that in Explanation and Understanding, von 
Wright  likens  emergence  to  a  process  of  transmutation  of  quantity into quality.474 Through 
our understanding something physical in a new way, the physical takes on a quality which it 
did  not  have  before.  As  a  curiosity,  it  can  be  noted  that  in  the  Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein wrote: “Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead is not the same… if 
anyone says ‘That cannot simply come from the fact that a living thing moves about in such a 
such way and dead one not,’ then I want to intimate to him that this is a case of the transition 
from quantity to quality.”475 Should emergent qualities be understood as resulting from our 
capability to see aspects of the world in certain way, which in turn results from our attitude?  
 Von Wright’s own conclusion in fact is that perhaps his position could be best 
described as a form of emergentism or epiphenomenalism.476 These positions do not exclude a 
monistic physicalistic ontology but are perfectly compatible with it. In fact, as noted earlier, 
epiphenomenalism, a causal eliminativism with respect to mental phenomena, could be seen 
as a version of extremely strong physicalism. Von Wright notes that the necessary 
simultaneity of the mental and physical, and the consequent causal inefficacy of the mental, 
could be interpreted as a form of materialism which is nevertheless not reductive.477 But a 
non-reductive position can be a version of eliminativism. I have argued that von Wright’s 
reason for defending materialism is scientific intelligibility, and I have also shown that, in the 
case of the Churchlands and others, this position has led to the elimination of the mental. 
Whereas Davidson always insisted that his view does not lead to epiphenomenalism, von 
Wright admits that his position has this consequence. Interestingly, commentators who have 
accused Davidson’s position as endorsing a form of epiphenomenalism have largely ignored 
the relation between von Wright’s view and epiphenomenalism. Emiliani’s claim that von 
Wright’s position does not focus on the notion of emergence is incorrect, because it is this 
very concept that von Wright uses in describing the nature of sensations. No one has studied 
this side of von Wright’s philosophy of mind and the consequences to which it leads. I think 
this aspect could be developed further from two different directions. On the one hand, the 
claim that emergence is a process where quantity turns into quality could be further explored. 
                                               
474 Von Wright, 1974, 135. 
475 Wittgenstein, 1953, §284. 
476 See, von Wright, 1997a, 1998 and 1999. Von Wright (1997a) notes that he is not acquainted with any 
positions of emergentism or epiphenomenalism that would be identical or even very similar to his position.  
477 Von Wright, UPd, 7. 
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This would be a “dualistic” direction. On the other hand, it could be considered whether 
supervenience – understood as a reductive relation – deprives supervening entities of their 
causal powers and makes them emergent qualities which are something like byproducts of 
physical phenomena. This would be an “eliminativist” direction. It is fascinating that von 
Wright’s position allows for both readings. He did not develop these directions further, and 
for  the  purposes  of  this  work  it  would  not  be  beneficial  to  speculate  about  the  possible  
directions. I hope to be able to develop these thoughts in the future.478 
I  think  that  three  conclusions  can  be  drawn.  First,  von  Wright  sees  his  position  as  a  
form of materialism. Second, he stipulates an important role for the relation, if not the 
concept, of supervenience, which comes as near to establishing psycho-physical identity as is 
possible. Third, he sees mental phenomena as emergent qualities of a physical substrate. All 
the essential claims of non-reductive physicalism are in place; monistic metaphysics 
(materialism), a critique of reductionism and an acceptance of conceptual dualism, a non-
reductive relationship of mind and matter (supervenience) that the concept of emergence is 
meant to further clarify. This is in contrast to Davidson, who was careful not to use the 
concept of emergence as a description of the mind–matter relationship. Does my 
interpretation once more change the roles of von Wright and Davidson with respect to the 
strength of their physicalism? By accepting “emergent qualities”, von Wright would seem to 
be less of a physicalist than Davidson, who sees emergence as being “merely” a conceptual 
issue.479 Since von Wright does not elaborate on his use of the concept of emergence, a 
conclusive decision about the role it plays in his views about the mind–matter relationship 
cannot be drawn. The fact that he nevertheless uses this concept is interesting given the 
contemporary discussion about the (in)coherence of emergentism in the context of 
physicalism. The most severe criticism against emergentism from the perspective of 
physicalism has usually been that it fails to explain how mental causation is possible. I want 
to emphasize that von Wright is immune to this criticism, because he gladly accepts the view 
that, in a sense, mental causation can be reductively explained – the consequence being that 
mental phenomena turn out to be epiphenomenal by-products of neural phenomena.480 The 
combination of monism and “emergent qualities” is not an easy alliance, and the conclusion, 
epiphenomenalism, is of course dramatic.  
                                               
478 Von Wright’s relation to epiphenomenalism is explored in Kuusela 2009. 
479 For Davidson’s brief remarks about emergence, see Davidson, 1997a. For further consideration of the 
conceptual nature of emergence and a discussion of Davidson’s position see Pihlström, 2002.  
480 The sense in which von Wright accepts this claim will be discussed in section 4.2.1.1. 
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By rejecting interactionism and accepting a form of materialist monism, von Wright 
solves  the  ontological  problem  created  by  Descartes.  This  is  basically  the  same  solution  as  
Davidson’s if the plausible interpretation that AM is a form of physicalism is accepted. 
Insofar as both von Wright and Davidson are interpreted as being physicalists, there is no 
important difference between their views. Non-reductive physicalism captures the essence of 
their positions although, as I have shown, certain views of von Wright point towards a more 
robust form of physicalism. There is also room for a different interpretation according to 
which the positions of Davidson and von Wright are not in any clear sense physicalistic 
positions at all. The view that von Wright and Davidson could be described as defending a 
form of neutral monism will be presented in section 2.6. I think the fact that both philosophers 
can be interpreted as physicalists, non-reductive physicalists, and also as neutral monists is a 
very interesting similarity between them, since both von Wright and Davidson have arrived at 
their rather original conclusions in separate ways. The non-physicalistic suggestions of von 
Wright and Davidson provide an alternative which should be considered seriously when 
trying to come up with a “solution” to the mind–body problem. This is especially so if one is 
dissatisfied with the way in which robust physicalism deals with the question and is unwilling 
to accept the naturalistic view at face value. I believe that in the end it should be argued that 
the spirit of the positions of von Wright and Davidson goes against robust physicalism. 
 This being said, it cannot be denied that there are very good reasons to think that both 
Davidson and von Wright see physicalism as an answer to the mind–body problem. This is 
the  conclusion  of  sections  2.1  and  2.2.  I  have  argued  that  Davidson’s  argument  for  
physicalism is far from convincing and that von Wright does not actually give an argument 
for physicalism at all. Whereas Davidson has become known for his monistic theory of mind, 
von Wright merely states his allegiance to a scientific world view and its conviction that the 
nature of reality is physical.481 In  this  sense,  von  Wright’s  views  about  monism  are  less  
interesting than Davidson’s, and his straightforward acceptance of monism is, in my opinion, 
surprising. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that von Wright emphasizes the 
postulational nature of materialism and therefore strongly undermines the philosophical 
interest of  the  question  of  whether  materialism  is  true.  Perhaps  one  could  conclude,  as  for  
example Stoutland does, that both Davidson and von Wright see minimal ontological 
physicalism as a position which just about any philosopher would accept, and that it therefore 
                                               
481 As should be clear, the motivation behind Davidson’s philosophical argument is certainly, at least in part, the 
view that the results of science should be respected. But whereas von Wright is happy to rest with this attitude, 
Davidson’s argument for monism goes a step further and is this sense an important philosophical contribution to 
physicalism. Von Wright seems to think that it is not a philosopher’s task to make such a contribution. 
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does not need much argumentation for its defense. But as has become clear, the status of even 
minimal ontological physicalism is still a debated issue among philosophers, and a 
consideration of the non-physical alternatives does not make one automatically a 
“supernaturalist” – or if it does, it is time to consider whether  opponents of supernaturalism 
are in fact restricting themselves to a narrow understanding of the term “natural”. If a 
generous enough attitude is taken, then nothing counts as supernatural. It is not clear that this 
would necessarily be an unacceptable position; perhaps certain forms of pragmatism could be 
seen as moving in this kind of direction. Conceptual clarification is what a philosopher is 
trying to achieve, and an open mind is required in order to evaluate the deep conceptual 
problems which still surround the mind–body problem in its ontological form. The 
plausibility of physicalism should be considered in an unbiased manner: it should be 
considered whether the claim that “all entities are physical” provides any substantial 
clarification of the question about the relationship between mind and matter – and if it does 
not, then it should be considered whether the claim is unsupported and should be rejected.  
 In the next two sections, I consider the problems of non-reductive physicalism. For the 
most part I will ignore other positions than Davidson’s and von Wright’s, because my purpose 
is to consider whether these two philosophers succeed in providing serious support for a 
physicalistic world view. In order to determine this, we must consider whether their position 
can solve two of the most serious problems which allegedly face non-reductive physicalistic 
views about the mind.  
 
2.3 A problem for non-reductive physicalism: Mental properties 
 
Philosophers who are minimal physicalists disagree on the question of whether there are non-
physical properties. Non-reductive physicalists argue that mental properties are not physical 
properties; thus the label property dualism is often associated with non-reductive physicalism. 
In this section, I will consider how Davidson discusses the problem of irreducible mental 
properties. Von Wright’s views on the subject cannot be discussed in great detail because he 
has been silent on the issue. This being said, in an unpublished manuscript von Wright briefly 
discussed the problem of mental properties in a way which shows that he was thinking about 
the problem, although his views were never published.482 The actual result of the unpublished 
manuscript is von Wright’s “An Essay on Door-Knocking”, where the problem of mental 
                                               
482 See von Wright, UPg.  
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properties is not given much attention. I will very briefly describe what von Wright did say 
about the problem, thereby showing what his position with respect to mental properties was. 
My purpose is to place the positions of Davidson and von Wright in the current context, the 
one in which the discussion about the status of mental properties is currently being carried on. 
I will do this by considering how well their views agree with the standard view about the 
nature  of  mental  properties  (in  terms  of  which  the  contemporary  problem  is  usually  
formulated). 
The question about the status of mental properties has become an important part of the 
ontological mind–body problem for physicalists. The term “property dualism”, of which non-
reductive physicalism is allegedly a form, is understood and used in different ways in the 
current philosophical literature. According to Searle,483 a property dualist endorses the 
following views: 
 
1) There are two mutually exclusive metaphysical categories, of mental and physical 
phenomena, which constitute all of empirical reality. 
 
2) Because mental states are not reducible to neurobiological states, they are 
something distinct from and over and above neurobiological states. The irreducibility 
of the mental to the physical is by itself sufficient proof of the distinctness of the 
mental. 
 
3) Mental phenomena do not constitute separate objects or substances, but rather are 
features or properties of the composite entity, which is a human being.  
 
This formulation illustrates well how the discussion of property dualism in the context of 
physicalism leads immediately to obscurities. What is a metaphysical category? What does it 
mean to say that a mental state is distinct from a neurobiological state? What is a mental 
feature or property of a human being? Davidson, for example, argues that mental phenomena 
do not constitute an ontological category. Von Wright agrees with this. If “metaphysical 
category” is a synonym for “ontological category”, then Davidson and von Wright do not 
defend the view (1), which Searle attributes to property dualists. It is thus incorrect to say, 
according to all property dualists, that mental properties constitute an ontological class of 
                                               
483 Searle, 2002. 
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their own. If one endorses materialist monism, as von Wright and Davidson do, it is unclear 
what the distinctiveness of mental states from neurobiological states could mean. Searle 
correctly points out that the irreducibility of the mental is sufficient proof of the distinctness 
of the mental in some sense. But for many philosophers, the irreducibility of the mental is a 
conceptual question and therefore does not imply ontological or metaphysical 
distinctiveness.484 Finally, the claim that mental phenomena are features or properties of a 
human being is obscure. The term “feature” is sometimes used interchangeably with the term 
“property” but sometimes the expression “feature” is used to refer to something less 
substantial than a property. These terms are used unproblematically in the discussion about 
the nature of property dualism, but it is not clear what it means to say that being in pain is a 
feature of a person. In sum, we can conclude that in the context of materialism the meaning of 
“property dualism” is very problematic. 
 The task of coming up with a clarifying definition of property dualism has been taken 
up by many philosophers. Searle has described property dualism by describing the principles 
endorsed by a property dualist. According to Kim, non-reductive physicalism is committed to 
the idea that mental properties constitute “an autonomous domain” that resists reduction to the 
physical domain, and therefore mental properties should be understood as being distinct from 
physical properties. Mental properties are irreducible in the sense that they are not to be found 
among the properties of basic physics and are not reducible to such properties. What Kim 
actually means by “property dualism” is this: a property dualist would claim that higher-level 
features of the brain are not reducible to, or reductively identifiable with, the lower level 
properties. Curiously, this formulation makes Searle, for example, a property dualist, contrary 
to his own views.485 Biological naturalism would thus be a form of property dualism together, 
for example, with AM. This shows that in the contemporary philosophy of mind the 
boundaries of property dualism are not always clear. In my opinion this is not just a 
terminological question; the important question is what characterizes modern property 
dualism according to those who see the position as incoherent. 
 The question about the status of irreducible mental properties relates to the more 
general problem concerning the coherence of non-reductive physicalism. Kim has been one of 
the main critics of non-reductive physicalism, arguing that ontological physicalism and an 
                                               
484 This is of course a matter of controversy. It is clear, however, that both von Wright and Davidson deny that 
such irreducibility would have consequences for a physicalistic ontology. 
485 For Searle’s denial, see Searle, 2002. Searle (1994) notes that he has been described as a materialist and a 
dualist. The same has been said about Davidson. 
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autonomous mental domain make an incoherent combination.486 Kim writes that according to 
a non-reductive physicalist, it is possible to:  
 
[…] assuage our physicalist qualms by embracing ‘ontological physicalism’, the claim that all that 
exists in spacetime is physical, but, at the same time accept ‘property dualism’, a dualism… insisting 
that psychological concepts or properties form an irreducible, autonomous domain.487  
 
Here Kim formulates the position of property dualism in a similar vein as Searle: a property 
dualist insists that psychological (mental) concepts488 or properties form an irreducible 
domain. At least here, Kim brings together concepts and properties. But surely the question of 
whether a property dualist is talking about concepts or properties makes a difference to his 
position. If this distinction is ignored, a serious confusion in the discussion about the nature of 
property dualism occurs. 
 Kim’s formulation nevertheless captures the spirit of Davidson’s position. Defined in 
the  way  Kim  does,  the  label  of  non-reductive  physicalism  applies  also  to  von  Wright’s  
position. Psychological properties are not physical properties although everything is physical. 
Kim and many other contemporary naturalists are not willing to accept this. Louise Antony 
claims: “[…] there must be microphysical explanations of all non-basic properties and laws, 
including intentional ones, and… these properties and laws must be predictable from 
microstructural facts”.489 This must be so, if everything is physical. Antony belongs to that 
group of naturalistic philosophers who want to secure the scientific status of psychology. But 
is this an idle dream? Already Wittgenstein noted, when discussing the nature of psychology: 
“psychologists want to say: ‘There must be some law’ – although no law has been found.”490 
Stoutland, repeating the Wittgensteinian point, has claimed that a modern metaphysician is 
considering how concepts must work in the metaphysical construction which he has built by 
and for himself.491 Hacker is more straightforward in his criticism of the trend of modern 
philosophy. He claims that the scientism which bedevils a notable part of contemporary 
philosophy has licensed also a scientistic metaphysics.492 From Hacker’s perspective, Kim, 
Antony and others who insist that there must be such and such explanations are in the grip of 
scientism.  
                                               
486 From Kim’s perspective, the positions of von Wright and Davidson are therefore hopelessly incoherent. 
487 Kim, 1989, 266-267. 
488 This could be likened to Searle’s “features”. 
489 Antony, 1999, 38, emphasis mine. 
490 Wittgenstein, 1966, 42. 
491 Stoutland, 2006a. 
492 Hacker, 2001. Also Davidson (1997c) has noted that a form of scientism is one of the obstacles standing in 
the way of mental realism. 
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 The charge of incoherence against non-reductive physicalism is very common in the 
modern philosophy of mind. But, as we have seen, Davidson – a non-reductive physicalist – 
tries to vigorously defend physicalism. What is the place of mental properties in this picture? 
The position of non-reductive physicalism is usually understood in terms of irreducible 
properties, but the nature of these kinds of properties is far from clear. Searle’s definition does 
not clarify what a mental property is, and Kim’s definition merely states what mental 
properties are not. I think that the question about the nature of mental properties is important 
in itself, because in order to be able to discuss the problem of mental causation or the problem 
of emergent properties, a description of the nature of mental properties is required. 
Unfortunately, the contemporary discussion about mental properties is very obscure. Many 
reductive physicalists and non-reductive physicalists understand the nature of properties 
differently.  It  is  easy  and  tempting  to  go  along  with  the  reductive  physicalists  who identify  
mental properties with physical properties. This is easy and tempting for the same reason: 
such a view fits best with the scientific understanding of the mind–body relationship. 
Moreover,  in  the  discussions  about  mental  properties,  a  paradigm  example  of  a  property  is  
usually a property which in some clear sense is undeniably physical. It is therefore easy to use 
physical properties as examples of properties in terms of which mental properties should also 
be understood. This is a suggestive picture, which it is convenient to accept. But before this 
“easy” road is taken, we should perhaps ask whether the very question itself (i.e., are mental 
properties physical properties?) is distorted and a result of a linguistic confusion, or the result 
of accepting a false picture as a guideline for thinking.  
 
2.3.1 The nature of mental properties 
  
In this work I am not going to go deeply into a philosophical discussion about the nature of 
properties as such. I justify my decision not to discuss the general problem of properties or 
universals with the fact that Davidson and von Wright do not discuss the nature of this 
problem in any detail.493 The general discussion about the nature of properties is, or at least 
can be made to be, an extremely complex philosophical problem. I am not going to participate 
in this discussion. I will rest with von Wright’s and Davidson’s approach, as both in a sense 
stress the importance of common sense when approaching philosophical issues. Von Wright 
                                               
493 In fact, in the posthumously released Truth and Predication (Davidson, 2005a), Davidson discusses in detail 
issues which relate to problems of predicates. However, these views do not really illuminate the question about 
the nature of properties. 
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states: “[…] the picture we create for ourselves of the object-quality relation… is founded on 
everyday experiences with macroscopic solid bodies and the changes which they may 
undergo”.494 Without suggesting that this is Davidson’s view, I believe that what Davidson 
said about events can be said also about properties: “[…] the assumption… ontological and 
metaphysical… is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common 
talk.”495 Since my purpose is to describe the positions of Davidson and von Wright, I do not 
want to become speculative by going beyond their views on this matter. I nevertheless find it 
quite absurd that the problem of mental properties is a central problem in the contemporary 
philosophy of mind, and yet only few philosophers bother to clarify or consider the question 
of what mental properties are. Those who bother to clarify the nature of mental properties are 
usually seen as being “overtly metaphysical” and are thereby excluded from the mainstream 
discussion in the philosophy of mind.496 In the mainstream discussion it is assumed that one 
already  knows  what  mental  properties  are.  In  this  work  I  am  willing  to  make,  without  
argument, the assumption that physical properties are real. But how should mental properties 
be understood? 
The question of whether mental properties are real may sound absurd. Of course they 
are real; they are at least as real as physical properties. I believe it is nevertheless easy to 
become confused with this question, because it is not clear what mental properties are. In the 
absence of this knowledge, philosophers use the term “mental property” without hesitation 
and  formulate  problems  in  terms  of  it.  What  is  the  common-sense  understanding  of  mental  
properties? The reason one should consider this is that it is questionable whether the notions 
that refer to mental phenomena have, or could have, a “life of their own” completely detached 
from everyday usage. We recall that according to Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy it 
was noted that “Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts.”497 To many this sounds 
controversial. But where do we get the concept of “thinking”, in terms of which philosophical 
problems about the mind are formulated? This concept is, first and foremost, from our 
everyday language. Can this claim be “proven”? It is not easy to imagine what it would mean 
to prove it.  Most humans use psychological concepts and have learned to use them in certain 
circumstances – this is uncontroversial. A child learns the use of psychological concepts as 
                                               
494 Von Wright, 1998, 74. This resembles Davidson’s view that ” physical concepts…are tied to the common 
sense notion of a physical object which has a location in space and time, which undergoes changes which are 
physical events…” (Davidson, 1964, 45). 
495 Davidson, 1967a, 162. 
496 For this kind of  ”overtly metaphysical” perspective from which also the problem of mental causation could 
be considered, see for example Lowe, 1989 and 2009. 
497 Wittgenstein, 1980, § 62. 
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(s)he becomes part of the human community.498 These are remarks about the natural history of 
humans. In their own ways Wittgenstein, von Wright and Davidson try to (re)turn our focus to 
what is already known. They are trying to highlight the mental or psychological facts obvious 
to all. But from the fact that psychological concepts are everyday concepts, it does not follow 
that the problems relating to them would not be immensely complex; perhaps it could be 
argued that the complexity is related to the fact that psychological concepts are so interwoven 
with the activities of human life. Wittgenstein tries to remind us of these complexities by 
discussing the manifold everyday circumstances in which psychological concepts are used.499  
Would scientific discoveries about the referents of mental concepts be discoveries 
about the referents of the mental concepts that are currently used? Mental concepts have 
conceptual connections to other common-sense notions and to the activities of everyday 
human life. These connections, as for example Bennett and Hacker have argued, are 
constitutive of the meaning of the current concepts. We should again remind ourselves of 
Wittgenstein’s lesson: “Pain has this position in our life; has these connexions; (That is to say: 
we only call ‘pain’ what has this position, these connexions)”.500 Can a pain which does not 
have a certain familiar position in our conceptual scheme or certain familiar connexions be 
imagined? Perhaps. But what would be a reason to say that we are talking about pain as we 
know it? If the alleged pain did not have any of the conceptual connections that current pain 
has, how could it be identified as pain? Would it be rational to call such a phenomenon 
“pain”, i.e. would this expression make sense? Nothing would connect this new concept of 
pain to the concept of pain with which we are familiar. Could the new concept be part of our 
“form of life”? As Wittgenstein reminds, the concept of pain is characterized by its particular 
function in our lives.501 Could a pain that did not fill this particular function at all, be pain?  
The fact that pain has certain connections for other concepts and phenomena is 
empirical. It is a contingent fact that our concept of pain happens to have certain specific 
conceptual connections. It is also the case that people have different conceptions of pain. But 
all  these  ‘pains’  share  features  which  are  familiar  from the  language  of  everyday,  and  from 
everyday life. The joint conception, the features that are agreed upon, cannot be violated 
without changing the subject of discussion. It is not possible to force people to accept a new 
way  of  thinking  about  pain  if  it  does  not  fit  their  way  of  life.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  
                                               
498 For an insightful discussion about why psychological concepts should not be seen as theoretical concepts, see 
Hacker, 2001a. 
499 As Wittgenstein (1967, §64) reminds us: ”[…] we need to remember that the process of thinking may be very 
various.” This theme is emphasized through Wittgenstein’s writings. 
500 Wittgenstein, 1967, §533. 
501 See, for example Wittgenstein, 1967, §101 - §103, §532. 
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scientific discoveries could be relevant for a deeper understanding of current mental concepts 
if these discoveries did not take as their starting point the concepts as they appear in everyday 
life. What would be the relevance of the discoveries for the current concepts? An approach 
which emphasizes the primacy of the obvious is common to those philosophers, Davidson and 
von Wright among them, who accept a mild form of behaviorism. 502 The truth of this form of 
behaviorism seems to me something which cannot be denied.503 We do understand mental 
concepts in terms of behavior; the concepts have behavioral criteria. Von Wright’s last word 
on the subject was: “The criteria for the existence of individual mental phenomena are… 
behavioral and thus corporeal – and I fail to see how it could be otherwise.”504 For von Wright 
this is a conceptual truth; it is not an empirical question whether or not behavior is the 
criterion of the mental. This is emphasized by Wittgenstein with his famous claim that:”The 
inner is tied up with the outer logically, and not just empirically.”505 I find it interesting that 
this kind of Wittgensteinian–Davidsonian–von Wrightian behaviorism is being revived, of all 
philosophers, by Kim who writes: “[.] ..it seems to me that we cannot avoid thinking of 
intentional / cognitive states, like thought, belief and desire as supervenient on behavior and 
other observable physical facts. We must accept creatures that are behaviorally and 
functionally like us as creatures with mentality similar to ours.”506 According to Kim, the way 
we use language is among the reasons “for thinking that cognitive / intentional mental 
properties are closely tied, conceptually and semantically, to behavior.”507 Further mental 
states must ultimately be anchored, conceptually and epistemologically, in observable 
behavior.  This kind of conclusion was one of the essential  conclusions of von Wright’s last  
philosophical investigations.   
My claim is that one crucial problem with the contemporary discussion about the 
nature of mental properties is that the primacy of the obvious has been ignored. What are the 
examples of mental properties of which we are directly aware? Let us try to consider this 
question without taking a stance on the philosophical question about the fundamental nature 
of properties. What do we mean by saying that there are such “things” as mental properties? 
The answer is not obvious; if this question is asked of a philosopher of mind, it is by no means 
certain that a clarifying answer is forthcoming. One “intuitively” plausible answer is that by 
claiming that there are mental properties, we are simply saying that mental states, or 
                                               
502 This term is used by von Wright (2000) in characterizing the cornerstones of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. 
503 This claim will be defended in section 3.2. 
504 Von Wright, UPe, 13. 
505 Wittgenstein, 1992, 64e, 
506 Kim, 2005, 166. 
507 Kim, 2005, 167. 
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“phenomena”, are something which more than one individual can have. Mental states are thus 
something that can be exemplified by more than one individual. In the contemporary 
philosophical discussion, “being in pain” is often used as a paradigm example of a mental 
property. We can think of somebody’s being in a state of pain as exemplifying the property of 
“being in pain”, and similarly for any state that we take to be mental. Thus, being in a state S 
and exemplifying a property P are just two different ways of expressing the same thing. There 
is no essential difference between saying “I have pain” or “I am in pain” and “He [which 
refers  to  me]  has  [or  ‘exemplifies’]  the  property  of  being  in  pain”.  I  see  no  reason  why the  
terms mental property and mental state could not be used interchangeably. 
It is commonplace to think that two persons can be in a state of pain. This being the 
case they can, and do, share a mental property, although it is unclear to me why this term 
should be brought into the discussion. Saying that two people are in pain is certainly part of 
the way we speak about mental phenomena, although the expression “mental property” is 
rarely used in colloquial language. In this sense, property talk is clearly the philosopher’s own 
creation. Mental properties are not needed in order to talk about mental phenomena in a 
meaningful and non-problematic manner. But if we assert that two people are in pain, are their 
pains the same? After all, your pain is yours, mine is mine. Since we do often say that two 
people are in pain, and we can fluently communicate with this kind of expression, it is best to 
consider what we mean by this statement.  Here intuitions differ,  and it  is  not clear how one 
could argue that a certain interpretation of the meaning of this statement is the correct one. If I 
ask myself, what do I mean when I say that Donald and Georg are in pain, where can I find 
the answer? I suggest that we again take a cue from Wittgenstein: “One ought to ask, not what 
images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word ‘imagination’ is 
used.”508 One should not consider what mental properties are or what happens when someone 
is  exemplifying  a  mental  property,  but  how  the  expressions  which  refer  to  the  relevant  
“mental properties” are used. Focusing on the first two questions is apt to lead to speculation, 
since we do not know what mental properties are or what happens in the brain when a person 
exemplifies this kind of property; there still remains an ontological puzzle about the mind.  
Therefore, one should focus on considering how psychological language is used. From this 
consideration, it can be seen what we mean when we use psychological terms, and it is 
doubtful whether any substantial puzzlement will remain when this use is clarified.509 
                                               
508 Wittgenstein, 1953, 370 §. 
509 It could be argued that an ontological puzzlement remains. But if we think this, are we then merely misled by 
the thought that there must be a certain kind of answer? 
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If one considers the way mental language is used, it is possible to conclude, together 
with Davidson, that when we say that two people have the same thought, we mean that their 
states of mind are similar enough for each to be able to interpret the other and – when we 
take our own perspective in consideration – similar enough for us to interpret them.510 This 
interpretative approach to mental states is strongly based on the idea of the primacy of the 
obvious. Davidson claims: “We know what states of mind are like, and how they are correctly 
identified; they are just those states whose contents can be discovered in well-known 
ways.”511 It should be recognized that “well-known ways” should be taken literally. We all 
know how to attribute mental states to others; even very young children know how to do this. 
This again could be seen as note about the natural history of humans. We all know whether a 
person “exemplifies a mental property” at time t. The primary evidence for the attribution of 
“mental properties” is the behavior of others; children take this naturally into account without 
problematizing the connection between mental phenomena and behavior. What is essential in 
the views of von Wright and Davidson is the Wittgensteinian idea that the “nature” of mental 
concepts, thus of mental properties, is revealed through an analysis of how mental concepts 
are used. Wittgenstein did not use the term “mental property”, but he wrote about the problem 
in a way which is more illuminating than the discussion of contemporary philosophers of 
mind. The discussion about the status of non-reductive physicalism has largely ignored 
Wittgenstein’s observation that the use of psychological concepts is often confused. I believe 
it could be claimed, with some justice, that the most serious confusion of modern philosophy 
of mind in its critique of non-reductive physicalism is its attempt to understand and model the 
“nature of the mental” solely in terms of the physical. But if Wittgenstein is correct there is no 
such thing as the nature of the mental, and the mental cannot be understood as a metaphysical 
category. Incidentally, Wittgenstein’s claim that the mental is not a “metaphysical epithet” 
(logical category) bears a striking resemblance to Davidson’s latter claim that the mental is 
not an ontological category.512 Von Wright has the same view as Wittgenstein and Davidson: 
the  mental  is  a  conceptual  category.  Both  Davidson  and  von  Wright  seem  to  follow  
Wittgenstein in his attempt to show the conceptual nature of the mental – especially the 
relation between mental phenomena and behavior. 
When an interpretative approach towards mental states is taken, it is possible to see 
what is wrong with the very idea of a mental property as it is usually understood in the 
                                               
 510 Instead of  ”being in pain”, ”having a thought t” is here used as an example of a mental property. 
511 Davidson, 1988a, 40. 
512 See Wittgenstein, 1992, 63e. 
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contemporary discussion; there simply are no such properties. Philosophers freely talk about 
mental properties as if it is perfectly clear what such properties are. Let us again use “being in 
pain”  as  an  example.  It  is  assumed that  a  specific  property  /  concept,  call  it  M,  has  enough 
stability so that the question of whether or not it is identical with a physical property – say, 
the firing of c-fibers – could be raised.513 Let us suppose that the human brain is observed 
from the outside and c-fiber activity is detected. Let us also suppose that the brains of person 
A and person B both have the property that c-fibers are firing, and that a more detailed, 
perhaps immensely complex, physical description of why the fibers are firing can be given. 
We can also assume that it is possible to describe a shared property of the brains at a micro-
level “below” the firing of c-fibers.514 Firing of the c-fibers is a clear example of a physical 
property which both brains have. This can be said without problems. The brains of A and B 
have a property which can be observed objectively. It cannot be denied that there is a 
similarity between the two brains; perhaps their properties are even identical – in all relevant 
respects.   
The problem is that the mental property of “being in pain” seems to be nothing like the 
physical property that can be observed intersubjectively. Whereas, based on intersubjective 
observations, it is possible to say with certainty that the c-fibers of two brains are firing, that 
in some sense of the word the same process is taking place in both brains, it is incorrect to say 
that two individuals who report that they suffer from pain have the same pain. We cannot 
conclude that the pains are even similar. The subjective element of “mental properties” is 
certainly something which distinguishes them from physical properties. Since this subjective 
aspect cannot be captured by anyone else other than the subject who is in pain it is, in my 
opinion,  a  grave  mistake  to  think  that  pains  could  be  grouped  in  such  a  way  that  the  term  
mental property would be a clarifying description of “pain”. There are practically endless 
ways in which we can be in pain; that is, there are an enormous number of states in which we 
                                               
513 Pain = c-fibers firing is commonly used by philosophers as an example of the identity between mental and 
physical  properties.  I  don’t  know  whether  this  is  or  is  even  meant  to  be  a  neuroscientific fact, but it seems 
plausible that philosophers often use an expression like “the firing of c-fibers” without considering whether this 
expression captures any well-defined brain state at all. It is a mere placeholder in the discussion of philosophers. 
Kripke (1980) for example notes that this expression is used as shorthand for whatever neural mechanism 
science discovers about pain-processing in the brain. I claim that no matter what view we have about the 
vagueness of this expression, we will see that nothing could convince us that pain has to be identical with the 
firing of c-fibers. Of course, if we take the Putnamian–Malcolmian–von Wrightian line, we should conclude 
right from the start that the claim Pain = c-fibers firing is nonsense. 
514 I don’t know whether this is actually the case, but from the perspective of physicalism this, i.e. an explanation 
in terms of lower level entities, should be possible in principle. Certain forms of physicalism insist that such an 
explanation must be possible. Recall the view of Antony (1999, 38): “[…] there must be microphysical 
explanations of all non-basic properties and laws, including intentional ones, and… these properties and laws 
must be predictable from microstructural facts.”  
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take it as appropriate to use the term “pain” as a description of that state.515 Toothache, 
headache, heartache – all of these are forms of pain – but do they have anything in common 
except our tendency to use the same term, ache, in each case?  
One answer, which I think should be considered, is that what these pains have in 
common is the feeling of pain, and that is why each is called pain. The feeling, a sensation, is 
precisely what pain, as a mental phenomenon, is. Perhaps this feeling could be called an 
emotion. In the course of everyday life, pains certainly have more conceptual connections to 
emotions than to brain states. The centrality of the feeling is shown by the fact that, or so I 
assume, most of us would be very puzzled to hear that someone is in pain, but yet he feels 
nothing.516 Would we be equally puzzled to hear that someone is in pain but her c-fibers are 
not firing? The feeling – the “essence of pain” – is something that cannot be captured except 
by the subject whose feeling it is. How could you find out whether your pain feels the same as 
mine? If we cannot be sure that you feel the pain in the same way as I do, what would be our 
reason to think that it is the same pain that we both suffer?  
Let us suppose that Donald has a headache and so does Georg. What is the reason to 
say that the headaches are similar mental phenomena? If they are not, it is misleading to refer 
to headache using the term mental property. Donald’s headache is a state of one individual; 
Georg’s headache is an ache of another individual. Donald’s headache is a property of him, 
but this says nothing about its relation to Georg’s headache, or to headaches in general. Can 
something general and illuminating be said about headaches, conceived as mental 
phenomena? I cannot see how, since they are always states of a certain individual. Even in the 
case of an individual like Donald, the question of whether his pain today is the same as 
tomorrow is difficult to answer. Maybe the pain of today feels almost similar to the pain of 
yesterday; yet there is an extremely slight, almost unnoticeable difference between them, 
which becomes “visible” for Donald only when he focuses on the pain through introspection. 
But can it be known that such self-observation does not change the feeling? Is Donald going 
through the same state twice, or are the pains two different states? If it is supposed that there 
is some difference between the states the latter seems to be more appropriate way to describe 
                                               
515 The problematic nature of pain is shown also by the fact that psychologists, neuroscientists, doctors, cognitive 
scientists, philosophers and lay people all have very different views of what pain is. Also different sciences may 
have different definitions of what pain is. The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) defines 
pain as “[…] an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, 
or described in terms of such damage” (See Merskey, 1986). Alternative definitions are certainly possible, and 
how could we decide which one is “right”? For example, is pleasant pain impossible? Why would IASAP’s 
definition have authority over the everyday concept? 
516 For a discussion of pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain, see Grahek, 2007. For a recent 
general discussion about the philosophical problems surrounding pain, see Aydede, 2005. 
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what is happening; yet both states are called headaches, as if there were a “general headache” 
of  which  these  two  are  instances  and  examples.  It  is  obviously  not  false  to  say  that  both  
experiences are headaches; the confusion is to say that two headaches are examples of the 
same “mental property”.  
In the philosophy of mind, during the last fifty years a lot of emphasis has been put on 
the claim that mental properties are multiply realizable and thus pain, for example, cannot be 
type-identical with a physical property. Whereas this may be true, the real problem, it seems 
to me, is that it is not possible to say whether pains, as mental phenomena, have any shared 
features with each other except the subjective feelings that connect them, which cannot be 
captured in any objective way. But if there are no general mental properties, one of the main 
problems posed for non-reductive physicalism vanishes. If mental properties are being 
modeled by using a physical property as an example, a dead-end is quickly reached because 
physical properties have no subjective aspect. This aspect is, however, the essence of a 
“mental property”: this aspect could group pains together, it would show their similarity to 
each other, if the aspect could be brought under objective analysis. But an objective analysis 
of a subjective aspect is a contradiction in terms. If sense could be made of the claim that 
Georg’s pain feels (and  therefore  is)  the  same as  Donald’s,  it  would  be  possible  to  say  that  
they shared a mental property, since there would be something which both of them would 
have;  the  same  feeling.  Lacking  this  alternative,  it  makes  no  sense  to  say  that  they  share  a  
mental property. To insist that they must feel the same pain because they are in the same 
physical state is obviously wildly question-begging. To suggest that there is no such thing as 
the subjective feeling of pain is absurd. This view generalizes also to other mental phenomena 
than sensations. The identity conditions for “having the same belief” are even more obscure 
than the identity conditions for sensations, because whereas, in the case of sensations, there is 
something which could be similar – the feeling – we do not know what to even look for in the 
case of beliefs.    
In its attempt to bridge the gap between the mental and the physical, contemporary 
philosophy of mind has largely ignored the discussion about the nature of mental concepts. A 
lesson from Wittgenstein is again appropriate in order to see what has been ignored. He 
writes: “We are not at all prepared for the task of describing the use of e.g. the word ‘to 
think’… the naïve idea that one forms of it does not correspond to reality at all.”517  The 
concepts have been removed from everyday use and as a result a distorting view about the 
                                               
517 Wittgenstein, 1953, 111, my emphasis. 
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nature of mental “properties” has occurred.518 Mental concepts are from everyday language. 
How could they remain the same concepts once removed from this context? If removed from 
such a context, the result is a naïve view such as the contemporary suggestion that there are 
mental “properties”. Wittgenstein’s view contains also an insight about the source of the 
contemporary problem. He says:  
 
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states… arise? The first step is the one 
that altogether escapes notice. We talk of states and processes and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps  we shall  know more  about  them –  we think.  But  that  is  just  what  commits  us  to  a  
particular  way  of  looking  at  the  matter.  For  we  have  a  definite  concept  of  what  it  means  to  learn  to  
know a process better.519 
 
That naturalistic philosophy of mind is committed to a particular view of mental properties is 
obvious. Naturalism has a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a mental process 
better. Naturalists claim that if mentality is real, it must be something other than what it 
appears to be. As Wittgenstein thought, this assumption is one of the biggest mistakes that 
can be made in philosophy. Those who are sympathetic to “Wittgensteinian approach” in the 
philosophy of mind have emphasized that Wittgenstein’s lesson should not be forgotten. 
Anthony Kenny suggests:  
 
 […]  some of the philosophical gains we owe to Wittgenstein seem in danger of being lost… his 
contribution has been neglected because more and more philosophers, especially in the United States, 
have attempted to model their studies on the pattern of a rigorously scientific discipline, mimicking the 
type of precision characteristic of mathematics, and holding up… an abstract system of 
 artificial intelligence as the goal of philosophy of mind.520 
 
This is a very perspicuous comment. It is unfortunate that the naturalistic trend silences 
Wittgensteinian insights without arguments, but it is even more unfortunate that this trend 
itself creates philosophical pseudo-problems, like the ‘problem’ about the nature of ‘mental 
properties’. It is the first step, as suggested by a physicalistic metaphysics, which leads one 
astray. Malcolm claims, in a Wittgensteinian spirit, that:  
 
Our assumption that there is a nature of… thinking... to be found out, to be identified or explained, 
either by philosophy or by science, is the worst mistake we make in the philosophy of mind…. We start 
                                               
518 Strictly speaking there cannot be any “false” or “right” view about the nature of mental properties because the 
only measuring stick is the conformity or non-conformity of this expression with the way that language is used. 
What can be said is that the more the use of this expression distorts the way it is actually used in the everyday 
language, the more “false” it is. 
519 Wittgenstein, 1957, § 308. 
520 Kenny, 1984, vii-viii. 
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off by saying to ourselves: ‘What is remembering? What is the process of remembering? And already 
we have gone wrong!”521 
 
More recently a similar observation has been made by Stoutland:  
 
 It is taken for granted that various events, processes, and states are there to be investigated and that our 
primary philosophical task is to construct a theory about their nature and relationships. But this neglects 
the vital task of considering how we understand them as we do….”522  
 
It  is  a  telling  fact  about  contemporary  philosophy  that  Stoutland  must  emphasize  the  same  
point that Malcolm did twenty-five years earlier, as did Wittgenstein twenty-five years before 
him. There is truth in Hacker’s observation that contemporary philosophy of mind, far from 
showing Wittgenstein’s arguments to be invalid, has simply chosen to ignore these 
arguments.523 I believe that the reason for this ignorance has one clear source. I suggested in 
chapter one that the nature of philosophy is changing. Many modern philosophers think that 
philosophy should construct explanatory theories. When this task is undertaken, underlying 
conceptual problems remain unsolved and keep on surfacing. Language, the source of such 
problems, has stayed the same, thereby giving rise to the same problems again and again. A 
concrete example of this is the debate between Hacker / Bennett and Searle / Dennett. The 
debate shows that no real progress has been made: the conceptual problems are basically the 
same as they were in the times of Wittgenstein, whose prediction the debate seems to confirm. 
I think we should conclude that the expression property should be understood 
differently  in  the  mental  and  physical  cases.  Because  of  the  subjective  character  of  the  
concept involved, it is never possible  to  say  whether  an  instance  of  a  mental “property”  is  
identical to another instance – even though we refer to both instances, with the same name 
and know that these two instances share some features. If an uncontroversial physical 
property is the paradigm example of a property, then there are no such things as mental 
properties. The fact that the term “property” is used in both cases creates a distorting 
misunderstanding; that the contemporary discussion about the mind–body relationship has 
been carried on in terms of mental properties is therefore unfortunate.  
 
 
 
                                               
521 Malcolm, 1970, 29. 
522 Stoutland, 2005, 134. 
523 Hacker, 2001. Von Wright has stressed the same point. 
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2.3.2 Why mental properties create a problem for non-reductive physicalism 
 
The conclusion of the previous section was that there are no mental properties in the sense in 
which most (physicalistic) philosophers talk about them. Their talk of mental phenomena 
resembles too much their talk of physical phenomena. In his time, Wittgenstein tried to warn 
that mind should not be seen as standing for a substantive ‘thing’. Modeling mental 
phenomena by using physical phenomena examples creates the misleading picture that there 
are such things as mental properties. Pain is claimed to be a mental property. Yet, we do not 
know how to fill the blank in the statement: “To be in a state of pain is….” Kim, for example, 
claims  that:  “we know… that pain occurs only because a certain neural state, call it , 
occurs”.524 Kim does  not  refer  to  neurophysical  evidence,  but  I  assume that  he  has  in  mind  
something like “Pain = c-fiber firing” when he says that we know that pain occurs because  
occurs. This view, that pain occurs because a “certain neural state” occurs, is a naïve one even 
in terms of the available physicalistic evidence, because during a painful stimulation a PET-
scan allegedly shows brain activity in the sensory and motor cortexes, premotor cortexes, 
parts of the parietal and frontal cortexes, cingulated cortex, insula, and occipital cortex. Pain 
also projects to the following subcortical structures: thalamus, putamen, caudate nucleus, 
hypothalamus, amygdala, periaqueductal grey matter, hippocampus, red nucleus, pulvinar, 
and vermis of the cerebellum.525 Pain,  as  a  physical phenomenon,  seems  to  be  a  more  
complex issue than what physicalists in their simple picture suggest. Such a simplification 
may lead to many philosophical mistakes about what pains, or more generally mental 
phenomena,  are.  Perhaps  it  could  be  argued  that,  also  in  terms  of  neuroscience  and  not  just  
mentally speaking, that pain is a global phenomenon. 
In order to think of pain as a property, we should be able to say what pain is and what 
pains have in common. I may describe on each occasion what my being in pain means, how I 
see the situation on certain occasion – but this cannot be generalized so that it would be a 
clarifying description of the property that “being in pain” is supposed to be. Perhaps pain 
simply is a phenomenon the nature of which cannot be fixed, and perhaps what von Wright 
wrote about values could be said about pains as well: pain is something which we can 
understand but which cannot be codified into truths. Can it be proven that the nature of mental 
phenomena or concepts cannot be clearly defined? This seems unlikely. But what would be 
the reason to think that pain does have a fixed nature? There are various definitions of pain – 
                                               
524 Kim, 2004, 135, emphasis mine. 
525 See Wall, 1996.  
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for  example  the  one  given  by  IASP  –  and  these  definitions  are  not  immune  to  counter-
examples. Even if it is accepted that pain is, by definition, an “unpleasant sensory and 
emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage”, or is described in 
terms of such damage, this does not help at all in the consideration whether the headache of 
Donald feels the  same  as  the  headache  of  Georg.  The  definition  cannot  help  to  solve  the  
question whether Donald and Georg have the same pain.526 In one clear sense they certainly 
do not have the same pain: Donald’s pain “belongs” to Donald, Georg’s pain “belongs” to 
Georg. But ignoring this aspect, is it the same pain in both cases? Is this a meaningful 
question? Is there a way to tell whether the pains are the same? The definition of IASP refers 
to “unpleasant sensory and emotional experiences” and thus, or so it seems to me, the crucial 
question is precisely whether these experiences are the same in the case of the two pains. Pain 
has been used here as an example, but the problems are even more obvious with more 
complex mental phenomena like jealousy, desire, hate, or love. There is absolutely no reason 
to think that a satisfying definition of jealousy, a definition which would apply to every 
person who is jealous and to none who is not, could be found. Donald shows certain 
behavioral signs which suggests for us that he is jealous, whereas Georg admits that he is 
feeling extremely jealous. The absurdity of the question “Who is really (or more) jealous, 
Donald  or  Georg?”  shows  how  desperate  task  it  would  be  to  try  to  form  a  satisfactory  
definition of jealousy.   
Despite the obscurities involved with the expression “mental property”, it is used non-
problematically in the current philosophical discussion. This means, I believe, that those 
involved in the discussion think that they understand what this expression means and how it 
should be used. It is claimed that mental properties create a serious problem for a non-
reductive physicalist by forcing him to accept “property dualism”. Kim writes: “[a] 
nonreductive physicalist believes that there are events in her ontology that have mental 
properties  (e.g.  being  a  pain,  being  a  belief  that  snow is  cold,  etc.).”527 This seems correct, 
although it is unclear whether many non-reductivists would accept the claim that events have 
mental properties. It is also assumed by Kim that a non-reductive physicalist is a realist about 
(mental) properties.528 Let us accept this for the sake of argument. What is problematic is 
Kim’s  view  of  the  nature  of  mental  properties.  He  says  that  in  formulating  the  problem  of  
mental properties: “nothing will depend on precise general definitions of ‘physical’ and 
                                               
526 Sometimes definitions help. Water = H20 does help to decide whether a glass contains water. 
527 Kim, 1989b, 279. 
528 See, for example, Kim, 1993b. 
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‘mental.’”529 But how could this be the case? If there are no mental properties of the sort Kim 
thinks exist,  then  surely  the  whole  problem  of  their relation  to  physical  properties,  as  
formulated by Kim, disappears. In order to discuss the problem, we must know what a mental 
property is. An assertion that “being in pain” is a mental property is not enough. 
The misunderstanding of the nature of mental properties is the main reason for the 
confusing way in which the accusation of property dualism is put forward.530 Paul Churchland 
describes the idea of property dualism as follows:  
 
[…] the brain has a special set of properties possessed by no other kind of physical object.  It  is these 
special properties that are nonphysical: hence the term property dualism. The properties in question are 
the ones you would expect; the property of having a pain, of having a sensation of red, of thinking that 
p….531 
 
It should be noted that whereas Kim talks about events that have a property of being a pain, 
Churchland talks about brains having the property of having a pain. It is not obvious that a 
non-reductive physicalist would be committed to either one of these theses. He could argue, 
for example, that events or brains do not have pains, only persons do.  
 The  “dualistic”  claim  that  the  brain  has  properties  that  no  other  physical  object  has  
sounds right. As far as we know, the capability, for example, of being self-conscious is a 
property that only the human brain possesses.532 This cannot be the dramatic claim of property 
dualism. It is claimed that according to property dualism “some material entities can have 
properties that are essentially different from those we normally regard as physical 
properties.”533 Given the variety of physical properties, it is difficult to understand what is the 
key characteristic of these properties is that marks them as “essentially different” from the 
others. It should also be asked what the nature of the properties which we “normally” regard 
as physical is: are “normal” physical properties those which are evident in everyday life or 
those studied by physics? The subjective aspect of mental properties could perhaps be a 
feature which marks an essential distinction between them and physical properties. But is 
there anything “dualistic” in this claim? No; to say that the brain has properties which no 
other physical object has is not a dramatic claim. This is especially so if one thinks that mental 
                                               
529 Kim, 1993b, 340. 
530 Instead  of  calling  this  approach  a  misunderstanding,  it  is  perhaps  better  to  say  that  only  a  specific  
understanding about the nature of mental properties is what opens up the possibility for the problem of property 
dualism. 
531 Churchland, 1988, 10. 
532 This is a controversial claim since many think that also some other animals are capable of self-consciousness. 
Let us ignore this possibility for the sake of argument. 
533 Svensson, 1994, 97, my emphasis. 
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properties are a result of lower level physical properties, i.e. if it is thought that the former 
supervene on the latter. 
The claim that sounds implausible from the physicalistic viewpoint must be the claim 
that the “property of having a pain” is a non-physical property. But what does non-physical 
mean here? It means that these properties do not appear in basic physics or cannot be reduced 
to the properties of basic physics – or, more broadly, that these properties cannot be explained 
solely in terms of the concepts of the physical sciences.534 This, most likely, is the essential 
difference between mental and physical properties. Everything about the latter can, in 
principle, be explained in scientific terms, whereas this is not the case with respect to the 
former. For a property to count as physical, it should be such that it can be reduced, “in a 
broad sense”, to fundamental physical properties. But whether or not a non-reducible property 
should count as non-physical seems to be, above all else, a purely definitional or 
terminological matter. It can be argued that irreducible properties are non-physical in the 
sense that they are not reducible, but nothing substantial or interesting, as far as ontology is 
concerned, follows from this. In section 2.3 it was noted that Searle’s claim that “the 
irreducibility of the mental to the physical is a sufficient proof of the distinctness of the 
mental” is obscure and suspect if the “distinctness” in question refers to ontological 
categories. What is the rationale for believing that everything physical, everything that exists, 
could be explained in physical terms?535 Faith that science will advance to a stage where this 
may happen is the rationale. But this is mere speculation, and as the results of quantum 
physics show, it may be that the nature of reality is such that “absolute” physical explanations 
are simply not possible. This would not be a result of the inadequacies of our epistemological 
capacities, but rather a feature of reality. Whatever the situation turns out to be, it should be 
acknowledged that physicalism is not really a scientific view but a metaphysical doctrine. 
The new-wave reductionist John Bickle claims that property dualism remains a form 
of dualism since “[…] it denies that even a matured physical science could exhaustively 
explain the essence of the mental.”536 Some dualists certainly make this kind of claim, but the 
same  is  true  of  physicalists  as  diverse  as  Kim,  Mcginn,  Chomsky  and  Nagel.  Given  the  
historical  load  of  the  term  “dualism”  and  its  close  connection  to  Descartes’  view  about  
essentially different substances, the term is quite inappropriately associated with non-
reductive physicalism. To suppose that a matured physical science could explain the “essence 
                                               
534 For these formulations see, Kim, 2003 and Churchland, 1988. 
535 For a view questioning this rationale see Meixner, 2004, 2005, 2006. 
536 Bickle, 1998, 7. 
184 
 
of the mental” is only to show allegiance for the view that reductive physicalism is true.537 To 
insist that physical science must be able to explain the essence of the mental is merely to state 
a dogma of physicalism. It is almost like some physicalists do not want reality to be such that 
a part of it could remain beyond explanation in physical terms.538 Given  that  the  “physical  
essence of the mental” has surely not been explained by a physical science, opposed opinions 
about the irreducibility or reducibility of the mental stand on an equal footing. But, 
terminology aside, does a non-reductive physicalist really accept the view that “mental 
phenomena are distinct from neural phenomena”?539 In my opinion this is more like an 
interpretation of a non-reductivist view than a position which, for example, Davidson and von 
Wright would accept. We should ask what the claim that mental properties are distinct from 
neural phenomena means, according to those who make this interpretation. If it means that 
mental properties will not reduce to fundamental physical properties although everything is 
composed of physical particles, then the dualism of which non-reductive physicalists are 
accused of is at best an attenuated form of dualism, as for example Kim admits.540 So, instead 
of making the accusation, as Bickle does, that non-reductive physicalism is essentially a form 
of dualism, it could be noted, as Kim does, that this position seems to accept a form of very 
weak dualism in a way similar to biological naturalism.  
Some physicalists are eager to claim that higher level physical properties will reduce 
to basic physics, but the question of whether this will actually happen, or whether such a 
reduction is possible even in principle, is pressing. It is unclear whether a matured physical 
science is capable of explaining even the “essence” of matter.541 If higher level properties in 
general may turn out to be irreducible to basic physics, there is no rationale for claiming that 
the irreducibility of mental makes a non-reductive position any more “dualistic” than the 
position  of  physicalism  itself.  Kim,  among  others,  often  runs  together  the  terms  “non-
reductive physicalism” and “property dualism”. This is misleading, because there are also 
forms of property dualism which are genuinely dualistic.  I  would thus agree with Pereboom 
and Kornblith when they suggest: “Under no classification is the anti-reductionist’s position a 
kind of dualism… it is pluralism at one ontological level and a monism at the most 
                                               
537 Bickle’s formulation raises further questions: What is an “exhaustive explanation”? What about the “essence 
of the mental” is still unexplained? 
538 Recall Smart’s (1959, 142) ”confession of faith”: “That everything should be explicable in terms of 
physics…except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.” 
539 Kim, 2005, 153. See also Antony, 1999. 
540 See, Kim, 1993b. 
541 This problem is raised for example by Chomsky, 2000. 
185 
 
fundamental level.”542 The  real  issue  is  not  whether  a  certain  position  should  be  labeled  as  
dualistic or not. The important question is whether non-reductive physicalists accept the kind 
of distinction between mental and physical properties that is suggested by the critics. Even 
this question would be uninteresting if it were not repeatedly claimed that the relation 
between mental and physical properties is an important problem in the contemporary 
philosophy of mind requiring a solution, and that a non-reductive physicalist cannot provide 
it. “Property dualism” often refers to a position that a non-reductive physicalist, like Davidson 
or von Wright, would not accept. In this merely exegetical sense, the correctness of certain 
labels of certain philosophical positions is of some interest.  
 In the following I shall tentatively (and for the sake of argument) assume that the 
notion  of  “mental  property”  makes  sense.  Let  us  assume a  certain  kind  of  understanding  of  
mental properties in order to better evaluate the problem that is posed for non-reductive 
physicalism in general and for Davidson’s position in particular. The problem could also be 
formulated without the confusing term “mental property”, and this would dispel the question 
about the coherence or incoherence of property dualism. As Kim notes: “the substantive 
question that we are asking, or should be asking, is whether or not things like belief, desire, 
emotion and consciousness are reducible to neural, biological, and physicochemical properties 
and processes.”543 Indeed, this question, i.e. whether “mental things” can be reduced to 
physical phenomena, is the interesting one. But this question of whether a “mental thing” is 
reducible to a physical one sounds like the question of whether token-physicalism is true. If 
this is the substantial question, the answer of non-reductive physicalism is clear. Davidson 
argues that belief and desire are token-reducible and von Wright thinks that token-identity is 
trivially true and local reduction is possible. Davidson was in fact one of the first philosophers 
to argue that the answer to Kim’s “substantive question” has to be affirmative. Given that 
Davidson and von Wright answer Kim’s substantive question affirmatively, how can they be 
described as dualists or non-reductive physicalists? If the question is answered affirmatively, 
perhaps the status of non-reductive physicalism depends on the question of whether “things” 
like belief and emotion are de facto reducible. I will consider this question in section 2.4.   
We should note that if, as Kim claims, the substantive question is whether a thing like 
consciousness is reducible to neural processes, then the answer also among reductive 
physicalists may be a reserved no. There are hardcore reductive physicalists who would not 
shy away from the claim that consciousness is going to reduce to neural processes. This claim 
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is intertwined with the problems relating to the questions of what consciousness is and what 
its reducibility to something else would mean. These are not just empirical questions but 
conceptual ones. As von Wright has claimed: “no future ‘brain research’ will – contrary to 
what many enthusiasts now seem to expect – eventually solve ‘the riddle of consciousness’. 
This… is a philosophic muddle which no findings of a scientific nature will ever clarify.”544  
If this view about the problem of consciousness is accepted, an empirical solution just isn’t 
the  right  kind  of  answer.  This  view  cannot  be  ignored  by  insisting  that  the  problem  of  
consciousness is an empirical problem; there has to be room to think about the problem in 
characteristically different ways. Excluding the most enthusiastic reductionists, the consensus 
view among naturalists about the actual reducibility of consciousness may in fact resemble the 
view of non-reductive physicalists: among others Fodor, Chomsky and McGinn have 
expressed their different doubts about the reducibility of consciousness. Kim, who is certainly 
a reductionist, thinks now that the mind will not completely reduce to the physical.545  The  
current view seems to be that mind will not smoothly reduce to matter. This being the case, 
the old mind–body problem is still a problem.  
 If the substantial question is, or should be, formulated in the way that Kim does, then 
it is unclear whether there is any problem of mental properties. If token-identity is accepted, it 
seems that the question about type-identity is, ontologically speaking, a side issue. Smart, a 
recognized type–type identity theorist, perspicuously notes:  
 
How far token-token identity theories can be extended in the type–type direction is a matter for further 
empirical conjecture and investigation. On the main ontological issues the differences between the two 
types of mind-brain identity theory do not seem to be crucial.546 
  
It  is  easy  to  agree  with  the  view  that  the  strength  of  type–type  relations  is  a  matter  of  
empirical investigation and, as far as ontological issues go, token-identity theories and type–
type identity theories are not crucially different. But it should nevertheless be noticed that the 
important question is not how well mental types correspond to physical types. The essential 
question is not whether type-identity or token-identity best captures the relation between the 
mental  and  the  physical.  The  prior  problem  is  whether  sense  can  be  made  of  the  idea  of  a  
mental type. 
If it is agreed that there are mental properties in the sense that there are mental states 
in which two people can be, the problem becomes: does a similarity of mental states imply a 
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similarity of physical states? This, in my view, is the best way to formulate intelligibly the 
question of whether the properties in question might be identical. Let us assume that pain is a 
well-defined mental property. Is it the case that when people are in pain they are always in a 
physical state P? To this question type–type identity theorists would answer affirmatively, but 
this theory is not widely supported anymore.547 Why not? As I briefly noted in section 2.1.1 
there were two major reasons why type–type theory started to seem implausible. First was the 
advent of a functionalist view about the mind and the argument that mental properties are 
multiply realizable. According to this view, mental properties are defined by the functional 
role  that  they  have  in  the  behavior  of  their  bearer(s).  A second argument  against  type–type  
theories was Davidson’s view that there cannot be strict psycho-physical laws. But do these 
arguments really show that it could not be, or cannot be, the case that whenever Donald is in 
pain he is in a physical state P, or that whenever Georg is in pain he is in the same state P as 
Donald? They obviously do not show that it could not be the case. What could show that? It is 
perhaps possible to show empirically that Donald is not in state P, although he is in pain. But 
after showing this we are faced with the question of whether the pain, as a mental 
phenomenon, at t1, is type-identical to the pain, as a mental phenomenon, at time t. If it is not, 
then it is not a mystery why the second of these pains fails to be identical with P although the 
first is identical with P. Suppose that Donald were to insist that his pain at time t1 felt exactly 
the  same  as  the  pain  he  had  felt  at  time  t.  How  could  we  be  sure  that  he  is  not  mistaken?  
Perhaps there might be such a slight difference in the intensity of two pains that it would be 
almost impossible to detect it, and Donald would thus ignore the difference. Yet, this 
possibility would mean that the pain, as a mental phenomenon, at time t1, was not exactly the 
same as the pain at time t. So the fact that a pain at time t1 fails to be identical with a physical 
state,  or  let  us  say  with  property  P,  does  not  mean  that  pain  could not be identical with P. 
which was identical with the pain at time t. 
Do functionalism and AM show that it is not de facto the case that when Georg and 
Donald share a mental characteristic they also share a physical characteristic? Of course not, 
how could they show this? Suppose that we observe, through familiar means, that Donald is 
jealous  and  so  is  Georg.  Whether  or  not  “being  jealous”  is  a  property  which  could  be  
physically multiply realized, the mere possibility of it  being so realizable does not settle the 
question of whether Donald and Georg in fact share a physical property on which their being 
jealous supervenes, or which is identical with their being jealous. Whether or not they share 
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such a physical property is an empirical question. Whether or not mental properties are in fact 
multiply realizable is an open question. Currently the exact answer is unknown. The alleged 
multiple realizability of mental properties is sometimes defended by imagining non-human 
creatures which have such a strange physical constitution that their being jealous cannot be 
identical to a physical property P because they do not have properties like P at all. But it is 
utterly implausible to think that this argument would show that Donald and Georg do not, or 
could not, or must not, have an identical physical property P when they are being jealous. It is 
interesting that the multiple realizability argument has gained so much support, given the fact 
that it was originally formulated in terms of intuitions about the mental lives of non-human 
animals  or  even  extraterrestrial  creatures.  Perhaps  it  could  be  claimed  that  the  point  of  the  
multiple realizability argument is philosophical. It is not the case that a mental property M 
cannot be realized by various physical properties. M would not thus be identical with P. But, 
the argument does not show, and cannot show, that it could not be the case that a specific M 
must be realized by P.548 
What about Davidson’s argument, according to which there are no psycho-physical 
laws? If Davidson is correct it can never be shown or proven that a certain mental property is 
identical with a physical property P. Tight connections between the mental and physical 
descriptions in question are impossible. But, or so the naturalists would claim, the question 
about the identity of properties is an ontological one. Does the absence of psycho-physical 
laws show that mental properties are not physical properties? No, what the argument shows is 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  determine the  physical  properties  that  are  identical  with  the  mental  
properties, assuming that they indeed are identical with physical properties. Does Davidson’s 
argument show that it is not possible that when Georg is in pain and Donald is in pain they 
both have a physical property P, and that they have pain because P exists? Does the argument 
show that this could not be,  or is  not,  or must not be the case? No, it  leaves these questions 
open.  
As we have seen, the contemporary discussion about mental properties in the context 
of non-reductive physicalism includes the claim that non-reductive physicalists are property 
dualists. But how could a physicalist be a dualist of any kind? The accusation, of course, is 
that she can’t, and that this is precisely what is wrong with non-reductive physicalism and its 
non-physical properties. But in what sense are mental properties non-physical? According to a 
                                               
548 This discussion is immediately confronted with confusions about modalities. These cannot be completely 
ignored when discussing the status of multiple realizability argument, but they can be ignored here when 
discussing the question of whether mental properties are de facto identical with physical properties. 
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non-reductive physicalist, the non-physicality of mental properties means that these properties 
cannot be found among the properties of basic physics, and that they cannot be reduced to 
such properties. But this does not mean that mental properties are non-physical in any 
substantial sense, it does not mean that mental properties inhere in a non-physical substance 
or that they do not function according to the laws of nature. Donald’s becoming jealous, his 
acquiring this mental property could, in principle, be explained in terms of physical 
properties. A non-reductive physicalist does not need to reject the possibility that such an 
explanation could be given. Given a commitment to O-physicalism, why think otherwise? 
Property dualism is a badly chosen term to describe the non-reductive physicalist’s view of 
the relationship between mental and physical properties. Those who accuse non-reductive 
physicalists of property dualism have chosen a confusing and misleading expression to 
describe the position – and most interpretations of, for example, Davidson’s position therefore 
simply do not accurately capture the spirit of his work.  
I claim that we should conclude (in the context of this discussion) the following: we 
should accept that there are mental properties and by this I mean mental phenomena that 
people can and do “share”. The contemporary discussion in the philosophy of mind is largely 
based around the assumption that mental properties are something real. Let us accept this for 
the sake of argument. This being the case, the central question has been what their relation to 
physical properties is. A philosopher committed to O-physicalism has only one answer: in 
some sense they are physical properties. Davidson, although admitting that everything can be 
described in the language of physics, however denies that mental properties are physical. Is it 
because: (a) he rejects properties altogether; (b) he rejects mental properties; or (c) he is a 
substance dualist? Since at this point we have no reason to believe in (c), let us consider the 
alternatives (a) and (b).  I  now turn to a discussion of this question in order to tease out one 
way to understand the nature of mental properties in the context of physicalism. 
 
2.3.3 Davidson on properties 
 
The purpose of this section is to come to an understanding of what Davidson’s view of 
properties is and what the reasons for it are. I defend Davidson’s position against those critics 
who describe it as a form of property dualism and thus defend my interpretation, given in 
section 2.1.3, that Davidson argues for robust physicalism.  
According to AM, every particular can be described in the language of physics but 
mental properties are not physical properties. How should the latter claim be understood? 
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Doesn’t a dualism of properties imply substantial dualism rather than conceptual dualism, 
which Davidson certainly accepts? For example, in his analysis of dualism, Howard Robinson 
makes a distinction between predicate and property dualism, arguing that the latter is, 
ontologically speaking, a stronger position.549 He  refers  to  Davidson  as  an  example  of  a  
predicate dualist but as we have seen there is a strong tendency to describe Davidson as a 
property dualist as well.550 Davidson is often described as supporting a view which is opposed 
to robust physicalism. Ilkka Niiniluoto, for example, uses the term emergent materialism to 
describe Davidson’s position.551 This is interesting given the fact that, unlike von Wright, 
Davidson did not want to describe his view of the mental in terms of emergence. Niiniluoto’s 
use of the term is thus at least misleading if not incorrect with respect to Davidson’s own 
understanding of the nature of his position. As an exegetical remark it can be noted that Von 
Wright’s position, on the other hand, could with some justice earn the label “emergentism”. 
As I have suggested, this could be done as a consequence of his strict physicalism. 
Davidson’s position, however, is certainly closer to a view that: “we can have ontological 
mind–brain identity without mind–brain reduction… the mystery occurs… because of 
epistemological  constraints  on  our  abilities  to  analyze  complex  systems”552 than  to  a  view  
according to which “there exists two fundamentally different kinds of properties….”553 It  is  
clear, however, that Davidson is a property dualist in the sense described by Kim, namely: 
“[mental properties] are nonphysical in the sense that they do not appear in our basic physics 
and… they are not reducible to the properties dealt with in physics.”554 We have seen that this 
is one standard way that contemporary property dualism is understood, but in my view it is 
doubtful whether this kind of position should earn the label of dualism.  
Ernest Sosa has noted: “Either AM [anomalous monism] accepts properties or it does 
not. If it does, then is not AM committed essentially to property dualism?”555 I think this is 
precisely the case given Davidson’s view about the status of mental properties. If Davidson is 
a realist about properties and if mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, then 
this implies a more substantial dualism than the conceptual dualism to which Davidson is 
committed on his own admission. On the other hand if Davidson is an antirealist about 
properties,  this  could  open  the  way  to  an  austere  form  of  physicalism.  Sosa  makes  an  
                                               
549 Robinson, 2003. 
550 Antony, 1999, for example describes Davidson as a property dualist. 
551 Niiniluoto, 1990. 
552 Uttal, 2004, 216. 
553 Uttal, 2004, 215. 
554 Kim, 2003, 114. 
555 Sosa, 1993, 48. 
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interesting remark when he notes that if Davidson rejects properties, then “reality may be in 
itself homogeneously physical, since all particulars, all particular token events, would be 
physical. This seems a more radical and interesting, a truly monistic physicalism.”556 On this 
reading Davidson would be close to an eliminativist. This interpretation would agree with my 
claim  that  Davidson  argues  for  robust  physicalism.  But  at  the  same  time  it  is  difficult  to  
discuss these problems and Davidson’s position without the threat of conceptual confusion. 
As we have seen, it is questionable whether the irreducibility to physics is enough to render 
properties non-physical in more than a merely terminological or definitional sense. On the 
other hand, there are views, like genuine emergentism, panpsychism, idealism and substantial 
forms of dualism which are clearly something stronger than the property or predicate dualisms 
of non-reductive physicalism. Where on this continuum Davidson’s view falls is a difficult 
question, which depends on one’s view, or on one’s intuitions as one could say, of what the 
irreducibility to physics entails. If a principled irreducibility to physics is interpreted as 
implying a form of dualism, then the term “emergent materialism” is perhaps not completely 
out of place as a description of Davidson’s position. On the other hand, at least some of the 
classical emergentists thought that emergent properties are something novel and ontologically 
over and above physical properties. The spirit of Davidson’s philosophy of mind does not go 
well with this kind of view. This being said, it should also be considered that if the 
irreducibility implies that the essence of the mental will remain mysterious forever, then non-
reductive physicalism is perhaps best described as a form of dualism, at least in spirit if not in 
practice. The essence of the mental would remain mysterious, but a non-reductive physicalist 
could still firmly argue against the immortality of the soul or against other views which seem 
to be in conflict with a scientific understanding of the world (but which are important or 
essential aspects of certain versions of dualism). 
Davidson  claims  that  mental  properties  are  not  physical  properties.  If  he  is  a  realist  
about mental properties, then the claim about the distinctiveness or non-identity of mental 
properties with physical properties would amount to a form of strong property dualism, 
perhaps resembling something like what is proposed by Chalmers. According to him:  
 
[…] property dualism… involves properties of an individual that are not entailed by the physical 
properties of that individual. Consciousness is a feature of  the  world  over  and  above  the  physical  
features of the world…. there are properties of individuals in this world… that are ontologically 
independent of physical properties… [the] property dualism that I advocate involves fundamentally new 
features of the world.557 
                                               
556 Sosa, 1993, 49. 
557 Chalmers, 1996, 125. 
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If and when property dualism is attributed to Davidson, we should consider how strongly such 
a dualism should be understood. The question has wider importance; it is one of the central 
questions to be addressed in the attempt to formulate a non-reductive view of the mind. If 
Davidson did subscribe, for example, to Chalmers’ version of property dualism, then the 
nature of his physicalism would be questionable. I shall not take a stance on the question of 
how the position of Chalmers is best understood, but the expression that mental properties are 
“fundamentally new features of the world” which are “ontologically independent” can be 
thought of as a very strong form of property dualism.558 Here again the question about the 
“distinctiveness” of mental properties is essential; ontological independence could be taken to 
mean the true distinctiveness of mental properties. Chalmers wants to distinguish his position 
as being a stronger view than the “dualistic” view, according to which mental properties are 
not properties invoked by physics or reducible to such. This weaker sort of property dualism 
is the one which Kim and Churchland attribute to non-reductive physicalists. The position of 
Chalmers, on the other hand, seems to be the kind of position of which certain physicalists 
talk about when they hurl their accusations of genuine property dualism. This position would 
be dualistic enough for such accusations to stick. 
As an answer to the question how of Davidson sees the nature of properties, it could 
be argued that given Davidson’s Tarskian and Quinean influences, a natural conclusion is that 
Davidson  is  a  nominalist  and  denies  the  existence  of  properties  altogether.  But  whereas  
Davidson is skeptical about properties, he claims that he is not a nominalist.559 Strangely 
enough, many critics do not notice or care about this and still continue to describe him as a 
nominalist. Stoljar, for example, claims that Davidson’s position “officially eschews 
properties outright in favor of a nominalist ontology of events”560. The reason why Davidson 
refuses to accept properties as concrete entities  in  his  ontology  is  his  conviction  that  
everything involving properties can be explained by treating them as abstract. I think it is not 
clear how the terms “abstract” and “concrete” should be understood here. How does the claim 
about the abstract nature of properties fit with some other of Davidson’s claims, like the 
following: “The relevant laws [which explain why a piece of chalk broke] have to do with the 
microscopic properties of this particular piece of chalk…”,561 or that “laws deal with types of 
events, and hence with particular events only as they have the properties that earn them 
                                               
558 For a brief but useful clarification of Chalmers’ position see Chrucky, 1998. 
559 Davidson, 1997c. 
560 Stoljar, 2008, 276. For a similar view see Campbell, 2006. 
561 Davidson, 1964, 48. 
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membership in a type”?562 Isn’t there a distinction made between predicates and properties 
when Davidson claims: “[…] concepts classify in terms of properties that may or may not stir 
the senses at the moment”?563 How can predicates classify in terms of properties if there are 
no such things as concrete properties, or how can properties “stir the senses” if they are 
abstract? Let us suppose that a piece of chalk has such and such microscopic properties and 
we refer to them in order to explain why the chalk broke. How can we give this kind of 
explanation if the property in question is not concrete? David Armstrong has asked: “Must 
there not be something quite specific about the things which allows, indeed ensures that 
the[se] predicates apply? The predicates require ontological correlates.”564 Von Wright makes 
the  same  point:  “[a]  predicate  names  something  which  has  ‘ontological  status’,  viz.  a  
quality”.565 Armstrong argues that even simple explanations become obscure if predicates do 
not  require  ontological  correlates.  It  is  possible  to  know  that  water  freezes  at  a  certain  
temperature because certain molecules have such and such properties. How could these 
explanations be formulated if reference to concrete properties is not allowed? To use 
Armstrong’s example: let us suppose that a kettle of water is heated. What causes the heating 
of the water? According to Armstrong, the fire must be in the right relation to the kettle, say 
underneath it, and the kettle must contain water. The fire must be hot in order to cause the 
heating etc. As Armstrong notes:  
 
Consider how this is explained by an account in terms of predicates. The predicate ‘underneath’ applies 
to the pair of the fire and the kettle, the predicate ‘hot’ to the fire and, eventually, to the water. But 
when we have said that these predicates apply, we have surely not said enough.566  
 
 
A nominalist has to explain why it is the case that a certain predicate “fits” on a given 
occasion. Both Davidson and Quine have an answer. Quine’s answer is: “[…] that houses and 
roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible”.567 This is not a 
clarifying answer. Davidson says: “If an evaluative word fits, it’s because of properties that 
we could describe in non-evaluative terms.”568 But how does this answer go together with the 
view that properties are abstract? If the term “property” is replaced with the term “predicate”, 
                                               
562 Davidson, 1987a, 109. 
563 Davidson, 1993b, 608. 
564 Armstrong, 1992, 164. 
565 Von Wright, 1998, 77. 
566 Ibid. 
567 Quine, 1960, 81. 
568 In Bergström and Föllesdal, 1993, 218, my emphasis. On the other hand, Davidson (1974, 194) has famously 
claimed that: “Nothing… no thing, makes sentences and theories true….” This suggests that there need not be 
anything about events that explains why certain predicates apply to them. 
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then the answer is that an evaluative word fits because a non-evaluative predicate fits. How 
would this clarify why the evaluative word fits? The explanation would concern linguistic 
conventions and it would remain utterly obscure why the attribution of an evaluative term, say 
“good”, would have anything to do with the fact that a non-evaluative term happens to apply 
to the same object as the evaluative term.569 It is thus understandable that Davidson gives the 
explanation in terms of properties.  
But why use the term “property” if everything could be explained without it? It is not 
easy to see how Quine and Davidson can deny (of course they do) that objects satisfy certain 
predicates because of such and such physical facts (which are in the object); but if they are not 
denying this, then what are they denying? Recall the example of the microscopic properties of 
the chalk. Doesn’t this formulation imply that the chalk breaks because of the properties it 
possesses?  Being  a  grandfather,  for  example,  can  be  thought  of  as  a  relational  instead  of  a  
microscopic property of a man, but how could it be denied that the microscopic properties of 
the chalk are not properties intrinsic to it? If these properties are intrinsic, then they are in the 
chalk and the predicate of, say frangibility, applies to the piece of chalk because of  them.  
Davidson has claimed that a fully adequate science “[…] relies on knowledge of the structure 
that explains why [a] brittle object shatters when it does, or allows us to predict when, and to 
what degree, an object will return to its original shape after being subjected to precisely 
specified forces”.570 How else could the structure be understood than as a concrete physical 
property? The following statement of Davidson’s surely gives the impression that properties 
are, after all, something concrete:  
 
[…] if  an  object  has  a  disposition,  this  fact  must  depend on the  physical  properties  of  the  object.  So  
whatever can be explained by appeal to the disposition must be explicable in physical terms. Solubility 
illustrates the point: at one time we knew there was some unknown physical property of an object that 
made it soluble; now we know what the property is.571 
 
Davidson is here describing Quine’s view, but given the nominalism of the latter it cannot be 
the case that Davidson, who shies away from nominalism, would be less realistic  about  
                                               
569 The problem is obvious in the mind–body case. Psychological terms fit because of properties (or predicates) 
that could be described in non-psychological terms. But if the explanation stops here, the connection between 
consciousness and brain-states remains a mystery. Whereas the view that the applicability of  the predicate 
”good” or ”beautiful” cannot be explicated in non-evaluative terms may sound plausible, the view according to 
which the physical property which corresponds to psychological predicates could not be explicated sounds 
implausible. Whereas there may be nothing in the object which makes us to judge it as being beautiful, mental 
properties are in the subject because of physical properties. Of course, all this is true only as long as one believes 
in the truth of O-physicalism. I am not defending O-physicalism here but merely discussing how things should 
look if this version of physicalism is accepted. 
570 Davidson, 1993f, 311. 
571 Davidson, 1995a, 120. 
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properties than Quine. I therefore conclude that the above describes also Davidson’s own 
view.572 Obscurities follow if in the above quote the term “property” is changed to the term 
“predicate”. What would it mean to say that there was some unknown physical predicate that 
made an object soluble and now we know what the predicate is? 
It is problematic that Davidson uses the terms “predicate” and “property” 
interchangeably. This suggests that he accepts properties in his ontology. Usually Davidson 
talks about properties instead of predicates, and this is an important reason why so many 
commentators continue to discuss his position from the perspective of property realism. For 
example, in the quote above the claim that disposition must depend on the physical properties 
of the object easily leads the reader to assume that, according to Davidson, there are such 
things as properties. How could something depend on physical properties if these properties 
are abstract and nowhere? But, of course, if Davidson denies the concrete existence of 
properties, then it is no wonder that he claims that mental properties do not reduce to physical 
properties – because what he is in fact saying is that mental predicates cannot be reduced to 
physical predicates. This in turn can be understood as a claim that mental predicates cannot 
be defined in terms of physical predicates, and this is one central claim of AM. Mental 
predicates do not translate into physical predicates. If this is the essential lesson, then the label 
“property dualism” is inappropriate and Davidson’s position is best understood as a form of 
predicate dualism. Then the “dualism” of Davidson’s position means “merely” that mental 
talk cannot be translated into talk which uses only physical terms and that mental talk is not 
an optional part of our conceptual resources. 
However, let us for the moment proceed under the assumption that Davidson is an 
antirealist with respect to properties. He notes: “[...] properties are abstract objects. They are 
nowhere.”573 Since Davidson does elaborate his claim, let us not speculate about the question 
of what abstract objects are, but instead take Davidson’s claim that “properties are nowhere” 
as conclusive evidence for the conclusion that, in his opinion, “properties are not anywhere in 
any clear sense”. But what are the reasons to say that properties are, pace Armstrong for 
example, nowhere? Although Davidson is not a nominalist, his commitment to Tarski’s 
theory of truth has the consequence that Davidson has no use for properties.574 He notes: 
 
                                               
572 Indeed, similar kinds of statements are given in Davidson 1991 where Davidson certainly describes his own 
position. 
573 Davidson, 2000a, 24.  
574 For a discussion of this aspect of Davidson’s view see especially Neale, 2003. 
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I  am  firmly  convinced  that  when  we  make  such  remarks  as  ‘Alphonse  believes  that  Lisbon  is  in  
Portugal’ what we say about Alphonse is objectively true or false. Statements like this attribute a 
genuine psychological property to a person. People believe, want etc. this and that.575 
 
So far everything is understandable. Statements about psychological states are objectively true 
or false just like statements about non-psychological states, because the former attribute a 
genuine psychological property to  a  person.  We can  notice  that  on  Davidson’s  view mental  
properties would be properties of a person, not properties of an event (as Kim thinks) or 
properties of the brain (as Churchland thinks). But then the story is spoiled.  
 
Actually I don’t want to invoke properties at this point either: attributing a property is done by using a 
predicate, and the semantics of predicates don’t need or want properties. Having banished properties, 
states, beliefs, and so on, from my explanatory machinery, I will now continue to allow myself to use 
words that superficially seem to refer to such things, on condition that I be understood to hold that such 
talk can be exchanged at boring length for talk that doesn’t use these words as referring to entities. It 
should be clear that my ontological scruples are due only to my suspicion that these entities do not help 
explain what I want to explain.576  
 
So, in the end the reason why Davidson does not want to talk about properties is his view that 
everything that could be explained by using properties can be explained by using predicates. 
This  view  obviously  faces  the  difficult  challenge  of  whether  all talk and every explanation 
that refers to properties can be exchanged with talk that does not refer to them. This problem 
cannot be considered here; yet the problem raised by Armstrong is something for which a 
nominalist would be required to give an answer. I believe we can discuss Davidson’s view 
about properties without trying to solve, beyond what we have already said, the question of 
whether properties exist or what our attitude towards properties should be. 
We now know the reason behind Davidson’s antirealism about properties. There is no 
clear semantic need to treat states or properties as entities, that is: “[...] the semantics of 
predicates don’t need or want properties”. Indeed, as Davidson says “there are no compelling 
reasons to introduce entities corresponding to predicates in giving the semantics of 
predicates”.577 Davidson’s skepticism towards properties is a result of a project in the 
philosophy of language where he tries to provide an adequate compositional meaning theory 
for natural languages. This project can, according to Davidson, be accomplished without 
assuming entities which correspond to predicates. As the previous quote shows, the semantics 
of predicates do not require entities corresponding to predicates. The facts about the use of 
predicates can be explained without introducing entities corresponding to these predicates. In 
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their recent study of Davidson’s philosophy of language, Lepore and Ludwig point out 
precisely this: “No properties… of any kind are required to carry out the project of providing 
an adequate compositional meaning theory for natural languages for sentences which do not 
explicitly refer to them.”578 Many commentators see Davidson’s commitment to Tarski’s 
theory as the key to his rejection of properties. The questions that were asked in the beginning 
of  this  section,  namely  what  Davidson’s  attitude  towards  properties  is  and  what  the  reasons  
for it are, can now be answered. Davidson does not want to invoke properties because of his 
project in semantics. This much is clear. 
Commentators have nevertheless drawn very different conclusions from Davidson’s 
Tarskian and Quinean commitments. Some, like Campbell, Neale, Lepore and Ludwig claim 
that it is precisely Davidson’s commitment to Tarski-style semantics which leads him to say 
that there are no properties in virtue of which events support certain descriptions.579 Others 
like Crane and Marras claim, without going into details, that the issue is broadly one of 
“Davidson’s nominalism”.580 Their conclusions about what Davidson would say about the 
reality of properties vary. According to Mclaughlin, “it is far from certain whether… 
Davidson thinks there are any properties at all, mental or physical”.581 Crane is more explicit: 
“[…] on Davidson’s… nominalistic view there are no properties”.582 A recent conclusion by 
Gibb is that for Davidson, “properties are not objective aspects of things in the world”.583 
Melchert  concludes  that  according  to  Davidson  there  are  no  mental properties.584 Campbell 
seems to agree with this, since he notes that Davidson is “perhaps a realist” with respect to 
physical properties but an anti-realist with respect to mental properties. Yet, in a similar vein 
as Mclaughlin, he notes: “Whether or not one can show that Davidson has implicit realist 
commitments to properties is unclear.”585 This view suggests that Davidson’s view about 
properties is  something which cannot be settled with certainty.  All  the commentators cannot 
be right, but who is? 
 
                                               
578 Lepore and Ludwig, 2005, 8. 
579 Campbell, 1997, 1998, Neale, 2001, Lepore and Ludwig, 2005. 
580 Crane, 1992, 2000, Marras, 1999. As I noted already, this interpretation is, to say the least, interesting given 
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2.3.4 Is Davidson’s rejection of properties justified? 
 
In the previous section I described why Davidson is “suspicious” of properties. Now we turn 
to the question of whether Davidson’s commitment to a Tarski-style semantics gives a good 
reason to claim that properties are unreal or that they are nowhere. Some of the problems that 
are currently being discussed in the philosophy of mind, like the problem of mental causation, 
may require a discussion of properties. It is not obvious that from the fact that one does not 
“need” properties in his philosophy of language, it would follow that he also does not need 
properties in his philosophy of mind.586 Tarski,  to  whom  many  refer  as  the  source  of  
“Davidson’s nominalism”, notes: 
  
[…] we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving up any epistemological attitude we 
may have had; we may remain naïve realists, critical realists, or idealists, empiricists, or 
metaphysicians—whatever we were before. The semantic conception is completely neutral towards all 
these issues.587 
 
Davidson himself admits that deep metaphysical problems about events remain and that the 
study of the logical form of sentences “can carry us only a certain distance.”588 Robustly 
ontological questions about the status of mental properties remain. In fact, as Davidson notes, 
there are two separate questions about properties:  
 
The first is whether there is in general any objection to including properties in our ontology. The second 
is whether there is any advantage in introducing predicates as the sole semantic items used to explain 
the function of predicates.589  
 
It is the second question which captures Davidson’s main interest, since with respect to the 
first question he notes: “I have no objection to accepting properties, if they turn out to be 
needed to explain such sentences as ‘This is the same colour as that’”.590 Why should not this 
attitude be applied also to mental properties? Should we not accept such properties if they turn 
out to be needed to explain sentences such as “Donald has the same belief as Georg”? There is 
                                               
586Davidson obviously thinks that these two branches of philosophy cannot be clearly separated. There is no 
reason why one would have to accept this view as strongly as Davidson does. In fact, the problems that discussed 
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no reason to be skeptical about such properties in these kinds of cases.591 In his last statement 
on the subject Davidson notes:  
 
Tarski’s truth definitions, and theories of truth based on them… distinguish between the issue of whether 
properties and other abstract entities exist and the semantic role of predicates. Of course, if some (second-
level) predicates are true of abstract objects, those objects must exist...592 
 
Given  Davidson’s  view  it  follows  that  if  certain  sentences  cannot  be  dealt  with  without  
positing properties, he would allow them into his ontology as long as these properties are 
treated as abstract objects. Commentators have taken this into account. Crane, for example, 
notes that nominalism a la Quine and Davidson does not need to deny the existence of all 
abstract objects.593 Davidson himself affirms that “no one has good idea of how to do syntax 
or semantics without appeal to [abstract objects]”.594  
Since Davidson accepts properties in the sense described above, the real question is 
what kind of “things” these properties are. I will not go too deeply into metaphysical 
questions, but nevertheless but the following should be recognized. According to Rosen: “[…] 
if any characterization of the abstract deserves to be regarded as the standard one, it is this: 
An abstract entity is a non-spatial (or non-spatiotemporal) causally inert thing.”595 It is 
impossible to tell whether Davidson’s use of the term “abstract object” fits this 
characterization. However, Davidson does claim that properties “have no location” and that 
“they are nowhere”.596 The non-spatiality of abstract objects seems thus to be satisfied. What 
about the causal inertness? This would seem to follow from the non-spatiality of properties. 
How could something which is nowhere have any causal effects on anything? Is it even 
appropriate to use the term something in the case of properties if they are abstract and not 
anywhere? Armstrong and Heathcote argue that: “Davidson’s Quinean nominalism does not 
enable  him  to  say  that  it  is  the  properties  of  cause  and  effect  are  the  main  players  in  
causation.”597 A similar conclusion is reached by Crane when he notes that followers of 
                                               
591 But it is crucially important to understand correctly the status of mental properties. That people share a mental 
property means that their states are sufficiently similar for us to understand them, not that they share an 
underlying physical property. 
592 Davidson, 2005a, 158. 
593 See Crane, 1992. 
594 Davidson, 1999s, 101. 
595 Rosen, 2001. The reference is to a web-page. 
596 Let us suppose that according to Davidson mental properties are abstract objects and thus nowhere. Von 
Wright makes an interestingly similar claim when he notes that: “Meanings are no-where. So, if the mental were 
the meanings (of behavioural signs caused by nervous processes), then mental things would not exist in space, 
i.e.  physical  space”  (Von  Wright,  1997,  133).  There  is  a  hint  of  intentional  antirealism  in  the  views  of  both  
Davidson and von Wright. I will consider this aspect of their views in section 2.5.3. 
597 Armstrong and Heathcote, 1991, 68. 
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Davidson cannot say that properties are literally a cause.598 Crane’s reading will be questioned 
in section 4.1, but let us note here that according to this “nominalistic interpretation”, 
properties are not causally efficacious. In fact, Davidson himself says that properties are 
causally inert and he goes on to say that it makes no sense to say that A causes B in virtue of 
having such and such properties, and finally he claims that abstractions generally have no 
causal relations.599 But  what  is  the  point  of  positing  the  existence  of  abstract  entities  then?  
Many philosophers think that if mental properties are abstract then they cannot be causally 
relevant, and this being the case it is not clear why it would be worth having them at all.600 
Crane has noted: “[…] properties understood [as abstract entities] cannot be causes, since 
causes must have spatial or (at least) temporal location”.601 It  is  interesting  to  consider  
whether von Wright’s temporal supervenience would grant mental phenomena a causal role, 
for example, on Crane’s account. This would be another interesting direction in which von 
Wright’s position could be developed: by its insistence on temporal supervenience, this 
position could be taken to provide a positive solution to the problem of mental causation. We 
should note that if we take Davidson’s line of thought, then properties are nowhere and they 
do not seem to have causal powers, and their causal inertness leads to their elimination. There 
have been many accusations that Davidson’s theory leads to epiphenomenalism. I will 
consider these charges in chapter four, but it should be noted here that this question is closely 
connected to Davidson’s views about properties. The problem of mental properties, so it is 
claimed especially by Kim, is a problem for non-reductive physicalism because of the 
problem of mental causation.  
 What can thus be said about Davidson’s rejection of properties? Although it seems 
that Davidson is an antirealist about properties he, quite surprisingly, remains silent when it 
comes to finally saying something specific about their ontological status. Are there such 
things or not? Davidson comments: “Properties are abstract, that is, if they exist. About this I 
am agnostic.”602 If Davidson is agnostic about the question of whether properties exist, why 
have so many commentators concluded that he is an antirealist about properties? This cannot 
be anything else than a misreading. Davidson notes: “There is no objection to taking 
properties and relations as entities about which we want to think and say things, unless, of 
                                               
598 Crane, 2008. 
599 See Davidson, 1993d, 1995b, 1997c. 
600 For this worry see, for example, Dretske, 1989.  
601 Crane, 2008, 180-181. 
602 Davidson, 2000a, 24, fn. 7. According to Davidson, predicates are abstract objects too.  
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course, there are no such entities. I shall not cast doubt on their existence.”603 In his reply to 
Jennifer Hornsby, Davidson notes that some may think that his reason for talking in terms of 
predicates instead of properties might be the desire to avoid references to universals.604 But, 
as Davidson notes: “I have no objection to referring to universals when it promotes some 
explanatory or semantic project….”605 These claims certainly create doubts about all those 
interpretations which simply declare that Davidson rejects properties altogether. Yet it must 
be noted that Davidson nevertheless firmly thinks that if properties exist they must still be 
abstract. In my opinion it could be said that Davidson takes an “easy way out”, because when 
it comes to properties:  
 
[...]I plan to concentrate on what might be called the epistemological problem and let the ontological 
problem, if there is one, take care of itself. For I think that if we were to solve the epistemological 
problem we would lose interest in the supposed ontological problem.606  
 
Davidson is willing to admit properties into his ontology because they “take up no space”. 
This is an interesting suggestion and an example of the way in which Davidson thinks about 
the relationship between epistemological and ontological questions. According to Stephen 
Neale, “Davidson suggests that if the need to posit a particular ontological category does not 
arise in the construction [of an acceptable T-theory], then the need cannot arise at all.”607 This 
interpretation emphasizes the relevance of the analysis of language for ontological questions. 
But what does it mean to say that there is no need for a particular ontological category? How 
to decide whether there is a need or not? If properties are needed for certain explanations, 
then it would seem that there is a need for properties. Whether they are needed is a question 
over which “intuitions” can differ. One conclusion that can be drawn from Davidson’s 
“agnosticism” about properties is that he is not an antirealist. Another conclusion is that it is 
not clear after all what Davidson’s stance with respect to the question of the reality of 
properties is. It is therefore not surprising that critics have held different opinions about this 
matter. The fact that Davidson does not state clearly his views about properties is an 
important observation, since critics have noted that Davidson’s view about properties is, 
depending on the critic, either a solution to the problem of mental causation or gives rise to 
this very problem.  
                                               
603 Davidson, 2005, 84. 
604 Davidson, 1999p. 
605 Davidson, 1999p, 636-637. 
606 Davidson, 1995b, 44. 
607 Neale, 2001, 172. This resembles the recent interpretation of Lepore and Ludwig, 2005. 
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What I have shown is that Davidson’s view about properties cannot simply be 
interpreted as being antirealist or realist. This is to be expected, since his version of 
intentional realism does not fit the standard realism / antirealism distinction well either. This 
being the case, it is not surprising that his view on the status of mental properties is likewise 
not easily fitted into the realism / antirealism dichotomy either.  Perhaps Davidson’s position 
is best described as epiphrastic, as one commentator, Welshon, has done.608 According to the 
epiphrastic view of properties, properties are not to be distinguished from concepts or 
predicates. It is quite clear that Davidson subscribes to this view, but it is not clear how the 
view should be understood.609 Armstrong has noted:  
 
To appreciate the utter implausibility of the attempt to evade properties by means of predicates it is 
perhaps sufficient to consider a case where a thing’s property changes. A cold thing becomes hot, For 
one who puts his or her faith in predicates this is a matter first of the predicate ‘cold’, or its semantic 
equivalent, applying to or being true of the object, and, second, the predicate ‘hot’ becoming applicable 
after cold loses applicability. Properties in the object are but metaphysical shadows cast on that object 
by the predicates. But what have predicates to do with the temperature of the object? The change in the 
object could have occurred even if the predicates had never existed.610 
 
Armstrong’s conclusion is: “[…] one has to be pretty far gone in what might be called 
linguistic idealism to find predicates much of substitute for properties”.611  I think we should 
conclude that Davidson does not offer good reasons for thinking that there are no such things 
as properties. His general rejection of properties (if that is what he is doing) is not sensitive to 
the kinds of questions which can be taken, with some justice, to be relevant in the philosophy 
of  mind.  Examples  of  the  issues  which  are  relevant  but  difficult  to  answer  if  an  epiphrastic  
view about properties is accepted are, to mention only few:  
 
1) If the relation between a mental event and a physical event is the relation of identity, it is 
still possible to ask why a certain physical event is also a mental event. There must be an 
ontological answer to this question as long as one does not accept the view that events are 
“mental only as described” in the strong sense, i.e. in the sense in which a distant collision 
of stars counts as a mental event. A very general way in which this question can be 
formulated in terms of properties instead of events is to say that consciousness is a mental 
                                               
608 Welshon, 1999. 
609 Davidson’s acceptance of this obscure view has the unfortunate consequence that certain commentators keep 
interpreting his views without problematizing the epiphrastic view. For example, Simone Evnine (1991, 68) in 
his book about Davidson writes: “In what follows, I shall take supervenience indifferently to be about mental 
predicates or mental properties.” 
610 Armstrong, 1992, 161.  
611 Ibid. 
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property.612 But why are certain brains conscious? It is not a satisfying answer to say that 
brains are conscious only as described; there is (and could we say must be) a difference 
between a conscious and a non-conscious brain, a difference which can be found from the 
brain. This is a simple matter of scientific truth.613  
 
2) If mental events really cause something, we may want to have an ontological answer as to 
why this is the case. “Ontological answer” here means an answer which is formulated in 
terms of causally efficacious physical properties.  
 
3) To what extent can the study of the brain tell us something about the mind?  
 
4) Where are mental events if their existence is just a matter of a mental predicate fitting?  
 
And so on. I am not saying that these are the essential questions that one should be asking in 
the philosophy of mind. I am not even saying that I take these questions to require answers 
which depend on the acceptance of properties; quite on the contrary. I merely note that many 
philosophers would raise these kinds of questions against an epiphrastic view. I believe that a 
Davidsonian and von Wrightian way to think about the mind suggests that some of these 
questions may be ill-formed. Yet, at least some of these questions sound intelligible and a 
dismissal of them because of obscure reasons given for antirealism about properties is perhaps 
a rushed dismissal. 
Does the following view of Davidson offer a satisfying description of the nature of 
mental properties? Consider:  
 
If you ask what kind of properties we’re attributing when we attribute beliefs, I think a theory about 
how we tell that belief-attributing sentences are true provides the best answer. This shows what kind of 
property it is: it’s a property which you determine to apply to an individual in the following way... (and 
here you describe the method). Is there something more to say about it? I don’t see why there has to 
be.614  
 
                                               
612 I believe we can understand this claim without taking a stance on the question of the nature of properties 
generally, or of the status of mental properties particularly. 
613 An important question is how much emphasis is put on the scientific truth. What is however clear is that both 
Davidson and von Wright respect these truths, as their naturalism requires. This being the case they would accept 
the view that the reason that the property of being conscious is exemplified by a person would depend on the 
brain of the conscious person.  
614 Davidson, 1993c, 196. 
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This view about mental properties reflects the Wittgensteinian view, which was briefly 
described in section 2.3.1. What needs to be considered is how we come to apply mental 
predicates to others; this captures something essential about the nature of mental properties. 
 I believe it possible to think that there could be something “more to say” about mental 
properties  than  the  description  of  a  theory  which  tells  when mental  predicates  are  true  of  a  
subject. It is not clear how Davidson’s remark that “there does not have to be anything more 
to say” about properties should be understood. Either there is something more to say or there 
isn’t. Many contemporary philosophers, for example Kim, would claim that the view given in 
the quote above neglects important questions.615 The question about the relation between 
mental and physical properties is precisely one of these questions.616 What, for example, can 
be said about the reality of mental properties if properties are abstract objects that have no 
location? Moreover, we should keep in mind that Davidson uses (all the time) expressions 
like physical (or mental) “features”, “respects”, “characteristics” and, of course, very often the 
term “property” itself. It is unclear how these terms should be understood if the only sense of 
property-talk is the one described in the previous quote. It seems to me that Davidson accepts 
property-talk when it suits his purposes. This is most evident in his discussion about the 
possibility of mental causation when he talks about properties without quarrels. As I showed 
in section 2.3.3, Davidson uses the expression “physical property” without hesitation and in a 
way which suggests that he thinks of physical properties as something concrete. The contexts 
in which such expressions are used do not allow for an epiphrastic understanding of 
properties.  
 If properties are treated as abstractions, or if it is claimed that properties should not be 
distinguished from concepts, attempts to answer certain questions in the philosophy of mind 
face serious problems. This of course is a satisfying conclusion for some. The conclusion is 
that the relation (or non-relation) between mental and physical properties cannot be further 
explicated and therefore a reductive analysis of mentality is an impossibility. But perhaps one, 
in an anti-Wittgensteinian “metaphysical mood”, feels that there has to be something more to 
say about the nature of mental properties than what Davidson admits. Perhaps the view that 
there has to be something more to say is a result of an uncritical acceptance of the 
metaphysical framework of physicalism. The temptations of this framework need to be 
                                               
615 See Kim, 2003. 
616 Davidson’s view about the attribution of mental properties does not clarify the question of whether these 
properties could be understood as physical properties. Whereas the view may suggest what kind of properties 
mental properties are, it remains silent on the question of whether they are physical properties and does not 
imply the non-physicality of mental properties. 
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considered carefully, but I also think that they cannot be completely ignored. Although I 
believe that a Wittgensteinian perspective should be more strongly used against physicalism, 
it seems to me that certain claims of O-physicalism sound plausible. As von Wright has 
claimed, certain views are natural and empirically plausible; for some the view that there must 
be something more to say about the nature of mental properties than what Davidson suggests 
may be very natural. In Davidson’s case it should also be acknowledged that, given his 
physicalism, it would be surprising if the nature of mental properties could not be explicated 
in any way which refers to a physicalistic ontology and uses the resources of this ontology. 
Despite Davidson’s Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy, he also accepts many basic 
principles of physicalism.  
 
2.3.4 Are mental properties physical properties? 
 
I have shown what Davidson’s view of properties is, and concluded that the reasons he gives 
for treating properties as abstract are not satisfying. The reasons he gives for rejecting 
properties once and for all should also be treated with suspicion. I nevertheless emphasize that 
these reasons may be satisfying if one  accepts  that  semantic  reasons  to  believe  in  the  non-
existence of properties override other reasons to believe in their existence. Davidson says that 
we would lose interest in ontological problems if epistemological problems were solved. But 
we have also seen that, according to him, deep metaphysical problems remain even after the 
logical form of sentences have been studied and clarified. The final answer is thus partly a 
matter of intuition. 
To the question “Are mental properties physical properties?” Davidson would thus 
answer negatively, because properties are not part of his official ontology. Because the 
reasons for the rejection are unsatisfying, I believe we should consider more generally 
whether non-reductive physicalism can make sense of the view that mental properties are 
physical properties. A positive answer would remove one major problem haunting non-
reductive physicalism – the charge of property dualism. An answer to the question about the 
relationship between mental and physical properties tells something important about the mind. 
All this being said, I note that Davidson’s view on properties is not entirely clear.  As  I  
showed  in  section  2.3.3,  commentators  have  drawn  different  conclusions  from  the  same  
textual evidence. Most critics see Davidson’s rejection of properties as being a result of his 
nominalism; yet Davidson claims that he is not a nominalist. Moreover, commentators have 
differing opinions about the properties that Davidson is allegedly antirealist about. Some 
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argue that he is a realist about physical properties but antirealist about mental properties, 
while others claim that he is antirealist about mental and physical properties.  
These different interpretations of Davidson’s position have created confusion in the 
subsequent discussion concerning the questions of whether AM can account for mental 
causation  or  whether  AM is  a  version  of  epiphenomenalism (or  leads  to  it).  Kim notes  that  
Davidson is not comfortable with unrestrained talk of properties, and although Kim 
emphasizes that Davidson-interpreters may need to be careful with respect to this, he 
nevertheless notes that he will continue to discuss Davidson’s position in terms of properties 
because “property talk has been the norm”.617 This  creates  a  problem  which  some  
commentators have recognized. If Davidson rejects properties, then an accusation of 
epiphenomenalism, which is grounded on the claim that the causal efficacy of mental 
properties has not been shown, is simply ill-founded. In other words, commentators criticize 
Davidson while accepting the background assumptions which Davidson himself would reject 
right from the beginning.618 This problem has been recently emphasized by Gibb.619 
Criticisms based on assumptions which Davidson would reject result in an unfair description 
of Davidson’s position. I believe that an important part of the problem of property-dualism is 
a result of a similar kind of confusion. Certain philosophers, like Kim, have a view about 
mental properties, and what they are really doing is accusing non-reductive physicalists of the 
fact that they do not share this view.   
 As far as Davidson’s position is concerned I suggest that, given the textual evidence, 
Davidson is a realist about physical properties (physical predicates are ontologically 
grounded), and that if he is a realist about mental properties too, his only route to avoiding 
robust emergentism (which von Wright perhaps accepts) or full-blown property dualism (a la 
Chalmers) would be to say that mental properties are, after all, physical properties. Since 
Davidson  is  not  willing  to  do  this,  I  shall  consider  the  question  about  the  relation  between  
mental and physical properties independently of his views. The conclusion will be that a non-
reductive physicalist has no alternative than to admit that mental properties are physical 
properties. But there is no reason why a non-reductive physicalist could not admit this while 
still accepting the essential principles of his non-reductive position. We should disagree with 
                                               
617 Kim, 2003, 135. 
618 This is obvious, for example, in the debate between Davidson and some of his critics in Heil and Mele, 1993. 
619 Gibb, 2006. Unfortunately Gibb herself makes the same mistake of which she accuses other commentators. 
After criticizing those who have a different view about properties from Davidson’s, she herself argues against 
Davidson’s view based on her own ontological reading of properties.  
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Davidson’s view that solving the epistemological problem of properties (the problem of 
predicates) clears all ontological worries about properties. The problem of properties certainly 
seems, above all else, to be an ontological problem. Whether there are such things as 
properties and what their nature is, is a question about the nature of reality. This is how the 
problem is usually treated in the contemporary philosophy of mind. We attribute mental 
properties to people and are interested, for example, in the question of what the relation 
between these properties and the robustly physical properties of the brain is. This is an 
ontological question and a claim according to which this question can be completely 
dismissed in favor of the epistemological problem, which is the problem of how we attribute 
mental properties and how to tell whether the attributions are true, is not a satisfactory answer 
to the ontological question. Gibb has explicitly raised this objection against Davidson’s 
position. She writes: 
 
[…] from an ontological point of view, Davidson has arguably got things the wrong way around. It is 
arguable that one’s motivation for accepting or rejecting an ontological category should not have 
semantic considerations at its base, because contrary to Davidson, a theory of meaning cannot be 
appealed to in order to settle ontological issues. An appropriate semantics is to be construed only after 
the ontological issues are settled. Given this approach to metaphysics, whether or not one should admit 
the ontological category of properties is not to be based upon consideration of whether sentences require 
quantification over properties…rather, whether one should admit the ontological category of properties, 
and indeed what properties are, is to be established through metaphysical enquiry…620 
 
There are several very interesting things worth considering in Gibb’s suggestion, which is a 
good example of certain kind of approach that has been taken towards the problem of mental 
causation in the contemporary philosophy of mind. This approach could be labeled “overtly 
metaphysical”. Gibb, Lowe and others have a research agenda which is based on the view that 
the mental causation debate has been “framed with insufficient metaphysical precision” and 
that that the purpose of their research is “to explore recent advances in metaphysics, in 
particular new accounts of the categories of being and of levels of being.”621 It is telling that 
Gibb  uses  the  term  “from  an  ontological  point  of  view”,  which  could  be  taken  to  be  the  
opposite perspective from Quine’s logical point of view.622 It is unclear what the ontological 
                                               
620 Gibb, 2006, 420. 
621 See, http://www.dur.ac.uk/philosophy/ontologyofmentalcausation/. The group believes that metaphysical 
enquiry would constitute a significant step towards the resolution of the problem of mental causation. Is this 
project lost in the jungle of metaphysics of which Wittgenstein and von Wright warned? It is not a scientistic 
jungle of metaphysics, but it (perhaps) is a jungle in which the philosopher is no longer looking at  the  way  
concepts  work  in  our  life  and  thought,  but  is  constructing  detached  views  about  how  they  must work, given 
certain structural assumptions. 
622 Quine, 1953a. 
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point of view is exactly, but the view can be achieved through “metaphysical inquiry”, which 
“settles ontological issues”.623 
 Whether or not Gibb’s view is reasonable, it is nevertheless a very unfair treatment of 
Davidson’s position.624 To claim that “a theory of meaning cannot be appealed to in order to 
settle ontological issues” or that “metaphysical inquiry should settle whether an ontological 
category should be admitted” is merely to say that this is one way to think about the issue and 
that Davidson’s view is incorrect because it differs from this specific way. To say that 
ontological issues can be settled through metaphysical inquiry is the opposite of what 
Davidson claims. Gibb does not elaborate why a theory of meaning could not settle 
ontological issues, and she does not explain how a “metaphysical inquiry” should proceed.625 
Although the kind of criticism raised here is unfair insofar as the critic does not explain why a 
theory of meaning could not settle ontological issues, it is at the same time clear that 
Davidson’s analysis of mental properties is not an answer to the question of whether mental 
properties are the properties of the brain – which in the end is the way how the problem of 
mental properties is usually formulated. The substantive question in the contemporary 
philosophy of mind is that of whether consciousness is reducible to neural processes, and 
Davidson’s view cannot help to answer this question. Of course, whether this should be the 
substantive question is one of the most pressing issues defining the gulf between non-
reductive and reductive physicalists. Davidson and von Wright may be correct in their view 
that the question which Kim proposes is not philosophically substantive. On the other hand, if 
one thinks that the question about the actual reducibility of consciousness is philosophically 
interesting then one is apt to be dissatisfied with Davidson’s tendency to ignore the 
metaphysical problem.   
If Davidson’s view is seen as an answer to the question of what the relation between 
the mental properties and the physical properties of the brain is, then the relevant consequence 
is negative: mental properties are not properties of the brain. In the context of O-physicalism, 
this sounds counter-intuitive. Twisting Davidson’s words a little, he can be interpreted as 
saying that when we solve the epistemological problems about the mind, we will lose interest 
                                               
623 Incidentally, From an Ontological Point of View is the title of Heil, 2003, which considers the fundamental 
questions of what there is. Again, this way to consider what there is differs crucially from Quine’s view, shared 
by Davidson, of how to settle the question of “What there is”.  
624 A  somewhat  similar  kind  of  unfair  treatment  can  be  found  in  Antony,  1989,  in  which  it  is  surprisingly  
claimed that the view which Davidson should hold is the kind of view suggested by Fodor. 
625 The explanation of metaphysical inquiry is vague: “[a] consideration of whether [ontological categories] 
could exist (and thus their existence and identity conditions), whether they play a nonredundant role in one’s 
ontological system, and whether they can co-exist with the other ontological categories that one includes within 
this ontological system.” (Gibb, 2006, 420.) 
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in the supposed ontological problems about the mind as well.626 If the problems concerning 
the ways that mental predicates are attributed are solved, there do not remain any interesting 
ontological problems any longer. Given Davidson’s understanding of ontological and 
conceptual problems and the connection between them, this sounds like an acceptable 
strategy. However, it is not clear how well the strategy works when it is ontological problems 
that one wants to study. Why believe that the interest in “supposed” ontological problems will 
be lost? What does it even mean to say that we would lose interest in the “supposed 
ontological problem”? Does it mean that, in a Wittgensteinian spirit, by solving the 
epistemological problem we would see the ontological problem as dispelled? Would we 
realize  that  there  was  no  ontological  problem  at  all?  A  brief  overview  of  the  topics  in  
contemporary philosophy of mind shows that ontological problems are at the forefront. This 
shows that many philosophers have not lost interest in them. It could be argued that those who 
still have an interest in such ontological problem(s) have not realized the consequences of 
Davidson’s views for the philosophy of mind. This is what has been said about Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy: certain problems keep tormenting contemporary thinkers because the lessons of 
Wittgenstein have not been taken seriously. We can recall Rorty’s comparison: “Many who 
have no use for Wittgenstein have none for Davidson, and for the same reason: to adopt the 
views of either would be to dissolve problems which they have spent the best years of their 
lives trying to solve.”627   
Rorty’s observation notwithstanding, I believe we should tentatively join those who 
think that there are some interesting questions about the mind which are related to a 
physicalistic ontology, such as what kind of a brain a brain “with” a mind is, and what it is 
about brains as physical things which makes them “brains with minds”. There are brains with 
minds and brains without them, and this applies also to human cases also. We are willing to 
say that a person in a vegetative state is “mindless” although she has a brain.628 As far as we 
know, mental events are lacking from the head of a person who is (“properly”) in a vegetative 
state. Although our main evidence for this would be the behavior of the person in question, it 
is plausible to think that the physical condition of her brain has something to do with the fact 
that mental events have disappeared. If we suppose that O-physicalism is true, we should in 
                                               
626 Perhaps this really is what Davidson thinks in a quite strong sense. As he (1999, 654) says: “Beliefs, desires 
and intentions belong to no ontology….” If this view is taken literally, there is no ontological problem about 
beliefs, desires etc. But does a thing which belongs to no ontology exist? Isn’t something which belongs to no 
ontology a candidate for elimination? 
627 Rorty, 2005. Reference is to an electronic review for which page numbers cannot be given. 
628 Very young children and babies, certain mentally handicapped persons, certain psychotic people and some 
Alzheimer’s patients (among others) would be borderline cases. They all have brains but who has a mind? 
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fact say that the condition of her brain has everything to  do  with  the  fact  that  mental  
phenomena have disappeared from her brain, and from this perspective the state of her brain 
would be “conclusive evidence” for the conclusion that her mental life has ceased. Isn’t the 
difference in mental capacities between a “normal” person and a person in a vegetative state 
an ontological difference,  a difference which depends of the intrinsic physical properties of 
their respective brains? In the context of O-physicalism this claim sounds self-evident. As 
long as O-physicalism is accepted, we should have an interest in the ontological problem, or 
at least admit that it is still an unsolved part of the mind–body problem. On the one hand, I 
believe that a robustly metaphysical approach is mistaken and neglects Wittgenstein’s 
insights. On the other hand, it seems to me that a philosopher who accepts O-physicalism 
cannot brush aside all the problems which are related to a monistic, physicalistic ontology.  
With respect to Davidson’s position, one should therefore agree with Kim when he 
argues that “it is important to appreciate some robustly metaphysical versions of Davidson’s 
many central doctrines.”629 One should agree with this view because there are interesting 
questions about the mind which are “metaphysical”, and one is interested in knowing how 
Davidson’s approach particularly, and non-reductive physicalism generally, faces them. The 
kinds of questions which one wants to ask if one is robustly metaphysical are dismissed if the 
discussion is taking part only at the level of predicates. Now, it is quite certain that Davidson 
would indeed have dismissed these kinds of ontological questions. This kind of attitude is a 
central  lesson  of  AM.  It  says:  Do not  look  at  the  mental  through the  lens  of  a  physicalistic  
ontology, and do not think that you can, without confusion, ask in physical terms ontological 
questions about mental states. Events are mental only as described, so they do not have a “life 
of their own”, i.e. detached from the interpretative practices on the basis of which they are 
being attributed. Enough about ontology has been said when we have shown, through 
Davidson’s argument, that mental phenomena are token-identical with physical phenomena. 
If the argument structure which leads to token-identity is accepted, further philosophical 
discussion or philosophical speculation about the physical aspect of mental phenomena 
should stop. This I take to be the central point that von Wright is also trying to make. 
                                               
629 Kim, 2003, 135. When discussing Gibb’s criticism I noted that this is a somewhat unfair reading of 
Davidson’s position. But my purpose is to find out whether Davidson’s view can cope with problems that many 
contemporary philosophers see essential and also in this sense to defend Davidson’s view. This being the case, 
Gibb’s claim that Davidson cannot be criticized from a perspective which he would reject at the outset, while 
somewhat correct, neglects the most important part of this kind of criticism. The issue is, of course, to find out 
whether Davidson’s position is tenable and the critics try to ascertain that by considering how the position copes 
with respect certain important problems of the mind.  
211 
 
This view goes, or can at least be interpreted as going, strongly against the idea that 
empirical research, the study of the brain, could tell us something fundamentally important 
about the connection between the mental and the physical. Although this is a philosophically 
interesting view, I believe that in order to remain interesting it should be strong enough to 
stand against the views of those who think that these questions are, by and large, empirical. 
Certain questions about the mind are metaphysical and trouble philosophers. I do not think 
that Davidson has completely succeeded in his attempt to just sideline these questions. One 
can try to ask interesting “ontological” questions about the mind while maintaining the central 
insights that Davidson offers about the nature of our mental vocabulary.630 However, it surely 
would be a merit of Davidson’s, as well as of von Wright’s philosophy, and an important 
consequence if it turned out to be the case that these ontological questions are indeed 
confused and should be dismissed. This possibility has to be kept open. I admit that in 
suggesting that one can try to ask interesting ontological questions about the mind, I may be 
falling precisely into the trap warned about by Wittgenstein: my suggestion may reflect the 
desire to ask and answer questions in the same way that science does. Von Wright warned of 
the “jungle of metaphysics” in which a philosopher may lose himself if he participates in a 
philosophic culture gone scientistic. But it is extremely difficult to reject all metaphysical 
questions about the mind. Why? Perhaps because we have a firm, although perhaps distorted, 
view of how philosophical problems should be solved. As I noted in section 1.3, both 
Davidson and von Wright participate in empirical speculations from time to time and – by 
doing this – are not always true to their conception of philosophy. This shows how difficult in 
the contemporary philosophy of mind it is to follow certain insights of Wittgenstein.  
 One interesting and obviously a robustly metaphysical question is: Are there mental 
properties? If the answer is affirmative, can these properties be understood as being physical 
properties? In section 2.3.1 I have suggested that mental properties are real, but it was also 
noted that a model of mental properties that is formulated by using a physical property as a 
paradigmatic example of a property is confusing. The assumed starting point was a common-
sense understanding of mental properties, which shows itself at the level of ordinary talk. But 
are these properties physical properties? An affirmative answer to this question is not in any 
sense a result of common-sense reasoning, but is based on the acceptance of a scientific 
picture of the world according to which there is nothing else besides physical particulars and 
properties.  
                                               
630 For Davidson our mental vocabulary is, of course, what captures the nature and complete essence of the 
mental. 
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 But are we led astray by language when considering this question? This would be one 
way to see the debate that has emerged between reductive and non-reductive physicalists. Is 
the relation between mental and physical properties similar to the relation between higher 
level physical properties and lower level physical entities? Does it make sense to say that 
someone’s mental state of “being jealous” is constituted of physical entities like atoms 
arranged in a certain way in his brain? If not, the physicalistic understanding of the term 
“property” confuses us when the same term is used in discussions about mental phenomena. 
When it is said that a person has such and such mental properties, should we understand the 
term “property” differently than when it is said that a brick has the property of weighing one 
kilogram? Those who formulate the problem of mental properties as a problem of how these 
properties are related to physical properties may be wrong in their assumption that the term 
“property” can be understood in the same way when talking about mental and physical 
properties. Perhaps we can conclude that mental properties exist, but that they cannot be 
understood in terms of physical properties because they are two different kinds of “things”, 
even though the same term is applied to both. The reason why the same term is used in both 
cases is that there are similarities between mental and physical properties. This is, again, one 
of the lessons that can be learned from Wittgenstein. 
 If it is accepted that mental properties are physical properties, then it has to be the 
case that just as water’s liquidity is explained in terms of its molecular structure, a person’s 
being jealous could likewise be explained, for example, as his nervous system being in a 
certain  physical  state  P  and  ultimately  as  being  a  certain  formation  of  microscopic  physical  
entities. Then we could use a microscope where this formation could be seen and assert: “This 
formation of subatomic particles is the jealousy of Donald.” I think we can at least vaguely 
understand what this statement means.631 A constellation of subatomic particles, a certain 
space-time location, would thus literally be a certain mental property. This constellation is, in 
turn, without doubt a physical property of an object. Recently neuroscientists have claimed 
that  a  certain  parts  of  the  brain  correspond to  the  locations  of  certain  mental  functions;  the  
claim that a specific part of the brain is a thought does not sound nonsensical to many 
scientists.  We  can  claim  that  an  object,  Donald  that  did  not  exhibit  a  specific  concrete  
constellation would lack one property that another object, Georg, that did exhibit it, would 
have. The constellation, being an objective physical property, would be something which 
could exist in different individuals at different times if the materials for the formation of the 
                                               
631 Putnam (1999) claims that this would not make sense. Malcolm shares this view. 
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constellation were present. If mental properties like “believing that water is wet” or “being in 
pain” are only a matter of an individual’s brain being in a certain state, then there is no 
principled reason why these properties could not be shared between different individuals. We 
can imagine that Donald thinks “water is wet”, and that this mental property of his is identical 
with a certain physical property P of his brain. Georg could have the very same property P, 
because the existence of P is just a matter of certain physical particles existing in a certain 
kind of combination in his brain. The existence of these combinations occurring in different 
places at different times is possible. We have seen that the argument for the multiple 
realizability of mental states or the argument for the anomalism of the mental do not show 
that this kind of view about the relationship between mental and physical properties is 
impossible or even implausible. 
Is this merely a version of the type–type identity theory, or is the term “property” 
being used here in a looser way? If the latter is the case, then the claim seems to agree instead 
with the token-identity thesis; the specific belief “water is wet” at time t is identical with some 
physical  phenomenon  (be  it  a  state,  entity,  or  process).  It  is  possible  to  say  that  at  time  t  
Donald has the property of believing “water is wet” that Georg lacks, and Donald has this 
property because at time t his body has a certain physical property P. But this way of using 
the term “property” is not the way that it is understood in the argument for type–type identity 
theory. Although this way of thinking about properties is not consistent with the sense of the 
type–type identity theory, it is nevertheless something stronger than the view that properties 
are epiphrastic. The reason for using the term “property” in a somewhat metaphysical sense 
(whether or not it here corresponds to the philosopher’s standard use of the term) is to 
question whether or not one should think of properties in an epiphrastic sense and think of 
properties as abstract objects. But can this talk about properties be understood also in the 
sense in which the term is understood in the argument for the type–type identity theory? It 
can, for it has not been shown that a mental property M could not be type-identical with a 
physical property P.  
The problem for a Davidsonian is that since a type–type reduction is a priori ruled 
out, it can never be shown that a mental property M is identical with a physical property P. 
But the identity of M and P could be the case even if the possibility of establishing this is 
forever prevented. Epistemological irreducibility does not prevent the possibility of at least 
theoretical ontological reducibility, although it may prevent the possibility of establishing 
ontological identity. If actual type–type reducibility is impossible to achieve, then there is no 
rationale for insisting that a mental property M is identical with a physical property P; yet it is 
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still possible to claim that the property M is identical with some physical property P1…Pn. To 
me, this seems to be something which an O-physicalist has to accept.  
 Nick Zangwill has proposed a view which could look promising for a non-reductive 
physicalist. He claims that the position is something that a Davidsonian could accept. 
Zangwill writes:  
 
The real Davidson identified mental and physical events. But a Davidsonian might talk in terms of 
mental and physical states of affairs. A state of affairs is a structured entity consisting of an object or 
event which possesses a property at a time. Such states of affairs are particulars. We might then identify 
someone’s having a certain mental property at a time with his having a certain physical property at that 
time, as one might identify a mechanism’s being unlocked at a time with all its slots being lined up at 
that time. Or some might prefer it if we say that someone’s having a certain mental property at a time is 
constituted by his having a certain physical property at that time, much as a mechanism’s being 
unlocked at a time is constituted by all its slots being lined up at that time.632 
 
Although it is unclear what “a Davidsonian” can tolerate in his metaphysics, it can be argued 
that replacing events with states of affairs, which are understood as particulars, does not 
affect  Davidson’s  arguments  in  favor  of  the  irreducibility  of  the  mental,  which  I  see  as  the  
most interesting and important part of his philosophy of mind. From Davidson’s perspective 
the essential question is that of the usefulness of one sort of entity (e.g. states of affairs) over 
another sort of entity (e.g. events) in interpreting sentences that seem to be, for example about 
events. We must remember that Davidson’s “ontological scruples” are only a result of his 
suspicion  that  certain  entities  turn  out  to  be  “irrelevant”  for  explanatory  purposes.  But,  
semantic reasons aside, there seems to be no major difficulty for a Davidsonian in accepting 
the kind of view suggested by Zangwill. A Davidsonian could never show that Zangwill’s 
position is correct, but he could accept that this is how things nevertheless are.633 One could 
hold a view about the nature of reality while insisting that it is not possible to show this view 
to be true.  A Davidsonian could accept  the  claim  that  mental  properties  are  physical  
properties; yet he would have to insist that this cannot be shown. This would render the status 
of the claim that mental properties are physical properties quite empty, but it would be in 
harmony with the view that all phenomena are strictly determined and predictable. Every 
mental property would be identical with some physical property, never mind which one. 
 Because this work is not a study in metaphysics, the question about the actual physical 
mode of properties being mental must be left open. It seems that a notable part of the 
contemporary discussion concerning the problem of mental causation or the coherence of 
                                               
632 Zangwill, 1996, 72. 
633 Such a Davidsonian would have to be somewhat more metaphysical or naturalistic than Davidson himself, 
perhaps carrying on the kind of metaphysical inquiry suggested, for example, by Gibb. 
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non-reductive physicalism ignores the deep metaphysical questions about the nature of 
properties. But, or so I believe, philosophers should make clear what they are saying when 
they  talk  about  mental  properties.  They  should  engage  more  fully  in  the  clarification  of  
conceptual intuitions, to use von Wright’s expression. I would like to suggest very tentatively 
that together with Zangwill’s proposal, one could consider the trope-theoretic view of 
properties as a solution to the question of whether mental properties are physical properties, or 
better  still,  to  the  question  of  how best to understand the relation between these properties. 
Does a suggestion that mental properties are physical properties imply that the properties are 
identical? A claim that a mental property M is a physical property P seems to imply that they 
are in fact the same property. But does this make sense? Is Donald’s believing that “Water is 
wet” identical to the brain state in which he is at time t? This view would seem to face serious 
problems.634 But consider the suggestion by John Heil:  
 
Soup  is  liquid  in  virtue  of  its  possession  of  a  certain  molecular  structure.  We  can  also  speak  of  the  
soup’s liquidity being realized in or by its molecular structure. The relation here is not a relation 
between types – properties or characteristics – but between instances or exemplifications of properties 
or characteristics, between the soup’s liquidity and a particular dynamic distribution of its molecular 
constituents. If this particular arrangement of molecules realizes the soup’s liquidity, then the soup’s 
being liquid is, I shall say, constituted by its molecular structure.635   
 
In  this  work  I  do  not  want  to  try  to  defend  the  kind  of  view  that  Heil  proposes.  I  want  to  
suggest, nevertheless, that one can think of the relation between mental and physical 
properties in terms of constitution or realization instead of identity. We do not have to 
consider the plausibility of this view, since for the purposes at hand it is enough to recognize 
that this kind of position is open to a non-reductive physicalist who accepts O-physicalism. 
As an ontological solution, a non-reductive physicalist could accept perhaps even the kind of 
realization physicalism proposed, for example, by Andrew Melnyk.636 At the same time, it 
needs to be recognized that the physical constitution or realization of mental phenomena must 
be understood somewhat metaphorically, as being simply a form of speech that relieves 
physicalistic anguish. It is difficult to make sense of a view according to which an individual 
thought (whatever that might be) is constituted of molecules.637 
 I believe that a Davidsonian could be more robustly metaphysical than Davidson 
himself was. I think that Davidson himself could have accepted a more metaphysical view if it 
had not been for his other reasons for being suspicious about properties. A discussion about 
                                               
634 These problems will be considered in section 2.4 and 2.4.3. 
635 Heil, 1992, 136-137. See also Heil and Robb, 2003. 
636 Melnyk, 2003. 
637 We come back to this problem in section 2.4.4. 
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the physical realization or constitution of mental properties  would  of  course  be  overtly  
metaphysical from Davidson’s actual philosophical perspective. The kind of metaphysical 
inquiry in which, for example, trope-theorists are engaged seems utterly wrongheaded from a 
Wittgensteinian point of view. Whereas there are good reasons to share Wittgenstein’s 
skepticism towards this kind of enquiry, it should nevertheless be emphasized that a non-
reductive physicalist with a non-Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy could explore 
different ontological options in order to answer the charge of incoherence put forward by 
reductive physicalists. It could be argued Davidson’s use of the concept of supervenience 
opens up the possibility for the interpretation that one way in which Davidson could have had 
discussed the relation between physical and mental properties is in terms of the former 
determining or constituting the latter. In section 4.1.1, Davidson’s understanding of 
supervenience will be considered in greater detail. Here I want to point out that statements 
like the following give the impression that the relation between mental and physical properties 
could be something along the lines that Zangwill and Heil, among others, have suggested.638 
When Davidson first introduced the term supervenience he claimed:  
 
Although the position I describe denies there are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that 
mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such 
supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but 
differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering 
in some physical respect.639 
 
He claims also: 
 
Although… psychological characteristics cannot be reduced to the other, nevertheless they may be (and 
I think are) strongly dependent on them. Indeed, there is a sense in which physical characteristics of an 
event (or object or state) determine the psychological characteristics…640 
 
These are examples of passages where Davidson uses the term “characteristic” or “respect” 
unproblematically. It is also important to see that Davidson talks about the strong dependence 
of mental on the physical, and of the latter determining the  former.  I  would  say  that  
dependence or determination, as notions, are as ontological as the constitution used by 
Zangwill and Heil. Although supervenience does not imply that the same physical properties 
change with the same mental properties, supervenience does not prevent this possibility 
either. Kim, for example, has claimed that supervenience is best understood as being a 
                                               
638 For a discussion of determination and constitution of the mental by the physical see Polger, 2004 and Melnyk, 
2003. 
639 Davidson, 1970, 214, my emphasis. 
640 Davidson, 1974b, 253. 
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reductive relation. When the concept was introduced by Davidson it was meant to describe a 
relation of dependency. Davidson writes, for example: “The property of being good is 
supervenient on physical properties in [the] sense that goodness wholly depends upon the 
physical properties.”641 How to understand this, given Davidson’s view of properties? It could 
be  understood  either  as  saying  that  the  application  of  mental predicates depends on the 
physical properties of the object to which these predicates are attributed, or that the 
application of mental predicates depends on what physical predicates can be attributed to an 
object. According to the epiphrastic reading, Davidson would probably not make a distinction 
between these formulations. It is unfortunate that Davidson, because of his somewhat obscure 
reasons, did not discuss the different ways in which one could be a realist about properties. A 
trope-theoretic approach is perhaps something which Davidson could have had accepted. If 
we are more realistic about properties than Davidson, we can say that goodness, or any 
higher-level property, depends on the physical properties of  an  object  in  a  sense  somewhat 
similar to that in which the soup’s liquidity depends on its molecular structure, or in a sense 
somewhat similar to that in which an unlocked mechanism is constituted by all its slots being 
lined up. I say “somewhat similar” since there is no reason to believe that goodness could be 
defined in terms of physical properties or that one could nomologically relate goodness to 
physical properties. From this it does not follow that goodness is a non-physical property in 
any interesting sense. As Davidson himself notes: “The definition of supervenience implies 
that a change in mental properties is always accompanied by a change in physical 
properties....”642 It needs to be recognized that the talk about constitution cannot be taken 
literally, but I believe it is a good enough metaphor to make mental properties 
physicalistically respectable. 
What  can  be  said  of  the  position  of  von  Wright?  He did  not  really  participate  in  the  
contemporary debate about the nature and status of mental properties and did not clearly 
express his general views about the nature of properties. Von Wright does note that the 
mistake of nominalism is to identify the meaning of a word with the reference of the word.643 
In an unpublished manuscript von Wright nevertheless considered the question of how the 
claim about the identity of properties could be understood and made few interesting 
remarks.644 His  general  view  was  that  the  temptation  to  identify  mental  properties  with  
                                               
641 Davidson, 1964, 47, my emphasis. 
642 Davidson, 1993d, 187.  
643 Von Wright, 1998a. 
644 A modification of the manuscript von Wright, UPg, was later published as von Wright, 1988. Interestingly the 
discussion in the manuscript about mental properties was left out from the published paper. 
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physical properties, or more broadly, mental phenomena with physical phenomena, must be 
due to our inability to understand the ontological status of the mental in a correct way. 
Considerations of this question lead us astray by presenting misleading pictures. Von Wright 
thinks that is misleading or false to see consciousness as a specific phenomenon. Our 
examples of mental phenomena are usually 
 
[…] things such as ‘being in pain’ or ‘having an optical after-image’. Or one speaks abstractly about 
‘states of consciousness’ as though this most obscure term had a clear meaning…The confusion seems 
to have its source in an oversimplified, one could perhaps call it ‘animistic’ or ‘primitive’ view of the 
mental, encouraged by such locutions in our language as talk of ‘mental events’, ‘thought processes’, or 
‘states of consciousness’ which are analogical modes of speech modeled on phenomena in the world 
around us.645 
 
This was stressed by Wittgenstein when he warned that the temptation to substantilize the 
mind should be resisted. The tendency to model our understanding of mental properties in 
terms of physical properties, or in terms which are first and foremost applicable to physical 
phenomena, is still strong.  
An identity claim often used as an example by philosophers is  that  of the identity of 
“water” and “H20”. Another example used by von Wright is the identity of brittleness and a 
certain microstructure. Von Wright claims that both examples of identities are problematic as 
exemplars of the mental–physical relation. He notes that in the water-case two identity claims 
can be distinguished. On the one hand, water is  stuff which is a chemical compound of two 
other stuffs. On the other hand, samples of water are aggregates of small bodies, molecules. 
For this second identity claim, it is not essential that the molecules happen to be composed of 
hydrogen and oxygen. Von Wright thinks that both identities are contingent. Water could 
have been something else than H20, and therefore samples of water could have been 
something else than compounds of hydrogen and oxygen molecules. This identity cannot be 
used as an example of the mental–physical identity because there simply is no something 
which could be both a brain state and a mental state in the sense in which a bucket of liquid 
can be both water and a collection of H20 molecules.  
The assumed identity of brittleness and microstructure is problematic in a different 
way. The property of being brittle is a different property than that of having of a certain 
microstructure. They are two distinct properties of the same material object. However, there 
has to be a substance of which both brittleness and microstructure can be properties. But, 
again, in the mental–physical case, there is no substance besides the person which could be 
                                               
645 Von Wright, UPf, 16, 22. See also von Wright, Upg. 
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the bearer of both mental and physical properties. The brain cannot be such a substance 
because one cannot attribute mental properties to the brain. 
 I conclude that an O-physicalist has no alternative than to claim that mental properties 
are physical properties. For the moment, notwithstanding the views of Davidson, we can 
conclude that mental properties are physical properties and the relation between them is a 
relation of constitution or realization. This is a solution which a non-reductive physicalist 
does not have to reject. Let it be emphasized, though, that I fail to see how the acceptance of 
the identity of properties would imply a stronger commitment to physicalism than the 
acceptance that every individual state is physical. What I fail to see, supposing that one has a 
proper understanding of the nature of mental properties, is how the question about the 
physicality  of  mental  properties  differs  from  the  question  of  whether  a  specific  state  is  
physical or not. I fail to see this as long as it is supposed that no matter what our ontological 
views are, the irreducibility of the mental holds. 
 
2.4 A problem for non-reductive physicalism: Token identity 
 
It is unclear whether the problem of mental properties is a special problem for a non-reductive 
physicalist. What about the view which according to many captures the essence of non-
reductive physicalism, namely the view that every particular is a physical particular. I think 
that the most serious problem that can be raised for non-reductive physicalism is: why believe 
this? If the claim about the physicality of particulars cannot be defended, then the position is 
not a very interesting form of physicalism; it is physicalism strictly by name only. But it 
seems to me that this is not a problem just for non-reductive physicalism. It is a general 
problem for physicalism, because whatever the view about properties is, it is clear that a 
physicalistic world-view cannot tolerate a world with non-physical particulars.646 
The problem of whether token physicalism is true is a problem for non-reductivism 
and reductivism for different reasons. Let us suppose that it is being claimed that mental 
phenomena are physical phenomena and can be reduced to physical phenomena. Then two 
problems  occur.  First,  we  must  show  or  at  least  suggest  how  the  reduction  could  be  done;  
otherwise the claim is empty. Second, we must refute the philosophical arguments which 
purport to show that such a reduction is impossible in principle. Of course, quite trivially, if it 
could  be  shown  that,  or  more  correctly  how, mental phenomena reduce to physical 
                                               
646 Of course “substantial” non-physical properties, for example properties occurring outside space-time, cannot 
be tolerated either. 
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phenomena, we could thereby largely defuse the philosophical criticism that this cannot be 
done. Since these kinds of reductions are non-existent at this time, the criticism that such 
reductions are impossible is relevant. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that it is being 
claimed that mental phenomena are physical phenomena but cannot be reduced to physical 
phenomena. Then we encounter a different problem. If the claim is that token-reductions are 
impossible,  what  is  the  reason  to  believe  that  mental  phenomena  are token-identical to 
physical phenomena? We must have an argument which is meant to demonstrate that mental 
phenomena are physical phenomena, although this can never be shown empirically. The 
argument cannot be empirical in any clear sense. 
 The purpose of this section is to consider what the reasons to hold the token identity 
thesis are, what the thesis actually means and, supposing that the thesis is true, how plausible 
actual token reductions are. These questions will be considered, as elsewhere, primarily from 
the perspectives of Davidson and von Wright. 
  
2.4.1 A Davidsonian approach: Token identity between the mental and the physical 
 
The essential  claim of Davidson’s physicalism is that  every particular is  physical.  But what 
does the physicality of particulars mean, and why believe it? Davidson gives one reason to 
back up this claim, which is the cornerstone of his physicalism. It is the principle of the 
nomological character of causality (PNCC),647 which states that causally interacting events 
must fall under a strict law. This, together with the other premises of AM gives, according to 
Davidson, a straightforward demonstration of the identity in question. How this is supposed to 
work was described in section 2.1.3. But in order to accept the demonstration, the truth of the 
premises  of  AM  must  be  accepted.  The  thesis  of  the  anomalism  of  the  mental  will  be  
thoroughly discussed and defended in later sections. But what about the crucial premise for 
monism, namely PNCC? Yalowitz is correct when he claims that it is a key argument for 
Davidson’s monism; yet as was noted in section 2.1.3, Anscombe and Van Gulick, among 
others, raise the objection that Davidson has not given good reasons to believe the thesis. I 
have concluded that Davidson’s argument, which is meant to back up the principle, is obscure 
and unconvincing. 
                                               
647 I will simply use ‘PNCC’ from now on. 
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Let us suppose for the sake of argument that one does not accept PNCC.648 This is an 
unfair interpretation of Davidson’s views, but let us accept it for the moment in order to test 
the coherence of a non-reductive view. What are the reasons to believe that every particular is 
physical if the principle is rejected? One would have a reason to believe this if one could show 
that each mental event is a physical event. 649 If it could be shown, on each and every 
occasion, that such and such mental event at time t is a certain physical event, there would be 
a reason to believe that mental events are physical events – at least until shown otherwise by a 
case, if such were to occur, where a correlation could not be shown. Token-identity would 
then be at least a well confirmed empirical hypothesis. A real correlation at time t between a 
mental event M and a physical event P would not, however, show that mental event M1 which 
would be “relevantly similar” to M at time t1 would correlate with P. The question about 
relevant similarity is obviously extremely complex: how to decide when temporally distinct 
mental  events  are  relevantly  similar?  Some  of  these  problems  we  encountered  when  
considering the nature of mental properties.  
The argument for physicalistic monism that can be derived from the premises of AM 
shows that the general claim that each mental event is identical with some physical event, but 
it does not say anything about particular or specific identities. How could particular identities 
be established? If PNCC is rejected, the question about particular identities is important also 
with respect to the question of whether mental events are physical events. One possible 
answer is that the only way to establish particular identities is to do science studying the 
brain. This strategy obviously depends on the assumption that mental states are brain states; 
they must be in the brain. Although this is the point that needs to be proven, we can accept the 
assumption for the sake of argument when considering whether identities could be 
established. That is, let us tentatively assume that mental states could be states of the brain. I 
believe an O-physicalist like Davidson or von Wright does not have convincing alternatives. 
The question now is whether this can be shown to be the case.  
Token physicalism is consistent with genuine property dualism, and therefore token 
physicalism could be seen as a version of very weak form of physicalism. It nevertheless 
captures the idea that there is only one substance and that substance is physical. As Davidson 
notes, the “[…] important philosophical and, indeed, metaphysical thesis to  which  we  are  
                                               
648 Pereboom and Kornblith (1990) for example, reject the Humean account of causation and thereby also the 
token-identity of mental and physical events, offering instead the idea that mental states are physically 
constituted but not token-identical to the token physical states that constitute them. 
649 Or whatever particular one wants to put here. 
222 
 
committed to is that mental events are identical with physical events”.650 It has not been 
shown that there could not be such “thing” as mental substance, but it has been shown, 
supposing that Davidson is right, that such substance could not interact with the physical 
substance and therefore it would be hard to become aware of its existence. It is clear that in 
the context of O-physicalism, ontological priority is given to the physical. One way to 
understand what this means is again in terms of supervenience. Davidson’s use of the terms 
“characteristic” and “determinination” in his discussions of supervenience has led some 
commentators to conclude that Davidsonian supervenience is:  
 
[…] an inter-level metaphysical determination-relation that renders mental properties materialistically 
respectable…. The idea is that a reasonable materialism need only claim that physical facts and 
properties are the ontically basic ones, the ones that fix or determine all the facts.651  
 
This description of Davidson’s position by Terence Horgan is similar to my interpretation, 
offered in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, which suggests that AM is a form of robust ontological 
physicalism. It also gives support to the view of the previous section, according to which the 
way in which Davidson formulates the idea of supervenience is compatible with the idea that 
mental properties are physical properties; as Horgan notes, Davidsonian supervenience 
renders mental properties materialistically respectable. I agree with this and suggest, as was 
discussed in the previous section, that the view could be developed even further in the 
direction of materialism. 
What is said about properties and supervenience applies also to supervenience and 
token-correlations. If the claim about supervenience is cashed out in substantial terms, it could 
be claimed that each mental entity must be made of physical entities. Notwithstanding the 
possibility of genuine emergence, this is one way to understand the claim that physical 
characteristics determine mental characteristics. This kind of compositional physicalism is 
one way to argue in favor of physicalism more generally. However Davidson’s relation to the 
claim that  mental  entities  are  composed  of,  but  not  identical  to  physical  entities,  is  unclear.  
Although Davidson usually rejects the talk of “mental entities”, he nevertheless uses this 
expression when he claims that mental entities (objects and events) are identical to physical 
entities. What mental objects are remains a mystery, and I think it is questionable whether, 
given Davidson’s other views, the very term mental entity is a clarifying one. Objects and 
events are paradigmatic examples of entities, and the individuation criterion for both is their 
                                               
650 Davidson, 1974b, 248, my emphases. 
651 Horgan, 1993, 565. 
223 
 
spatiotemporal location. Can mental entities be individuated in terms of this criterion? Let us 
for the moment ignore this question and conclude that the term mental entity is  best  
understood as being a loose manner of speaking.652 It can be noted that whereas in “Mental 
Events” Davidson was discussing, as the title shows, the status of mental events, in his later 
writings he was not unwilling to talk about mental entities. 
It seems to me that, given Davidson’s commitment to O-physicalism, we have reasons 
to think that mental entities are identical to physical entities in the sense of being composed of 
them. However, Davidson’s identity criterion for events is their identical spatiotemporal 
location, and it is not clear whether events generally can be analyzed into smaller components 
in any useful sense. In order to clarify Davidson’s identity-criterion, let us consider an event 
E. Since the problems that I want to raise are most obvious in the case of events that can be 
ascribed a mental description, we shall suppose that E is such an event.653 Let E be the event 
of Donald remembering where his keys are. A particular event E is now described in mental 
terms.  Let  us  refer  to  event  E  as  event  M,  since  it  now has  a  mental  description  and  this  is  
what  “makes”  it  mental.  Donald  is  aware  of  M in  the  sense  that  he  has  a  linguistic  thought  
“My keys  are  at  work”.  Perhaps  it  could  be  said  that  being  in  this  state  is  the  mental  event  
M.654 According to the thesis of token-identity, M is identical with some physical event P. Let 
us follow Davidson and reformulate the problem in terms of descriptions. Instead of asking 
when an event M is identical  with an event P,  we shall  ask when a sentence M = P is true.  
Davidson himself suggests that instead of asking the question of when are events identical, we 
should ask the general question of when a sentence of the form a = b, where “a” and “b” are 
supplanted by singular terms that refer to events, is true. He is thus looking for a general 
criterion of event-identity, and we already know what that is: events are identical if they 
occupy the same portion of space-time. Since we are interested in finding out whether 
particular token-identities can be established, we are asking the specific question when a 
sentence M = P is true.  
Let  us  formulate  the  question  in  the  following  way.  How  to  tell  whether  “Donald’s  
remembering where his keys are = activation of certain brain cells” is true? If Donald is aware 
of event E under description M, what are the reasons to think that description P (activation of 
certain brain cells)  applies to E? What reasons do we, or Donald,  have to believe that there 
exists  a  P  (a  spatiotemporal  physical  entity)  to  which  description  P  refers?  This  Donald  
                                               
652 The individuation criteria for mental entities will be discussed in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. 
653 Let us for the moment ignore the possibility that any event can be described as mental. 
654 Perhaps the correct way to state this would be to say that being in the state of thinking “my keys are at work” 
is a mental event M and Donald being aware of this thought would be another mental event M1.  
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certainly  cannot  know  through  introspection.  The  only  event  that  Donald  is  aware  of  is  M,  
which is a purely mental event, and of this event Donald can be aware through introspection. 
Putting neuroscientific speculations aside for the moment, what reasons do we have to believe 
that M is  a  spatiotemporal  entity?  It  certainly  does  not  seem to  be  such.  In  fairness  to  
Davidson, I have to emphasize that the kind of approach suggested here would not make 
sense from his point of view, since the problem of token-identity is resolved simply by 
accepting PNCC. If this thesis is accepted, the problem of individuation becomes a question 
of how language identifies and sorts out events. But the individuation criteria for M are 
certainly different than the criteria for P; yet both descriptions are thought to refer to a single 
event E. The proposal that the problem of individuation is a question of how language is used 
cannot be an answer to the question of whether M is the same event as P; it cannot solve the 
question  of  whether  descriptions  M  and  P  refer  to  the  same  event.  Can  we  answer  this 
question by saying that M and P are the same event if they occupy the same portion of space-
time? It can be argued that if M and P are the same event,  they occupy the same portion of 
space-time but, obviously, this criterion cannot be used if we want to know whether M and P 
are the same event. Suppose that M occurs “in” Donald and a neuroscientist observing a 
computer screen notices the occurrence of P. How to tell whether these seemingly distinct 
events are one and the same? With respect to this problematic question Davidson himself 
notes:  
 
[…] perspicuous forms of the identity theory of mind require that we identify mental events with certain 
physiological events… for such theories to be interesting, there must be ways of telling when statements 
of event-identity are true.655 
  
With the last sentence we can certainly agree. The criterion which Davidson first proposed for 
event identity was that events are identical if they have the same causes and effects. The 
inspiration for this criterion came precisely from a consideration of how brain events could be 
identified with mental occurrences. The suggestion was that what these events have in 
common is the sameness of their causes and effects. This criterion was later rejected by 
Davidson, although he seems to think that different ways to individuate events are possible 
and which one is chosen is, above else, a practical decision. But as the reference to identity 
theories shows, Davidson was concerned with the question of how to tell whether statements 
of event-identity are true. Let us now turn to the question of whether we can make sense of 
the  claim  that  a  specific  mental  event  is  a  physical  event,  and  whether  it  is  possible  to  
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establish actual correlations or identities between these events. I will first briefly present von 
Wright’s views and shall then return to Davidson’s views. 
 
2.4.2 A von Wrightian approach: Token-identity is a serious confusion 
 
In section 2.2, I showed that von Wright expresses his sympathy for a physicalistic world 
view because of demands of “scientific intelligibility”. This being the case, we could assume 
that von Wright would accept also the truth of token-identity. But whereas Davidson is trying 
to provide an argument for such identity, von Wright’s general view is that the idea of token-
identity is “a serious confusion”. In this sense Davidson’s contribution to physicalism is 
clearly more robust than von Wright’s, whose doubts about the coherence of the token-
identity thesis can be seen as doubts about the coherence of the very position of physicalism. 
 On the one hand, von Wright claims that the suggestion that each psychological 
phenomenon has a neural counterpart contains “ an important grain of possible truth….”656 
The claim is delicate; token identity may be part of a possible truth. On the other hand, von 
Wright thinks that the very idea of token-identity is exceedingly obscure, unintelligible or 
confused. The reasoning behind these claims is that the empirical evidence suggests, and 
therefore scientific intelligibility demands, a defense of the view that there is something 
physical corresponding to every mental phenomenon; yet the result is a conceptual confusion 
when the idea of neural counterparts, the idea of “parallelism”, is coupled with the view that 
this parallelism amounts to identity. 
 Von Wright’s reasons for arguing that the idea of mental–physical identity is, if not 
complete nonsense, at least a serious confusion, are influenced by Wittgenstein’s views. The 
essential point is that there are certain requirements that the referents of the terms in true 
identity-statements have to meet, and these requirements are not met and cannot be met in the 
case of mental–physical identity. There do not seem to be non-problematic and acceptable 
criteria of identity between mental and physical phenomena. The phenomena in question, 
although they are the same in some sense, are individuated so differently that the identity-
claim becomes absurd or false. It could be argued that since the identity of a phenomenon as 
such and such, for example as a mental phenomenon, depends on the way that it is 
individuated, the phenomena in question are so different that we cannot make sense of the 
claim that they are identical. Two major differences between mental and physical phenomena 
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are the difference in their spatial location and the difference in the way that these phenomena 
are epistemically available. 
These differences are closely related. A physical phenomenon, a brain state, exists in 
space. It can be observed, registered, and measured by an observer outside the brain. But a 
mental phenomenon, a feeling of pain or a belief that water is wet, is a “private property” of 
the person who has or experiences it. The fact that a brain state can be epistemically accessed 
from the outside whereas a mental phenomenon cannot be so accessed is one clear difference 
between them. This is so even though it is tempting to think that, in some sense, the 
phenomena in question are the same. Only the subject who is experiencing a mental 
phenomenon knows for sure whether the phenomenon exists at all: we feel that she is the final 
judge on the question of the existence of a mental phenomenon. This privacy of the mental 
must surely be taken seriously, because it is a clear feature which distinguishes these 
phenomena from physical ones. The problem of privacy does not occur in the case of a brain 
state. Anyone familiar with the relevant measuring technique can be certain that a specific 
brain  state  exists.  The  criteria  for  physical  phenomena  are  public  and  such  phenomena  can  
thus be intersubjectively observed. From the fact that a mental phenomenon is private and 
thus not objectively accessible or observable, von Wright concludes that it is best to say that a 
mental phenomenon does not exist in space, and therefore it is absurd to identify the mental 
phenomenon with a physical phenomenon. We should not say that a mental phenomenon 
exists in space because there is no way in which we could show this to be true. The claim that 
mental phenomena could be found from the brain is nonsense, does not mean anything at all. 
 Von Wright admits that  although this argument – which he considers to be the most 
important against the view that the relation between mental and physical phenomena is that of 
identity – must be taken seriously, it is also obscure and mystifying. Insisting on the 
identification of a mental phenomenon with a physical phenomenon would be to confuse 
things that have conceptually different natures. Whereas this sounds reasonable and the 
differences between mental and physical phenomena are real, the claim that mental 
phenomena  are  not  in  space  is  certainly  mystifying.  If  mental  phenomena  are  not  in  space,  
where are they? Should we conclude that the where-question itself is nonsense? I believe this 
conclusion  would  be  too  hasty,  since  we  can understand the question of where mental 
phenomena are and, this being the case, the question is not complete nonsense. If mental 
phenomena  were  really  not  in  space,  if  we  could  make  good sense  of  this claim or perhaps 
even prove or show that mental phenomena have no spatial location, the claim of identity 
would be false and von Wright’s position would not be a version of physicalism. But, as I 
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have shown, von Wright subscribes to physicalism and rejects any form of substance dualism. 
Therefore the claim that mental phenomena do not occur in space should not be understood as 
a claim according to which these phenomena occur in a non-spatial, soul-like medium.  
If we accept minimal O-physicalism, then we must accept that mental phenomena do 
not occur outside time and space. I think that what we should say, instead of claiming like von 
Wright that mental phenomena do not exist in space, is that the spatiality of mental 
phenomena is of a very different nature than the spatiality of physical phenomena. Both 
mental and physical phenomena are located in space, but a physical phenomenon has a 
specific location, which a mental phenomenon lacks. As I noted in section 2.3.1, an attempt to 
describe mental properties by modeling them in terms of physical properties leads easily to 
confusion. Likewise, to think of a mental phenomenon in terms of physical attributes, like 
spatiality, locality or extension, leads to a confusing picture because a mental phenomenon is 
not a thing-like entity. It cannot be intersubjectively observed and it does not have a clear 
spatio-temporal location, which means that the idea of its physical extension is nonsense. The 
lack of clear spatio-temporal location is true of many physical phenomena too, since a 
material object is a poor example of a physical phenomenon in general. But all physical 
phenomena are possible candidates for intersubjective observation. This is not the case with 
mental phenomena. The temptation to see mind as a thing-like entity, as a kind of object like 
the  brain  or  some  other  organ,  is  what  above  all  makes  us  ask  questions  about  mind’s  
location.  
 Malcolm, a close friend of von Wright’s, argued that the idea of mind–brain identity, 
the idea that mental phenomena are token-identical with physical phenomena, is nonsense. It 
is somewhat surprising that von Wright does not mention Malcolm as an influence.657 Perhaps 
the most obvious reason for this is that Wittgenstein was an influence for both. Malcolm 
emphasizes that whereas a brain process occurs at a certain time in a certain location, we do 
not understand at all what the bodily location of a thought would mean.658 He claims: “I do 
not know what it means to say that a sudden thought is a brain process. In saying this I imply, 
of course, that the proponents of this view also do not know what it means.”659 Malcolm was 
challenging Smart’s position (who claimed that the identity thesis is an empirical hypothesis). 
Malcolm admitted that the accusation of Smart not knowing what he was talking about could 
                                               
657 Von Wright does mention that Stoutland and Malcolm were his most active discussion partners after he got 
interested in the philosophy of mind in the 1980s. It is plausible to think that these philosophers influenced each 
other reciprocally. 
658 Putnam has more recently defended this kind of view. 
659 Malcolm, 1964, 171-172. 
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of course turn out to be false if Smart were, to Malcolm’s “surprise and gratification”, to 
explain his view. The fact that non-reductive physicalism is still a live position shows that 
such an explanation has not been given. This, that we cannot understand the meaning of 
identity claim, is what also von Wright says, but Malcolm made the point much earlier.660 
Von Wright notes that he agrees with Malcolm about the unintelligibility of the view that 
mental phenomena are identical to physical phenomena, but concludes that they could never 
reach a complete agreement about these matters.661   
Malcolm claims that the bodily location of thought could have meaning only if we 
gave it a meaning by dramatically readjusting our language. We could adopt a new way of 
speaking, a new convention, according to which it would be perfectly natural to speak of the 
exact locations of thoughts. This could happen, but the new way of speaking would have to be 
justified somehow. Empirical evidence showing that thoughts could be arranged in specific 
location would be one good way to justify the new way of speaking. But as things currently 
are, the identity-claim is a claim without meaning. We often speak as if the  location  of  
thoughts would make sense, but on reflection it becomes obvious that this kind of talk leads to 
problems. Von Wright claims: “There simply is no ‘something’ which could conceivably be 
both a ‘brain state’ and a ‘mental state’….”662 Could we in the future find something which 
could be understood as being both a brain state and a mental state? Von Wright seems to think 
that this cannot happen, because there is no “substrate” the traits (properties) of which the 
mental  state  and  a  brain  state  could  be.  Mental  states  are  traits  of  a  person,  brain  states  are  
traits of the brain. But persons are not brains and brains are not persons. It seems to me that a 
person could qualify as the bearer of both mental and physical traits. But this says nothing 
about the identity of mental and physical phenomena; it merely shows that a person is a 
psycho-physical being. 
How do these worries relate to Davidson’s position? He has suggested that events are 
identical if they have the same space-time location. It seems to me that this criterion cannot 
work for of the reason that von Wright and Malcolm state, namely that mental events have no 
extension in the sense that physical events have. How could we tell or show whether a mental 
event without a clear extension is or is not identical with a physical event, which presumably 
has a clear measurable extension? As I noted in section 2.4.1, what Davidson can say is that 
two events are identical if they have the same space-time location, but this criterion does not 
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answer  the  question  of  whether a specific mental event M (which a subject privately 
experiences) is identical with a specific physical event P (which an outsider observes). 
Davidson has no acceptable suggestion about how to answer the question of whether two 
events are identical or not. This has the unfortunate consequence that the identity-claim must 
be accepted, while accepting that we may never be in a position where the identities could 
actually be established. What we have to acknowledge, however, is that the problem of the 
identity-claim is not especially interesting from Davidson’s perspective, since from this 
perspective the truth of monism is already established. All events are physical, all physical 
events have a space-time location, and therefore also every mental event has a space-time 
location. But how does this reasoning fare against the von Wrightian claim according to 
which the spatiality of mental events is nonsense? It cannot answer this challenge. 
 
2.4.3 Token reducibility 
 
We have seen two different non-reductive approaches to the problem of token-identity. 
Davidson tries to defend the token-identity thesis and attempts to provide an acceptable 
criterion for event identity – whereas von Wright, while partly agreeing with Davidson, 
suggests that the idea of identity in this context is confusing. An interesting question arises: 
how should the possibility of actual token reducibility be seen from these perspectives? We 
know, for example, that a brain-tumor is a physical object which can be found from the brain. 
We know that a stroke is a physical event which can be observed occurring in the brain. 
Under the assumption that O-physicalism is true, mental phenomena are considered to be 
physical phenomena inside the brain. But can tokens of mental phenomena be actually found 
from the brain in a similar way as a brain tumor can?  Is it  possible to literally show that a 
certain  brain  state,  a  physical  event,  corresponds  to  a  mental  phenomenon?  If  a  comparison  
between a belief and a brain tumor or between believing and stroke sounds odd, why is this 
so? They are all physical things – at least, so an O-physicalist would claim. 
The question of the physical nature of mental phenomena can be approached from a 
philosophical (conceptual) perspective as Davidson and von Wright do, or from a scientific 
(empirical) perspective like many current philosophers and scientists studying the brain do. 
These perspectives are foreign to each other. Perhaps the main reason for this is the “crisis of 
philosophy” discussed in chapter one – the fact that the role of philosophy is becoming 
increasingly blurred as science keeps revealing new facts about reality. The obscure role of 
philosophy is especially evident in the philosophy of mind, where an important question – for 
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philosophy – is whether the problems are empirical or whether they can be solved through 
conceptual analysis. The question addressed in this section is that of what contributions a 
philosopher can make to the discussion concerning the possibility of actual token-reducibility, 
and more specifically, that of what Davidson’s and von Wright’s contributions to this 
discussion are. What is the attitude of a non-reductive physicalist towards token-reductionism 
and how does this attitude affect, if it does, the coherence of the position of non-reductive 
physicalism? The focus will be on Davidson’s views since von Wright’s skepticism about the 
idea of token-identity does not leave many reasons for him to think that mental phenomena 
could actually be reduced to physical phenomena. The views of Davidson and von Wright do 
not really clarify the empirical issues related to the problems of token-reduction, but their 
analysis of the relevant concepts is an important philosophical contribution.  
  The question about token reducibility is a question which is interesting from the 
perspectives of the various sciences studying the brain. In addition to its philosophical 
importance, it has consequences for the question of the extent to which the mind–body 
problem can be studied empirically and in an interdisciplinary fashion. The desire or need to 
establish mental–physical correlations is increasing as our understanding about the 
functioning of the brain increases. The problem of consciousness, a deep philosophical 
problem, suddenly seems to be a problem which can be solved empirically. Neuroscientists 
are making claims which would have sounded like science fiction just a few decades ago.  
Philosophy of mind is being integrated into cognitive science and the neurosciences. Non-
empirical philosophical claims about the prospects or pitfalls of token-reducibility are facing 
empirical challenges to an increasing extent. There is clear empirical pressure on the kind of 
philosophy of mind which Davidson, von Wright, and other classical philosophers are doing. I 
think  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  more  we  pay  attention  to  the  results  of  modern  
neuroscience, the more implausible certain parts of Davidson’s and von Wright’s views start 
looking. Perhaps certain aspects of their positions cannot simply be defended any longer; but 
even if  this is  the conclusion, I  nevertheless try to clarify what kind of views they hold and 
why they hold them. 
 Many have interpreted Davidson’s view as suggesting that actual identities between 
particular mental and physical events could be established, that identities could be 
conceptually proved or empirically shown, and that it could be explained how or why a 
certain mental event is in fact a physical event (or how the causation between mental and the 
physical works). There is degree of vagueness involved in using expressions like “how”, and 
especially “why”, a mental event is a physical event. But we can nevertheless ask: why is the 
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neural basis of a given mental phenomenon the neural basis of that phenomenon rather than 
another? It is known, for example, how the heart circulates blood and how (though less 
clearly) a pain-killer reduces pain; the physical mechanisms are known. Can the alleged 
physical mechanisms “behind” mental phenomena explained likewise? An affirmative answer 
to this question would open the way for an empirical study of the mind through the study of 
the brain. If Davidson is suggesting that an affirmative answer can be given, this would place 
him firmly among those physicalistic philosophers who argue that the talk about mental 
phenomena can be replaced by talk that refers solely to physical phenomena. This would 
undermine Davidson’s position as a non-reductive physicalist, although it still would not 
imply that Davidson would accept type–type identity between the mental and the physical.  
The interpretation that Davidson is not denying the possibility of actual reductions is 
justified, given that in “The Material Mind” Davidson claims: “[…] psychological events are 
describable, taken one by one, in physical terms…”, and that “[...] for any particular, dated 
psychological event we can give a description in purely physical terms….”663 Perhaps the 
modal status of “can” in this expression should be analyzed more carefully, but one way to 
understand it is to conclude that in Davidson’s opinion, physical descriptions of mental events 
are possible in the sense that there is no reason to doubt that a science studying the brain 
could not give a physical description of a mental event. But in order to give a physical 
description of a mental event, one would have to know which physical event the mental event 
in question is. How else could a specific mental event M be described as being a particular 
physical event P? 
Davidson does not propose to explain how a particular mental event could be 
identified with a particular physical event, nor does he propose to explain how a description 
of mental events in physical terms could actually be given. But he insists that there has to be a 
physical description of any particular mental event. This must be the case, given physicalistic 
monism. Davidson makes a strong statement when he notes: “Particular mental events can be 
explained by physical science when we know particular identities.”664 This is a move towards 
a view that mental facts can be explained in terms of physical ones, i.e. it is essentially a 
reductive view. Whereas many philosophers, not to mention scientists studying the brain 
would be happy to endorse this, it is not clear how well this view fits with Davidson’s overall 
non-reductive position. But the claim that particular mental events can be explained by 
physical science if their identities are known raises the question: how are we able to know, or 
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establish, these particular identities? How to tell whether a particular identity has been found? 
Without an answer to this question, the claim that mental events can be explained in a 
physical vocabulary, “by physical science”, is an empty prediction. Davidson himself seems 
to be ambivalent about the question of whether the establishment of identity is possible. On 
the one hand, he seems to think that empirical findings about the workings of the brain must 
be taken into consideration when philosophizing about the mind, but on the other hand he 
seems to put certain, quite strict, limitations on what science can reveal about the mind–body 
problem. I think this shows that in one sense Davidson’s position is anti-Wittgensteinian, or at 
least not as Wittgensteinian as his conception of philosophy might suggest. Wittgenstein was 
even hostile towards certain results of science, but Davidson seems to accept many results of 
science and even puts forward philosophical claims which could be interpreted as competing 
with empirical views. This reflects the general problematic position of contemporary 
philosophy of mind, since it, at least in the writings of Davidson and von Wright, tries to steer 
a middle course between being a wholly empirical and wholly conceptual discipline.  This 
confusion in philosophy is partly a result of the naturalistic challenge it faces. In order to be a 
respectable philosopher of mind, one has to acknowledge what science tells us about the mind 
or  brain.  I  believe  that  for  philosophy  this  is  not  a  healthy  course,  because  it  can  lead  to  a  
situation in which philosophers start to think that their claims are open to the same kind of 
criticism that empirical claims are. In this work I shall not further consider this possibly 
dangerous threat to philosophy. 
The view that philosophical claims should not be evaluated according to the same 
standards as scientific claims may as appear to be a form of philosophical arrogance. In 
“Mental Events” Davidson writes: “Do we, by declaring that there are no (strict) psycho-
physical laws, poach on the empirical preserves of science – a form of hubris against of which 
philosophers are often warned?”665 He concludes that we do not, because whether we or not 
trust a philosophical statement is governed by empirical and theoretical concerns not 
indistinguishable from those of science, and goes on to say that in the question regarding the 
possibility of psycho-physical laws there seems to be no clear line between philosophy and 
science. This also is somewhat anti-Wittgensteinian and could be read as a counter-view to 
my claim, put forward in section 1.2.2, that philosophy and science should be kept clearly 
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apart and that this is Davidson’s view as well.666 I  showed  how  Davidson  claimed,  for  
example, that “I am arguing, as philosophers will on a priori grounds, that psychology and the 
social sciences are impossible.”667 In Davidson’s view philosophical claims are generally 
sensitive to empirical considerations; the reason that the claim of irreducibility of the mental 
is not sensitive to empirical considerations relates to Davidson’s conviction that any 
reducibility  of  the  mental  would  amount  to  a  “change  of  subject”,  that  is,  to  a  situation  in  
which our concept of the mental would change. The various problems relating to this change 
will be thoroughly discussed in chapter three and in the appendix.  
Davidson’s claim that mental events are recognizable and identifiable in the 
neurophysiological and physical realms when given neurophysiological or physical 
descriptions suggests that a mental event can be recognized and observed as a 
neurophysiological event. According to Davidson, discoveries clarifying the mental–physical 
relation can be anticipated and “understanding of correlations between events described 
psychologically and described in neurological terms will, and should, influence the 
philosophy of action.”668 Given the recent progress of neuroscience, this is perhaps a plausible 
claim although von Wright, for example, would be skeptical about the question of whether 
these discoveries are relevant for the philosophy of action and whether they should influence 
philosophy.669 But Davidson expresses also a more skeptical view about the prospects of 
science when he notes: “I have no hope that anyone will discover how to describe a state of 
mind or action in physical terms that are suitable for strict laws.…”670 In my view this, a 
limitation of science, is a crucially important aspect of Davidson’s philosophy of mind. This 
aspect will be discussed in more detail in the appendix. There I will show that both Davidson 
and von Wright have a skeptical view about the possibility of science explaining in any 
significant way the mental life of humans. This skeptical view of Davidson’s also has 
consequences for the possibilities of token-reductions. Since physical terms which are suitable 
for strict laws are terms which are reducible to physics, the claim is that a state of mind cannot 
be described in terms which are reducible to physics. Since higher level physical sciences are, 
in principle, reducible to physics, the claim has to be that a state of mind cannot be described 
                                               
666 On  the  other  hand,  with  respect  to  the  relation  of  philosophy  and  science,  Davidson  (1970,  215)  notes:  
“Where there are no fixed limits only the timid never risk trespass.” This could be read as a claim that 
philosophers should not be too modest in their claims. 
667 Davidson, 1964, 47, second emphasis mine. 
668 Davidson, 2001e, 277. 
669 At times Davidson seems to share this scepticism of von Wright, for example, when he is skeptical about the 
philosophical conclusions that can be drawn from Chomsky’s work. 
670 Davidson, 1999 p. 639. 
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in terms of any science which is reducible to physics. This, in turn, implies that mental events 
cannot be reduced to physical events.  
According to Davidson, a systematic correlation between mental and physical events 
is forever out of the question, whereas particular correlations are, if not plausible, at least 
possible. Davidson argues that for a particular psychological event a description in purely 
physical terms can be given. But this view is repudiated to some extent when Davidson notes 
that: “Mental events are physical events, and so some physical description applies to each 
mental event. I don’t think I was saying anyone could say what the physical description is in 
particular cases, but if I did mean this I was wrong.”671 Davidson’s last word on the subject is 
surprisingly “pessimistic”. New scientific methods: “[…] may make it plausible that there is a 
physical event which is identical with each mental event….”672 An interesting question is how 
scientific methods could make this sort of identity plausible. By being able to demonstrate the 
identity  between  a  mental  and  a  physical  event?  But  how  would  such  a  demonstration  fare  
against the von Wrightian challenge that identity is nonsense? In fact, despite the progress of 
scientific methods, Davidson nevertheless claims that “[…] they do not come close to really 
picking  out  a  precise  physical  event,  nor  is  it  likely  they  ever  will.”673 Indeed, picking out 
precise physical events that correspond to mental events is “a hopeless project” according to 
Davidson. But why is the project hopeless? It is curious that, according to Davidson, future 
scientific methods may make the token-identity thesis “plausible”. A philosopher with a 
naturalistic view would claim that these methods will make token-identity certain, and that 
picking out a precise mental–physical event will be anything but hopeless. On the other hand, 
it is also very curious that Davidson refers to new scientific methods as being arbiters in the 
question of mental–physical identity. The plausibility of a physical event being identical with 
a mental event should be a non-issue for Davidson, given his philosophical argument for 
monism. AM does not, or at least should, not need empirical support. Here Davidson’s 
oscillation between a position influenced by Wittgenstein and naturalism is again evident.  
The problem with Davidson’s views about the possibility of token-reductions is that 
he often argues that there must to be token-identities while acknowledging that we may never 
find such identities. What is the rationale behind the claim that “it is possible to know that a 
mental event is identical with some physical event without knowing which one (in the sense 
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of being able to give it a unique physical description)…”?674 It is, of course, Davidson’s 
argument for monism, which we have found to be unsatisfying. As I have claimed in the 
preceding, it seems to me, however, that a non-reductive physicalist who accepts O-
physicalism could accept also a view of mental properties or tokens according to which there 
have to be identities although we may never find them – and, as noted before, the acceptance 
of this claim would not make an essential change to his position. When Davidson asserts that 
particular mental events can be explained by physical science, this suggestion is lacking an 
argument which would lead one to believe that particular identities could be established. But 
the claim about the possible physical explanation of a mental event cannot stand without the 
view that identities can be established. The claim that mental events could be explained by 
physical science if and when identities are available is trivial, because then a mental event 
would literally be a physical event and there is no reason to think that physical events could 
not  be  explained  by  a  physical  science.  I  think  that  in  order  for  the  claim to  be  interesting,  
some kind of actual reduction from mental to physical is required. A philosophical argument 
that there are only homogenous events is certainly not enough, because it does not say 
anything about the mechanics of actual reductions. Since we are after particular identities, it 
is not enough to say, as Davidson does, that mental events in general are identical to physical 
events. Even if this is true, i.e. even if we accept Davidson’s argument for monism, the 
troubling question is: in the case of individual mental events, M, M1,…Mn, with which 
physical events are they identical and, more importantly, how to show this? How to decide 
whether M is identical with P and M1 identical with P1 if P and P1 occur at the same time but 
at different places? A “brain scan” example illustrates the point. How to decide which part of 
the scanned brain is identical with a mental event? If we take seriously von Wright’s claim 
that mental events cannot be assigned a location, the question of with which spatio-temporal 
region a non-spatial mental event is identical becomes extremely problematic. Von Wright’s 
claim certainly has some point and Davidson does not indicate how to solve this problem.  
 The problem of actual reduction is also an empirical problem. The human brain is a 
complex organ and countless processes take place in the living brain continuously. Paul 
Churchland, in a surprisingly pessimistic mood, claims for example that: 
  
[...] your physical brain is far too complex and mercurial for its behavior to be predicted in any but the 
broadest outlines... faced with the extra-ordinary dynamical features of a functioning brain, no device 
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constructible in this universe could ever predict your behavior, or your thoughts, with anything more 
than merely statistical success.675 
 
The claim that no device constructible in this universe could ever predict my thoughts is 
remarkable. What justifies this skepticism? Again, before even trying to imagine how 
person’s thoughts could be predicted, we should ask a more moderate question: How to pin 
down correctly the physical processes which are M and M1? Where should the boundaries of 
mental events be drawn, if the von Wrightian view that these events have no extension is 
accepted? In fact, if von Wright’s critique is accepted there is no way to draw the boundaries 
of mental events, because such events simply have no boundaries. If we agree with von 
Wright’s view that mental events have no boundaries, then it follows that they cannot be 
identical with defined regions of the brain. In this case, clinging on to the view that they are, 
or  must  be,  identical  with  specific  regions  of  the  brain  requires  the  acceptance  of  the  very  
identity which, as for example Putnam has noted, is sui generis and without acceptable 
criteria. It is difficult to conceive of a mental event as being in some sense a non-spatial 
entity, but it is just as difficult to think of it as an entity with size and shape. Talk about 
“belief-boxes” is commonplace in the contemporary philosophy of mind, and pictures of 
brains in which beliefs and other mental phenomena are nicely located are familiar. Although 
all this talk and the graphic presentations of it can be thought as being partly metaphorical, 
they show that mental phenomena are often conceived as thing-like entities. To think of a 
mental phenomenon as a kind of object is a tempting picture, because if mental phenomena 
are real they have to be somewhere. On the other hand, it is difficult even to imagine a thing-
like belief. If we agree with von Wright in his view that mental events have no boundaries, 
then it follows that they cannot be identical with defined regions of the brain. And then 
clinging on to the view that they are identical with specific areas of the brain requires the 
acceptance of the very identity which, as Putnam among others has noted, is sui generis and 
without acceptable criteria.  
If mental events are actually non-reducible, this is obviously a more general problem 
for a physicalistic philosophy of mind and for the sciences which try to establish connections 
between mental and physical events. It is also a problem for research agendas which are based 
on the view that identity between the mental and the physical holds. John Dupre, a 
philosopher arguing against the idea of reductionism and emphasizing the disunity of science 
has noted: “[…] to assume that every event is amenable to physical explanation is wholly to 
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beg the question in favor of physicalism.”676 The problem is evident in the case of mental 
events. Why believe that mental events are amenable to physical explanations? The obvious 
but trivial answer is that mental events can be physically explained because they can be 
described in a physical language, and this in turn is a consequence of the fact that they are 
physical events. We have seen that the possibility of a description in a physical language has 
been used as a criterion that “makes” an event physical. The circularity is obvious: if events 
are physical because they can be given a physical description, and the reason why they are 
amenable to physical explanations is the fact that they can be given a physical description. 
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that each event is a physical event, it 
may still be the case that they are not amenable to physical explanation – why insist that 
everything physical has a physical explanation? – but the philosophical worry here is more 
serious. Without actual token-reductions, what are the reasons for believing in the token-
identity thesis? What is the reason for accepting that a mental event is a physical event? 
Doesn’t the impossibility of token-reductions open, in principle, the door for dualism? 
Davidson notes that if mental events and states are, or can be, physically describable one by 
one, then the issue is not ontological.677 In other words, dualism is not an ontological threat as 
long as mental events are physically describable. But what secures the physicalistic ontology 
in the absence of actual token-reductions? In answering this question, we could let science be 
our guide and follow the naturalistic or von Wrightian line, according to which demands of 
scientific intelligibility cannot really “tolerate” non-physical phenomena.678 With respect to 
the question of whether particular mental events could be reduced to physical events and 
explained in terms of them, we could wait for a scientific verdict. This was a common attitude 
among the identity theorists of the 1950s. If we follow those who claim that we already have 
various examples of successful mental to physical reductions and accept the view that this is a 
sufficient reason to believe that physicalism is true, then there seems to be no need for a 
philosophical argument for monism. But do we, or could we, have philosophical – that is 
conceptual – reasons to believe or disbelieve the thesis of token-reducibility and therefore the 
thesis of physicalism – which render them immune to empirical claims?  
Davidson has claimed that in accepting physicalism we are committed to a 
philosophical thesis, and it is reasonable to expect that the expression “philosophical” must 
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carry some weight in this claim. Everything comes down to this: if particular identities cannot 
be established we can, following Davidson’s argumentation, believe that each mental event is 
a general event E, and that these types of events are such that they can be given physical and 
mental descriptions. But from this it does not follow that the relation between a particular 
mental event M and a physical event P would be such that M could be given a physical 
explanation, although M is P. The version of physicalism which follows if even token-
reductions are impossible is very weak and then, in the case of AM, the entire burden of proof 
is based on PNCC, which I have shown to be highly suspect. In section 2.4.1, I proposed that 
the particular contingent identities between mental and physical events can be established 
only by doing science that studies the brain. This would imply that the question of the 
possibility of token-reducibility is empirical. If PNCC is rejected and if it turns out that token-
identities cannot be established empirically, we have to ask what is left of token-physicalism 
in the absence of empirical and philosophical arguments supporting it. From the perspective 
of AM, the question of the possibility of token-reductions is uninteresting. The general thesis 
of identity has already been established and no additional empirical evidence is needed for 
monism. On the other hand, certain views of Davidson seem also to make this claim suspect. 
We have seen how Davidson speculates about the possibility and nature of token-identities by 
referring to the practices of current and future science. These speculations give the impression 
that empirical evidence could be relevant for token-identity. But if this is so it undermines the 
philosophical importance of AM and undermines Davidson’s original intent to provide a 
philosophical argument for monism.  
 One interpretation of the supervenience-thesis that Davidson endorses seems to imply 
that the relation between mental and physical events is similar to the kind of relation that 
exists between a physical event and that event described in a higher level of a physical 
vocabulary. On a physicalistic reading of AM a certain physical, say neural, event can be 
described also in psychological language, which is subject to the principles of interpretation. 
On this picture, there are no “ontological correlations” or “ontological relations” like 
constitution or composition between events, since the mental description of an event is just 
that – a description. In the discussion of token identity, all spatial terms are misleading since 
there are no two events which could be related in a way which would imply that there is 
spatial distinctiveness between the events. Constitution and composition, for example, can be 
understood as referring to spatial relations; but there are no such relations in the case of 
mental and physical events. In fact, what kind of relations could there be between events M 
and P if they are the same event E? The mental description is supervenient mainly on 
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behavioral facts about the subject to whom the mental phenomenon is attributed, and 
therefore the question of whether this description reduces to a brain state of the interpretee is 
obscure. 
If there are two persons A and B, it should be quite obvious that A’s description of B’s 
mental states cannot reduce to the brain state of B. If it reduces to anything, it is the brain state 
of A. However, if the problem is formulated in a somewhat more substantial sense and not 
from the perspective of person A, we can ask whether an existing mental state or event 
reduces to its physical “counterpart”. This raises the familiar worry of whether it makes sense 
to talk about counterparts if there is only one event being described. But even in order to 
formulate  the  worry  in  this  way,  it  is  already  required  that  the  mental  status  of  an  event  is  
being  thought  of  as  merely  a  description.  According  to  this  understanding,  an  event  E  is  a  
neural  event  (as  well  as  physical,  chemical  etc.)  and  this  event  can  also  be  described  as  
mental, but there is no higher level entity which could be reduced to the neural event. There is 
no entity in addition to the neural event because the mental event is “nothing but” a neural 
event. This is a perfectly understandable physicalistic view, but does it make sense if it is 
considered in a broader setting? If it is claimed that a certain event E is a neural event and its 
also being a mental event is just a matter of us describing it as such, it seems to follow that the 
neural status of the event is somehow a more substantial fact about it than its being a mental 
event. But why believe this, and what could this claim even mean? If a person is aware of a 
certain mental event which takes place in them, it is obscure to say that this event is first and 
foremost or “nothing but” a neural event – thereby having an objective status as an event 
which can be observed from the outside. In a situation where person’s awareness of an event 
is an essential part of the event, there certainly seem to be two perfectly real aspects (mental 
and physical, or subjective and objective) of an event, and the question of what their relation 
to each other is can be asked. Can they be understood in terms of each other? 
 I think it is instructive to consider the issue in a more substantial way, one which 
clarifies the double aspect view. This may be in conflict with Davidson’s views about the 
nature of mental events but, as we will see below, the problems that are raised concern his 
position too. Moreover, the more substantial understanding of the problem fits well with 
common-sense intuitions and is therefore worth considering. In section 2.3, I claimed that the 
mind–body problem can be raised in a way that does not concern just the relation between 
mental and physical descriptions. To consider an example, let us suppose that I know that I 
believe at time t that “This table is pretty”. I have this thought “in my head” in the sense that I 
am aware that I describe to myself the table as being pretty. This mental process, my being 
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aware of what I am describing to myself, can be thought of as a true mental phenomenon. 
What is “mental” about this phenomenon is the subjective awareness involved, which cannot 
be wholly captured from the outside by an observer who is not experiencing this awareness. 
The outside observer cannot know for sure whether or not I am describing something to 
myself. Let us also suppose that at the time when I am having a thought, a neuroscientist is 
looking at a computer screen where the results of the scanning of my brain are being 
displayed. In this kind of situation we can ask: Is there something in my brain corresponding 
to my thought, or is some brain state my thought? This question is understandable, and in the 
context  of  O-physicalism  in  a  physicalistic  vein  we  are  apt  to  think  that  the  answer  to  this  
question is affirmative. We may even think that if I am really aware of my thought, something 
in my brain also has to correspond to my awareness. But can we say where my thought 
exactly is? Which slice of space-time is my thought?  
What kind of a physical event a mental event is and where it is located are questions 
which do not arise, at least not in the same sense, when we are dealing with “purely” physical 
events or objects, i.e. with events or objects that cannot be given a non-arbitrary mental 
description. It  is  possible to say in great detail  what kind of stuff water,  for example,  is  and 
why it  has  the  properties  it  has.  If  there  is  a  glass  of  water  and  the  water  is  heated,  we  can  
certainly say where the event of water’s warming up takes place, we can explain why the 
water boils when it is heated etc. Our knowledge about the connections between macroscopic 
and microscopic physical phenomena is impressive, and constantly accumulating. But we 
know next to nothing about the relation of mental and physical entities. If mental entities are 
physical entities then our understanding of these relations may increase in the future, but a 
serious problem remains: How can the subjective (the mental description) and objective (the 
physical description) aspect of an event E be brought together so that it would be possible to 
say that they refer to, or are part of, the same event E? 
 I have shown that Davidson has little to say about the prospects of actual token-
reducibility and his final views about such a possibility are negative. His opinion seems to be 
that mental events cannot be clearly located, but that this is not a deep problem. According to 
Davidson, beliefs and intentions are not “little entities lodged in the brain”. This is a view 
shared by many non-reductivists like Rorty and Putnam. But what is this bold view based on? 
It is clear that the claim is not based on empirical evidence. But if non-reductive physicalists 
are not referring to empirical evidence, then what allows, for example, Rorty to say: “[…] we 
do not expect neurology to provide a fairly detailed microstructural story about any given 
mental state. We do not expect to be able to change people’s beliefs and desires by tinkering 
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with their brains…”?679 By “we”, Rorty must mean mainly philosophers – and especially non-
reductive physicalists – because it is implausible to think that scientists studying the brain 
would have this attitude. Many of them would be willing to say that what we expect is 
precisely that neurology will provide a detailed microstructural story about any given mental 
state.680 In fact, research on the neural correlates of individual thoughts is being done 
constantly.681 It is interesting that on the one hand such research is being done and at the same 
time various philosophers like Malcolm, Putnam, Rorty, Davidson and von Wright claim that 
such research is basically impossible. This situation says something revealing about the 
current relation between philosophy of mind and the sciences of mind. The previously 
mentioned debate between Hacker / Bennett and Dennett / Searle is a concrete example of the 
complex nature of the disagreement and also of the passion which surrounds the discussion.   
Given that current empirical evidence is apt to suggest otherwise, what is Davidson’s 
and Rorty’s reason for claiming that beliefs are not little entities in the brain? Ignoring here 
the fact that Davidson does not clearly define the expressions “state” and “entity”, perhaps the 
best way to understand the view of Davidson and Rorty is to realize that their understanding 
of the nature of beliefs, as mental entities, prevents them from seeing beliefs as independent 
physical atoms of the brain’s architecture. The holistic nature of the mental is the main reason 
for this. As Rorty argues: “If we assert token–token identity between sentential attitudes and 
neurological states, the latter will have to be states of an entire nervous system, rather than 
nicely specifiable bits of that system which could be zapped in order to alter beliefs and 
desires one at a time.”682 This claim is the consequence of the view that, because of the 
holistic nature of thoughts, a specific thought cannot be changed without changing the 
relations between it and many other thoughts. Many philosophers, most famously Davidson 
and Putnam, have argued that the holism of the mental has the consequence that token-
identities obtain between sentential attitudes and the states of an entire nervous system. The 
identities cannot obtain at a more local level. In my opinion it is unclear how seriously 
Rorty’s expression “entire nervous system” should be taken. Literally speaking, the human 
nervous  system does  not  consist  of  the  brain  alone,  since  the  spinal-cord  is  also  part  of  the  
central nervous system. Is Rorty suggesting that sentential attitudes are token-identical with 
neurological states which are the total states of the brain and spinal-cord taken together? This 
would mean that my belief would be partly located in my spinal-cord! This conclusion shows 
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the problems that become evident if an expression like “the entire nervous system” is used 
loosely and if non-empirical claims about the assumed identity are being made. It is of course 
possible to settle for the view that my belief is token-identical with a state, or a space-time 
region, which includes a part of my spinal-cord. This would mean that my beliefs would 
literally be outside my head. This conclusion would agree with von Wright’s and Malcolm’s 
views. They would claim that a view according to which my belief is identical with a part of 
my spinal-cord is as nonsensical as the view according to which my belief is identical with a 
part of my brain. 
Davidson and Rorty are not the only philosophers who see holism as an obstacle for 
specific token-reductions. Putnam has also suggested that holism prevents the possibility of 
specific mental–physical identities and even token-correlations.683 If  there  cannot  be  token-
correlations, a token-reduction is also obviously out of the question. What it would mean to 
claim that thoughts were independent and nicely specifiable bits of the brain? According to 
those who emphasize the holism of the mental, it would mean that we could take one belief, 
say “Dogs are animals”, in isolation and perhaps even change it, without changing (any of the 
other) physical relations in the brain. A more radical conclusion considered by Putnam is that 
if propositional attitudes were clearly specifiable bits of the brain it would be possible, in 
principle at least, to isolate a specific thought and have that single thought stored in a test tube 
in a laboratory. In Putnam’s view this idea is utterly crazy.684 Perhaps it is too easy to agree 
with Putnam. An isolated thought sounds nonsensical because its content could not be 
identified or defined without relating it to other thoughts. What would an isolated thought be 
about? 
The suggestion of Davidson, Putnam and Rorty that holism creates serious problems 
for the possibility of token-reductions is interesting because ontological conclusions are being 
drawn from a consideration about the peculiar features of mental states and their attribution 
conditions. We can agree that holism is a problem, but should we perhaps go even further 
than  Putnam in his claim  and say that, because of holism and externalism, it does not make 
sense to think of beliefs as internal states of the brain, or more broadly, of the body at all. This 
is the von Wrightian–Malcolmian view – the conclusion being that it is not clear what the 
mind-brain identity amounts to or could amount to. This is not as radical a conclusion as it 
may sound; the mind–body problem is still unsolved and it is not obvious that the 
physicalistic answer or the “mind–brain identity thesis” will triumph. Those who keep 
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identifying the mind with the brain ignore the non-reductivist challenge, according to which it 
simply makes no sense to say that mental phenomena are identical with the states of the brain. 
If this is the case, then claims about the brain should be withheld when talking about mental 
phenomena. This is a conclusion drawn by von Wright and Malcolm, and it is understandably 
not a well accepted view in the contemporary philosophy of mind.   
Are Davidson and other non-reductivists giving a satisfying argument that shows 
actual token-reductions are not possible? The thesis of the holism of the mental gives rise to 
one such argument. Although holism is an obstacle for successful token-reductions, there is 
nevertheless the following problem: It is true that the content of thoughts depends on the 
contents of other thoughts. But it seems to me that when we are talking about thoughts we are 
already, so to speak, in the realm of the mental. Does it make sense to say that the physical 
relations between the states of the brain could constitute the identities of brain states in a 
similar  way  as  in  the  case  of  mental  states?  Presumably  not,  for  holism  is  a  feature  of  the  
mental realm. But can this form of holism then preclude actual token-reductions between 
mental and physical states? As will become evident in chapter three, an important reason for 
defending the irreducibility of the mental is precisely the conviction that certain relations 
which obtain at the mental level do not obtain at, and cannot be transferred to, the physical 
level. Connections which depend on the propositional contents of thoughts cannot exist in a 
vocabulary  which  is  devoid  of  these  kinds  of  contents;  these  connections  do  not  exist  in  a  
vocabulary where the contents have no relevance. It does not make sense to speak about 
logical relations between physical events. But if this is the case, can Davidson and Rorty 
really argue that the holism of the mental is the reason that there cannot be locally identifiable 
physical states which are the physical “counterparts” of specific mental states? Can the holism 
of the mental be used as an argument against reducibility if holism has no relevance at the 
physical level? Why think that the holism of mental states would lead those states to be 
global, not local, states of the brain? Although it may be the case that in order for a person to 
have the concept of a “cat”, the person must have many other concepts, it is not at all clear 
that these conceptual connections are, or must be, realized in the brain in a way which 
prevents, or would prevent, actual token-reductions. Given that it is not well known how the 
brain functions, it seems premature to say that token-identities between mental states and the 
brain exist only at the level of mental states and the whole nervous system.  
The main question is whether the holism of the mental has ontological implications if 
our ultimate ontology is physicalistic. Does the holism of the mental have any consequences 
for the question of what kind of physical phenomena mental phenomena are? It is interesting 
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that Davidson thinks that he agrees with Rorty in the view that the holism of the mental does 
not have ontological implications. But it seems to me that Rorty draws precisely ontological 
conclusions from the fact that mental states are holistic by nature: he believes that these states 
must be states of the whole nervous system. This is a specific claim about the physical nature 
of beliefs. What Davidson must mean is that he agrees with Rorty’s view that holism is not a 
threat to the reality of mental states. Holism does not, pace Fodor for example, threaten the 
ontological status or existence of mental states. But it is unclear what Davidson’s main reason 
for rejecting the possibility of establishing psycho-physical token-identities is. Since he 
argues in favor of physicalism on a priori grounds, he has to think that there must to be such 
identities. Insofar as beliefs are real physical phenomena, there must be spatiotemporal 
regions which could, in principle, be identified as beliefs. As we have already concluded, 
conscious belief – as long as it is a physical phenomenon – must be somewhere, and there is 
no argument whatsoever in Davidson’s writings which would offer support for the claim that 
this belief would be identical with a state of the whole nervous system. For Davidson, the 
claim that mental phenomena are token identical with physical phenomena is not an empirical 
claim although the question of “how beliefs are physically constituted” is to be decided 
empirically – and for this question Davidson offers only negative, skeptical and obscure 
answers.  
Given that the physical constitution of beliefs, insofar that this expression makes sense 
at all, is an unresolved empirical question, why should we think that mental states correspond 
to global states of the brain? What kind of states are these “global” states in the first place, 
should the spinal-cord or indeed the whole peripheral nervous system be included in the 
“physical base” of beliefs? It is a contingent empirical fact that, most likely, I would not have 
thoughts if I lacked a central nervous system. But, to elaborate further, I would not have 
thoughts if I lacked a heart. Should we conclude from this that if we assert token-identity 
between sentential attitudes and physical states, the latter must include my heart as a part? 
The exact location of thoughts may be an empirical question, but the philosophical suggestion 
that they are identical with the states of the whole nervous system is not obviously better than 
the suggestion that thoughts are identical with the states of the heart. 
I  believe  that  Rorty  and  Davidson  are  not  aware  of  the  exact  details  of  how  the  
nervous system, or the brain, functions. If they are aware of these details, they do not use this 
knowledge to support their view concerning the location of thoughts. Many philosophers, von 
Wright among them, openly admit that they do not know at all how the brain functions. Yet 
these philosophers are willing to make claims about the mind–body relationship that are not 
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entirely conceptual. This is one reason why the dialogue between scientifically-minded 
philosophers and those who are interested in conceptual arguments is often so futile. We can 
assume that when Davidson or Rorty are speaking of “global” and “local” brain states, they 
do not have anything very specific in mind. Is Rorty’s claim – that propositional attitudes are 
states of the “whole nervous system” is unlikely – based on neurological evidence? Likely 
not. But is it then meant to be a claim about the physical structure of the brain which could 
actually and seriously compete with empirically based neurological claims? Scientists 
studying the brain would be skeptical of these kinds of a priori philosophical views. They 
would perhaps judge them as irrelevant and consequently would not take them seriously. 
Whether this in turn moves philosophers much is questionable. Rorty, Davidson, Putnam and 
von Wright are not among those philosophers who try to reconcile philosophy and science. 
Their attitude is totally different from those who are openly doing neurophilosophy. The view 
of, for example, Paul Churchland is based, partly, on what we already know or seem to know 
about the brain whereas the view of Davidson, von Wright and Rorty are based on what we 
know or seem to know about the mind.685 Since we seem to know much more about the mind 
than about the brain, we may be easily tempted to draw conclusions about the latter from the 
former.  But  as  those  studying  the  nature  of  the  brain  know,  this  a priori strategy does not 
often work very well. I think that when Davidson and von Wright offer speculations about 
token-reductions they are not being true to their Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy. In 
this respect they are being pseudo-naturalists whose claims cannot really compete with 
empirical claims. Whereas I think we should express great doubts against scientistic 
naturalism, we should also be aware of the dangers and temptations of a priori scientific 
philosophy. 
  What, in sum, can be said about the non-reductivist’s arguments against actual token-
reducibility is this. It is obvious that the conclusions of Davidson, Putnam, von Wright or 
Rorty are not a result of their empirical study of the brain. These philosophers seem to hold 
the view that empirical study of the brain cannot find beliefs in the brain because, needless to 
say, beliefs are something else than specific little entities in the brain. They are either states of 
the whole brain or states of the whole person. But it is quite unclear what the talk about 
entities, states, processes etc. mean in this context. Are philosophers and scientists talking 
about the same things when they use these terms? Most scientists studying the brain think that 
whether or not beliefs can be found from the brain is entirely an empirical question. Perhaps 
                                               
685 For a general view see Churchland, 1995. 
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beliefs are not “entities” or “objects” in some philosopher’s obscure sense of the word, but a 
scientist who is actually studying the brain could be convinced that beliefs correspond to local 
states or processes of the brain – and empirical evidence may support this view. A scientist 
would not problematize these issues in the same way as a philosopher does. The consequence 
of this is that, from the scientific perspective, the a priori arguments of philosophers insofar 
as they attempt to compete with empirical views look suspicious and are accorded little 
relevance. 
It is plausible to think that philosophers of mind who are not “scientifically oriented” 
understand the nature of beliefs very differently than neuroscientists who study the brain do. 
This is a reason why philosophers so often complain that scientists “have missed the point”. 
On the other hand, in his recent book the philosopher / neuroscientist John Bickle claims that 
many philosophers of mind are just not aware of the current situation in the sciences, and 
therefore many of their claims can be refuted by empirical evidence.686 Bickle has argued that 
scientists are actually doing the kinds of reductions the possibility of which is being denied by 
certain philosophers. On the other hand, those philosophers who, for example, want to defend 
the autonomy of psychology insist that Bickle’s claims are simply untrue. This is yet again an 
interesting fact about the sociological trends in contemporary philosophy. Bickle’s view is 
nevertheless shared among many empirically oriented philosophers. Patricia Churchland, for 
example, claims that many philosophers are still under the impression that philosophical 
questions could not be solved empirically.687 Against these views we have the recent claim of 
Bennett and Hacker, who insist that the task of philosophy is not to put forward claims subject 
to empirical testing. The task of philosophy is a clarification of existing views in terms of 
conceptual analysis. I believe this is an important remark on the nature of philosophy, and as 
the debates show the question about the nature of philosophy does have concrete 
consequences for the kind of philosophy that is being done. It seems that many of Davidson’s 
suggestions about the prospects of token-reducibility amount to no more than speculation, 
which is especially dangerous if it is meant to compete with empirical views. Philosophers 
should not provide these kinds of suggestions, according to one plausible view, concerning 
the nature of philosophy. Churchland’s claim that philosophers are “under the wrong 
impression” is a non-starter for a philosopher like von Wright, who has a specific and 
different view about the nature of philosophical problems. 
                                               
686 Bickle, 2003. 
687 Churchland, 1986. 
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Here we again encounter the crucial problem which I introduced in chapter one, 
namely that philosophy in general and philosophy of mind in particular are facing a crisis, 
since their conclusions are becoming irrelevant in the light of empirical evidence. The 
discussion about the possibility of actual token-reductions from the viewpoint of non-
reductive physicalism shows how obscure some of the arguments, such as Rorty’s claims 
about the relationship between “sentential attitudes” and “the nervous system”, are. The 
serious threat for any non-reductive philosophy of mind is simply that the philosophical 
claims of this position will not be taken seriously in the future. Bickle, for example, is already 
explicit in his view that scientists should not especially care about the arguments of 
philosophers, and Paul Churchland’s view that philosophical problems are empirical problems 
leaves no room for speculative philosophical arguments.  
Whether or not philosophical arguments have relevance for science is an important 
question, and philosophers should be cautious in their claims especially in the areas which are 
becoming increasingly empirical. Philosophy of mind is such an area. I think that the position 
of  non-reductive  physicalism,  insofar  as  it  tries  to  hold  on  to  the  non-reducibility  of  mental  
phenomena, should present an argument which would show the impossibility of actual token-
reductions, and this argument should be such that it is immune to empirical counter-examples. 
Since the prospects of coming up with this kind of argument are not particularly bright, non-
reductive physicalism should perhaps settle for the next best thing: to critically evaluate 
scientific claims without putting forward a theory of its own. I think that von Wright has 
succeeded better in this second task than Davidson, who constructed a theory of the mind. 
AM has its merits, but the details concerning the ontological mind–body problem which this 
position suggests certainly look suspicious from the naturalistic perspective. 
 
2.5 The nature of mental phenomena 
 
I have described the nature of the physicalism that Davidson and von Wright defend, and the 
reasons why they defend it. We have seen the arguments these philosophers give for their 
physicalistic positions. We have also seen what their view about mental properties, token-
identities, and token-reductions is. These are the main questions that are usually raised in the 
discussion about the coherence of non-reductive physicalism. With respect to all these issues, 
Davidson’s  and  von  Wright’s  views  are  somewhat  obscure  but  quite  similar  to  each  other.  
Despite the obscurities, I believe we have arrived at a view of what Davidson’s and von 
Wright’s understanding of the physical nature of mental phenomena is. Whether it fits with 
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empirical facts is doubtful.  Some of the claims of von Wright and Davidson certainly go 
beyond “describing features of concepts”, and as such face the challenge of being refuted 
empirically. 
 Because the position under discussion is non-reductive physicalism, it is to be 
expected that its conclusions about the physical nature of mental phenomena are inconclusive. 
It would be surprising if a non-reductivist had many specific views about the physical nature 
of mental phenomena. A non-reductivist cannot offer a detailed view of the physical nature of 
mental  phenomena  if  his  position  is  to  remain  coherent.  Specific  claims  about  the  physical  
nature of mental phenomena would be almost like contradicting the basic position taken, 
according to which not much can be said about the relationship between the mental and 
physical. As Davidson notes: “I find no plausibility in the idea that thoughts can be 
nomologically identified with, or correlated with, phenomena characterized in physical or 
neurological terms.”688 In order to hold this view too much need not be said; but how should a 
Davidsonian position react to current empirical results which suggest that such nomological 
correlations are possible? Is Davidson’s understanding of nomologicality perhaps too strict or 
restrictive?689 A non-reductive physicalist cannot provide any details about the physicality of 
mental phenomena if he is to insist, as Davidson does, that: “No physical or non-mental 
science could be expected to explain thinking, the formation of intentions, or the states that 
characterize our mental lives and explain our actions.”690 Given these “convictions”, the 
physical nature of mental phenomena has to remain incomplete. 
 But what can be said about the mental nature of mental phenomena? A substance 
dualist would perhaps say, for example, that mental phenomena do not occur in space. Mental 
phenomena would thus have at least one important property that physical phenomena do not 
have. Non-reductive physicalism is accused of being a form of “property dualism” (according 
to which the brain has properties possessed by no other kind of physical object), but as I have 
argued, this is not an illuminating way to describe the position. Even a reductive physicalist 
would admit that the brain does have properties possessed by no other kind of physical object: 
it is for example conscious. As far as we know, other material objects are not conscious. The 
view that brain is a special kind of material object does not imply a substantial form of 
dualism. Although a “property dualist” need not commit himself to a robust form of dualism, 
                                               
688 Davidson, 1982, 100. 
689 This question will be addressed in detail in chapter three. 
690 Davidson, 1990b, 92. 
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it can nevertheless be asked what the properties of mental states are that distinguish them 
from physical states. We can ask what kind of phenomena mental phenomena are. 
 Davidson and von Wright claim that mental states are physical states under a certain 
description. There is therefore no “ontological mystery” about the nature of these states. This 
is explicitly Davidson’s view, whereas von Wright’s view is more wary. Given monism, there 
cannot be any issue about the ontological status of mental entities, as Davidson himself 
claims. In my view this claim is highly questionable, but it shows Davidson’s view of the 
mental. The exact physical nature of mental states is currently unclear; these states are neural 
states, and the question about their physical nature is left for neuroscience to answer. To 
describe phenomena as mental is to say that they can be described in a certain vocabulary. 
The mind–body or mental–physical distinction is not an ontological, but only a conceptual 
distinction. But what are the essential properties, if such there are, of mental phenomena? A 
non-reductive position emphasizes, so to speak, the mental aspect of mental states. What do 
Davidson and von Wright say about this aspect? The details they give are actually few. What, 
then, is the merit of their positions as non-reductive positions? It could be argued that they say 
what mental phenomena are not, instead of saying what they are. An essential question to ask 
of Davidson’s and von Wright’s positions should be: how is the nature of mental phenomena 
defined or clarified? Perhaps it could be claimed that their respective philosophies of mind are 
attempts to come up with such a clarification. But their detailed views about the mental nature 
of mental phenomena are scarce. This is unfortunate, because although there may not be a 
question about the ontological status of mental entities in the context of monism, I think there 
is nevertheless a kind of ontological question to be answered, namely the question about the 
“mental mode of being” of mental entities. Given monism, there is no question about the 
ontological  status  of  gases  or  liquids,  but  there  is,  for  example,  a  question  about  how  they  
differ from solid objects. Likewise, one should arguably be interested in the peculiar general 
features of mental phenomena, because understanding these features helps to better 
understand the human position within a physical reality.  
 In my opinion, it is not enough to say that being amenable to a mental description in a 
certain vocabulary makes a phenomenon mental, because the consequence of this would be 
that any event would count as mental if given a suitable description.691 This does not go well 
with our actual, common-sensical understanding concerning the status of mental phenomena. 
In the contemporary discussion, references to mental states are made without clarifying what 
                                               
691 Davidson (1970) admits that his position has this consequence. 
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the essential features of these states are. A similar problem was encountered in our discussion 
of mental properties: it is doubtful whether there are the kind of mental properties which most 
contemporary philosophers of mind take there to be. With respect to tokens of mental 
phenomena,  the  essential  problem  is  this.  Let  us  suppose  that  person  A  attributes  a  mental  
state to Georg. He says: “Georg believes that he is late for the meeting”, thereby attributing to 
Georg  the  belief  that  he  is  late  for  the  meeting.  This  belief  is  a  mental  state.  Seen  from the  
perspective of physicalism, the belief could be seen, for example, as a physical disposition. 
This is how Davidson sees the nature of belief: “Anomalous monism makes sense of the 
claim that attitudes are dispositions to behave in certain ways, which in turn are physiological 
states, which finally are physical states.…”692 This, incidentally, is in rough outline also 
Quine’s view about the nature of belief. Davidson seems to accept Quine’s view that beliefs 
are dispositions which finally are microphysical states of physics, although it was Quine who, 
after rejecting his eliminativist leanings, came to endorse AM as the most plausible theory of 
the mind. It is a plausible thought that Davidson adopted the general view concerning the 
physical nature of mental phenomena from his teacher, who then followed Davidson’s further 
reasoning and finally accepted the inevitable irreducibility of the mental. The kind of 
transition which can be seen in Quine’s views is nevertheless absent in Davidson’s writings. 
At times Quine described his position as reductivist, while at times his position was best 
interpreted as a form of eliminativism. Davidson, on the other hand, was always a non-
reductivist  and  the  only  transition  that  can  be  detected  is  a  move  towards  a  position  which  
more strongly emphasizes the irreducibility of the mental. 
 A brief description of Quine’s position is useful because Davidson has often been 
interpreted to hold the same position as Quine, i.e. continuing a strict eliminativist approach 
in the philosophy of mind. The critical Quine of Word and Object famously noted:  
 
One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of  intentional idioms and 
the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional 
idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention.  My attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the second.693 
 
The main reason why Quine distinguishes himself from Brentano’s view is that “[...] the 
essentially dramatic idiom of propositional attitudes”694 has no place in serious science and 
that the “[...] mentalistic vocabulary is stubbornly at variance with scientific patterns”.695 All 
                                               
692 Davidson, 1997c, 72. See also Davidson, 1990b. Von Wright (UPg, 1) agrees: “To believe is dispositional.” 
693 Quine, 1960, 221. 
694 Quine, 1960, 219. 
695 Quine, 1975, 92. 
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things considered, “The propositional attitudes are in a bad way”696 and “The easy familiarity 
of mentalistic talk is not to be trusted”.697 This is Quine’s most critical phase. He notes: “The 
bodily states exist anyway; why add the others?”698 States  of  mind  can  be  ascribed  to  the  
body, which leads to the view that “The mind goes by the board, and will not be missed.”699 
Quine  seems  to  be  ambivalent  about  the  question  of  whether  mental  phenomena  should  be  
reduced to physical phenomena or eliminated in their favor.700 A physicalistic conclusion is: 
“I  end  up  with  the  so-called  identity  theory  of  mind:  mental  states  are  the  states  of  the  
body.”701 Surprisingly, Quine is not expecting a reduction of mental to the physical. He says:  
 
It [my approach] to physicalism is not a reductionist doctrine of the sort sometimes imagined. It is not a 
utopian dream of our being able to specify all mental events in physiological or microbiological terms. 
It is not a claim that such correlations even exist, in general, to be discovered; the grouping of events in 
mentalistic terms need not stand in any systematic relation to biological groupings.702 
 
On the other hand, in “Mind and Verbal Dispositions” Quine distinguishes between three 
levels of explanation, the mental, the behavioral, and the physiological.703 According to 
Quine, the mental hardly deserves to be called an explanation, whereas the physiological is 
the deepest and most ambitious way of explaining. The three levels are levels of reduction.704 
Like in Davidson’s view also, mind consists in dispositions to behavior, which in turn are 
reduced to physiological states. I think that Davidson’s suggestion that AM makes sense of 
these levels of reduction could be interpreted as a suggestion that AM clarifies Quine’s 
original position.  
The conclusion at which Quine arrives is the identity theory of mind: mental states are 
the states of the body. But, right after praising the identity theory, Quine becomes cautious 
and warns that the theory has its problems. What Quine ends up holding is the claim that “[...] 
                                               
696 Ibid. 
697 Quine, 1975, 95. 
698 Quine, 1960, 264. 
699 Quine, 1985, 5. 
700 Quine has often been interpreted as one of the main influences behind eliminative materialism. But these 
interpretations should take into account Quine’s view that: “Some may... find comfort in reflecting that the 
distinction between an eliminative and an explicative physicalism is unreal”.700 
701 Quine, 1975, 95. 
702 Quine, 1979, 163. See also Quine, 1987, 133 and 1995a, 87.       
703 Quine, 1975. 
704 “Our three levels [mind, behaviour, neurophysiological] thus are levels of reduction: mind consists of in 
dispositions to behavior, and these are physiological states.” (Quine, 1975, 95) Moreover, according to Quine, in 
explaining mentality those behavioral dispositions whose physiological mechanisms seem “most likely” to be 
detected in the foreseeable future should be favored. I take it to be rather mysterious how this view should be 
interpreted.  A hint is given when Quine (1960, 225) writes: “The farther a disposition is from those that can 
confidently be pinned on molecular structure or something comparably firm, the more our talk of it tends to 
depend on a vague factor of ‘caeteris paribus’”. This suggestion seems to indicate that molecular structure, or 
something as “firm” or “real”, would be the mechanism to look for.      
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instead of saying that mental states are identical with physiological ones, we could repudiate 
them; we could claim that they can be dispensed with, in all our theorizing, in favor of 
physiological states....”705 He thinks that the identity theory may excuse a “recourse to 
mentalistic semantics”, but that the repudiation theory blocks this option and should therefore 
be favored. An identity theory could be “abused” by a philosopher who would like to excuse 
his free and uncritical use of mentalistic concepts. The virtue of the repudiation theory is that 
it precludes this kind of abuse. However, later Quine goes through considerable change of 
mind. He claims:  
 
There is no mental substance, but there are irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and 
wants. The keynote of the mental is not the mind; it is the content-clause syntax, the idiom ‘that p’. 
Brentano was right about the irreducibility of intensional discourse.... Its irreducibility is all the more 
reason for treasuring it: we have no substitute.706 
 
This is a remarkable change of mind, and the exact reason for it is unknown. It may relate to 
Quine’s doubts about the capacity of physics to describe “what there really is”. In the 1960s 
Quine thought that Brentano was wrong; later he accepted that Brentano’s view was, in some 
central respects, correct. Brentano was correct in suggesting that our intensional vocabulary is 
irreducible and indispensable. Whereas in 1960 Quine couldn’t find a “base” for mental talk, 
in 1995 he concludes that “[…] the conspicuously intensional idiom of propositional attitude 
finds it niche.”707 Perhaps surprisingly, the final position of Quine is the position of AM.708 
Here we have an interesting example of how the “master learned something from the 
acolyte”.709 Quine’s last word is: “The age-old duality of mind and body has not dissolved; it 
has shifted from substance to concepts… as such it remains irreducible”710 and  “[…]  we  
must… acquiesce in the psychophysical dualism of predicates”711 and “Eventual reduction of 
[propositional attitudes] is hopeless… in respect of cognitive content they are danglers….”712 
This being said, I think it must be emphasized that, despite Quine’s acceptance of conceptual 
                                               
705 Quine, 1975, 94, my emphasis. 
706 Quine, 1990, 71, my emphasis. 
707 Quine, 1995, 98. 
708 See, for example, Quine, 1985, 7, 1987, 133, 1995, 87 and 1995b, 358. We can note, as the reference to 1985 
article shows, that Quine’s move towards anomalous monism was not especially recent. Woods (1992, 559) 
perspicuously notes: “Quine succumbs to a kind of dualism, an uncongenial fate for one who aspires to 
monism.” Of course, the same could be said also of Davidson and von Wright. 
709 Maybe the seeds of non-reductionism were already planted in 1960, when Quine comments that his approach 
is less reductive than Frege’s version of number and acknowledges Davidson as one of those who made him to 
see this. (Quine, 1960, 265 fn. 7) 
710 Quine, 1987, 133-134. 
711 Quine, 1995, 87. 
712 Quine, 1995b, 358. It is an interesting question what Quine means by “danglers”. This term could be expected 
from a philosopher who defends emergent properties, but it is hard to think that Quine would be one of them.  
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dualism he is best interpreted as a pseudo-anomalous monist.  Until  the  end,  even  after  
becoming an anomalous monist, he hoped that psychology could be reduced to a certain kind 
of materialistic view and encouraged the efforts of, for example, the Churchlands to “reclaim 
territory from the intensional side”.713 A “true” anomalous monist would not conclude, as 
Quine does, that “Mentalistic words contribute vitally to everyday explanation and are 
practically indispensable, today anyway….”714  
 After this consideration of Quine’s view about the physical status of mental 
phenomena, we should ask what kind of state a mental state is, mentally speaking. What is 
mental about a belief? Do we, by saying that Georg believes that he is late for the meeting, 
imply that Georg is aware of his belief? If not, it seems that nothing mental or physical needs 
to  be  “in”  Georg  at  the  time  of  the  attribution.  We  say  that  people  can  “have”  all  kinds  of  
beliefs although they never believe those beliefs. On this account, mental states like beliefs 
are  physical  dispositions  of  which  a  person  needs  not  to  be  aware.  Yet  we  can  correctly  
attribute these states to the person. In fact, we may be in a better position to attribute these 
beliefs to a subject than the subject himself. I believe this raises very interesting questions 
about the possibility and nature of unconscious mental states. However, if nothing mental or 
physical is “in” Georg at the time when a certain belief is attributed to him, this means that the 
ontological status of mental states is suspicious and their mode of being is strange. The 
existence of mental states would be tied to the attributions of such states. A physical 
disposition would count as a mental state only because it would be described as being mental. 
This would cause the mental to be in the eye of the interpreter. According to some, this would 
mean  that  the  very  existence  of  mental  states  would  be  the  result  of  a  process  of  
interpretation.715 This seems implausible. It would come close to a form of antirealism about 
beliefs, i.e. a form of eliminativism. The flaws of such a position I have already discussed. 
 
 
 
                                               
713 That Quine welcomed a reclamation project and at the same time saw his own approach as a more cautious 
one can be seen already in Quine’s earlier writings. In Word and Object Quine notes: “The radical reduction that 
would resolve the mental states into the independently recognized elements of physiological theory is a separate 
and far more ambitious program [than Quine’s reductive approach].” (Quine, 1960, 266) On the other hand, 
when it comes to such radical reduction, “I should prize that achievement, and I should regard nothing short of it 
as a full causal explanation of the mental states and events in question….” (Quine, 1977, 637) This is interesting, 
since it seems to imply that the “full causal explanation” takes place at the most basic physical level. This view is 
relevant for the discussion of mental causation, which will be addressed in chapter four. 
 714 Quine, 1999, 409, my emphasis. 
 715 Fodor, among others, raises this criticism against Davidson. 
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2.5.1 A distinction between conscious and non-conscious beliefs 
   
If  the conclusion that mental  phenomena are in the eye of the interpreter is  to be rejected,  a 
reference to consciousness cannot be avoided. Given the complexity of this phenomenon, a 
detailed discussion of its nature would be a topic for another work. In order to clarify 
Davidson’s and von Wright’s view about the mental nature of mental phenomena and to find 
out whether it is a plausible view, a few brief remarks about consciousness are, however, 
mandatory. This is because consciousness seems to be an essential feature of at least some 
mental phenomena. 
 Donald asserts: “Georg believes that he is late for the meeting”. In thinking that Georg 
believes this, one does need not to suppose that he is conscious of the belief that Donald has 
attributed  to  him.  Georg  does  not  need  to  be  thinking  of  that  belief  at  the  time  of  the  
attribution; yet he may nevertheless believe that he is late. It appears that with respect to those 
beliefs which a person does not believe at time t, it is in order to say that they can be attributed 
to the person without his awareness of the belief in question. It would not be false to say that a 
person believes something as long as it is understood that this believing differs from 
conscious believing. It may be correct to say that Donald believes that Paris is the capital of 
France, that clouds are made of vapor or that snakes are animals. Donald may believe these 
things even though he does not believe them at the time of the attribution, or in fact even if he 
does not ever consciously entertain these beliefs. In saying that Donald believes that “Paris is 
the  capital  of  France”  we do  not  usually  imply  that  he  is  conscious  of  this  belief.  What  we  
roughly mean is that Donald would answer appropriately if asked the appropriate questions or 
behave in a way which would agree with the fact that he does have these beliefs according to 
our standards.  
 Let us suppose on the other hand, that Georg believes that he is late for the meeting 
and thinks this silently in his head. This “discussion with oneself” is something which we all 
find ourselves doing from time to time. This kind of conscious belief is something different 
than  the  belief  which  is  attributed  to  Donald  even  though  he  is  not  aware  of  the  attributed  
belief. In the case of conscious belief there is a clear subjective element present, which is 
lacking in the case of non-conscious belief. There is nothing particularly mental about non-
conscious beliefs, they can be understood solely as being physical dispositions, each 
ultimately a mechanism which, given appropriate conditions has, with high probability, such 
and such consequences. This kind of belief need not be “in the person” at the time of the 
attribution. On the other hand, in the case of conscious belief there is, supposing that O-
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physicalism is true, something physical corresponding to the belief. In this case, there is a 
physical truth about the mental. However, it seems that a belief or believing of which a person 
needs not to be aware does not need to be implemented in the brain. Does this matter? It 
certainly matters when we consider the problem of mental causation. How could a belief 
which is not physically present in the person, more specifically in the brain, cause anything?  
My claim is that a firm distinction between belief and conscious belief, call it beliefC 
as well as believing and consciously believing, call it believingC should be made.716 BeliefsC 
are something which are “in” the conscious awareness of a person; they are beliefs which a 
person consciously believes – whereas beliefs are something that may come to be in the 
conscious awareness of the person. Of beliefsC we are immediately aware when we 
experience or “have” them. The reasons to make these distinctions are that: 1) there certainly 
are beliefsC and therefore (so I contend), 2) the only way to make sense of mental causation is 
by  referring  to  beliefsC.717 How should we understand the nature of conscious mental 
phenomena? I suggest, and this is obviously very crude, that a propositional attitude of which 
one is conscious is nothing but an internalized sentence that one is thinking of. What does 
“thinking of” mean? Doesn’t it push the question about the nature of conscious states only a 
step further? Perhaps, but it is doubtful whether there is any further mental explanation of 
what “being aware of the existence of a propositional attitude” could mean beyond the 
observation that it is a form of silent speech. What we do when we consciously entertain a 
thought? We think it  “in our head”. Is there something more to it? It  is  difficult  to see what 
more could be said. How would you answer the question “How do you know that you are 
thinking of X?” Merely by asserting that you are thinking of X. The only criterion that you 
have for the existence of your conscious thought is the thought itself; there are no other 
criteria.  I  believe  most  of  us  understand  what  it  means  to  think  a  thought  silently  in  one’s  
head. But at the same time it must be admitted that the nature of introspection is unclear. 
What do we do when we introspect our own thoughts, what kind of process takes place when 
we are conscious of our thoughts? Hacker, who being a Wittgensteinian is very dubious of 
private experiences, suggests that: “There is such a thing as introspection, but it is not a kind 
of inner perception – it is a form of self-reflection.”718 But what is self-reflection? In the 
                                               
716 The distinction should of course be made with all mental states with propositional content; belief is used here 
only as an example. As far as sensations are concerned, it seems to me that there can be only sensationsC. A pain 
of which a person is not aware is an incoherent concept. 
717 This claim will be defended in chapter four.  
718 Hacker, 2007, 6. 
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following I will describe von Wright’s brief answer to this question.719 The answer seems to 
me congenial. 
 What are Davidson’s and von Wright’s views with reference to the kind of distinction 
suggested above? In their writings references to consciousness are few and I suppose that they 
would see the distinction between belief and beliefC as overtly Cartesian because it assumes 
that  there  is  an  inner  truth  which  is  the  final  arbiter  with  respect  to  question  of  whether  a  
person is really in the state of believing, or whether she really has the belief that is attributed 
to her. This kind of suspicion follows from their neo-behaviorist views about the mind. 
Davidson is silent about the nature of consciousness; he mentions the concept only once or 
twice in his writings. This is quite remarkable given the centrality of the concept in modern 
philosophy and given the extent of Davidson’s writings. Some critics have seen this as a clear 
defect of his views and concluded that perhaps Davidson is an eliminativist with respect to 
qualia and consciousness.720 It  seems  to  me  also  that  the  failure  to  discuss  the  nature  of  
conscious states is a flaw in Davidson’s philosophy of mind. If his concept of “mental event” 
is  meant  to  refer  to  conscious  events,  there  is  no  mention  of  it  whatsoever  in  his  writings.  
What is clear, as we are about to see, is that Davidson’s use of the “mental” does not usually 
refer to conscious states. This being the case, AM is silent about the phenomena that I would 
call beliefsC.  
 When going through von Wright’s writings for the first time, I had the impression that 
his position would suffer from the same flaw as Davidson’s, namely an ignorance of and lack 
of attention to consciousness. However, it turned out that one of the last things that von 
Wright  ever  wrote  was  a  paper  called  “Consciousness”.  It  was  a  work  which  was  left  
unfinished; yet it shows that von Wright’s interests in the philosophy of mind were gradually 
moving towards the problem of consciousness.721 I mention these facts in order to emphasize 
that although von Wright never made this writing public, he nevertheless had carefully 
articulated views about consciousness. Being aware of this may hopefully preclude possible 
misinterpretations of von Wright’s position. It is interesting that von Wright makes a 
somewhat similar distinction to the one suggested above.722 Especially for those who are 
interested in von Wright’s work, it is worth noticing that his ideas relating to consciousness 
supplement his general view about the mind in a way which opens up avenues for further 
                                               
719 For an interesting recent analysis about the nature of self-reflection see, von Kutschera, 2006. 
720 See, for example, Robinson, 2001.  
721 The paper was found from the archives of von Wright. In the bibliography it is referred as von Wright, UPe. 
722 I was surprised when I found out von Wright does make a distinction which I think is essential in order to 
develop a thorough view about the nature of mental states. 
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explorations. I think that von Wright’s brief discussion of the nature of conscious states 
makes his view more interesting than Davidson’s, whose conclusions seem to have 
counterintuitive consequences. I thus have a more optimistic view about von Wright’s 
position than what he himself had. The unfinished article was left with a note: “I fear that this 
paper will stir more misunderstanding than understanding.”  
 In his last paper, von Wright makes a distinction between consciousness and self-
consciousness. The former is something which is a defining feature of living beings, although 
von Wright acknowledges that it is unclear to which living beings this concept can be 
meaningfully applied. The criteria for the attribution of consciousness are behavioral. Human 
behavior and behavior resembling it is the standard against which consciousness-exhibiting 
behavior must be measured. This is a familiar point from Wittgenstein and its importance has 
been emphasized by neo-behaviorists like Hacker. Self-consciousness, on the other hand, is a 
property or an ability which is unique to humans. Von Wright defines self-consciousness as 
the ability to be conscious of one’s own mental states. Being conscious of one’s own mental 
state is something like reflecting on one’s mental state. This self-reflecting is essentially 
linguistic and therefore only possible for humans. The idea of self-consciousness as linguistic 
reflection is: “…related to the idea of soliloquy or monologue, and to the special form of 
monologue we call speaking to oneself.”723 Von Wright concludes that to be self-conscious is: 
“[…] like speaking to oneself e.g. saying ‘I have a toothache’ or saying ‘I have not 
toothache’”724, it is like asking oneself: “Do I experience M, or not?”725 I think the reference 
to silent speech to oneself must be taken literally and that it is in essential respects a correct 
description of how the nature of self-conscious states should be understood. In this work I am 
not willing to elaborate this point further since it would require a thorough analysis of the 
concept of consciousness. I merely note that I was very interested to see von Wright in the 
end describing a view which has always seemed congenial to me and which I thought was 
lacking from his philosophy of mind. 
 It seems clear that there is a subjective element involved in genuine mental states – 
that is, in those states of which we are conscious.726 As von Wright suggests, the subjectivity 
consists in the fact that any outward evidence that a person is in a state which can be 
described as beliefC,  that  a  person  is  self-conscious  of  a  certain  thing  at  time  t,  is  not  and  
                                               
723 Von Wright, UPe, 8. 
724 Von Wright, UPe, 15. 
725 Von Wright, UPe, 20. 
726 Davidson (1970, 211) disagrees: ”[...] the distinguishing feature of the mental is not that it is private, 
subjective or immaterial….” 
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cannot be conclusive. Only the subject knows what the case is. A non-conscious belief, on the 
other hand, can be attributed beyond “reasonable doubt”. There are, or can be, reasons which 
conclusively justify our belief that Georg believes that “Paris is the capital of France”. There 
is no evidence which would conclusively justify the attribution of the same beliefC to Georg. 
To claim that conscious states necessarily have a subjective aspect which cannot be captured 
from the outside is merely to note that there are different kinds of mental phenomena and, as 
far as I can see, Davidson’s and von Wright’s conception of mental phenomena fits better 
with the view that we need not be aware of mental states, although these states can still be 
attributed to us. This could be taken to mean that consciousness is not an essential feature of 
mental phenomena. Unlike Davidson’s view, von Wright’s understanding of the nature of the 
mental  captures  the  essential  feature  of  the  mental  –  its  subjectivity.  I  think  we  should  
appraise von Wright’s approach, because I fail to see what reason there could be to call non-
conscious phenomena “mental”. Strictly speaking, we should say that there are no such things 
as non-conscious beliefs just as there are no non-conscious pains. Such “beliefs” deserve not 
to be called mental. I will return to discussing the importance of this view when the problem 
of mental causation is addressed in chapter four. 
 
2.5.2 Radical interpretation – Davidson’s conception of the mental  
  
It could be claimed that there is a quite obvious reason why Davidson remains silent about the 
subjective aspect of mental states. His conception of the mental is based on the view that facts 
about mental phenomena are publicly available, and thus nothing inner can be of interest in 
deciding whether a person is in a mental state. Davidson’s famous idea of radical 
interpretation is based on the conviction that there cannot be facts about what a person means 
or believes which would transcend our ways of knowing them. The use of a conceptual tool 
like radical interpretation reflects Davidson’s philosophical interests; he wants to understand 
how we are able to understand others. 
 The question of what understanding others involves was a central question in 
Davidson’s philosophy from the beginning. In the first place, the considerations about 
interpretation were meant to help to answer a question in the philosophy of language. The 
question which troubled Davidson during the 1960s was “What is meaning?” Instead of trying 
to answer this question, Davidson proposed that one should try to give an answer to different 
question, namely “What would it suffice an interpreter to know in order to understand the 
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speaker of an alien language and how could he come to know it?”727 Davidson’s description 
how a theory of meaning could be verified is expressed in his idea of radical interpretation. In 
Davidson’s early writings, radical interpretation was a methodological device meant to help to 
clarify questions about meaning. Later the notion of interpretation came to be the central 
notion in Davidson’s philosophy. The importance of this concept becomes clear from the 
following quote: 
 
It is always possible… to improve one’s understanding of another, by enlarging the database, by adding 
another dose of sympathy or imagination, or by learning more about the things the subject knows about. 
This is the process of radical interpretation. There is no further court of appeal, no impersonal 
objective standard against which to measure our own best judgments of the rational and the true.728 
 
The quote shows how interpretation has gotten a central role in Davidson’s view concerning 
our understanding of ourselves and the world. In his later works, the importance of 
interpretation is highlighted to the extent that it is an indispensable requisite for language and 
thought and a necessary condition for acquiring the concepts of truth, objectivity and reality. 
Questions about rationality and truth make sense only against the standard which is set by the 
intersubjectivity of interpretation. When this principle is applied to the philosophy of mind, it 
can be said that questions about the nature of mental states make sense only against this same 
standard. What often goes neglected in the discussions about the status of radical 
interpretation are the questions which interest Davidson, and of which the approach of radical 
interpretation is meant to provide clarification.  Davidson notes, for example: “I have long 
been puzzled by the question as to what it is about human behavior, verbal and otherwise, that 
makes it possible for us to figure out… what others think and mean, want and intend.729 The 
question is what it is about behavior which allows the inference to mental phenomena; a 
discussion, for example, about the brain would not answer this question. Davidson thinks that 
by discussing the nature of radical interpretation an answer, which goes to the basis of how 
we are able to understand other people, can be achieved. As he says:  
 
Radical interpretation will throw light on the question of how we can tell when a creature has a genuine 
concept…. The point of the study of radical interpretation is to grasp how it is possible for one person to 
come to understand the speech and thoughts of another, for this ability is basic to our sense of a world 
independent of ourselves, and hence to the possibility of thought itself.”730  
 
                                               
727 Davidson, 1994, 126.  
728 Davidson, 1994a, 232, emphasis mine. 
729 Davidson, 1999b, 155. 
730 Davidson, 2001f, 123, 127. Compare: “I want to know what it is about propositional thought that makes it 
intelligible to others.” (Davidson, 1995a, 14)  
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I would claim that these questions are of fundamental interest to a radical interpreter. The 
main motivation behind radical interpretation is not, as for example Glock claims, the 
 
[…] hope of accommodating apparently recalcitrant phenomena like meaning and thought within a 
naturalistic framework. If radical...interpretation is possible even in principle, this will show how our 
rich intensional and semantic concepts and statements can be derived from, albeit not strictly reduced 
to, something more basic.731 
 
Glock continues: “If we can show that meaning and understanding are possible on an austere 
extensional and physicalist basis, the threat which these higher level phenomena pose to a 
naturalistic world-view seems to be defused.”732 In his study of Quine and Davidson, Glock 
writes that Davidson regards as problematic concepts that are both semantic and intensional or 
linguistic (like meaning, synonymy and reference). These concepts do not appear on 
Davidson’s list of elementary concepts. Given that the intentional supervenes on the non-
intentional, the purpose is to bridge the gap between them. This would mean that the puzzling 
phenomena which exhibit intentionality could be analyzed in terms of more basic, non-
intentional phenomena. A theory about problematic phenomena like thought should be based 
on more elementary evidence. Ultimately this evidence is the physical behavior of people, 
which can be interpreted without mental concepts. If this willingness to promote extensional 
concepts is indeed present in Davidson, it is plausibly interpreted as a remaining piece of 
influence from Quine and the positivists. Indeed, Glock claims that Davidson’s alleged move 
away from Quine’s behaviorism is “half-hearted and does not make interpretation from 
scratch intelligible.”733 Again, this interpretation is similar to the one suggested by Mullhall, 
who claims the following of Davidson’s view:  
 
The world we really perceive is radically devoid of any human significance, until we use our 
interpretative theorizing to organize…primitive data into units of human meaning – words, actions, 
                                               
731 Glock, 2003, 169, my emphasis.     
732 Glock, 2003, 249, my emphasis. This view sounds similar to Mullhall’s (1987, 322): “Davidson’s 
commitment to the notion of bare sounds and bare movements is strikingly analogous to empiricist sense-datum 
theories of knowledge: in both, it is presupposed that everyday experience of the world can be illuminatingly 
viewed as a logical or theoretical construction out of brute data – “the given”; and in both… an unsubstantiated 
belief in the possibility of a systematic redescription of the everyday world in terms of this postulated category 
of brute data is held to reveal something fundamental about the ontology of that world…. If this notion of the 
given is juxtaposed with the picture of alienation from language and other people, we can see how much of 
Davidson’s world-view is the result of Quinean influence.” Glock thinks that, according to Davidson, intensional 
concepts pose some kind of threat to a “naturalistic framework” which can however be solved. Mullhall makes 
the same point when he notes that Quine and Davidson want to show that intensional concepts are no threat to a 
physicalistic worldview. Indeed, by showing how intensionality reduces to “brute data” we would show 
something fundamental about the ontology of the world.    
733 Glock, 2003, 188. On the other hand, puzzlingly enough, Glock (2003a, 353) admits that “the  perspective of 
the radical interpreter is not unduly behaviourist or verificationist.” 
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gestures…the significance and the humanity we find in…phenomena of our everyday life are a result of 
our reading our concepts into the data we directly apprehend.734 
 
I think we should strongly disagree with this kind of interpretation.735 Radical interpretation 
does not provide, and is not meant to provide, a reduction of intensional concepts to 
something else although, in Davidson’s words, it is “an important step in the direction of 
reducing complex and relatively theoretical intensional concepts to intensional concepts that 
in application are closer to publicly observable behavior.”736 Notice: intensional and closer, 
but still not reducible, to publicly observable behavior. Against Glock, I must doubt that 
Davidson would have thought that higher level phenomena pose a “threat” to a naturalistic 
world view.737 In  order  for  them to  be  a  threat,  one  would  first  have  to  accept  the  idea  that  
lower level phenomena are somehow more natural than others. Davidson, however, stands 
firmly against this view.738 There are no epistemological priorities between the descriptive 
levels, and we are equally in touch with reality through different ways of describing it. I admit 
that this interpretation is somewhat controversial because, as we have seen, in Davidson’s 
philosophy of mind there is a certain bias towards the physical.739 It should also be recognized 
that Davison claims that it would be desirable to base semantic theory on non-semantic 
evidence, because this kind of “reduction” would make for “conceptual progress.”740 In the 
same  context  Davidson  notes,  rather  cryptically:  “An  attempt  to  build  [the  theory]  on  even  
more elementary evidence, say behavioristic evidence, could only make the task of theory 
construction harder, though it might make it more satisfying.”741 I do not want to speculate on 
the question of how this remark should be interpreted, but I admit that it could support the 
view that Davidson is a true Quinean-behaviorist or eliminativist in disguise. However, this 
would go so clearly against the spirit of Davidson’s overall anti-reductionism that I reject the 
possibility.  
                                               
734 Mullhall, 1987, 322. 
735 Davidson (2001f, 132) notes: “Of course, propositional attitudes are involved; they just aren’t expressed, in 
the theory, in a way that individuates attitudes generally, and in a way that would make the theory circular.”  
736 Davidson, 1980, 4, my emphasis. 
737 Davidson (2001d, 11) notes: “Our failure to provide an analysis of the concept…of thought…does not mean 
there is something hopelessly mysterious about [this concept]; it only reflects the fact that intentional phenomena 
cannot be reduced to something simpler or different.” 
738 With respect to the purpose of radical interpretation, commentators have drawn interestingly opposite 
conclusions. Glock (2003, 182) claims that: “Davidson seeks to extract rich semantic concepts and statements 
from evidence which he considers to be more basic, because it can be described in non-semantic terms.” This 
should be compared to Evnine (1991, 101):  By admitting that the evidence for a theory of meaning is not 
entirely non-semantic, Davidson is opposing reductionism. Semantic facts cannot after all be extracted from 
purely non-semantic facts, as behaviorists and other reductionists have hoped.” 
739 This problem will be considered in section 2.7 
740 Davidson, 1974a, 142.  
741 Ibid. 
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 As far as the details of radical interpretation are concerned, the original idea of radical 
interpretation is wholly theoretical and methodological. Its purpose is to give a suggestion of 
how one could come to know that an interpretee means one thing or another, or has one belief 
or another. A philosopher is looking for a fundamental answer and this kind of answer cannot 
be had if  too many of the things that she wants to explain are assumed. Only by taking the 
position of radical interpreter can we hope to answer the question of what the conditions on 
the possibility of understanding are. What is relevant to the question about the nature of 
mental states is that one cannot assume that one knows the content of those states before 
interpretation  has  started.  One  does  not  start  with  a  class  of  mental  states  as  though it  were  
already transparent what those states are. Instead, if one is looking for a fundamental answer, 
one  has  to  start  without  any  assumptions.  This  remark  can  be  applied  to  the  case  of  mental  
properties and to the problems they allegedly pose for non-reductive physicalists. Kim and 
others start with the assumption that the nature of mental properties is transparent and then go 
on  to  ask  what  their  relation  to  physical  properties  is.  However,  I  have  suggested  that  this  
approach errs in its assumption that we understand clearly the nature of mental properties. 
The fact that the available evidence for the attribution of mental phenomena must be 
restricted led Davidson to invent the thought experiment of radical interpretation. Originally, 
the problem was formulated in terms of the question of how a field-linguist could come to 
understand a speaker of a foreign language. The motivation behind this thought-experiment 
should be clear. One wants to try to find out what it is about thoughts and meanings that 
makes them interpretable and understandable. What is it about humans and their behavior that 
enables us to know what other people think and mean? People are not the kind of mind-
readers described in science fiction stories and they cannot assume, at least not when doing 
philosophy, that they know what other people are thinking. If a conclusion that people in fact 
make such assumptions is reached, a philosopher wants to know on what these assumptions 
are based. This, incidentally, is a good example of Davidson’s philosophical strategy in 
general. He wants to know how understanding is possible, in principle. Davidson is not 
suggesting that radical interpretation models the actual competence of a field linguist, child, 
or an adult interpreting the linguistic behavior of another with a homophonic translation 
manual.  He  says:  “The  approach  to  the  problems  of  meaning,  belief  and  desire  that  I  have  
outlined is not… meant to throw any direct light on how we master our first concepts and our 
first language”.742 However, it should also be noticed that all the three cases mentioned above 
                                               
742 Davidson, 1980, 12. Exactly the same point is repeated ten years later (Davidson, 1990, 325), so it is clear 
that on this issue Davidson’s views remained steady.  He repeatedly emphasizes that the model of radical 
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are instances of radical interpretation. The case of a field linguist, made famous by Quine, 
should be straightforward. A non-linguistic child is also an example of a radical interpreter, 
since  the  child  has  to  go  on  without  any  prior  knowledge  of  the  meanings or beliefs of  the  
people he is observing. Finally, according to Davidson, an everyday interpretative situation is 
also an instance of radical interpretation. Doesn’t this sound contradictory? On the one hand it 
is being repeatedly claimed that radical interpretation is not meant to throw any direct light on 
how we actually understand other people; on the other hand, Davidson claims that all 
understanding involves radical interpretation.  
I believe there is a simple solution to this confusion.743 Davidson has noted that there 
is an “official” and “unofficial” story about radical interpretation.744 The official version is the 
theoretical idea that Davidson first suggested in his article “Radical Interpretation”.745 
According to this official formulation, it is essential to show how a theory of meaning can be 
interpreted without appeal to any evidence that assumes the individuation of the contents of 
any propositional attitude. The merit of the official story lies not in its plausibility as an 
account of how a person actually understands others, but in the fact that it amounts to an 
“informal proof” of the adequacy of the theory to yield what is needed to support the 
interpretation of basic propositional attitudes. This is an idealized model, and it does not 
attempt to say anything about how people actually operate in actual situations of 
interpretation. The purpose of the model is to describe sufficient conditions for understanding.  
The “unofficial story” is closer to our intuitions concerning the details of everyday 
understanding. People never have enough of the sort of evidence which would be needed to 
follow the  official  route,  and  they  always  have  a  great  deal  of  other  sorts  of  evidence.  The  
claim that all understanding involves radical interpretation is meant to highlight only that 
what someone means is always an empirical question, since there are no such entities as 
determinate meanings. There is no more in meaning than what can be found out in the process 
of interpretation. Understanding requires interpretation, and a theory of interpretation is a 
general theory of what understanding people involves. Davidson has detailed views about the 
question of what understanding requires. They need not concern us here.  
                                                                                                                                                            
interpretation should not be seen as a suggestion of how we actually understand each other. See for example, 
Davidson, 1973a, 1984, 1994, 1994b, 1995a, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f and 2000. 
743 Davidson (1994) himself notes that his view about radical interpretation have not always been steady. This 
being the case, perhaps one should not even try to find a solution to the conflict. I believe, however, that a 
solution is quite easily reached. 
744 See Davidson, 1994 and 1995a.  
745 Davidson, 1973a. 
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 The famous slogan that “meaning is use” has been interpreted in many ways. 
However, to acknowledge that use creates meaning explains the focus on radical 
interpretation. The claim “meaning is use” is not a definition of meaning; it is rather an 
acknowledgement of the view that attributions of meaning must be tied to observable 
behavior. It is to acknowledge that there are no mysterious entities ‘out there’ called 
meanings. Words do not have meanings intrinsically, they have meanings only because they 
are used in certain ways. What holds for meaning, holds also for belief.746 Davidson argues 
that behavior is the main evidential basis for attributions of belief, and that the attributions of 
beliefs are supervenient on behavior.747 This does not amount to traditional behaviorism. 
Davidson notes: “Propositional attitudes can be discovered by an observer who witnesses 
nothing but behavior without the attitudes being in any way reducible to behavior.”748 
Although attitudes are not strictly reducible to behavior, there are “conceptual ties”, which are 
sufficient to allow inferences from behavior to the attitudes.749 A complex enough pattern of 
behavior,  or  a  reason  to  believe  that  there  could  be  such  a  pattern,  is  required  for  the  
attribution of a single thought. A strong claim is made when Davidson argues that “unless 
there is actually such a complex pattern of behavior, there is no thought.”750 Three theses of 
neo-behaviorism influence Davidson’s views. First, mental states supervene on behavior. 
Second, because of “conceptual ties”, behavior is sufficient for inferences to attitudes, and, 
finally, there must be a complex pattern of behavior found if mental states are to be attributed 
to somebody or something. Davidson does not object to a mild form of behaviorism: 
“Behaviorism is objectionable only if it maintains that mental states are nothing but the 
phenomena we normally take to be evidence for them; or that mental concepts can be 
explicitly defined in terms of the behavioral concepts.”751 Davidson is not committed to these 
doctrines and claims that accusations of behaviorism aimed at him are therefore misguided.752  
 What is the main reason to insist that evidence for the existence of mental states must 
be publicly available, at least in principle? It is the conviction that language is “intrinsically 
                                               
746 Davidson has the view that there cannot be thought without language. The reasons for this are too 
complicated to explicate here. Let us therefore only note that the connection between language and thought, 
according to Davidson, is essential. Also von Wright thinks that thought requires language, although he does not 
give as clear reasons for this view s Davidson. For Davidson’s reasons see for example Davidson 1975, 1990b, 
1991, 1992, 1994a, 2000, and the views put forward in interviews with Gluer, 1995 and Borradori, 1994. 
747 This raises an interesting question about the exact nature of Davidson’s supervenience, which will be 
considered in section 4.1.1. 
748 Davidson, 1982, 100. 
749 This reminds us of Wittgenstein (1992, 63e): ”The inner is tied up with the outer not only empirically, but 
also logically”. 
750 Davidson, 1982, 100. 
751 Davidson, 1986, 200, my emphasis. Perhaps the same could be said about “nothing but” materialism. 
752 This criticism against Davidson is repeatedly raised by Fodor. 
265 
 
social.” Davidson claims that “everyone” can agree to the following: “Whatever there is of 
interest to the notion of linguistic meaning has to be something that one person can figure out 
about another, because the whole point of language and meaning is communication.”753 Since 
language  is  essentially  a  tool  for  communication  the  claim  is  that:  “whatever it is about 
speech that makes it useful for communication, has to be conveyed by the publicly observed 
behavior of language users.”754 Given the view that communication is the main function of 
language, it is only a short step to claim that: “Language is a social art which we all acquire 
on the evidence solely of other people’s overt behavior under publicly recognizable 
circumstances,”755 or that “public availability is a constitutive aspect of language,”756 or that 
“language is necessarily a social affair.”757 The consequence of this is the view that meaning 
has its life only in successful cases of communication. There is no “real” meaning which 
could completely transcend the powers of recognition. For a child learning a language, the 
only evidence available comes in the form of observable facts. Usually from this starting point 
the child eventually becomes an adult capable of using language fluently. We learn our 
language by observing the linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour of others. Davidson notes: 
“[…] the irreducible element of behaviourism implicit in the radical interpreter’s point of 
view is that what can be learned of how others react to the world and use words is learned by 
observation of what those others do.”758 This claim would be challenged by “nativists” like 
Chomsky and Fodor; here I am not taking a stance on the question but merely describing what 
Davidson’s view is.759 The emphasis on behavior means that non-observable facts cannot add 
any relevant information to linguistic meaning. The facts that are not observable in overt 
circumstances are irrelevant to linguistic meaning, at least as long as the concept of meaning 
is not turned into a technical notion that is separated from the actual use of language. Because 
meaning and thought are social phenomena, the evidence for them must be publicly available. 
The public availability should be taken literally; the evidence must be available to anyone 
who is capable of understanding another speaker. This explains why brain states, for example, 
are not really publicly available, although they are available in principle. 
                                               
753 Bergström, Föllesdal, 1993, 213. 
754 Davidson, 2003, 284-285, my emphasis. 
755 Quine, 1969a, 26. 
756 Davidson, 1990, 314. Davidson (ibid.) refers especially to Wittgenstein as the source of this view: “As 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and many others have insisted, language is intrinsically social. This does not entail that 
truth and meaning can be defined in terms of observable behavior, or that it is ‘nothing but’ observable behavior; 
but it does imply that meaning is entirely determined by observable behavior.…” 
757 Davidson, 1992, 117. 
758 Davidson, 2003a, 692. 
759 Davidson (2000) himself notes that those who embrace conceptual atomism may merely have a different 
understanding of the question what counts as a ”concept”. 
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 An approach to the mind which emphasizes the necessity of interpretation has 
important consequences for the question of what the nature of mental states is. The third 
person perspective on mental phenomena emphasizes the inevitable intersubjective and 
objective elements of mental phenomena. In this approach, there is perhaps no place for the 
subjective awareness which I have suggested as being an essential feature of mental states. 
Davidson writes: “[…] what a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker 
means is all there is to learn… the same goes for what the speaker believes.”760 What a fully 
informed interpreter could learn captures the whole truth about the beliefs of an interpretee. 
This could be seen as an unjustified move from an epistemological premise to an ontological 
conclusion. Colin McGinn has raised this criticism against Wittgenstein and Antony claims 
that non-reductive physicalists are confusing epistemological and ontological issues.761  
 Here Davidson’s understanding of “intentional realism” creates a tension between him 
and those naturalists who claim that there must be interpretation-independent facts about 
mental phenomena. It seems to me that if we consider how psychological language is usually 
used or consider how language in general seems to be learned, Davidson’s realism agrees with 
our intuitions better than the view claiming that the facts about mental phenomena must be 
interpretation-independent. Wittgenstein once wrote that the essence of the mental is not 
something that can be clearly shown; only its different features can be described. He also 
suggested that by investigating the laws of evidence for the mental we are investigating the 
essence of the mental.762 The  way  I  read  these  remarks  is  that  there  is  no  “essence”  of  the  
mental;  the  only  nature  of  the  mental  that  we  can  find  is  a  result  of  our  describing  certain  
important features of mental phenomena. What a Davidsonian approach is attempting to do is 
to describe these features. Davidson claims: “[…] speakers of natural language can be, and 
often are, correctly understood on the basis of non-linguistic facts not merely available, but 
readily available, to the likes of you and me.”763 This kind of view is justified if we consider 
how linguistic practices actually work. Also here Wittgenstein’s lesson seems relevant. He 
suggested that instead of guessing how a word functions one should look and see how a word 
or expression actually works in the life of humans. Instead of speculating, we should consider: 
“is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original 
home?”764 Davidson argues that one can be a realist about mental phenomena who thinks that 
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761 McGinn, 1984, Antony, 1999. 
762 Wittgenstein, 1992. 
763 Davidson, 1994, 126. 
764 Wittgenstein, 1953, §116. 
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there are correct and incorrect interpretations of what a speaker means by his words and what 
he thinks. This version of realism is based on the conviction that the primary and ultimate 
source of meaning lies in successful interpersonal communication. The original home of the 
language game of the mental is the language of the everyday, and a realistic conception of the 
mental can be built on this ground. This kind of realism looks suspicious only if one has a 
“Cartesian, individualistic conception of meaning and the intentional….”765 I  think  
Davidson’s realism seems inappropriate only if we think that what someone means or 
believes is absolutely independent of what is understood by others, or that expressions have 
meanings that are independent of the facts about how people understand each other in the 
course of life. According to this view, it could turn out that the evidence for the attribution of 
meanings and beliefs could always lead one astray. But, so I think, we must stand on some 
ground; we manage to communicate most of the time and we successfully attribute mental 
phenomena to others. This obvious fact can be our starting point.  
 It may be difficult to justify going from an epistemological premise to an ontological 
conclusion, but it is difficult to challenge the view on which the conclusion is based – namely, 
that the best interpretation an interpreter can produce is  as  objectively  correct  as  it  can  be. 
The objectivity of interpretations could be challenged if we had another view of what beliefs 
are “really like”. The objectivity of attributions based on the folk-psychological method could 
be challenged if we had a convincing alternative which describes what mental phenomena 
really are. Eliminative materialists, for example, claim that they do have a conception of what 
beliefs really are: they are mere fictions. As a challenge to this suggestion, we should ask on 
which conception, on the folk-psychological one or on the eliminativist one, are our lives and 
practices actually based? 
 
2.5.3 Interpretation and the nature of mental states 
 
Davidson’s position has been perspicuously termed as a form of “third-person Cartesianism”, 
the basic idea being that under ideal conditions, people can have complete and infallible 
access to the mental lives of others.766 Davidson writes: “Thoughts, desires, and other 
attitudes are in their nature states we are equipped to interpret; what we could not interpret is 
                                               
765 Davidson, 1994, 127. 
766 This expression is from Byrne, 1994, who uses it to describe a contemporary form of behaviorism which he 
attributes especially to Davidson and Dennett. 
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not thought.”767 This is a strong claim which expresses Davidson’s understanding of the 
concept of thought or of the mental more generally. Criticism against this understanding can 
obviously be raised and Davidson admits that: “I (perhaps somewhat arbitrarily) restrict the 
word ‘thought’ to mental states and events with propositional contents.”768 Davidson is thus 
trying to define the concept of thought. Davidson’s understanding of how concepts can be 
defined was described in section 1.2.2.769 
 If we accept that a third-person view of mental phenomena is mandatory, what can 
be said about the nature of mental states that are being attributed as a result of interpretation? 
From considerations of how interpretation has to proceed, Davidson draws various 
conclusions. Interpretation must proceed so that the interpreter uses his own norms in trying 
to understand a person. A caveat with respect to the expression how “interpretation must 
proceed”  needs  to  be  noted.  As  I  showed in  the  previous  section,  at  times  Davidson  claims  
that his proposal should be understood as a suggestion about how interpretation could 
proceed, and it is not meant to describe how humans actually master their first concepts or 
learn language. In this sense, it could be argued that Davidson is not claiming how 
interpretation must proceed; he is not providing necessary conditions for interpretation.770 But 
it  is  also  clear  that  various  suggestions  of  Davidson’s  show  that  for  him  the  approach  of  
radical interpretation is a mandatory perspective. The third person approach to language and 
thought is not a mere philosophical exercise. 
 An interpreter has to consider how to make best sense of the person to whom mental 
states  are  being  attributed.  In  the  act  of  interpretation,  the  causes  of  beliefs  have  to  be  
evaluated  as  well  as  the  logical  or  conceptual  relations  between  beliefs.  These  relations  
specify the content of a specific belief. A thorough discussion of holism, externalism, and 
normative constraints would be required for a full picture of the Davidsonian conception of 
the mental.771 However, such discussion is not essential in order to understand what the 
general nature of mental phenomena and their relation to physical phenomena are.772 A 
clarification of this issue is essential for a discussion of the irreducibility of the mental and the 
problem of mental causation. 
                                               
767 Davidson, 1990b, 14. 
768 Davidson, 1999k, 327. 
769 For Davidson’s definition of thought see Davidson, 1989, 1990b and especially, 1995. 
770 On the other hand Davidson (1994b) notes that by not describing actual practices  he  tried  to  find  out  and 
clarify what is necessary for linguistic communication. 
771 I explored these questions in my Master’s thesis (Kuusela, 2001).  
772 How externalism, normativity, and holism relate to the irreducibility of the mental will be discussed in 
chapter three. 
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 The only measuring stick that can be used when interpreting others are our own 
beliefs.  We  understand  others  if  we  can  make  some  sense  of  them  from our point of view. 
This is not the case when we try to understand or explain physical phenomena. The process of 
attributing mental states to others is called interpretation for a reason; two systems of beliefs 
need to be correlated. The nature of the physical can be studied by making observations, 
whereas the interpretee’s belief system is understood only to the extent that it makes sense 
from the perspective of the belief-system of the interpreter. The two belief-systems must “fit” 
somehow; if  we could not understand the other at  all,  what would be the reason to attribute 
mental  states  to  him  (it?)  at  all?  Truths  about  the  physical  can  be,  and  in  fact  have  to  be,  
established without interpretation. These truths are a result of observing how things are. In the 
case of mental phenomena, there are no such interpretation-independent truths because facts 
about the mental are construed in the process of interpretation. What linguistic or non-
linguistic behavior means is always an open question, for which multiple answers can be 
given. Subjective decisions must be made when interpreting others. The use of subjective 
evaluation is not necessarily required in the course of understanding others in the everyday 
life, but it remains as a principled difference between understanding others and explaining 
mindless nature. Why think that this is how the nature of the mental should be understood? I 
believe that most of us are familiar with the concept of ‘thought’; we have an intuitive grasp 
of this concept. Given what we mean by it, Davidson’s conclusion is that: “A creature that 
cannot in principle be understood in terms of our own beliefs and mode of communication is 
not a creature that may have thoughts radically different from our own: it is a creature without 
what we mean by thoughts.”773 Can  this  view  be  shown  to  be  true?  Perhaps  not,  but  if  the  
Davidsonian conception is rejected, then the challenge is to explicate what we do mean by our 
concept “thought”. Why use this term to describe states that we cannot understand? This is 
partly  a  terminological  question,  but  it  also  challenges  us  to  contemplate  the  nature  of  our  
actual concepts. 
 Many critics have argued that emphasizing the primacy of interpretation has the 
consequence that mental facts turn out to be less real than other facts. Antony has claimed that 
from the perspective of AM, a mental–physical identity cannot be a “genuine fact.”774 The 
question which directly concerns the reality of mental phenomena is this. Does interpretation 
create order  in  the  belief  system  of  the  interpretee,  an  order  which  did  not  exist  before  
interpretation started? I think this could be argued. Davidson namely notes: “It is an artifact 
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of the interpreter’s correct interpretation of a person’s speech and attitudes that there is a large 
degree of truth and consistency in the thought and speech of an agent.”775 Consistency of 
thought is a prerequisite of interpretation, because without some consistency no sense of the 
other could be made. On the other hand, Davidson writes: “Sentences have logical relations 
with other sentences, and interpretation must, as far as possible, preserve these relations.”776 
My question is whether there is (already) consistency in the thought and speech of the other 
person and we preserve it in interpretation, or is the consistency an artifact of interpretation? 
If the consistency of interpretee’s thought is a result of the interpretation-process, doesn’t this 
imply that the reality of mental states is of a different sort than the reality of purely physical 
states? If events are mental only as described, is it correct to say that the existence of mental 
events is language-dependent whereas the existence of physical events is not?777  
 Given the “constructivist” element of interpretation, it seems unclear what Davidson’s 
position with respect to the reality of mental states is. The question of Davidson’s relation to 
intentional realism has been an issue under debate, dividing critics considerably. It is 
interesting that the conclusions are so diverse; I believe the reason for this is the difference of 
opinion as to what “intentional realism” requires. Many, for example Antony,778 Klagge,779 
Rawling,780 Jacob,781 Skillen,782 and Campbell783 see  Davidson  as  a  mental  antirealist.  This  
form of antirealism could be associated with a form of eliminativism. What these critics share 
is the view that the nature of interpretation, especially the requirement that interpretation 
should proceed according to normative standards, leads to antirealist results. Others, like 
                                               
775 Davidson, 1983, 150, my emphasis. 
776 Davidson, 1999,307,  my emphasis. 
777 For this question see Emiliani, 2001 and Up. 
778 Antony (1989, 179) claims that, according to Davidson, “one should look upon psychological hypotheses not 
–  as  one  views  hypotheses  in  the  physical  sciences  –  as  our  best  guesses  about  the  nature  of  an  objective  
phenomenon, but rather as artifacts reflective of our current stage of self-interpretation.” Antony concludes that 
given the “radically constructivist” position of Davidson, Dennett’s theory of mind is what Davidson should 
really have. We should note that Davidson (1997c) explicitly distanced his position from that of Dennett’s. 
779 “We ascribe beliefs and desires to people, in part, as a way of understanding, predicting, and appraising their 
behavior. Thus, the mental becomes more a way of seeing people than it is something in people that can be 
seen… this aspect of Davidson’s views pulls away from his seemingly realistic conception of the mental” 
(Klagge, 1990, 342) .  
780 Rawling, 2001, 2003.  
781 Jacob, 1997. 
782 Skillen, 1984. 
783 “Since an individual’s mental states depend on an interpretation of that individual’s behaviour… and the 
states ascribed at any one time may later be over-ruled if the interpretation requires alteration in light of new 
behaviour… there is no fact of the matter about someone’s mental states. This dependence of mental states’ 
ascription on interpretation is not unlike a form of anti-realism since on this view mental states become 
recognition – (or interpretation-) dependent.” (Campbell, 1997, 379) Campbell concludes that it is unlikely that 
one could find “compelling reasons” to believe that Davidson is a realist about mental properties. In making this 
claim, Campbell is one of the commentators who correctly see that the antirealism could be seen as a result of 
Davidson’s general attitude towards properties. 
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Joseph,784 Dennett,785  and Heil786 interpret Davidson as a realist. They think that this position 
follows from Davidson’s monism. If each mental event is identical to some physical event, 
how could the former be less real than the latter? Davidson himself has raised this question by 
asking: “How could there be a question about the ontology of  mental  entities  for  me if,  as  I  
hold, mental entities are identical with entities we also describe and explain, in different 
terms, in the natural sciences?”787 We should note how Davidson here ties ontology to natural 
sciences. Some e.g. Kim,788 Evnine,789 Hornsby,790 and Melchert791see Davidson’s position as 
a middle position between antirealism and realism. They claim that Davidson’s theory of 
mind is not easily labeled as realist or antirealist. With this interpretation I am essentially in 
agreement. As I mentioned in section 2.5.2, Davidson’s form of intentional realism is of a 
peculiar sort.  
But why do so many critics see Davidson as an intentional antirealist? I think that the 
essential  question  that  must  be  considered  is  that  of  what  realism  with  respect  to  mentality  
requires. Critics seem to conclude that interpretation-dependence leads to irrealism because 
what “truly exists”, what is real, must exist independently of us. In my view, the question of 
how the reality of mentality should be understood in the Davidsonian context is very well 
captured by Melchert: 
 
What then is an intention or a thought? It is whatever we correctly call an intention or thought. But what 
is it really?  Here  is  the  anomalous  monist’s  response  to  that  question;  if  by  ‘really’ you mean “apart 
from all descriptions”, there is not and cannot be any answer; but if you mean, What is the really 
correct description of it? You must specify the regulative and constitutive principles for some system of 
description, and then it will really be what the system describes it  to be. So a certain event is really a 
thought (relative to the intentional principles of description), and it is really a brain process (relative to 
physical principles).792  
 
                                               
784 ”[…] mental events are tokenwise identical to physical events, hence, unless he is guilty of gross 
inconsistency, Davidson cannot have denied existence to mental events but not physical events. The methods 
that govern our psychological attributions have no bearing on whether the subjects of those attributions 
exist…therefore their normative character cannot undermine the objectivity of mental events.” (Joseph, 2004, 
167.) 
785 Dennett, 1991. 
786 Heil, 1992. This being the case, it is surprising that Heil (2004) sees Davidson’s approach as being opposite 
to “realistic” theories of mind. 
787 Davidson, 1999o, 595. 
788 ”[…] the normativity of the intentional language does not entail its irrealism, but it does raise questions…. If 
beliefs are essentially normative and are posited because of our normative requirement, are there beliefs in the 
same sense in which there are physical objects and events, like trees and explosions?” (Kim, 2003, 134.)  
789 Evnine, 1991. 
790 Hornsby, 1997. 
791 Melchert, 1986. 
792 Melchert, 1986, 271. 
272 
 
I believe this description captures the Davidsonian spirit, which is somewhat reminiscent of 
Wittgenstein who in the Blue Book entertains the following thought experiment.793 Let us 
imagine that a person could observe her own brain while entertaining a thought. She sees the 
thought by seeing her brain and at the same time she is having the thought, that is, thinking 
silently something like “I have a toothache”, to use von Wright’s example. Wittgenstein asks, 
in this kind of case: “[…] is the subject… observing one thing or two things?”794 He notes 
that one of these things the subject could perhaps call “a thought”, the other experience would 
be seeing her brain work. Wittgenstein claims: “Both these phenomena could correctly be 
called ‘expressions of thought’; and the question ‘where is the thought itself?’ had better, in 
order to prevent confusion, be rejected as nonsensical.”795 Von Wright, when discussing a 
similar kind of thought experiment, agrees: “The ‘identity thesis’ now maintains that your 
acoustic sensation is identical with your percept (identical with that which you see in the brain 
mirror). How can this be anything but a tremendous confusion!!”796 Where the thought really 
is, can be answered only if “where” is first interpreted. To ask, outside all descriptions, what 
or in the case of thought, “where”, something really is, is a confusion because the answer will 
always be one or the other of the descriptions. Descriptions in mental terms are in no way less 
real than descriptions given in physical language. To think that the latter would be somehow 
more real is to already commit oneself to a certain understanding of what realism requires or 
what being real means. It is to accept a certain picture which, when accepted, constrains 
philosophical investigations. Thought is no more physical than mental, it is not “really” 
anything, although it can be described in various different ways. Melchert’s description of 
anomalous monist’s response to the question of “what a thought really is” resembles Rorty’s 
more general analysis of Davidson’s position. According to Rorty, the line of argument in 
“Mental Events” leads to the following conclusion:  
 
[…] reality does not have an intrinsic character, but can be described in any way… that language-users 
find  useful.  None  of  these  ways  is  more  faithful  to  what  is  described  than  any  other,  nor  are  there  
philosophical problems about how these various descriptions mesh.797 
 
Whereas I agree that this is how an anomalous monist could respond when charged with the 
“what thought really is” – question, it is not entirely clear that Davidson’s physicalistic 
                                               
793 Wittgenstein, 1958. 
794 Wittgenstein, 1958, 8. 
795 Ibid. 
796 Von Wright, UPg, 25. 
797 Rorty, 1998, 390. 
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ontology  allows  him  this  maneuver.  I  would  also  like  to  emphasize  that  there  is  a  kind  of  
antirealism in Davidson’s view about the mental given that “the process of specifying the 
content of a thought… does not require that we suppose there is a definite… object before the 
mind of the thinker….”798 It seems that on Davidson’s account the idea of a specific content, 
which would be present for the subject, his “private property”, needs to be rejected. One could 
argue that this makes the content of the belief less real in the sense that there is no determinate 
and final answer to the question of what the content is.  
 I would claim that we are familiar with the idea of a specific content through 
introspection, or self-reflection as it could be called. My thoughts do have a determinate 
content. I know what I think when I am having beliefsC. When I am consciously thinking 
something, I know what it is that I think, and the content of that thought is precise. Davidson 
would say that this experience of subjectivity is due to the fact that I must interpret the 
thoughts of others, while it makes no sense to say that attributing thoughts to myself involves 
a process called interpretation. Von Wright would agree with this claim.799 But if this is true, 
then there is an asymmetry with respect to beliefs and beliefsC – and even with beliefsC – 
when seen from the first-person and third-person perspectives. The asymmetry has something 
to do with the fact that I am a sensing subject and I have a special access to my own mental 
states, which the outside observer lacks. When I have beliefsC, the existence of which do not 
depend on interpretation, I cannot be mistaken about the fact that I have a specific beliefC. 
This is because having a specific beliefC is nothing other than having in mind a sentence 
which  expresses  the  content  of  that  belief.  There  is  therefore  no  way  that  one  could  be  
mistaken about the content of beliefC. But it is, of course, possible that interpretation does not 
capture that specific content and yet, pace Davidson, if the interpretee has a clear sentence in 
his mind we cannot insist that beliefC does  not  have  a  specific  content.  For  the  purpose  of  
understanding others, the fact that the specific content cannot be captured from the outside is 
obviously not fatal. People can make sense of each other while rejecting the idea that the 
contents of two minds have to match perfectly. Indeed, Davidson claims: “Success in 
interpretation is always a matter of degree; the resources of thought or expression available to 
an interpreter can never perfectly match the resources of the interpreted”.800 A more general 
observation is:  
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The thing to bear in mind is that interpretation… the understanding of others is a matter of finding a 
best fit. As interpreters, we have our sentences and we assign them… to the sentences and attitudes of 
others, thereby giving those sentences the content we deem best captures what they mean and think. We 
won’t understand them unless we find a core of agreement, but agreement isn’t the aim. The aim is 
understanding… there is no reason to suppose the understanding of another’s utterances is ever prefect, 
nor does it  need to be. The myth of meanings summons up the dream of perfect understanding which 
nothing in the actual process of conversation justifies.801 
 
For the sake of the argument, let us agree that this is plausible view. According to an approach 
which emphasizes the inevitability of interpretation, we interpret people as having thoughts 
and other propositional attitudes – in terms of which we explain their behavior. As I showed 
in section 2.4.3, Davidson claims that beliefs are not little entities lodged inside the brain. An 
important reason for this claim is that in interpreting others we need not think of mental 
phenomena as entities; we should rather see these phenomena as states of whole person. 
William Child, who labels the interpretation-based approach in the philosophy of mind 
interpretationism, notes: “[…] there is no license for thinking of… belief and desire as 
internal states or entities….  For, according to interpretationism, propositional attitudes are 
not entities or items at  all;  and  if  we  think  of  them as  states,  we  think  of  them as  states  of  
people….”802 The reason for claiming that beliefs are not in the brain is thus that the process 
of interpretation in terms of which beliefs are attributed does not imply that beliefs would be 
entities. Because it is also claimed that interpretation captures the whole truth about the 
mental, beliefs are what a correct interpretation concludes them to be, and there is no 
justification for the view that beliefs could be thought of as internal entities. The mainstream 
view in the contemporary philosophy of mind is of course that beliefs are states of the brain. 
But, if we follow interpretationism, this view becomes suspect. As Child notes:  
 
 […] by focusing on the idea of belief as a property of a whole person we do away with the conception 
of beliefs as internal states, states which are literally inside people’s heads.... Interpretationism... stands 
opposed to the view of propositional attitudes as internal states.803  
 
An important consequence, again noted by Child, is that: “The attitudes we cite in explaining 
an action need not correspond to anything running through the agent’s head before she 
acted.”804 But, it seems to me that if this is the case then interpretation fails, at least from time 
to time, to attribute beliefsC to a person because these beliefs do run through an agent’s head 
before she acts. However, we should note that according to Child, the attitudes to which an 
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interpretationist refers in his explanations of others’ actions need not correspond to anything 
in the agent’s head. This, presumably, does not exclude the possibility that the attitudes may 
exist in the head of the interpretee. Yet, what Davidson himself says about the mode of being 
of mental phenomena certainly gives the impression that these phenomena apply to the whole 
person, and it does not make sense to think of them as parts of the brain. How seriously can 
this suggestion be taken if O-physicalism is accepted? 
 
2.5.4 Consequence of interpretationism: Mental phenomena are not states of the brain 
  
My claim is that the reason why the mental mode of being of mental phenomena is important 
is  that  if  the  consequences  of  interpretationism  are  taken  seriously,  no  clear  sense  of  the  
distinction between beliefs and beliefsC can be made. If attitudes do not correspond to 
anything going on in the person’s head, then their reality can be questioned, as many critics 
have indeed done. It seems to me that there is an internal conflict in Davidson’s views; on the 
one hand he has a strongly realistic view about mental phenomena, while on the other hand 
his interpretationism seems to pull to an antirealist direction. Davidson claims that he is a 
realist about psychological descriptions, and that facts about mental phenomena are as 
objective as facts about anything else. Yet, it is also being claimed, for example, that:  
 
[…] it is natural to think of radical interpretation as taking for data not attitudes but the observed ways 
the agent changes (acts) as the environment changes…Given such data…we then hypothesize a set of 
attitudes to explain what we have observed, attitudes which will help predict how people will act in the 
future.805 
 
Davidson also notes: “We, watching a creature adjust its behavior to its needs and 
opportunities, read into that behavior the beliefs and desires and intentions that naturally 
occur in animals with thoughts.“806 These views sound like instrumentalism. If the set of 
attitudes is hypothesized, there remains a doubt about their existence. If it is not required that 
the agent be aware of the attitudes which are being attributed to him, it is always possible that 
the attitudes are non-existent. If they are non-existent, how can they play any role in the 
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causing of behavior? I believe we have reasons to think that mental states are causally related 
internal entities.807 In its denial of this, interpretationism errs. 
The conflict of interpretationism and monism is also evident. If, according to 
interpretationism, mental phenomena are states of the person, what is the reason to claim that 
mental events are also neurophysiological events? It is very difficult to get a clear view from 
Davidson or von Wright which would help us to determine what kind of entities mental 
phenomena are. We are told, by Davidson, that: “Having a belief is not like having a favorite 
cat, it is being in a state….”808 Von Wright has essentially the same view: “Having a sensation 
is not like having an ’object’ – a hat, say. Perhaps the best answer to the question what having 
a sensation is, is to say that it is a state in which a sentient being is.“809 When we describe a 
person having a belief , we describe him as being in a certain kind of state. What can be said 
of this state? Davidson explains: “To have a belief is to have a certain property. From an 
ontological point of view, for a person to have a belief is just what it is like for a room to have 
a temperature.”810 The point of the temperature analogy is to emphasize the following. When 
talking about the temperature of the room one does not need to suppose that there is an entity 
which is the temperature. Likewise, in thinking and talking about the beliefs of people we do 
not need to suppose that there are such entities as  beliefs.  Critics,  e.g.  Rawlings811 and 
Brandl812 have questioned, correctly I think, whether this view implies a kind of antirealism 
with respect to beliefs.  One could of course simply go along with Davidson when he claims 
that beliefs are states and states are not entities. But this kind of talk does not explain much, 
because we are lacking a detailed description of the nature of “states”, “events”, “entities”, 
and “objects”. It is unfortunate that Davidson uses these expressions loosely. In my opinion, 
the analogy between temperature and belief is not very illuminating. What does it mean to say 
that to have a belief is just what it is like for a room to have a temperature? It could be argued 
that there are essential differences between the properties of having a belief and having a 
temperature. The analogy is especially obscure because it is made from an “ontological point 
of view”, the nature of which Davidson does not further elaborate.  
 A belief is a state. A mental event, on the other hand, is a change in a mental 
property.  But  to  say  that  people  have  mental  properties  is  to  say  that  certain  psychological  
                                               
807 The specific reasons for this will be given in chapter four. It should be noted, however, that my claim applies 
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predicates are true of them. Doesn’t this imply that a mental event is a change in the 
conditions under which a mental predicate can be applied to a person? If this is so, it is 
certainly possible that the mental properties of a person can change without any change taking 
place in her brain. Let us suppose that I have a specific beliefC which, according to Davidson, 
means that I have a certain property. Suppose that a mental event occurs, i.e. the specific 
beliefC changes to another beliefC1. If the truth of O-physicalism is accepted, there would be a 
change in my brain state, because my conscious state would change to another conscious 
state. From an “ontological point of view”, the whole story would not be told by saying that 
the  conditions  under  which  a  mental  predicate  can  be  applied  to  me  have  changed.  On  the  
contrary, the application conditions of a predicate need not change at all, and yet a mental 
change may have occurred in me, or more specifically, in my brain. To be exact, the total 
application conditions of a predicate would have changed, because the state of my brain 
would have changed; but this condition cannot be a relevant condition for the interpreter 
operating from a third-person view.  
 Von Wright would claim that to say that a mental change would have occurred in me 
or  in  my brain  is  a  confusing  statement.  He  argues:  “In  the  brain  material  processes  go  on.  
There is no ‘room’ for anything mental. The subject has the sensation. Nothing mental is ‘in’ 
him.”813 With respect to sensations, von Wright concludes that sensation itself is not a state, 
although having a sensation is being in a state. With respect to belief, von Wright is even 
more wary when he wonders:  “[…] is belief a ‘state’? Is it  even ‘mental’? It  may be said in 
reply: faute de mieux we call it a ‘mental state’. It is surely not a ‘physical phenomenon.’”814 I 
think von Wright’s discussion suffers from the same flaw as Davidson’s: both philosophers 
do not clearly describe what they mean by “state” or with other relevant concepts that they 
use. If they are following some standard philosophical usage, they do not mention it. Von 
Wright’s case is even more complicated than Davidson’s, because he leaves the nature of the 
“mental” quite unclarified. What is worthy of praise in von Wright’s approach is his reference 
to the philosopher’s own conceptual intuitions as well as his conviction that philosophy 
should not be in conflict with common sense and everyday language.   
 Above  all  else,  von  Wright  seems  to  resist  the  desire  to  “substantialise”  belief  or  
other mental phenomena. He thinks that mental phenomena should not be understood as being 
something thing-like, but it is hard to see how this tendency could be ignored if, as von 
Wright’s  monism  supposes,  mental  states  are  states  of  the  brain.  Of  course,  if  “’To  have  a  
                                               
813 Von Wright, 1998, 113. 
814 Von Wright, 1998, 118. 
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belief’ is, in some ways, more like something we do than something we… experience”815 then 
there is no reason to think that there has to be state of believing, a brain state of which I am 
aware when I have a belief. But is it correct to claim that to have a belief is not something that 
we experience? If I have a beliefC of  which  I  am  aware  of,  in  what  sense  is  this  not  an  
experience of mine? To have a beliefC is not anything I do, and it is not to be defined in terms 
of what this beliefC is disposed to cause. It is simply my awareness of this beliefC, which 
establishes for me the existence of the beliefC – and this awareness is surely something that I 
experience. It seems to me that von Wright admits this when he notes that: “Is there… such 
thing as a ‘belief feeling’ a touch which singles out a certain mental phenomenon as a belief? 
[...] perhaps there is, in some cases, such a feeling, introspectively recognizable and 
susceptible of a phenomenological description.”816 I think von Wright reaches the right 
conclusion when he notes that:  
 
The mental phenomena or “Cartesian thoughts, i.e. our sensations, beliefs, desires, and volitions, the 
reasons we have for our actions are how we, as subjects, experience that which happens in our neural 
system (brain)…Our own sensations, thoughts, etc. are… experiences we have….817         
 
Here von Wright brings together various kinds of mental phenomena, sensations, beliefs, 
reasons. To define reason as an experience is a promising strategy in the attempt to solve the 
problem of mental causation – as I will argue in section 4.2.2. In another passage, von Wright 
describes the subjective experience of what happens in the brain as “a perceptualization of 
what goes on in the brain.”818 This perceptualization is direct or immediate. Yet, we do not 
observe the neural states as neural; we observe these states as mental.819 This is what grants 
autonomy to a mentalistic conceptualization. This sounds a more plausible understanding of 
the nature of mental phenomena than Davidson’s. Or let us say at the very least that it better 
captures our intuitions, which may of course lead us astray. 
There is nevertheless a hint of constructivism or antirealism in von Wright’s views as 
well, following from his interpretationism. According to him, the mind–body distinction, or 
the  distinction  between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  is  a  distinction  “between  two  ways  of  
                                               
815 Ibid. 
816 Von Wright, 1998, 119-120. 
817 Von Wright, 1994, 148. 
818 Von Wright, UPc, 4. 
819 In order to prevent misunderstanding, it needs to be emphasized that von Wright’s views are not always clear 
with respect to the question of whether we observe the states of brain when we have subjective experiences. 
However, it is plausible to claim that we do not perceptualize these states as neural, because in order to do that 
we would have to literally see our brains. We could see these states as neural, for example, by following a brain-
surgery of our brain but this obviously is something different than our normal way of experiencing these states. 
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looking at living beings.”820 This resembles Davidson’s claim that the mental is a conceptual 
category, one way to see and describe the behavior of fellow humans.821 According to von 
Wright, attributing intentions to a creature is a way to conceptualize its reactions in a certain 
way. As he says: “When movements in or of the body of a living being are understood or 
‘seen’ or described as intentional, I shall say that they are being conceptualized under the 
aspect of intentionality.”822 Sometimes von Wright refers to this aspect with an interesting 
term “aspect of spirituality”. Bodily movements, because they are conceptualized in a certain 
way, are understood as an action of an agent. Von Wright notes: “When understanding the 
movements to ‘mean’ an intentional action we, as it were, ‘ascend’ or ‘leap’ from the world of 
matter to the world of mind (the ‘spirit’).”823 The realm of the mental is constituted through 
certain kinds of conceptualizations. What happens is a “physical thing”, a movement, but we 
have  made  a  transition  to  the  “world  of  the  spirit”,  since  we  have  understood  the  physical  
thing in a certain way. I think that this leap to the world of spirit can also be understood by 
considering the “dualistic” interpretation of von Wright’s emergentism. I showed that von 
Wright likens emergence to a transition from quantity to quality. Perhaps the transition from 
matter to the world of spirit could be thought of as this kind of mysterious leap. 
 Von Wright shares with Davidson the view that any attribution of mental phenomena 
cannot be separated from the contexts in which these attributions are made. What also sounds 
very similar to Davidson’s holistic view is von Wright’s claim that: “In attributing reasons for 
action to an agent we normally also attribute to him various abilities, beliefs, desires and 
inclinations, the understanding of institutions and practices of the community...”824 as well as 
his view that “We attribute to a person a belief on the basis of a complex pattern of his bodily 
reactions (and ‘dispositions’) to react. This is a conceptualization of observations on physical 
phenomena under the aspect of intentionality.”825 The first quote fits well with Davidson’s 
view about the properties of mental states, and the second quote agrees with his view of 
radical interpretation. Davidson and von Wright agree that mental ascriptions are strongly 
context-dependent and therefore always open to reinterpretation, and in this sense to “non-
factuality.” 
                                               
820 Von Wright, 1998, 148. 
821 As I have argued, this is precisely how some critics interpret Davidson’s position and therefore describe it as 
a form of non-descriptivism or antirealism. As Klagge (1990, 344, my emphasis) claims: “Davidson seems to 
hold that mental judgments embody a way of seeing certain beings, rather than reflecting something in 
them…that non-descriptivism constitutes a form of anti-realism seems fairly uncontroversial.”  
822 Von Wright, 1998, 99. 
823 Von Wright, 1998, 106. 
824 Von Wright, 1998, 27. 
825 Von Wright, 1998, 119. 
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I think we can conclude that if the lesson of interpretationism is taken seriously, it 
follows that mental states are attributed to a person whereas, if monism is taken seriously, the 
physical counterparts of mental states are states of the brain. Von Wright’s description of the 
mental and the physical as the subjective and objective aspects of the same reality is, in my 
opinion, the most coherent formulation of a position which combines interpretationism and 
monism.826 Interpretationism is an acceptable description of the way that mental states are 
attributed to others, but monism is what matters if we think of our own thoughts as ways in 
which we experience what goes on in our brains. I claimed in section 2.4.1 (in the discussion 
about the nature of token-identities) and in section 2.4.3 (in the discussion about token-
reductions) that Davidson goes too far in his conclusions concerning what interpretationism 
implies about the nature of mental phenomena. He writes, for example, that “no interesting 
question about the location of the event remains that is not answered by knowing where the 
person was when the event occurred”827 or “we have no reason to locate mental states more 
precisely than by identifying a person for, more than this would normally be irrelevant for 
individuation....”828 Von  Wright  makes  a  similar  point:  “The  question  ‘Where  are  the  
sensations?’ can only mean ‘Where are you at the time when you have them?’ And you are 
where your body is, i.e. at a certain place in space.”829 I believe we have no reason to think 
that these claims are correct. Where in the brain a beliefC is can certainly be an interesting 
question. Some think that this question is not interesting at all because if mental phenomena 
occur in space, they most likely occur somewhere “north of the neck” as Fodor so eloquently 
puts it.830 But why should one think that the exact location of thoughts is an uninteresting 
question? For a physicalist, it could be a very relevant question, even more so for a reductive 
physicalist. If it  is  an  interesting  question  we do have reasons to try to locate mental states 
beyond the person who is experiencing them. Why would the individuation beyond the person 
be irrelevant?   A  bold  claim  is  made  when  Davidson  says  that,  when  there  is  a  change  in  
belief:  
 
The relevant entity that changes is the person, and there seems no difficulty in supposing these changes   
                                               
826 Which is not to say that this formulation is without problems. Wittgenstein (1958, 8) warns that if we are 
considering whether there are one or two things in the case where a person sees her brain and entertains a 
thought, we should not say “that he is observing one thing both from the inside and from the outside; for this 
does not remove the difficulty.”   
827 Davidson, 1969, 176. 
828 Ibid. 
829 Von Wright, UPg, 25. 
830 See Fodor, 1999. 
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have a physical description…  mental events… are global changes that apply to the whole person… the 
only thing that there is that changes when our attitudes changes is us.831  
 
Here we see how Davidson claims that a mental event is a “global change”. Yet, according to 
Davidson, mental events are also neural – they are physical properties of the brain. Why think 
that when a mental event occurs, the relevant entity that changes is the person? What can this 
claim  about  relevance  even  mean?  If,  for  example,  we  are  interested  in  the  question  of  the  
causal efficacy of beliefC, a relevant question could certainly be where in the brain beliefC is 
located. BeliefC is a mental event because you cannot have beliefs without believingC them, 
and believingC, (unlike believing) is a process which takes time and occurs in a certain place. 
Davidson himself ties the causal efficacy of beliefs to the fact that they are states of the 
physical body. He also claims that with respect to the question about the location of an event, 
“the location of the event at the moment is the location of the smallest part of the substance a 
change in which is identical with the event.”832 By the supposition that O-physicalism is true 
and mental-states are identical with brain states (which are literally composed of physical 
substance), it would seem to follow that a mental event is identical with the smallest part of 
the physical substance (the brain) in which the event (change) takes place. If we accept 
Davidson’s suggestion that a mental event is a global change that applies to a whole person, 
what then is the smallest part of the substance, or what in fact is the “substance” to which we 
are referring? Is it the person? What could convince us that there is no smaller part of the 
physical substance in which a change is an event than the person whose change it is? Indeed, 
as Davidson himself notes, it is an error to think that “if an event is a change in a substance, 
the location of the event is the entire space occupied by the substance.”833 So, it would seem 
to follow that if an event is a change in a person, then it is an error to think that the location of 
the event is the entire space occupied by the person. 
 Insofar as beliefs influence behavior it is reasonable to think, again supposing that 
the truth of O-physicalism is accepted, that they are states of the brain, not states of the whole 
physical body of a human being. It simply is unclear how the global character and the 
interpretation-dependence of mental states go together with Davidson’s view that: “To have 
or acquire a propositional attitude… is to have or acquire a property in as objective sense as 
can be, like a battery having or acquiring a charge or a car a coat of paint.”834 Of  course  it  
may turn out that beliefs cannot ever be found inside the brain as concrete entities that can be 
                                               
831 Davidson, 1999, 655. 
832 Davidson, 1969, 176. 
833 Ibid. 
834 Davidson, 1999o, 595. 
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clearly individuated. But if this turns out to be the case, or so I would contend, it is certainly 
not because “[…] mental events… are global changes that apply to the whole person” as 
Davidson argues.835 His conviction that this is how we should talk about mental phenomena is 
not an argument against the possibility of token reducibility. As I argued in section 2.4.3, 
Davidson and Rorty do not provide any real argument for their claim that beliefs are not little 
entities lodged inside the brain. Davidson merely notes that thoughts are not independent 
atoms. But this is meant as a comment about the mental nature of thoughts; I believe that, as 
far as neurophysical details are concerned, thoughts may turn out to be the brain’s 
“independent atoms”. Perhaps one could have thought that there might be principled obstacles 
preventing actual token-reductions, obstacles which follow from the mental nature of 
thoughts. But, apparently, this is not so, because it is not the case that: “there is some special 
difficulty about identifying the appropriate location for such [mental] events.”836 Perhaps one 
could have thought that the reason is precisely the difficulty in individuation. Perhaps holism, 
as  Rorty  seems  to  think,  could  have  been  offered  as  an  example  of  a  difficulty.  But  these  
difficulties are not the reason why individuation is problematic; the real reason for positing 
the global nature of mental events is the fact that “the only thing there is that changes when 
our attitudes change is us.”837 I think there is no reason to take this claim seriously. There is 
no reason to think that the only thing that changes when our attitudes change is us. On the 
contrary, this claim is obscure. 
 
2.6 An alternative to physicalism, dualism and non-reductive physicalism  
 
In  this  chapter  I  have  strongly  emphasized  the  physicalism  of  Davidson  and  von  Wright.  I  
have argued that, at least when seen from a historical perspective, AM was meant to be a 
contribution to a robust physicalism. It is no wonder that Davidson is often interpreted as 
continuing Quine’s work in the philosophy of mind. Although, as I have shown, Quine came 
to accept AM and the consequent irreducibility of the mental, his philosophy of mind is 
generally recognized as having a reductive or eliminative spirit. I believe that there is a trace 
of this spirit left also in Davidson’s work; he shows a bias towards materialism or physicalism 
by identifying the substance of reality with physical substance. I have argued that also von 
Wright shows a bias towards physicalism because any alternatives would go contrary to a 
                                               
835 Davidson, 1999, 655. 
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837 Ibid. My emphasis. 
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scientific picture of the world. He goes even so far as to admit that his position bears a 
resemblance to eliminative materialism. I have wanted to emphasize the physicalism of von 
Wright and Davidson in order to discuss whether and how they could face the major criticism 
which is raised against non-reductive physicalism. Another reason to discuss the physicalism 
of Davidson and von Wright in such detail has been to consider whether they offer convincing 
reasons to believe the claim that everything is physical. My claim is that their reasons are not 
convincing. Their final position seems to be that mental–physical token-identities cannot be 
established. This kind of view about identities which cannot ever be established is not a 
contribution to physicalism; if mental and physical phenomena each exist in their own right, 
what is the point of claiming that everything is physical? 
 I suggest that Davidson and von Wright should have taken a further step in their 
philosophies of mind by rejecting even O-physicalism. Although I am not willing to argue in 
this work that a robustly dualistic ontology should be accepted, I do want to suggest that the 
vagueness  of  ontological  physicalism  should  lead  to  its  rejection,  or  at  the  very  least,  to  a  
serious reconsideration of its status. Although dualism is treated with great suspicion in the 
modern philosophy of mind, there are philosophers who are willing to explore this alternative 
as  the  titles  of  recent  books,  Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach838 and, The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism839 
show. The ontology of the mind is not a clearly settled issue. Kim has claimed that we have 
little knowledge about the possibilities and dangers which lurk in the cavern of dualism. On 
the  other  hand,  he  has  also  concluded  that  dualism  is  an  uncharted  territory  and  that  a  
thoroughly physicalist view of the mind is not plausible. Some philosophers hope that 
quantum physics could perhaps provide a non-physicalistic solution to the mind–body 
problem. I believe that those exploring or defending a dualistic approach raise legitimate 
concerns against the position of physicalism. Leaving these speculations aside, I want to point 
out yet another ontological position which Davidson and von Wright at times seem to see as 
an alternative. This option is neutral monism.  
 There are clear reasons to think that physicalistic monism is the best way to describe a 
Davidsonian ontology. Davidson claims, for example that “psychological events simply are 
(in the sense of are identical with) physical events. If this is materialism, we are committed to 
it….”840 He notes also: ”[…] psychological events are describable…I n physical terms, that is, 
                                               
838 Antonietti, Alessandro, Corradini, Lowe, Jonathan (eds.), 2008. 
839 Meixner, 2004. See also Meixner, 2005, 2006. 
840 Davidson, 1973, 248, second emphasis mine. 
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they are physical events… this position deserves to be called… monism, because it holds that 
psychological events are physical events….”841 Finally: “Monistic my view is, since it holds 
that mental events are physical events.”842 It is therefore the case that: “Anomalous monism 
shows an ontological bias [by] insisting that all events are physical.843 Given these statements, 
it is perhaps surprising that in his later writings Davidson clearly shies away from materialism 
or physicalism. He says: “I would now hesitate to call this [his position in “Mental Events”] 
materialism.  All  that  this  sort  of  supervenience  enforces  is  a  single  ontology  of  objects  and  
events, a form of monism.”844 Usually the supervenience of the mental on the physical is 
understood as implying at least a weak commitment to materialism. But here, Davidson seems 
to think that his version of supervenience does not imply materialism in any interesting sense. 
The main reason why Davidson wants to distance his view from physicalism is the fact  that  
his position is a non-reductive one. Davidson notes: “I have resisted calling my position either 
materialism or physicalism because… I do not think that mental properties (or predicates) are 
reducible to physical properties (or predicates)….”845 In his later comments, Davidson in fact 
firmly denies that  he  is  a  physicalist.  This  certainly  distinguishes  him from Quine  and  from 
many contemporary philosophers of mind. As Davidson says, adding to the reasons why he is 
not a physicalist: “I am certainly not now what people usually call a physicalist. Anomalous 
monism is not a form of physicalism or materialism, since it denies that physics exhausts what 
there  is  to  say  about  the  world.”846 Davidson  could  be  interpreted  as  a  true  anti-physicalist  
because of his view that physics does not exhaust what there is to say about the world. On the 
other  hand,  I  have  shown  that  sometimes  Davidson  shows  a  clear  bias  towards  the  
explanations of physics. 
 But there is also another interesting reason why Davidson could be seen as an anti-
physicalist. Davidson could be interpreted as defending a view according to which the status 
of events, which are basic ingredients of reality, is in some important sense neutral. On many 
occasions Davidson compares his approach Spinoza’s position, which is usually seen as a 
form of neutral monism. Although some may not take seriously Davidson’s references to 
Spinoza,  the  extent  in  which  he  used  Spinoza  as  a  reference  point  is  notable  and  therefore  
interesting. In the contemporary philosophy of mind, Spinoza is usually not the first 
philosopher to whom one refers when describing his views about the relation of mind and 
                                               
841 Davidson, 1974b, 231. 
842 Davidson, 1985, 245, my emphasis. 
843 Davidson, 1970, 214. 
844 Davidson, 1974c, 281, fn. 1.The footnote is added in the year 2000. 
845 Davidson, 1985, 245. 
846 In Gluer, 1995, 76. 
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body. The reference to neutral monism raises the question of the extent to which Davidson is 
committed to O-physicalism. Neutral monism is clearly something different than physicalistic 
monism. The former denies that reality is “based” in either the physical or the mental; neither 
has priority. Reality is rather based in one particular kind of substance that can be classified as 
neutral .847 The  latter  holds  that  only  the  physical  is  real,  or  that  it  is  somehow “more  real”  
than the mental. The attribution of physicalist monism to Davidson has lead commentators to 
conclude  that  AM  is  a  form  of  eliminativism  since  the  “physical  furniture  of  the  world”  is  
more real than the mental descriptions of this furniture.  
Neutral monism is not a very popular position today, but it is a position which has 
been considered to be a reasonable alternative to idealism or materialism in the history of 
philosophy.848 Von Wright makes an interesting observation when he notes: “[…] early 
logical positivism… had to defend itself both against materialist charges of idealism – and 
against idealist charges of materialism. The defended position usually took the form of 
‘neutral stuff monism’….”849 Davidson was no positivist, but it is interesting that AM has 
often been criticized as being both an overtly physicalistic theory and not being physicalistic 
enough. The problem with neutral monism has however always been the question of how the 
nature of “neutral” substance should be understood. This substance can be described in two 
different and irreducible ways. Can anything more be said of it? 
When we consider this question, the ways in which Davidson refers to Spinoza are 
worth emphasizing. He says: “Spinoza was what is sometimes called a dual-aspect monist, 
and  so  was  I.”850 Moreover, “The result [of anomalous monism] is ontological monism 
coupled with conceptual dualism: this is in many ways like Spinoza’s metaphysics.”851 Again, 
more strongly: “Our grasp of reality demands two different… modes of description, 
explanation and prediction. Here I am a Spinozist; a single ontology, but two modes of 
apprehending it.”852 In one sense Davidson’s approach resembles that of Spinoza’s very 
clearly. There is only one substance that can be described in two different ways, and these 
descriptions cannot be reduced in favor of or to each other. We could argue that the two 
modes of description stand on equal footing and this would mean either that the physical is a 
conceptual category in a similar sense as the mental, or that that the mental is an ontological 
                                               
847 The expression ”substance” is perhaps misleading here, but I know of no better term to substitute. 
848 Philosophers who consider neutral monism as a serious alternative include, among others, Russell, Mach and 
Kaila. More recently, the views of Nagel and Chalmers bear some relation to neutral monism.  
849 Von Wright, 1998, 108. 
850 Davidson, 1999h, 64. 
851 Davidson, 1994a, 231. 
852 Davidson, 1999n, 124. My emphasis. 
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category in a similar sense as the physical. According to Spinoza the substance, which can be 
described as physical or mental, is neutral in itself. This impression is possible to get from 
reading Davidson as well. Thus – as we have already seen – one commentator, Louisa Röska-
Hardy writes: “What exists is non-abstract particulars…. They are neither mental nor physical 
in themselves.…”853 It seems that AM is at least compatible both with physicalism and with 
neutral monism. Davidson describes AM as being a version of “dual-aspect monism”.  The 
dual-aspect theory in general, and Spinoza’s version in particular, accepts the idea that things 
which have physical and non-physical properties or descriptions are themselves neither 
physical nor non-physical. Crane, for example, claims that property dualism and double-
aspect theory are reasonably seen as truly non-reductionist.854 A true dual-aspect theorist 
would therefore be far away from physicalism, and the term non-reductive physicalism would 
perhaps be an inappropriate name for such a position. 
The following kinds of statements also tend to weaken Davidson’s physicalistic 
position. “I see no good reason for calling all identity theories ‘materialist’; if some mental 
events are physical events, this makes them no more physical than mental. Identity is a 
symmetrical relation.”855 It is not easy to understand what it means to say that, with respect to 
the mental and the physical, identity is a “symmetrical relation”. True, each mental event is a 
physical event and each physical event is obviously a physical event, but what does it mean to 
say that a physical event is a mental event if event’s being mental is only a matter of 
description? It can only mean that a physical event, which is also a mental event, is “as much” 
mental as it is physical. In other words, if an event can be described in both vocabularies, the 
question of whether the event, “in itself”, is mental or physical does not make real sense. 
When an event is described as mental, then it is “really” a mental event, although it is also a 
physical event.856 When it is described as physical, then it is really a physical event. This 
holds for events which are both mental and physical, i.e. for events which can be given both 
kinds of descriptions. This view, which flirts with neutral monism, seems to suggest that we 
should not say that a mental event (which is also a physical event) is somehow more physical 
than mental. But this view is hard to understand if it is thought that what events are, or what 
kind of events there are, is a question of ontology, “a question of reality”, and, given 
Davidson’s views, a question perhaps of physics. I have shown how Davidson sometimes 
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856 One should recall Melchert’s (1986) perspicuous description of AM. 
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likens “ontology” to what is described by natural science; an extreme view of this sort is 
Quine’s position (whose ontology continues to consist of “quarks and the like”).  
If ontology is likened with what natural science says, then it should be said that events 
are physical and this status is stronger than the status of a mere mental description (which 
applies only to certain events). Every event and object is physical, whereas only some events 
are mental. What makes everything a candidate for a physical description if not the fact that 
they are physical – which means, perhaps, that they are composed in certain way from 
particles. They can be described as physical because they are so composed. One could argue 
that the composition or structure of everything is to be described by the science that studies 
composition and structure questions, and therefore this science, physics, has the last word on 
ontological questions. As Skillen has noted, according to Davidson, “things in themselves are 
physical.”857 But  part  of  the  fascination  of  AM  is  that  it  is  open  to  various  different  
interpretations. Siitonen, for example, claims that Davidson’s monism is “neither a neutral 
one, nor a reductionistic one – as e.g. physicalism and phenomenalism are.”858 His conclusion 
is that by representing monism, Davidson wants to avoid Quinean dualism. This is a very 
interesting interpretation, and I believe it agrees with my suggestion that Davidson is 
challenging Quine’s double standard. The interpretation made by Siitonen leaves nevertheless 
open the nature of Davidson’s monism; not neutral, not reductive, but what? 
Perhaps it is a mistake to call all identity theories “materialist” even if they 
ontologically reduce the mental to the physical and even if it is the physical which determines 
the mental so that mental depends on the physical, but this is the way the talk about identity 
theories in the philosophy of mind is usually understood. After all, the issue here is 
ontological. Davidson himself writes: “In ontic language, mental events are identical with 
physical events….”859 I think a legitimate question is: what does “ontic language” mean for a 
philosopher who wholeheartedly accepts conceptual dualism? What is Davidson’s ontic 
language, is it the language of science? It is not entirely clear to what Davidson’s terms 
“ontological”  or  “metaphysical”  refer.   If  we  are  committed  to  the  view  that  all  events  are 
physical or material, then I think that there is no reason to deny that our ontology is that of a 
physicalist. It is evident that Davidson’s identity theory differs from the usual forms of 
contemporary identity theories in an interesting and important sense, as the reference to 
Spinoza shows. The main reason why Davidson cannot endorse a standard version of identity 
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theory is that a typical version of an identity theory would jeopardize the idea of the 
anomalism of the mental. This idea is an independent view of Davidson’s, which he takes to 
be true and, since it is assumed to be true a priori, a reductive version of physicalism must be 
false. However, since also in Davidson’s case the mental is assumed – again a priori – to be 
identical  with  the  physical,  and  the  physical  is  assumed to  be  the  only  ontological  category  
there is, I see no real reason to label this kind of theory as non-physicalist. If formulated in the 
Davidsonian way, Davidson’s position is physicalistic. It is therefore interesting that 
Davidson himself refers to his position as “a mild form of materialism”860 or as a version of 
“bland monism”.861 The standard position in philosophy has been that either you are a 
materialist, or you aren’t. If you think that everything is physical, then you are a materialist 
physicalist. If you think that at least something is not material then you are something other 
than a materialist.  
Given that physicalism is usually understood as being an “all or nothing” position, the 
bland middle positions look puzzling. This puzzlement is evident among the critics who have 
evaluated the nature and importance of AM. The confusion with respect to Davidson’s 
position increases thanks to views like the following: “Such a bland monism… is not apt to 
inspire that nothing-but reflex (‘Conceiving the Art of Fugue was nothing but a complex 
neural event’….)”862 Does this mean that my conceiving is something other than the neural 
event which is identical with my conceiving, that is, which is my conceiving? I think that 
Davidson wants to emphasize that my conceiving is not “nothing but” – in the sense that we 
cannot reduce my conceiving of the Art of Fugue to the neural event which is identical with 
my conceiving it, and that we cannot explain everything (perhaps hardly anything) about my 
conceiving understood as a mental event if we understand it as a complex neural event (which 
it nevertheless is). But to draw strong ontological consequences from this insight would be 
strange, because it is already admitted that conceiving the Art of Fugue is a complex neural 
event. In a sense, an ontological conclusion is what Davidson nevertheless draws. In later 
writings, he does not want to see AM even as a mild form of materialism:  
 
[my position] is a form of monism. The objects and events are sometimes described in physical terms, 
sometimes in physiological terms, sometimes in psychological terms: the same things are described now 
as physical, again as mental or biological, etc. The only reason to call this physicalism would be if one 
accepts the additional claim that ideal physics is more precise or complete than any other system of 
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description and / or one thinks definitional or nomological reduction of the vocabularies of psychology 
to the vocabulary of physics is possible. But why believe this?863 
 
Here we again get the impression that the descriptions in different vocabularies stand on the 
same level. It sounds like events have physical or biological or mental descriptions and none 
is given priority in answering the question “What events really are?” Does this mean that the 
physical loses its status as an ontological category? Davidson is here speaking of a single 
ontology of objects and events, which he describes as a form of monism. He does not describe 
it as a form of physicalistic monism. This being the case, Davidson seems to have changed his 
mind. Earlier he described the position as a form of monism because it holds that mental 
events are physical events. His last view on the subject emphasized a single ontology of 
events and objects, thus the monism. This is interesting because it could really point to the 
conclusion  that  Davidson  takes  events  to  be  something  neutral,  and  that  their  status  as  
“physical” is only a matter of description. We already saw how it is indeed the case that 
events are mental or physical  only  as  described.  One  could  say  that  the  nature  of  reality  is  
such that it is amenable to these very different descriptions. But there is still a sense in which 
mental events are more conceptual than physical events. Davidson namely argues that any 
event can be given a mental description, and in that sense every event is mental as described, 
but it is physical ontologically speaking. We are told:  
 
Take some event one would intuitively accept as physical, let’s say the collision of two stars in distant 
space. There must be a physical predicate ‘Px’ true of this collision, and of others, but true of only this 
at the time it occurred. This particular time… may be pinpointed as the same time that Jones notices that 
a pencil starts to roll across his desk. The distant stellar collision is thus the event x such that Px and x is 
simultaneous with Jones’s noticing that a pencil starts to roll across his desk. The collision has now been 
picked out by a mental description and must be counted as a mental event.864 
 
We could describe any event mental in this way, but in that case the event, say the distant star 
collision mentioned, would surely be mental only as described. As Davidson correctly 
observes, this “Spinozistic extravagance” does not capture the “intuitive” concept of the 
mental. What this example shows, however, is a strong sense for the expression “events are 
mental only as described”. It sounds plausible that a collision of two distant stars counts as a 
mental event only because we have given it a description according to which it is 
simultaneous with the noticing of Jones. This property of the collision does not exist 
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independently of us, whereas some other properties of the collision could be taken to be there 
independently of our descriptions.  
The exact status of the mental and physical is still somewhat open. On the one hand we 
have very good reasons, based on textual evidence, to think that Davidson’s version of 
monism is physicalistic. However, what complicates things and increases the plausibility of 
the neutral monism option are remarks Davidson’s makes like: “Mental events are… physical 
(which is not, of course, to say that they are not mental).”865 An interpretation by Paolo 
Leonardi emphasizes that an event’s being mental or physical is something that depends only 
on the vocabulary in which it is described. He quotes Davidson as saying: “[…] with respect 
to those physical entities that are also mental entities, one could as well say that they are 
nothing but mental.”866 Leonardi  claims  that  Davidson  seems  to  have  the  view,  which  we  
have already discussed, that events are mental or physical, only as described.867 This being the 
case, ontology is relative to the theory by means of which we choose to analyze it. Our bias of 
attributing a special reality to a physical description, positing physical entities and privileging 
physical properties, depends just on the fact that physics is the core theory of what there is. 
But if it is the case that physics tells us what there is and the question of ontology is just the 
very question of “what there is”, then why shouldn’t we say that physics and thereby the 
“physical” are ontologically privileged? 
I don’t think that an interpretation according to which Davidson is arguing in favor of 
neutral monism can be correct in the end.868 Here we must be careful: the interpretation cannot 
be correct based on what Davidson has said. This obviously does not mean that neutral 
monism could not be a correct description of the metaphysical nature of reality. Perhaps 
something like neutral monism is a reasonable option over physicalism, and perhaps 
Davidson should have emphasized this. In fact in the most promising, although somewhat 
superficial, study of the similarities between Davidson’s and Spinoza’s views, van der Burg 
notes the following:  
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Davidson identifies the physical…with substance, thus taking the symmetry suggested by the 
conceptual dualism out of his metaphysics. And as long as we will keep saying that all talk of the 
mental is merely that, a different way of talking about the more fundamental and ‘real’ physical world, 
the urge to reduce this different…talk to the realm of that more fundamental physical world is never 
going to be silenced. If, however, we would not identify the physical with substance this reductionist 
urge would no longer be so natural.869  
 
In essential respects I completely agree with van der Burg’s interpretations. He provides a 
perceptive analysis of Davidson and Spinoza, and suggests that a crucial problem in 
Davidson’s “Spinozism” is precisely that whereas for Spinoza substance is neutral in its 
relation to the attributes which are used to describe it, it is equated with the physical in 
Davidson’s case. Van der Burg claims:  
 
 […] it is clear that Davidson’s version of substance monism and conceptual dualism is a materialistic 
view…. there is only one substance and that substance is matter. But this is not the case for Spinoza. He 
is a substance monist and a conceptual pluralist, but his monism is not materialistic.870 
  
It seems to me that van der Burg would agree with my interpretation, according to which 
those commentators who emphasize the “neutral nature” of Davidson’s ontology are 
mistaken. On the other hand, van der Burg does not refer to Davidson’s views, which I have 
described, in which he explicitly suggests that his monism is not materialistic. I assume that 
van der Burg would agree with my claim that these remarks cannot be taken too seriously; in 
the end, Davidson’s view is materialistic. His references to Spinoza are misleading in the way 
suggested by van der Burg; although both Davidson and Spinoza defend a form of conceptual 
dualism, there are essential differences in their metaphysics. 
I believe that a step toward neutral monism is something which would have been 
natural one for Davidson to take given his views about the nature of the mind. There is 
nevertheless a clear reason why this step was prevented; I agree with van der Burg also in his 
claim that “Davidson should not follow natural science as much as he perhaps does in his 
materialism.”871 Finally, I completely agree with van der Burg that although Davidson has the 
right critical attitude towards materialism, he does not quite bear it out in his philosophy.872 In 
chapter one I criticized Rorty for the fact that he sees Davidson as a pragmatist who has 
displayed no interest in a physicalistic ontology. I suggested that Davidson’s rejection of this 
ontology is not as clear as Rorty likes to think. Here an interesting difference between Rorty’s 
and van der Burg’s interpretations can be seen. Whereas Rorty argues that according to 
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Davidson we can understand everything naturalistically, van der Burg claims that Davidson is 
simply not naturalistic enough, at least when compared to Spinoza.873 My interpretation falls 
perhaps between these two views. In chapter one, I suggested that Davidson’s and von 
Wright’s calls for intellectual and methodological diversity in the study of human reality 
resemble the views of classical naturalists. Yet, I must conclude that both von Wright and 
Davidson are unwilling to take the step towards true conceptual plurality and the rejection of 
the special status granted to natural science. I believe we should let go of the view that non-
materialistic explanations of phenomena are also non-naturalistic explanations.  
  My conclusion is that the nature of Davidson’s metaphysics cannot conclusively be 
fathomed. This is related to the general problem of the nature of non-reductive physicalism: Is 
it best understood as a physicalistic position or as a non-reductive position? Can these 
positions co-exist? But, although I think that non-reductivism is a good reason to see 
Davidson’s position as a form of non-physicalism, his case is more complex than this. This is 
because it is not clear how the references to Spinoza and to dual-aspect theory might best be 
interpreted. My suggestion that the nature of Davidson’s metaphysics cannot be conclusively 
decided should cast doubt upon the common interpretations, which claim that Davidson is a 
physicalist or eliminativist. But the claims that Davidson is a dualist or neutral monist should 
be treated as carefully. This is an example of a question about Davidson’s philosophy that 
cannot be conclusively settled. Some critics may conclude that Davidson is a physicalist while 
others may conclude that he is a neutral monist, and both interpretations make sense. There is 
no  point  in  trying  to  show  which  option  is  ultimately  the  correct  one.  Given  the  textual  
evidence that I have presented, this conclusion is easily reached. It must also be accepted that 
perhaps Davidson just changed his mind about whether his theory was a form of physicalism 
or not. This being the case, all we can do is to consider the different aspects of his view and 
reach  a  conclusion;  this,  in  essential  respects,  is  what  I  have  done  in  this  chapter.  The  
resulting view may not be Davidson’s view but my interpretation of it.  
If, despite the above conclusion, we nevertheless stress the neutral monism aspect of 
Davidson’s position, then it bears an interesting resemblance to von Wright’s view. This fact 
has been neglected in the discussions of the positions of these philosophers. I think that von 
Wright’s description of the relation between mind and matter can clarify the question of how 
Davidson’s neutral monism or “dual-aspect monism”, as he himself describes it, could be 
understood. As I have argued, both Davidson and von Wright see the mental as a conceptual 
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category and the distinction between mind and matter is conceptual and not ontological. 
Incidentally, Wittgenstein once wrote: “’Mental’ for me is not a metaphysical, but a logical, 
epithet.”874 I am not suggesting that von Wright and Davidson adopt their view from 
Wittgenstein, but the similarity between the views of these three philosophers is interesting. 
When emphasizing that the mental is a conceptual category, are we saying that the physical is 
not a conceptual category? I think that in the case of Davidson he must, at some point at least, 
have had a conceptual / ontological distinction in mind. If there is no such thing as an 
ontological category, why stress the fact that the mental is not such a category? I think that a 
reasonable  way  to  interpret  Davidson  is  to  conclude  that  for  him  the  physical  is  something  
“more substantial” than the mental. This is, of course, to stress the correctness of the 
physicalistic interpretation. The question about the nature of Davidson’s monism is 
interesting, not just because we would like to find a correct answer to this question but also 
because the nature of his monistic position has obvious consequences for important questions 
in the philosophy of mind. Moreover, if neutral monism turns out to be a coherent option in 
the philosophy of mind, then Davidson’s and von Wright’s arguments in favor of it are a good 
starting point for further investigations about the nature and prospects of this position. One 
could say that von Wright and Davidson, insofar as they argue in favor of neutral monism, are 
introducing a new way of seeing contemporary questions in the philosophy of mind by 
reviving an old position. Davidson himself argued that Spinoza can be seen as an anomalous 
monist; perhaps it could thus be argued that Davidson is revoking or bringing back certain 
intuitions of Spinoza, which should be further discussed – not merely as part of the history of 
philosophy, but also with having a possible relevance for modern philosophy of mind. 
When describing his position von Wright writes: “I differ from behaviourism and 
materialism in that I cannot accept an identification of the mental with states of affairs in the 
material world.”875 This, I think, is true of Davidson also insofar as we think that the token–
token identity theory collapses to triviality. Both philosophers share von Wright’s sympathy 
“with  [the]  monistic  view  of  what  the  world  is  made  of.”876 But what is the nature of von 
Wright’s monism? Is reality neither mind nor matter but something “neutral”, out of which 
mind and matter, the mental and the physical, are conceptual constructions? Already in his 
youth von Wright had thought about “monistic philosophy”, which was inspired by such 
philosophers  as  Ernst  Mach  and  Richard  Avenarius.  Eino  Kaila,  von  Wright’s  teacher,  was  
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tempted by a form of neutral monism, and this approach inspired also his student.  Kaila could 
never explicate his position in a completely satisfying way, and I think that the same thing can 
be said about von Wright. 
Von Wright warns that the position of neutral monism is apt to invite criticism if we 
try to “concretize” the neutral substance of reality. He writes: “The ‘neutral stuff’ is not ‘a 
third thing’, neither material nor mental. But the view of mind and matter as two aspects of 
what is real is perhaps the best way to view the double relationship of mind to matter and 
matter to mind. This view is… not entirely unlike that of Spinoza’s.”877 It is remarkable that 
also  von  Wright  refers  to  Spinoza  when  clarifying  his  own  position.  This  is  a  peculiar  
similarity between von Wright and Davidson and a curious detail, one which sets their views 
apart  from  most  modern  theories  of  mind.  I  think  that  it  is  not  entirely  clear  how  the  term  
“aspects” should be understood here, but it seems that this view of von Wright, even in its 
obscurity, provides also one possible way to see how Davidson’s version of monism could be 
understood. The mental and the physical are conceptually intertwined and, this being the case, 
there is no sharp distinction between them. Then the distinction which we desperately try to 
establish  is,  more  or  less,  artificial.  There  are  no  priorities  between  the  mental  and  the  
physical conceptualizations; neither is more basic and the idea of an ontological category does 
not make clear sense. Mind and matter in their relations are the neutral stuff and to think of 
them as categories (one ontological, one conceptual) which could be clearly separated and 
considered in isolation is already a mistake.878 
 Von Wright thought that we are moving in an extremely obscure terrain when we try 
to clarify the mind–body relation. I have shown how he thinks that a fatal error in the modern 
philosophy of mind is the separation of mind and body, of the mental and physical, in terms 
of the mind and brain. The mind–body relationship can be seen clearly only once the 
Cartesian idea that mind and matter could be conceived independently of each other is 
rejected. As von Wright claims:  
 
Reflecting on the ‘nature’ of the mental, on what we ‘mean’ by attributing mental states to a being, will 
show that the criteria of the mental are material things and processes.  Conversely – reflecting on the 
nature of matter, of what it means to talk of properties and relations of material things, will show that 
the criteria of truth about matter are mental (e.g. sensations). Such reflective processes – not empirical 
investigations –may lead to the view that the two are conceptually ‘intertwined’ and not separable. This 
last would amount to a kind of ‘non-cartesian’dualism.879 
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This is a very interesting view. Von Wright suggests that monism is  a  conceptual  or  
metaphysical view because the monistic conclusion can be reached through “reflection”. 
Dualism, which von Wright likens to interactionism, is an empirical position because it holds 
that the relation between mind and body is causal and not conceptual. In my opinion this is an 
intriguing and very tempting take on the mind–body problem. 
 The conceptual relation of mind and body is what really opens the way to neutral 
monism. Von Wright was troubled by the question of how the nature of this position could be 
clarified. One way to try to describe the position is to claim that mental and the physical are 
two aspects, the subjective and objective aspect, of the same. This would resemble the “dual-
aspect” view. But, as von Wright asks, what is the “same” of which mental and physical are 
two  aspects:  “Shall  we  say  reality?  It  is  difficult  to  find  the  right  word  here.”880 When 
contemplating the conceptual nature of neutral monism, von Wright considers whether its 
main message should be just that mind and matter are “conceptually intertwined” and not 
“conceptually separable”? He goes on to ask: “But if so, why call this monism rather than 
dualism?”881 Von Wright’s position oscillates between different alternatives, and he despairs 
of finding a satisfying final characterization. We hear: “Is my position to be labeled, 
philosophically speaking, ‘dualism’ or ‘identity-theory’? One can accept both labels – and at 
the same time reject both.”882 Or: “Am I a ‘dualist’… who thinks that there are physical and 
mental phenomena and that the one kind is ‘irreducible’ to the other? Perhaps – but the 
meaning of the question is not quite clear to me.”883 His  final  formulation  was  that  the  
position deserves to be called “non-reductive dualism”, which has to compete against 
reductive materialism and reductive phenomenalism.  
In sections 2.2 and 2.2.1 I rejected the suggestion that von Wright subscribes to a 
neutral stuff monism and claimed instead that his position is actually a rather robust form of 
physicalism. I think there are good reasons to stand with this interpretation. But the “neutral 
stuff” interpretation cannot be completely rejected, and I believe that it is in fact 
philosophically much more interesting than von Wright’s physicalism. On the one hand, von 
Wright’s position definitely has important connections to physicalism, but on the other hand, 
in  the  end  he  came  to  describe  his  position  as  a  form  of  dualism.   Emiliani  has  tentatively  
labeled von Wright’s position with the title “Bi-Polar Monism.”884 Incidentally, in 1912 
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William James used the term “bilateral monism” when referring to the position of “scientific 
or Spinozistic positivism.”885 
According to Emiliani, mind and matter are opposite conceptual poles that presuppose 
and require one another; thus the label “Bi-Polar” for the position. Emiliani’s interpretation 
does justice to von Wright’s statement that “mind can be said to depend, conceptually, on 
matter, and matter on mind.”886 This observation is what justifies the position of neutral 
monism. But how to understand the claim that mind and matter depend conceptually on each 
other? I have shown that according to von Wright, mental phenomena have behavioral 
criteria. These criteria cannot be conclusive. Therefore in any third-person statement about the 
mental there is a residue of meaning which cannot be captured by behavioral criteria.887 This 
excludes the possibility of identifying the presence of mental phenomenon M with the bodily 
movements B. An identification of M with neural state N would be secondary to the 
identification of M with B. We must first know, relying on behavioral criteria, that a subject is 
experiencing M; it is only after this that further identifications are possible. But the 
identification of M with B cannot be conclusive, as von Wright notes: “Logically speaking 
there is always discrepancy between B and M.”888 The ignorance of this discrepancy is the 
materialist error. An attempt to identify M with P is to ignore that “Mental phenomena are in 
a characteristic sense transcendent in relation to material bodies and states.”889 The term 
transcendent is interesting. I believe it can be related to von Wright’s views about the nature 
of emergence and to his view of how quantity turns into quality. 
But if M is not identical with a physical phenomenon, what is then the status of M? As 
von Wright asks: “What is the sensation ‘itself’ then – this mental or psychic thing? What is 
its ‘mode of existence’, what its ontological status?”890 He  notes:  “The  ‘residue  of  
meaning’… is the locus of the ‘purely mental.”891 Insofar  as  we  want  to  talk  about  the  
location of a purely mental phenomenon, the location is “in” the residue of meaning. This 
again is a very intriguing suggestion, which in my view cannot be clarified much further. The 
transcendent nature of mental phenomena is due to the fact that they are located in the residue 
of meaning and that they are inaccessible to exact measurement in time. I believe it is these 
two properties of mental phenomena which ultimately explain the sense in which they are 
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emergent phenomena according to von Wright. What about the subjective aspect of mental 
phenomena? The residue of meaning occurs when mental phenomena are seen from the third-
person perspective. But I am aware of the mental phenomena which I experience or “have” 
directly or immediately; behavior plays no part in my experience. How to think about this 
subjectivity? Perhaps because of his Wittgensteinian sympathies, von Wright was careful not 
to emphasize too much the subjective aspect of mental phenomena. Such an emphasis would 
have brought us dangerously close to the web of mystification which philosophy has created 
around the inner-outer distinction of Cartesian dualism. But von Wright claims also that there 
is a genuine place for the subjective aspect of the mental, because of the irreducibility of 
subjectivity which cannot be captured from the outside. I think that the claim about the 
residue of meaning could be seen as an attempt to capture this very aspect. Von Wright did 
not use the favorite term of many modern philosophers of mind – qualia – but his view about 
the irreducibly subjective element can perhaps be seen as bearing some resemblance to them. 
The subjective side of the mental is summarized by von Wright when he notes that mental 
states are the subject’s way of experiencing his brain states.  
Now that we have found a “place” for the mental, how can we explain the claim that 
mind depends, conceptually, on matter, and matter on mind? I am not sure whether I can do 
full justice to von Wright’s subtle position, but I attempt to clarify one way in which to think 
about the position. Von Wright’s view is that when we attribute mental phenomena to a 
subject, we conceptualize physical phenomena under the aspect of intentionality. But when 
we attribute qualities to physical phenomena, we actually conceptualize mental phenomena 
under the aspect of materiality. As von Wright writes: “Just as bodily movements are ‘signs’ 
of mental phenomena, sensations are ‘signs’ of physical phenomena. Mental things and events 
have behavioural criteria and material things and events sensational criteria.”892 The concept 
of a purely mental phenomenon, one which would be completely detached from the material 
world, cannot be grasped. Perhaps we can imagine a “disembodied spirit” whose existence 
would be nothing but contemplation. Such a being would, however, be cut off from us. If we 
consider  how  we  could  come  to  know  about  its  existence,  we  would  have  to  refer  to  
behavioral manifestations – and this in turn of course requires that the being should have a 
physical body. Von Wright concludes that what we mean when we say that a being was 
experiencing such and such mental state is that the being would have reacted in a certain way 
had we put it in an appropriate test. If we forget the disembodied spirit and consider the 
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human case, the “purely mental” can be captured only through a counterfactual move. 
Davidson claimed that: “Disembodied minds wouldn’t be interpretable by any methods I can 
think of”893 and von Wright noted that he failed to see how the criteria for mental phenomena 
could be anything but corporeal. These views, which emphasize the primacy of interpretation, 
attempt to discredit the idea of a “Cartesian lonely soul” which would be causally cut off from 
everything. Kim has considered the unfortunate fate of this kind of soul by drawing on the 
principles of physicalism and concluded that a disembodied being could not interact with the 
physical world.894 I believe the same conclusion can be reached merely by contemplating on 
the methods which are necessary for the attribution of mental phenomena. A disembodied 
being could not have the kinds of states which we call thoughts. This is not an empirical 
claim. 
A counterfactual move is required to make sense of the purely mental. But the same 
seems to be true of physical phenomena. The idea of objective physical reality cannot be 
grasped. To say that a material object exists independently of us means, roughly, that were 
there a living being with sense organs sensing the object, the being would have the 
appropriate sensations of size, color and so on. The idea of mind-independent reality requires 
a similar kind of counterfactual move as was required in the attempt to hold on to the idea of a 
disembodied mind. A residue of meaning describes the relation of the mental to the physical, 
and this is what makes the mental to be transcendent in relation to the physical. But, 
interestingly, a similar kind of residue exists also in the relation between the physical and the 
mental because, as von Wright notes: “[…] all the necessary sensations (of a material thing) 
may be there and yet the physical phenomenon absent”.895 What stands in the way of clearly 
understanding the nature of neutral monism is “…the double dependence of matter on mind 
and of mind on matter in combination with the residues of meaning of the two in relation to 
each other….”896 The two residues of meaning in relation to each other prevent the reduction 
of matter to mind and the reduction of mind to matter. Because the criteria of the mental are 
physical and the criteria of the physical are mental, mind could be said to depend, 
conceptually, on matter, and matter on mind. This would mean, paradoxically, that: “reality… 
is neither mind nor matter and that it is both mind and matter.”897 According to von Wright 
this was not necessarily an unacceptable position. 
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 Nagel has suggested that when we try to reason about the possible relations between 
things,  we  have  to  rely  on  our  conceptual  grasp  of  them.898 I believe that von Wright 
deepened our understanding of the mind–body relation precisely through conceptual 
investigations. It remains to be seen whether these investigations can be carried further so that 
a new truly radical and illuminating position emerges as a result. 
 
2.7 Conclusions of chapter two 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the nature of Davidson’s and von Wright’s physicalism and 
considered some of the problems of their positions. The purpose has been to clarify the 
content of non-reductive physicalism and to consider whether this form of physicalism is 
warranted.  
 In section 2.1, the status of AM was considered by placing the theory in a historical 
context. Davidson’s case is especially interesting because, as I showed, AM was meant as a 
contribution to physicalism. I have claimed that, when it was given, AM was a relevant 
argument for physicalism, because at that time the consensus on physicalism was not yet in 
place. AM is thus an important part of the history of the philosophy of mind, although its 
current relevance as an argument for physicalism is questionable. This is so because, as I 
argued in section 2.1.3, Davidson’s a priori argument for physicalism is based on a principle 
the status of which is highly suspect. We have not found a reason to believe in PNCC. My 
conclusion is that Davidson’s physicalism is thus unwarranted in two ways. If Davidson 
accepts  the  truth  of  physicalism  as  a  scientific  truth,  then  there  is  no  need  for  AM  –  as  an  
argument for physicalism. If the scientific evidence is enough, as many contemporary 
philosophers would claim it is, then there is no need for an additional argument for 
physicalism. If Davidson does not accept the truth of physicalism at face value, then he needs 
an argument for physicalism – and this argument we have found to be unconvincing. 
Davidson’s overall position can be criticized also for the fact that his philosophical argument 
is meant to be contribution which adds to the empirical reasons to believe that physicalism is 
true.  In  doing  this  Davidson  is  somewhat  guilty  of  providing  a  theory  which,  or  at  least  so  
some would claim, should not be the task of a philosopher. I think that in trying to come up 
with a view like AM, Davidson is not entirely true to his Wittgensteinian conception of 
philosophy that I attributed to him in the first chapter.  On the other hand, perhaps Davidson’s 
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participation in the debate which takes the truth of O-physicalism for granted shows that he 
was not willing to take the Wittgensteinian step as far as I would like to think. 
 The case of von Wright’s unwarranted physicalism is  even  simpler.  I  showed  in  
section 2.2 that he accepts physicalism because an alternative would amount to a non-
scientific view about the nature of reality. Whereas this is certainly an acceptable position, it 
shows that,  contrary  to  Davidson,  von  Wright  does  not  offer,  and  does  not  even  attempt  to  
offer, philosophical support for physicalism. If one does not accept the truth of physicalism at 
face value then nothing that von Wright says can convince one of its truth either. On this issue 
von Wright is perhaps more true to the purpose of philosophy than Davidson. He does not try 
to prove that reality is thoroughly physical but is satisfied with the observation that this is how 
things seem to be. An important contribution of von Wright is his discussion about the 
postulational nature of this assumption, and his clarification of the obscurities and conceptual 
confusions of the monistic or interactionist positions. I believe these clarifications are far 
more illuminating than materialistic views which proceed without considering these 
confusions; in a word, von Wright is doing better philosophy.  
I have argued that, contrary to some commentators, von Wright’s physicalism bears 
obvious similarities to Davidson’s position – the main difference being precisely that von 
Wright  does  not  attempt  to  give  an  argument  for  physicalism,  whereas  this  is  one  of  the  
essential purposes of AM. Von Wright has often been interpreted as having nothing to do with 
naturalistic theories of the mind, and it is thought that his views remain outside the 
contemporary debates. My suggestion, however, is that his version of physicalism is as strong 
or  as  weak  as  Davidson’s,  and  that  the  strength  of  their  naturalism is  likewise  on  the  same 
level. My conclusion is thus that the physicalism of Davidson and von Wright is unwarranted 
– unless they simply accept the reductive naturalistic view that philosophy has to be 
continuous with science and that it is science which really describes what there is. Whereas it 
looks obvious that the physicalism of Davidson and von Wright is meant to be warranted 
through the acceptance of naturalism, this strategy is unsatisfactory because the status and 
truth of naturalism – and thus physicalism – is still under debate. Physicalism has not been 
shown to be true. Neither von Wright nor Davidson offers any convincing reasons, in addition 
to naturalism, to believe that physicalism is true. By letting science dictate the nature of our 
ultimate ontology von Wright and Davidson, despite their Wittgensteinian roots, come 
dangerously close to the position warned against by Wittgenstein; naturalism may lead us into 
complete darkness. 
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 Although Davidson and von Wright do not succeed in their defense of physicalism, it 
is  clear  that  they  stand  opposed  to  dualism  in  their  attempt  to  be  physicalists.  This  is  
especially true of Davidson, since AM was meant as an argument for physicalism. Likewise, 
von Wright noted that modern dualists were taking the situation back to the “neighbourhood 
of Descartes”, which is a place where a modern philosopher of mind definitely should not be. 
In the contemporary philosophy of mind, non-reductive physicalism has been criticized for 
the fact that it forms an incoherent combination. The claim is that non-reductive physicalism 
is  a  form  of  “property  dualism”,  and  that  a  position  which  intends  to  be  a  form  of  robust  
physicalism should not tolerate non-physical properties. However, as I claimed in section 2.3, 
the discussion about mental and physical properties is, as a result of an improper and unclear 
use of terms, often confused. It is not clear that Davidson’s position can be accused of 
genuine property dualism, because he does not accept the kinds of mental properties whose 
existence his critics take for granted. In sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 I clarified Davidson’s views 
about properties. The conclusion was that his views about the status of properties are not 
definite, and thus different interpretations are possible. Both Davidson and von Wright 
nevertheless reject the possibility of type–type correlations between mental and physical 
phenomena.  
I also noted that a non-reductive physicalist does not have to reject the view that 
mental  properties  are  physical  properties  if  the  term “property”  is  understood  in  the  correct  
way. Mental properties do not therefore pose an insuperable problem for a non-reductive 
physicalist, and both Davidson and von Wright could have answered the charge of property 
dualism without jeopardizing their views about the irreducibility of the mental. It is only the 
reductive physicalist view about the nature of mental properties which leads to the idea that 
non-reductive physicalism is committed to a dualism of properties. Von Wright and Davidson 
could have challenged this view about properties more strongly, for example, by drawing on 
Wittgenstein’s insights concerning how terms are used, how certain language games are 
played. We can agree with the common criticism that non-reductive physicalism is not 
physicalism enough – but this is not because its acceptance of non-physical properties. It is 
because non-reductive physicalism does not give good reasons to believe that O-physicalism 
is true. But the same criticism applies also to reductive physicalism. 
 Another problem, one which is often seen as challenge for a non-reductive physicalist, 
is the problem about the nature of token-identities. It was argued in section 2.1 that 
Davidson’s view is a form of O-physicalism, and it thus rejects non-physical substances. Von 
Wright has a similar view. Davidson’s argument for physicalism is meant to show that each 
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mental token is physical. In sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 I discussed Davidson’s and von Wright’s 
views about the nature of token-identity. My conclusion is that von Wright’s claim that the 
idea of token-identity is a serious confusion is better argued than Davidson’s view about 
identity, which is based on his unsuccessful argument for physicalism. I showed in section 
2.4.3 that Davidson’s last word on the subject is skeptical. Because of his argument for 
monism, there have to be token-identities; and yet we may be never in a position to find them. 
I also noted that non-reductive physicalists in general are skeptical towards the view that 
actual token-reductions are possible. This is a strange conclusion if the possibility of token-
reduction is considered to be an empirical issue and if the non-reductive physicalists do not 
give reasons, based on available empirical evidence, for why such reductions look 
implausible. This being said, my conclusion is that the skeptical attitude towards the 
possibility of token-reductions even further emphasizes the unwarranted nature of the 
physicalism of non-reductive physicalism. If mental to physical reductions are not 
forthcoming, we have no good reasons to believe that mental tokens are part of the physical 
world. At any rate, von Wright and Davidson fail to provide these kinds of reasons.  
 Whereas von Wright’s and Davidson’s arguments for physicalism are unconvincing, 
their  views about the nature of mental  phenomena are interesting. In section 2.5.1 I  claimed 
that the most serious problem of their positions is their insufficient attention to the nature of 
consciousness. As I showed, this was the last topic in von Wright’s philosophy of mind. It is 
unfortunate that his views were left unfinished. In section 2.5.2, certain misunderstandings 
about Davidson’s radical interpretation were clarified and in sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 the 
possible consequences for interpretationism were suggested. I believe that these consequences 
capture the essence of the non-reductive side of Davidson’s and von Wright’s positions. In 
section 2.6 the possibility of neutral monism was tentatively explored as an alternative 
metaphysical framework. Perhaps a plausible framework, which would non-reductively 
incorporate mental phenomena into a naturalist framework, could be found from this 
direction. Von Wright’s views about the mutual dependence of mind and matter could provide 
an opening towards such a new position and should be further studied in the future. 
 My conclusion is that non-reductive physicalism is physicalism by name only. The 
lack of convincing arguments for physicalism, together with arguments against the possibility 
of reductions, leaves the physicalism of non-reductive physicalism unwarranted. This is not to 
say that non-reductive physicalists would in any way show sympathies for the idea of 
substance dualism. We have seen that Davidson and von Wright stand firmly against this idea. 
But whereas their views do not give support for substance dualism they do not give support 
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for physicalism either. In chapter two Davidson’s and von Wright’s general views about the 
ontological mind–body problem have been described and their views about the physical 
nature of mind have been found relatively unclear and unwarranted. We have thus answered 
first of the main questions of this thesis, namely: How should we understand the 
physicalism of non-reductive physicalism, and is such physicalism warranted? For the 
most  part,  the  discussion  of  this  chapter  has  been  carried  on  under  the  assumption that O-
physicalism is true. This has allowed us to consider, for example, the relation between mental 
and physical properties and to consider whether mental states are states of the brain. Although 
I have defended the view that mental phenomena are located in the brain this, or other 
physicalistic assumptions, are not something to which I am committed to. For the sake of 
argument, I have explored these questions from the perspective of O-physicalism which is a 
perspective accepted by von Wright and Davidson. Personally I may be tempted more by 
dualism, emergentism, pan-psychism, epiphenomenalism or neutral monism than by 
physicalism.  
 In the next chapter I will describe in detail how Davidson’s and von Wright’s views 
about the nature of mental phenomena may explain why actual ontological or conceptual 
reductions of the mental to the physical are not forthcoming. 
 
Chapter three: The irreducibility of the mental 
 
In chapter two, different aspects of Davidson’s and von Wright’s solution to the ontological 
mind–body problem were considered. The conclusion was that their answer to the questions: 
“in what medium do mental phenomena take place?” and “how are they related to the physical 
world?” is quite straightforward. There is only one substance, so the answer to the first 
question is that materialism or physicalism is the correct ontology of the mind. The nature of 
the exact relation of mental phenomena to the physical world is less clear. Both Davidson and 
von Wright have non-reductive views about the mental, and they argue against type-type 
identity. Both reserve an important role for the concept or phenomenon of supervenience, 
although its explanatory import is unclear. We could conclude that supervenience merely 
states the nature of the irreducibility and does not further clarify the relation between mental 
and physical phenomena. 
 Davidson attempts to provide an argument which would show the identity of mental 
and physical tokens, whereas von Wright claims, with reservations, that the idea of this kind 
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of identity is more confusing than clarifying. Mental states are states of whole persons and not 
states of their brains. I believe that the details of Davidson’s and von Wright’s positions 
seriously undermine their common physicalistic position, and thus the claim that “everything 
is physical” is rendered hollow. I think it is worth asking why the need to establish the truth of 
physicalism is so important, given the simultaneous conviction that the mental is irreducible. 
Why is the ideology of physicalism so strong? Their attempt to establish the truth of 
physicalism fails, but this does not make the monism of Davidson and von Wright non-
physicalistic  in  spirit.  It  is  curious  that  in  his  later  writings  Davidson  wanted  firmly  to  
distance his position from physicalism. This is interesting given that originally AM was meant 
as an argument for physicalism and a contribution to the physicalist project. On the one hand 
Davidson wants to defend physicalism; on the other hand he wants to claim that he is not a 
physicalist. Von Wright wants to defend materialism because the scientific world view 
demands it, but he also wants to point out the obscurities of the materialist position. One way 
to solve the inherent conflict which can be detected in the views of these philosophers is to 
emphasize the interpretation that their common ontology is robustly non-physicalistic. 
Acceptance of the ontology of neutral monism would at least partly solve the conflict. 
Unfortunately, this option was not taken very far by von Wright and Davidson, and therefore 
continuing this line of thought in this work would amount to speculation. I shall not do it 
despite the fact that the non-physicalistic spirit of von Wright and Davidson would be better 
served by a non-physicalistic ontology, and despite my own belief that a non-physical 
ontology makes better sense than the ontology of O-physicalism. 
 The discussion about the nature of physicalism and non-reductive physicalism showed 
that the positions of Davidson and von Wright are not as incoherent as one might assume 
given the interpretations of various critics. Antony, for example, has recently claimed that “a 
full defense of psychology… requires an account how psychology… could be embodied in 
material beings.”899 Similar statements are heard from other reductive naturalists. It is curious 
that Antony does not recognize the efforts of von Wright and Davidson to save psychology. 
Davidson’s famous paper “Psychology as Philosophy” defends the autonomy and special 
character of psychology, as does von Wright’s “In Defense of Psychology”.900 It cannot be 
denied that these two philosophers have done a lot of work to defend the autonomy and 
importance of psychology. This does not satisfy a critic like Antony who wants to defend 
psychology as a science, and perhaps as a competitor to a brain-based psychology or 
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900 See Davidson, 1974b, von Wright, UPa. 
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philosophy of mind. This defense is based on the acceptance of a certain kind of metaphysical 
framework and on the demands that this framework makes. Antony claims that even non-
reductive physicalism is required to give a reductive explanation of psychological 
phenomena. This is because, according to Antony, a firm distinction between the epistemic 
grounds for our acceptance of mental concepts and the “ontological constitution” of the 
psychological realm must be made. Similar kinds of demands are made by other reductive 
naturalists.  Fodor  notes:  “It  is  hard  to  see...  how  one  can  be  a  Realist  about  intentionality  
without also being...  a Reductionist.”901 Antony complains that those non-reductive 
materialists, like Davidson, who are not willing to provide a reductive explanation, are 
confusing the epistemic and ontological issues. According to her, there is a “scientific 
impulse” asking what it is in the world that makes psychological attributions true. Again, 
Fodor agrees when he claims that there is a “naturalistic consensus” claiming that “[...] 
something has to be said about the place of the semantic and the intentional in the natural 
order....”902 
 In making these claims Antony and Fodor are committing simple mistakes against 
which some non-reductive physicalists warn. To insist that there must be a specific kind of 
answer to the question of what it is in the world that makes psychological attributions true is 
to ignore the possibility that perhaps in the case of the mental, the epistemological and 
ontological questions cannot be separated. Together with many reductive and eliminative 
materialists, Antony is making the mistake of which Wittgenstein, Malcolm and many others 
have warned. It is to assume that there is a “nature” or “essence” of mental phenomena to be 
found,  and  that  the  truth  of  psychological  attributions  does  ultimately  depend  on  the  
“physicalistic vindication” of mental phenomena. I think that a rejection of these 
considerations, i.e. a rejection of the discussion about whether these assumptions should be 
accepted, is a general problem for the contemporary philosophy of mind. What I have wanted 
to emphasize in chapter one is that, pace Antony for example, Davidson does not stay silent 
about the “ontological constitution of the psychological realm”. Pace Antony, Davidson is not 
willing to stop arguing once it has been shown that psychology is eliminable.”903 He  is  not,  
pace Antony, claiming that “it cannot be a genuine fact that any physical event is identical 
with any mental event.”904 Davidson claims that mental events are identical with physical 
events  and  that  the  facts  about  them  are  as  real  as  the  facts  about  anything  else.  How  is  it  
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possible, then, to claim that, according to Davidson, the identity between the mental and the 
physical cannot be a genuine fact? It is possible only if one has a very peculiar understanding 
of what a genuine fact can or must be.   
 I have shown that Davidson and von Wright make various claims about the 
ontological constitution of the psychological realm. As the discussion about token-identities 
and token reductions shows, they have views about the “physical constitution” of the mental. 
As the discussion about interpretationism shows, both philosophers have also views about the 
“mental mode of being” of the mental. Davidson and von Wright say a lot, if we agree with 
Kim that  with  respect  to  the  ontological  problem the  substantive  question  is  whether  or  not  
things like belief, desire, emotion, and consciousness are reducible to neural, biological, and 
physicochemical properties and processes. I think we should indeed agree that this is the 
substantive question. The ontological aspect of the mind–body problem is simply the problem 
of whether a “thing” like belief is a neural process. Whatever Davidson and von Wright are 
saying about the irreducibility of the mental, they are not challenging the view that beliefs are 
neural processes.905 They are even defending the view that in some cases we could identify a 
mental phenomenon with its physical counterpart. Therefore there is no ontological issue with 
respect to the views of Davidson and von Wright. It is a misstatement to claim that 
Davidson’s  arguments  in  favor  of  irreducibility  are  “[…]  really  echoes  of  the  old  anti-
materialist arguments against the claim that mental states are physical states.”906 Von Wright 
and Davidson can be interpreted as supporting a robust form of physicalism despite their 
claims for the irreducibility of the mental. Their defense of the autonomy of the mental does 
not make their positions insufficiently naturalistic or insufficiently physicalistic.907 
 In the works of Davidson and von Wright, the general ontological framework is 
established, although the status of mental phenomena is left somewhat unclear. What is 
essential to the position of Davidson and von Wright, in addition to their physicalism, is their 
conviction that mental phenomena are irreducible to their physical counterparts and especially 
that mental concepts are something that cannot be eliminated or replaced by physical 
concepts. The way in which mental phenomena are irreducible was discussed in chapter two. 
There it  was shown that the irreducibility of phenomena is perhaps not as principled as one 
might  have  assumed  from  reading  the  views  of  critics.  This  being  the  case,  the  substantive  
                                               
905 This claim must be prefaced with a caveat, since we have seen that both Davidson and von Wright, although 
accepting the token-identity thesis, sometimes challenge the view that a belief is a neural process. Interpretation-
based philosophy of mind pulls towards antirealist consequences, whereas monism points towards realism. 
906 Antony, 1989, 185. What are these “old anti-materialist arguments” and have they been refuted? 
907 Although, as we have seen, van der Burg (2007), claims that Davidson should be more naturalistic. 
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question of Kim is not a challenge which would turn Davidson’s or von Wright’s positions 
into dualism. Davidson suggests that actual token identities could be established, although his 
last word on the subject was skeptical. By his use of the concept of supervenience, von 
Wright can be seen as suggesting that the reduction of mental states to the states of the brain, 
i.e. identifying the former with the latter, is at least not complete nonsense as, for example, 
Putnam and Malcolm claim.  
 In this chapter I will further clarify why and to what extent mental phenomena cannot 
be reduced to physical phenomena, but the focus will be on the irreducibility of mental 
concepts908. The irreducibility of mental concepts is the essential point of the non-reductive 
position of Davidson and von Wright. It is not their insistence that mental properties are not 
physical properties. It is not their views about token-identities. It is therefore not “property 
dualism”, but conceptual dualism,  which  defines  their  position.  Therefore  the  nature  of  this  
sort of conceptual dualism is a worth exploring. The question of this chapter is: What are the 
reasons for the irreducibility of the mental? The focus will again be on Davidson’s views, 
because he wrote on the subject much more extensively than von Wright. However, I think 
von Wright makes an extremely important contribution that supplements Davidson’s 
arguments. This is von Wright’s claim that the mental is epistemically prior to the neural. 
What works as a guideline for this chapter is Davidson’s following statement:  
 
What I have chiefly emphasized is the irreducibility of our mental concepts. They are irreducible in two 
senses. First, they cannot be defined in the vocabularies of the natural sciences, nor are there empirical 
laws linking them with physical phenomena in such a way as to make them disposable. Second, they 
are not an optional part of our conceptual resources. They are just as important and indispensable as our 
common-sense means of talking and thinking about phenomena in non-psychological ways. 909  
 
This is general statement capturing well the spirit of Davidsonian irreducibility. I believe that 
this spirit has been often misinterpreted. Antony, for example, thinks that the essence of 
Davidsonian irreducibility is the claim that “[…] intentional properties are ontologically 
distinct from… the non-intentional properties also possessed by their bearers.”910 But if one 
considers how Davidson himself describes the irreducibility of the mental in the previous 
                                               
908 Perhaps one could claim that, given Davidson’s conviction that “events are mental only as described” and that 
“our sentences are the only measure of the mental”, a distinction between mental concepts and phenomena does 
not make clear sense. However, there is no reason to think that this formulation captures our intuitive conception 
of the mental. There are conscious mental states, and the features of these phenomena are different than the 
features of the concepts in terms which we describe them. In von Wright’s case the distinction between 
phenomena and concepts is made more strongly. As I have shown, he emphasizes the subjective aspect of 
“Cartesian thoughts”. 
909 Davidson, 1999o, 599. 
910 Antony, 1999, 37. 
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quote, it becomes clear that the basic charge of property dualism is misplaced; it certainly 
does not capture the central point of Davidsonian irreducibility, since Davidson would not 
accept the “ontological distinctiveness” of mental properties. 
 Although the general view about the nature of the irreducibility of the mental is clear, 
I believe it has to be straightforwardly admitted that Davidson’s and von Wright’s views are 
not knock-down arguments that prove the irreducibility of the mental. Philosophical 
arguments rarely are. In chapter one, elements of the Davidsonian conception of the mental 
were briefly discussed. In a radical interpretation, mental states are attributed according to 
normative standards of the interpreter and the identity of the states so attributed depends on 
their causal history and on their relations to other mental states. The defining features of the 
mental realm, when the mental is understood in a Davidsonian way, are therefore normativity, 
externalism, and holism. These features have an important role in the arguments for the 
irreducibility of the mental. Principles constituting mental reality are also those which make 
reality autonomous and not amenable to strict explanation and prediction. From this it follows 
that  if  the  Davidsonian  conception  of  the  mental  is  rejected,  also  the  arguments  for  the  
irreducibility of the mental must be rejected. It seems to me that it is a non-starter to argue 
against Davidsonian irreducibility without arguing against the whole Davidsonian project for 
the philosophy of mind, especially without arguing against the basic idea of interpretationism.   
 My view is that Davidson’s views about the irreducibility or anomalism of the mental 
are the most interesting part of his philosophy of mind, because of their philosophical 
consequences. Davidson has claimed that something like AM is needed if we want to make 
sense of the idea of human freedom. This is a challenging claim. The anomalism of the mental 
removes the mental, which is a defining feature of humans, from the domain of physical law 
and explanation. The irreducibility of the mental has far reaching concrete consequences, 
which relate to current discussions in which conclusions about the mind are drawn. I argue 
that the irreducibility of the mental is something that should be defended.911 A view about 
humans with irreducible mental states is something that needs to be defended in order to save 
the dignity of individual human beings. The question about the irreducibility of the mental 
connects concretely to the question of what kind of human image we want to hold. This is a 
political, philosophical, scientific, sociological, and religious question. These are some of the 
areas of human life for which this question is relevant. I hope that we would be more willing 
to defend the view that human nature is not fixed, and that we would have courage to take a 
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stand on the wider issues which relate to the questions in the philosophy of mind. We can take 
a stand on these wider questions and should not leave philosophical claims hanging in the air 
without any connection to reality which, after all, is what in the end influences us all. What 
kind of conception of human being we want can show itself, for example, in the philosophical 
attempt to try to defend the autonomy of the mental.  
 What is the point of defending the irreducibility of the mental? Why insist that 
psychological facts are autonomous with respect to physical facts? What is the rationale 
behind my claim that the irreducibility of the mental should be defended? To this question, I 
can give only the following answer: philosophy should be partly a normative discipline; 
philosophizing should have consequences. What is the point of philosophy if it does not help 
with the problems of life? What is the point of philosophy if it does not improve your thinking 
about the questions of ordinary life? My claim is that when a philosopher takes a stance on a 
question like the question about the irreducibility of the mental, he is not only taking part in a 
merely technical discussion of professional philosophy. By taking a stance, such a 
philosopher is also committing to certain values. A philosophical position must start from the 
acceptance of certain basic principles, which cannot be further grounded. There are choices 
that cannot be proven to be correct but which must be made. This is a von Wrightian view 
which I accept, but why I accept it has to remain without clear explanation. One consequence 
of this view is that in the following discussion I am making one choice which cannot be 
further grounded. It is the very choice I make to defend the irreducibility of the mental. Given 
the view of man that I think we should hold, my starting point is biased, perhaps quite 
strongly.  I  cannot  give  an  argument  as  to  why  a  certain  view  of  man  would  be  better  than  
another; but the choice has to be made nevertheless. Based on this choice, I claim that we 
should defend the autonomy of our common-sense understanding of ourselves against overtly 
scientific alternatives. Behind this choice there are certain personal fears and doubts about the 
consequences of technological progress. Perhaps this could be called my philosophical 
motivation for defending the irreducibility of the mental. I believe it would be dishonest to 
claim that philosophical views exist in isolation; there is always some motivation for a 
particular view. As Searle has noted: ”Some computationalists invest an almost religious 
intensity into their faith that our deepest problems about the mind will have a computational 
solution.”912 This is, of course, only one example, but some motivation explains also the 
computationalists’ intensity, and it seems to me that is plausible to think that this motivation 
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relates to broader, for example to political, issues. The question of whether mental phenomena 
can ne naturalized is a philosophical question which is considered in the philosophy of mind. 
But many claim that this question can and should be seen in a broader setting. Fodor notes:  
 
If it turns out that physicalization – naturalization – of intentional science… is impossible… then it 
seems to me that…we should stop doing intentional science and that counts a lot more than some 
philosopher being worried. That’s a matter of theoretical honesty. The position we’re in is, can we give 
a coherent account of this research project because, by Christ, if we can’t we should stop spending the 
taxpayers’ money.913 
 
Fodor continues by noting that the question of whether intentional science is possible is 
related to pragmatic questions such as which philosophers or scientists should get what kind 
of  grants  and  for  what  kind  of  research.914 Apparently, philosophical intensity is sometimes 
guided by very pragmatic considerations.   
 It is interesting that in a philosophical work one needs to defend a non-reductive 
position. Whereas our intuitions would perhaps say that our view about ourselves should have 
a priority and that a scientific understanding should try to challenge the commonsense view, 
the current situation seems to be the opposite. It is the non-reductive view that is required to 
justify its existence. Positions like Davidson’s and von Wright’s are treated with suspicion, 
because they do not fit well with scientific facts. Yet our lives are based on the common-sense 
understanding that we have of ourselves and of others, which we formulate in terms of mental 
concepts. We manage to live very well without any specific knowledge about the functioning 
of the brain. We succeed quite well, surprisingly well, in explaining and understanding 
ourselves and others without using neural concepts. Still, Davidson feels that he has to defend 
the view that mental concepts are important and indispensable. Given the importance of 
mental concepts for our lives, the defense of irreducibility of the mental or the need for such a 
defense would be very absurd if it were not for the unhealthy materialistic trend prevailing in 
the philosophy of mind. Recently Paul Churchland has claimed that:  
 
The so-called propositional attitudes must be, at best, the occasional and ridiculously low-dimensional 
‘projections’ of the mega-dimensional elements of the brain’s true representational vehicles… they are 
not the… relevant elements that drive our cognitive activity. More likely still, they don’t exist at all.915  
 
It is scientific evidence which challenges folk-psychology. When this view starts to compete 
with the common-sense understanding on which our current life-practices are based, the 
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stakes are raised. If eliminative materialism were just a philosophical view about the relation 
between mental and the physical, it could be taken to be one proposal among many 
interesting, although outrageous, suggestions that have occurred in the history of philosophy. 
But contemporary eliminative materialism is not this kind of position. It is meant to be a 
scientific theory. If such a theory is accepted, it may have concrete consequences for our self-
image. This image may have concrete consequences for human societies and social practices, 
and these consequences may turn out to be extremely harmful. To this aspect of physicalism I 
will return in the appendix of this work. Here I note merely that I find it important to defend 
the autonomy and importance of our common-sense view of ourselves given the current 
threats that this mode of understanding is facing.916  
 In the discussions of Davidson’s position, the irreducibility of the mental is usually 
understood in the original sense in which Davidson presented it in “Mental Events”. In that 
article the main thesis was that the mental realm is anomalous, it is not governed by strict 
laws. My claim is that the original thesis is only one part of Davidson’s completely non-
reductivist account of the mental. My interpretation emphasizes three non-reductivist aspects 
of Davidson’s views. Although the original thesis of the anomalism of the mental is an 
important  part  of  this  trio,  focusing  too  much on  it,  as  most  commentators  do,  may prevent  
one from seeing the overall non-reductivism of Davidson’s philosophy of mind. The editors 
of two recent collections of essays on Davidson see the arguments for the anomalism of the 
mental as being “notoriously difficult”917 and “intriguing, but notoriously elusive.”918 There 
are also more sympathetic commentators; van der Burg writes that on the whole he finds 
Davidson’s arguments convincing.919  I think we should sympathize with the critical views: 
the argument is obscure. Needless to say, in “Mental Events” Davidson provided grounds for 
these complaints by admitting that with respect to the argument for the irreducibility of the 
mental, nothing which he says deserves to be called a proof.  
  Whereas my purpose is to clarify these arguments as well as possible, I cannot help 
the feeling that the argument for the anomalism is not totally convincing. What I want to 
emphasize is that Davidson’s arguments between 1970 and 2000, his philosophy of mind as a 
whole, provide a non-reductivist view that was not in place when the argument of anomalism 
of the mental was first introduced. Davidson’s views developed in important ways. Therefore 
                                               
916 A similar kind of task is taken for example in Hornsby,1997 and Rudder-Baker, 1987, 2007. 
917 Ludwig, 2003a, 19. 
918 Ludwig and Zeglen, 1999, 11. 
919 Van der Burg, 2007. 
312 
 
commentators who narrowly concentrate on “Mental Events” only focus on a very small part 
of a larger picture. Antony, for example, notes:  
 
I should emphasize that I am not primarily…interested in explicating Davidson’s theory, which has 
undergone some potentially significant changes over the years. My aim is to examine the implications 
for psychology – whether ‘folk’ or scientific – of a view of the mental like the one set out in ‘Mental 
Events’. If Davidson no longer holds such a view, fine and good….920 
 
What  is  the  interest  in  this?  The  intellectual  curiosity  of  exploring  a  philosophical  position  
could be one reason for this kind of view. But Antony is certainly not interested in Davidson-
exegesis. She wants to argue that “Mental Events”, published twenty years before Antony’s 
criticism, suggests a view of the mental which has negative consequences for psychology. But 
since Davidson developed his position further, what is the point of taking “Mental Events” in 
isolation? Barry Loewer has recently noted that: “Davidson[s]… argument has been as 
influential as it is obscure to its conclusion.”921 He  refers  to  the  original  argument.  It  is  
interesting  to  note  how  much  discussion  “Mental  Events”  has  given  rise  to  without  
commentators agreeing even on its most important claims. My interpretation may be 
controversial in the sense that it is possible that Davidson did not intend his position to be as 
non-reductive as I claim. If this is the case, my interpretation can be seen as suggesting what 
kind of conclusions Davidson should have drawn; I claim that he should have developed 
further the view of neutral monism. Philosophers who have a non-reductive view about the 
mind should explain why postulating material mind is objectionable and discuss more 
thoroughly what kind of undesirable consequences it may have. This is especially important 
now when those who have a reductive view about the mind are drawing conclusions which 
have consequences for the actual practices of human society. Rorty and Putnam have raised 
the kinds of questions that a non-reductive physicalist should ask. Von Wright was also aware 
of the problems that a reductive view about the mind may bring. His discussion about the 
scientistic attitude in philosophy, and particularly his writings which were meant for a wider 
audience, show that von Wright saw the problems of the mind in a wider perspective. 
 Most critics and commentators of Davidson’s philosophy of mind focus too narrowly 
on his arguments against strict psycho-physical laws, that is, on his arguments for the 
anomalism of the mental. Since the publication of “Mental Events”, the majority opinion has 
been that Davidson’s reasons are not convincing or that the view is an obscure a priori 
argument against the possibility of such laws. It is true that Davidson is trying to provide an a 
                                               
920 Antony, 1991, 301. 
921 Loewer, 2007, 248. 
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priori argument. This argument can be accepted only if the Davidsonian view about the 
mental is accepted. It is easy to see that the argument does not move those who reject the kind 
of view of mental states that Davidson is defending. Commentators try to argue that Davidson 
has not offered convincing reasons to believe that there could not be any strict psycho-
physical laws.922 Whether there are convincing reasons for Davidson’s particular position or 
not is one question. Whether there are good reasons for supporting a general non-reductivism 
about  the  mental  is  another.  Those  who  focus  on  criticizing  the  claim  that  there  cannot  be  
strict-psychophysical laws usually ignore Davidson’s views about the irreducibility of the 
mental. I think that many commentators are simply not aware of  the  arguments  for  
irreducibility because they have not studied the views of Davidson carefully enough. It is 
disappointing to find article after article where the main critical argument can be simply 
defused by referring to arguments that Davidson has made in papers which the critic has not 
studied. The issue is not, however, one of who has studied Davidson deeply enough. The 
main issue is that there are two different questions to be discussed. First, we must ask whether 
strict psycho-physical laws are possible. Second, we must determine whether the mental is 
irreducible, especially whether our common-sense conception of ourselves is such that it 
cannot be reduced to, or replaced by, a different conception.  
 To these two questions there are three kinds of reactions from the commentators. First, 
there are those who focus on the thesis of anomalism as if it exhausts Davidson’s views on the 
irreducibility of the mental. These reactions are a consequence of not considering Davidson’s 
philosophy as a whole. Second, there are those who are not interested in the irreducibility 
arguments at all, because they do not share Davidson’s views about the nature of mental 
phenomena. Third, there are those who have a generally sympathetic view towards 
Davidson’s approach. I believe that if we want to try to describe accurately what Davidson 
argues and if we want to understand the points being made, we have to evaluate his arguments 
in the framework of his views, and not in some preferred framework of our own. Only then 
can the views be genuinely criticized. Those who ignore the Davidsonian conception of the 
mental but keep on criticizing his arguments for the irreducibility of the mental make the 
same kind of mistake as those who ignore Davidson’s views on properties and keep on 
insisting that Davidson does not provide a reductive explanation of mental properties. 
 The three arguments for general non-reductivism that will be presented in this chapter 
lead us to see how Davidson’s philosophy is in sharp contrast to most contemporary 
                                               
922 It is remarkable how many pages have been written on, for example, the questions of what Davidson means 
by law and how the argument against strict-psychophysical laws should be understood. 
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approaches in the philosophy of mind. What I emphasize is the irreducibility of the mental, of 
which the lawlessness of the mental is only one part. The exact content of this irreducibility 
will become clearer along with the arguments for it. Given what we already know or think we 
know about reality we may, as the reductive naturalists do, have the view that a complete 
physicalistic explanation of everything must be  possible.  It  is  telling  that  in  one  of  the  last  
papers Davidson ever wrote, he comments:    
 
There is nothing here (we say to ourselves), except physical stuff, so why shouldn’t we be able to 
consolidate our vocabularies for explaining, describing, and predicting what goes on? I think this is an 
irresistible ambition, but I am here to resist it.923 
 
Davidson notes that at times we may feel that a reduction must be possible, and yet he is 
willing to resist the urge. This is an interesting remark if, as I suggested earlier, we want to 
consider the motivation for defending irreducibility. Davidson does not state why he wants to 
resist the “irresistible ambition”; in the appendix I offer my brief analysis what his motivation 
for this kind of resistance could be.    
 In this chapter I will give reasons why the non-reductive status of the mental shows 
that eliminativism or reductive materialism are implausible views. I claim that conceptual 
dualism is necessary as long as we want to see ourselves in a certain way, namely as rational 
animals who can freely act out of reasons, who are responsible for their actions and are thus 
subject to moral evaluation. Elimination of the mental, if pushed to extremes, would lead to a 
situation where we would have to change our conception of ourselves. An eliminativist could 
argue  that  we  can  hold  whatever  kind  of  conception  of  ourselves  as  we  want,  but  that  our  
conception of ourselves should not distort the question what kind of beings we “really” are. 
Since I accept this view, at least for the sake of argument,  I argue that our self-conception is 
something which cannot be rejected, and therefore the question of whether our “real nature” 
can be something else than what we take it to be does not make good sense. 
 The trio of themes around a non-reductivist conception of the mental consists of the 
following:      
 
1) Anomalism of the mental 
2) Irreducibility of the mental 
3) Inescapability of the mental 
 
                                               
923 Davidson, 2003a, 697. 
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The arguments that will be presented to support my interpretation overlap each other. 
Together they establish the general irreducibility of the mental and suggest what the most 
important consequences of this view are. In this chapter, I will explicate the arguments for the 
anomalism and irreducibility of the mental. The case for the “inescapability of the mental”, 
which is not a clearly argued view of Davidson but my interpretation of how Davidson’s 
motivation could be understood, will be presented in the appendix.924 Von  Wright’s  views  
will be referred to whenever they provide support for the non-reductive view. 
  
3.1 Anomalism of the mental 
  
I will first consider Davidson’s original argument for the anomalism of the mental. The thesis 
of the anomalism of the mental is: there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which 
mental events can be predicted and explained.925 My discussion of the lawlessness of the 
mental focuses on the view that there cannot be strict psycho-physical laws in this domain. 
The reason for this is that the main significance of the anomalism of the mental for the 
questions about the irreducibility of the mental lies in the denial of the possibility of a 
nomological reduction between the mental and the physical. Before turning to Davidson’s 
reasons for the anomalism of the mental, his understanding of laws must be clarified. We have 
to be clear also about the question of what the thesis actually denies. The latter question has 
not always been clear for the commentators, and even Davidson himself has presented 
confusing and conflicting statements about the nature of the anomalism. 
 Davidson’s distinction between generalizations and laws and between strict and non-
strict laws has an important role in his argument for anomalism. Laws, distinguished from 
generalizations, “must be true universally quantified statements. They also must be lawlike: 
they must support counterfactuals, and be confirmed by their instances.”926 In “Mental 
Events”, Davidson makes a distinction between a homonomic and a heteronomic 
generalization. Positive instances of homonomic generalizations give a reason to believe that 
the generalization could be improved by adding further provisos and conditions stated in the 
same general vocabulary as the original generalization. The instantiation of a heteronomic 
generalization may give a reason to believe that there is an underlying precise law at work, 
but this law can be stated only by shifting to a different vocabulary. According to Davidson 
                                               
924 I believe I have borrowed the term “inescapability” from Ramberg, 2000. I use it in a different manner than 
Ramberg.  
925 Davidson, 1970, 208. 
926 Davidson, 1995c, 203. 
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the “laws” connecting mental and physical events have the status of heteronomic 
generalizations. He admits that there may be true general statements which have the logical 
form of a law, but are not lawlike. Heteronomic generalizations, or psycho-physical laws, are 
at best irreducibly statistical generalizations resisting improvement without limit. Homonomic 
generalizations, on the other hand, are found in the physical sciences. The generalizations of 
these sciences are such that if evidence supports them, there is a reason to believe that they 
may be sharpened indefinitely by drawing upon physical concepts. These generalizations 
point to the form and vocabulary of a finished law.  
Davidson notes that he does not object if some “important regularities” are to be 
described as laws. Strictly speaking, however, regularities count as laws only if they satisfy 
the conditions defined above. Heteronomic generalizations are not lawlike whereas 
homonomic generalizations are. When discussing the nature of psycho-physical “laws”, this 
must be remembered. Another important claim of Davidson is that regularities and laws 
should be distinguished from strict laws. A strict law “should contain no singular terms 
referring to particular objects, locations or times. Strictly lawlike statements do not contain 
open ended phrases like ‘other things being equal’, or ‘under normal conditions’.”927 Strict 
laws are generalizations which are not only “law-like” and true, but as deterministic as nature 
can  be  found to  be,  and  which  therefore  treat  reality  as  a  closed  system.  Strict  laws  do  not  
deploy disposition terms; nor do they use causal concepts. Davidson’s view is thus that laws 
are something else than strict laws. The question is: can there be strict laws, and if the answer 
is yes, then in which vocabularies can they be formulated? An answer to the first question is 
important because the anomalism of the mental is the thesis that there cannot be strict psycho-
physical laws. If it turns out that there are no strict (physical) laws at all, then the whole idea 
of anomalism seems to be empty.  
 Davidson claims that laws of physics, or “laws of nature” as he also calls them, are as 
exceptionless as nature permits, and it is only physics which treats reality as a closed system. 
The laws of physics therefore qualify as strict laws. It could be said that since it is an aim of 
physics to find laws as complete and precise as possible, it is not surprising that strict laws are 
to be found only in “developed physics”. The purpose of physics is to find exceptionless laws 
and describe every physical object and event. This is a requirement that defines the aim of 
physics.928 The  aim of  physics  is  closure.  Underlying  this  view seems to  be  the  assumption  
                                               
927 Davidson, 1995c, 204. 
928 It should be emphasized that this is Davidson’s formulation  of  the  aim  of  physics.  It  is  not  certain  that  
philosopher’s view about the aim of physics is in harmony with the physicist’s view. 
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that reality is, in some important sense, a deterministic system. What justifies this view? I 
suggest that it is just a physicalistic vision which Davidson, notwithstanding his anti-
physicalist remarks, seems to have. As I noted in chapter two, Davidson believes in 
“determinism” but does not really give a reason for this belief. There is no textual evidence 
warranting the conclusion that Davidson’s reasons to believe in the completeness of physics 
are the familiar reasons given by physicalists. 
 Davidson argues that whenever something causes something else, there must be a 
strict law that covers the particular case. In “Mental Events” Davidson treated this principle, 
which he called “The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality” (PNNC), as an 
assumption.929 As my discussion in chapter two showed, Davidson has later explained that 
this view is a “conceptual truth”. The concepts of “law” and “cause” are conceptually related 
and therefore the argument for PNCC is in some sense a priori. The acceptance of this 
conceptual truth does not amount to assuming the “regularity of nature”. I think it is difficult 
to say what PNCC’s exact implications for explanation and predictability are. Does a strict 
law that applies to a case where A causes B explain why A caused B, and does it enable us to 
predict that if A occurs, then B occurs necessarily? One natural reading of PNCC, or its 
implications, is that the reality of physical events and objects is governed by strict 
deterministic laws on the basis of which physical events can be predicted and explained. 
Davidson claims: “Everything in the universe and its history can in principle be described in 
the language of physics....”930 He notes that the natural sciences may arrive at a point where 
they  can  fully  explain  and  therefore  predict  any  event.  But  on  what  is  this  bold  assumption  
based, and what does it actually mean? A plausible answer is that this kind of conviction 
follows from Davidson’s physicalistic monism, together with his view that the PNCC is a 
conceptual truth. But it seems to me unclear whether the fact that everything can be described 
by physics implies that everything can be explained in the language of physics. It depends on 
what is meant by the term “explanation”. Even if it were possible to describe and predict the 
occurrence of any event, it is unclear whether anything would have been explained or left 
unexplained. Intuitions here differ.  
 Although Davidson does not explicitly state what the implications of the PNCC are, I 
take it to imply that if the strict law that covers the case of A causing B in a situation S were 
known,  the  prediction  that  whenever  an  event  identical  to  A occurs  in  a  situation  S,  B will  
occur too would be true. This example is artificial because there cannot be two identical 
                                               
929 PNCC from now on. 
930 Davidson, 1997a, 127. 
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occurrences of A in a situation S; the two occurrences would take place at different times. In 
this sense two identical events are impossible. However, since a strict law is a law which does 
not contain singular terms referring to particular objects, locations or times, a strict law which 
covers  the  case  when  A  causes  B  in  a  situation  S  would  have  to  state  something  like:  If  P  
(which is a complete physical description of A) occurs, P1 (which is a complete physical 
description of B) follows. According to Davidson it is possible to describe, in principle, in the 
case of each physical event, why it occurred – and in this sense explain why the event 
occurred. Perhaps explanation in this context is not the right word, because at the most basic 
level we would just describe how things happen by referring to the strict laws that cover the 
case. In other words, let us suppose that there is a law stating that if there is a certain 
distribution of forces and matter in a field of a certain size at time t, it will be followed by a 
certain distribution of forces and matter in a field of a certain size at time t1.931 It seems to me 
that this kind of law does not answer the question of why a  certain distribution of force and 
matter follows from a certain other distribution of force and matter; the law just describes that 
this happens and perhaps the only answer given by this kind of law is that certain things 
happen because this is just how things are. There is no way to answer the why-question just as 
there is no answer to the question why the laws of nature are what they are. What I find 
curious however, are Davidson’s occasional remarks that explanations get “better” when they 
get closer to physics. The level of strict laws is the level of perfect explanation. I agree that 
this would be a level of perfect prediction and description,  but  is  this  level  an  explanatory  
level at all? 
 The question of whether explanations in physics are better than other explanations is 
curious, because at times Davidson argues that all explanations are interest-relative. Or, to be 
more precise, sometimes he seems to argue that most explanations are interest-sensitive or 
relative, and sometimes he seems to claim that explanation is always geared to interest.932 
Given the latter view, the claim is that no causal explanation can be better than another 
independently of the context in which it is offered. So, a biological explanation could be 
appropriate in a certain context and an explanation in physics could be appropriate in another 
context; yet they could both be explaining the same event if and when the event is understood 
as a spatio-temporal particular. But how does this view fit with the suggestion that “if we ever 
had the laws of physics right, and we had the appropriate physical description of an event and 
                                               
931 This is Davidson’s own example of a strict law. A cruder version is that there is a strict law which says that 
all the objects similar to A are followed by objects similar to B.  This is given in Davidson, 1967a, 160. 
932 In Davidson 1993 and 1993g, it is claimed that most explanations are interest-sensitive, in Davidson 1987 it is 
claimed that explanations in ultimate physics are not interest relative. 
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of some cross section of the preceding light cone, we might be able to give a full and 
sufficient explanation of the second event.”933 Given that the explanation would be full and 
sufficient, it could exclude other kind of explanations because we would have no interest in 
them anymore. Davidson has a vision of “perfect explanation” which is formulated in terms 
strict laws of physics. This explanation is not interest relative. But doesn’t this vision reveal 
an unjustified bias towards the ideal explanations of physics as Davidson sees them? If one is 
inclined to say so, then there are two interesting additional questions. First, what is the status 
of interest-relative explanations when compared to the “perfect” explanations of physics? 
Second, what does this view tell us about Davidson’s relation to physicalism? With respect to 
the second question, I think that it shows how Davidson is more committed to physicalism 
than  he  himself  admits.  With  respect  to  the  first  question,  one  cannot  easily  avoid  the  view 
that interest-relative explanations are in some sense inferior when compared to perfect 
explanations, which are full and sufficient.  
 The  only  strict  laws  are  thus  the  laws  of  physics.  This  would  seem  to  provide  a  
straightforward answer to the question “Why can’t psychophysical laws be strict?” However, 
such a straightforward answer would make Davidson’s argument for the anomalism of the 
mental unnecessary. In order to solve this problem, we need to consider the argument in 
detail.   
3.1.1 Why strict psycho-physical laws are impossible? 
 
In order to understand why strict psycho-physical laws are impossible, it is necessary to keep 
in mind that for Davidson the mental is a conceptual category. The mental refers to our mental 
vocabulary. In chapter two I briefly described what kind of constraints Davidson takes to 
govern the use of this vocabulary. We attribute mental phenomena to others in a way that 
optimizes the rationality, truth and coherence of those attitudes. The principles of holism and 
normativity have an essential role in the attribution of mental states. We have seen that, 
according to Davidson, interpretative practices provide the only way by which beliefs can be 
attributed. The principles governing interpretation are constitutive principles of the mental, 
and in the absence of these principles the existence of the states that we have attributed to a 
person must be questioned. Mental reality is built on these constitutive principles in a very 
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strong way. Mental states are real physical states in a person, but we cannot make sense of the 
idea of their existence if they cannot be identified as mental states first.934 
 The claim that mental reality is not governed by strict laws has two components. First, 
it is claimed that there are no strict laws that relate mental events to physical events. Second, 
there are no strict laws that connect mental events to each other. Together they form the 
general  thesis  of  the  anomalism  of  the  mental,  according  to  which  there  aren’t  any  kind  of  
strict  laws  governing  the  mental  realm.  I  will  focus  on  the  argument  against  strict  psycho-
physical laws. The main reason advanced against the possibility of strict psycho-physical laws 
is, as Davidson famously claims “the disparate commitments of  the  mental  and  the  physical  
schemes.”935 What are these disparate commitments, commitments that cannot be compared? 
In Davidson’s words:  
 
It is a feature of physical reality that physical change can be explained by laws that connect it with other 
changes and conditions physically described. It is a feature of the mental that the attribution of mental 
phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons, beliefs and intentions of the individual. 
There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain to its proper source of 
evidence.936 
 
The argument in favor of the anomalism of the mental requires that the Davidsonian features 
of the mental and physical are accepted. The categorical difference between the mental and 
the physical vocabularies makes strict laws between them impossible. The main difference 
between these schemes is the one given above. When using our physical vocabulary we 
accept, or should accept, that physical changes can be described by laws which connect these 
changes with other physical changes. But this kind of law-involving constitutive principle is 
not part of our view about how our mental vocabulary is used or can be used. It is not part of 
our understanding of the nature of mental reality. It should be carefully noted what Davidson 
is claiming: there cannot be tight connections between mental and physical realities if both are 
to stay true to the evidence relevant for them.  
 When we use our physical vocabulary, we must operate under the constraints of that 
vocabulary. We are bound by these constraints if we are to use physical terms in a meaningful 
and systematic way. There are principles which are constitutive for our physical vocabulary, 
principles which govern their use. This is actually a Wittgensteinian view; it suggests that 
                                               
934 We can ignore here the view according to which mental states are states of the whole person. The point is that 
mental states are attributed according to certain principles. 
935 Davidson, 1970, 222, my emphasis. 
936 Ibid. 
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there are constraints which cannot be violated if concepts are to be used in a meaningful way. 
But what is a “constitutive principle”? It could be argued that a principle has constitutive 
status if it in some way governs the application of concepts. A constitutive principle partly 
determines what counts as a correct or incorrect application of a concept. In this sense, 
constitutive principles play a normative role in concept application regardless of which 
vocabulary they belong to. Davidson does not describe in too many words the constitutive 
principles of our physical vocabulary, but he gives as examples the principles governing the 
measurement of length, mass and temperature when he writes: 
 
[...] the whole set of axioms, laws or postulates for the measurement of length is partly constitutive of 
the idea of a system of macroscopic, rigid, physical objects. I suggest that the existence of lawlike 
statements in physical science depends upon the existence of constitutive...laws like those of 
measurement of length within the same conceptual domain...we cannot intelligibly assign a length to 
any object unless a comprehensive theory holds of objects of that sort....937  
 
In order to clarify the nature of constitutive principles, an example from “Mental Events” can 
be used. The claim is that we cannot consistently describe objects, for example, as having a 
certain temperature or rank objects in terms of their temperature unless the attributions satisfy 
the principle of transitivity, which is a constitutive principle of the physical. Measurements of 
temperature are normative because the principle of transitivity partly defines the structure of 
the theory that constitutes the notion of temperature. How should we react to an intransitive 
triad? A conclusion that the principle of transitivity is false would call into question the 
descriptions of an object having a temperature or being warmer than another and whether they 
have any clear meaning. This is what it means to say that the principle of transitivity is a 
constitutive principle of the concept of temperature.  
 Davidson  argues  that  one  important  feature  of  physical  reality  is  that  a  physical  
change can be explained by laws that connect it with other physical changes and conditions. 
This observation is vitally important. It could be taken to be a constitutive feature of physical 
reality, in the sense that our concepts of “physical object” and “physical event” are such that 
their behavior is law-governed. This is a remark on the nature of our current physical 
concepts;  the  question  of  whether  physical  concepts  must  obey  these  constitutive  principles  
can be left open. As Davidson notes:  
 
The causal powers of physical objects are essential to determining what sorts of objects they are by 
defining  what  sorts  of  changes  they  can  undergo  while  remaining  the  same  object  and  what  sorts  of  
changes constitute their beginnings and ends. Our concept of a physical object is the concept of an 
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object whose changes are governed by laws... In deciding what counts as a change we also decide what 
generalizations to count as lawlike.938 
 
As I noted in chapter two, this is an interesting statement insofar as it clarifies why Davidson 
thinks  that  the  PNCC  is  true.  In  “Mental  Events”,  the  thesis  was  treated  as  an  assumption,  
whereas Davidson later explained that the thesis is a conceptual truth and the reason for 
holding it must be a priori.  He  writes:  “If  the  thesis  is  true,  what  we  know  in  advance  of  
evidence is that if a singular causal claim is true, there is law that backs it....”939 In “Laws and 
Cause”  Davidson  returns  to  the  reasons  why  he  defends  the  PNCC.  The  reason  is  that  our  
concept of a physical object just is a concept of an object, the changes of which are governed 
by laws. Davidson claims that: “[...] to identify an object as a physical object... is already to 
have endowed it with certain causal dispositions; we cannot first classify an object and then 
discover that it has those causal properties.”940 This is what we mean by our concept of a 
physical object; an object could not be identified as physical if its causal properties or causal 
behavior were totally bizarre. This is an interesting claim if we speculate on the question of 
what kind of discoveries may be presented by basic physics. It is unclear whether the most 
basic physical entities bear any resemblance to law-governed objects. As I briefly noted in 
chapter one, some physicists have concluded that even they cannot really understand the 
discoveries of quantum physics. A claim that these phenomena are part of the same physical 
reality  assumed  elsewhere  in  physics  could  therefore  be  taken  as  controversial.  Perhaps  
Davidson’s claim that physical objects are governed by laws is appropriate at the level of 
macro-entities and macro-causation; the empirical investigation of the macro-level of physical 
reality warrants Davidson’s claim. But how far along the quantum-level can this view be 
applied?  It  is  interesting  that  on  the  one  hand  Davidson  often  refers  to  “ultimate  physics”,  
which is a science perhaps forever beyond human reach, but on the other hand he claims that 
“physical concepts… are tied to the common sense notion of a physical object….”941 It seems 
to me that whenever the mental is contrasted with the physical, it is the commonsense notion 
of a physical object that is used, which is the opposite of the mental.   
 Davidson’s reference to the commonsense notion of a physical object is based on his 
“naturalistic view” that, because humans seem to be inducers by nature, we cannot but 
observe physical events and objects as being law-governed. This perhaps sounds like a 
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philosopher’s psychological speculation. But for clarification we can recall Ramberg’s 
summarization of Davidson’s position. First he notes that, according to Davidson:  
 
What we count as an object and what we count as a state of an object,  as well as what we count as a 
change, is governed by our fundamental interest in construing our environment in terms of generalities. 
This is an interest that we have...as biological creatures. When we take two events as causally related, 
we thereby take them as nomologically related, because to recognize a change in the state of a physical 
object just is to recognize an event which is susceptible to explanation in terms of empirical law.942  
 
The “fundamental interest” is obviously not an interest of which humans are aware of at birth. 
Perhaps it could be claimed that this is what makes it “fundamental”. The interest is part of 
human biology. Ramberg concludes:  
 
[...] the observer of physical events cannot but see them as, on the whole, instances of how things 
generally tend to go. We couldn’t fail to discover general relations by which we understand the changes 
we perceive in the physical objects...because we are by nature disposed to count as changes and as 
persistent subjects of such changes whatever will yield general patterns allowing us to predict our 
environment.943  
 
The human observer has no alternative but to see reality in a certain way. The nature of 
physical concepts is what it is because we make predictions by tying the concepts of change 
and object together. Reality could look very different from the perspective of a creature with a 
different biological nature. As a consequence also, its PNCC would differ from ours.  
 The implications of human biological nature for the PNCC become clear when 
Davidson notes: “[...] the ground floor connection of causality with regularity is not made by 
experience, but is built into the idea of objects whose changes are causally tied to other 
changes.”944 But what does it mean to say that the connection between regularity and causality 
is “built into the idea of objects”? My claim is that we are talking of concepts, and since they 
are our creations we decide how they are used. But this cannot be wholly our decision because 
the  fact  that  humans  are  the  kind  of  creatures  they  are  must  be  taken  into  account.  In  this  
sense, so it seems to me, the connection between regularity and causality is partly made by 
experience. If all humans were blind, our visual concepts would differ from the ones that we 
have now. If all humans were deaf, our auditory concepts would differ from the current ones 
and so on. That singular causal statements imply the existence of covering laws “is not an 
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empirical fact:  nature  doesn’t  care  what  we  call  a  change,  so  we  decide what  counts  as  a  
change on the basis of what we want to explain….”945  
 It is interesting that Davidson attempts to explain an a priori view about the nature of 
causation by referring to human biological nature. Some commentators, like Sinclair, have 
concluded that Davidson’s constitutive principles are susceptible to empirical revision since 
they are responsive to empirical features of human beings as biological creatures.946 A 
broader conclusion is that “our view of ourselves as agents cannot be separated from 
important empirical features concerning the type of creatures we are.”947 Mental phenomena 
are shown to be natural through an account which aims to demonstrate how these states are 
possible for humans. This kind of interpretation of Davidson’s intentions aims to show that 
his overall position is sufficiently naturalistic without being reductionist.948 Sinclair suggests 
that Davidson can be seen as contributing to a distinctive conception of philosophical 
naturalism.949 I agree that this is one plausible interpretation of Davidson’s general 
philosophical position, but I nevertheless suggest that Davidson’s philosophy is best 
understood as an attempt to clarify conceptual structures and not as an attempt to come up 
with a distinctive version of naturalism. The purpose is not to offer explanations or theories 
about the mind. This being said,  as I suggested in chapters one and two, it should be 
emphasized that the non-reductive positions of Davidson or von Wright need not be viewed as 
forms of antinaturalism.  Sinclair’s  interpretation  can  be  seen  as  defending  this  kind  of  
suggestion. In section 1.2.2 I claimed that Davidson’s understanding of the nature, purpose 
and aims of philosophy is not entirely clear; I believe this is the conclusion that we have to be 
satisfied with. 
 One way to understand the connection between laws and causes is the “naturalistic” 
interpretation, which claims that the truth of the PNCC is based on certain empirical features 
of humans. But on the other hand, Davidson appeals to the intuition that since concepts are 
ours it is, in a sense, up to us how they are correctly used. The conviction that the changes of 
a physical object are governed by laws can be seen as a priori if we think that this is part of 
what we mean by our concept of physical objects. I think it is questionable whether our 
common sense notion actually corresponds with the intuition that Davidson is suggesting; 
perhaps it does. This is an empirical question. However, we seem to treat physical objects as 
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if they are governed by laws right from the beginning. Human behavior shows that we usually 
expect physical objects to behave in a lawful manner. This is perhaps the best evidence for the 
view that our concept of a physical object is a concept of a law-governed object. Perhaps the 
concept reflects something which comes naturally to humans, namely the capability of 
detecting certain kind of regularities. Infants expect that a moving object which disappears 
behind a wall will come out from the other side. If it doesn’t, they seem surprised. If an adult 
sees a rock flying towards his head at a certain speed he expects it to hit him soon. The 
examples of how we treat or see physical reality as being law-governed are endless. This 
suggests, as Ramberg notes, that in a sense we cannot see physical objects and events but as 
instances of how things generally tend to go, and our concept of a physical object is thus 
accordingly formulated. How we perceive reality is not up to us, although our interpretation 
of reality includes also an element of choice. 
 With respect to the strict laws of physics, it must be stressed that the aim of physics is 
to provide laws that are as complete and precise as possible. But this is an intrinsic 
requirement of physics. According to Davidson the “physical vocabulary” of physics, not the 
common sense physical vocabulary but the scientific one, is committed to the idea that a 
physical object is an object the changes of which are governed by strict laws because there 
exists a vocabulary, the vocabulary of physics, into which the broader physical vocabulary 
could be assimilated. It is unclear whether this suggestion is confirmed by current scientific 
knowledge. Davidson’s claim that a causal relation can always be described so that cause and 
effect fall under a strict law cannot be based on evidence; it cannot be empirically confirmed. 
I think that the PNCC must remain as an assumption because the conceptual argument for it 
cannot show that causal relations in nature are really backed up by strict laws. It could be 
claimed that the vocabulary of physics is a vocabulary in which the generality of laws is 
manifested in a way that side-steps all other concerns except the special pursuit of generality. 
This reasoning is, however, somewhat circular because, according to Davidson, basic physics 
is the only field containing a vocabulary sufficient for expressing strict laws. Fundamental 
physics is characterized as science which aims to find a vocabulary that is complete in the 
sense that whatever can be described in that vocabulary can also be explained in that 
vocabulary. 
  Davidson’s view is that it is “plausible” that there is a system of concepts in terms of 
which a closed causal system can be formulated. Within such a system of concepts, it is 
possible  to  formulate  homonomic  generalizations  the  positive  instances  of  which  give  a  
reason to believe that these generalizations can be improved by adding further conditions in 
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the same vocabulary used in the original generalizations. As the term “homonomic” suggests, 
there is something similar in  the  concepts  of  such  a  system.  Davidson  notes:  “Nomological  
statements bring together predicates that we know a priori are made for each other....”950 Here 
again it is claimed that we can know this a priori.  It  is  difficult  to  say  to  what  kind  of  
“nomological statements” Davidson is referring, and how we know that a statement is 
nomological. Is he talking about heteronomic or homonomic generalizations or about strict 
laws?  Each  one  of  these  could  be  taken  to  be  nomological  statement  in  some  sense  of  the  
word.  Lawlikeness  is,  after  all,  a  matter  of  degree,  as  Davidson  reminds  us.  However,  I  
believe we can interpret this view as implying that truly nomological statements equal strict 
laws, and to qualify as a strict law a statement must satisfy the definition of a strict law, which 
was given earlier. It remains to be seen what kind of predicates are made for each other in a 
way that makes them suitable for use in strict laws.  
 As noted in section 3.1, it is not only in physics but in all the “physical sciences” that 
homonomic generalizations are possible. Physical sciences hold the promise that their 
generalizations can be sharpened indefinitely by drawing on further physical concepts. In the 
physical sciences, and more precisely in physics, there is a “theoretical asymptote of perfect 
coherence with all the evidence, perfect predictability (under the terms of the system), total 
explanation (again under the terms of the system).”951 It is questionable how realistic this 
view is; the idea of perfect predictability and total explanation may have to be rejected at the 
quantum level. The view nevertheless expresses Davidson’s understanding of the nature of 
the physical sciences. It seems that on Davidson’s view, strict laws can be found only in 
closed theories, that is, in theories where the events in its domain interact only with other 
events within the theory’s domain. He notes: “[a] law can hope to be precise, explicit, and as 
exceptionless as possible only if its draws its concepts from a comprehensive closed 
theory.”952 A  strict  law  can  be  formulated  only  in  terms  of  concepts  that  are  drawn  from  a  
theory which treats reality as a closed system. Presumably only physics, because of its aims, 
is such a theory. This suggests that strict laws can be found only in physics. Could there be 
other  closed  theories  than  physics,  say  chemistry?  If  chemistry  is  a  closed  theory  wouldn’t  
also its laws qualify as strict? Davidson’s view seems to be that only physics counts as a 
closed theory because in all other vocabularies, unexplainable events – events that cannot be 
explained inside the given vocabulary – are possible. Non-chemical events may influence 
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chemical events in ways that cannot be described or explained inside chemistry. Therefore, 
chemistry is not a closed system. Physics, on the other hand, treats everything as a possible 
cause if it falls within its reach. Whatever could influence physical events would count as 
physical from the perspective of physics. 
 Davidson’s formulation from “Mental Events” is: “Physical theory promises to 
provide a comprehensive closed system guaranteed to yield a standardized unique description 
of every physical event couched in a vocabulary amenable to law.”953 Every physical event 
can be given a unique physical description and these descriptions are “amenable” to law. 
What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  physical  theory  “promises”  something?  Presumably,  that  the  
purpose or aim of a physical theory is the one described above. Perhaps this task is forever 
beyond human possibilities,  but  we  can  still  aim for  it.  Needless  to  say,  the  success  of  this  
project must depend also on the facts about the kind of universe our universe happens to be, 
on how strictly law-governed the universe actually is. Davidson acknowledges this. He 
quickly dropped the requirement that strict laws should be thought of as deterministic and 
claimed that they should be “as deterministic as nature can be found to be”954. It is possible 
that reality may turn out to be hopelessly non-deterministic. I think it could be claimed that 
the existence of mental events already shows that parts of reality are incurably non-
deterministic.  If  free  will  can  exercise  its  powers  in  ways  which  cannot  be  predicted,  what  
does it mean to claim that reality is deterministic? It is instructive to recall von Wright’s 
comment:  
 
Determinism holds good, one could say, to the extent that it works i.e. we can successfully predict the 
future on the basis of past experiences and hypothetically assumed laws of the nature.... In many areas 
of science the idea is likely to continue to play its classical role. In other areas it may have to be 
modified (‘relaxed’) or it will be dropped as useless.955 
 
Is  the  pursuit  of  “Davidsonian  determinism”  a  rational  task?  The  concepts  of  “physical  
object” and “law” are of our own making, but their applicability depends also on the nature of 
reality.  As  von  Wright  notes,  in  “those  parts  of  reality”  where  determinism seems to  fail,  it  
would be perhaps better to drop the whole idea. I think that we cannot really make sense of 
the view that our behavior could be strictly predicted or explained. The idea of determinism 
can work as a guiding principle, as a “heuristic device” for science, but it does not have a 
clear meaning in the realm of human behavior.  Science attempts to transcend our common-
                                               
953 Davidson, 1970, 224. 
954 See Davidson, 1970, 208 and Davidson, 1993d, 191. 
955 Von Wright, 1985, 42. See also von Wright, 1998, 150. 
328 
 
sense notions and proceeds to describe the reality “as it is” not “as it shows itself to us”. But 
this pursuit also has its limits. Davidson notes:  
 
[…] it is hard to think that the question whether such [a completely deterministic theory] exists is a 
purely conceptual question, at least a theory human beings could, even in principle, invent and test. 
Surely we must allow that the best physics that is possible for us is irreducibly probabilistic…if physics 
cannot be made deterministic, if the ultimate laws of the universe, so far as we will ever know, are 
probabilistic, then we must think of causality as probabilistic. Singular causal statements will still entail 
the existence of strict laws… but the laws will not meet Hume’s or Kant’s or Einstein’s standards.956 
 
The PNCC still holds, but the verdict on the degree of nomologicality secured under it will be 
set by our finished physics. It is clear that in Davidson’s view strict laws are to be found only 
inside physics: “I made clear that what I was calling a law in this context [Mental Events] was 
something that one could at best hope to find in a developed physics.... I allowed that there are 
not, and perhaps could not be expected to be, laws of this sort in the special sciences.”957 Most 
critics, for example, Kim did not read the original message of “Mental Events” in this way. 
Davidson’s admittance that strict laws are at best found in a developed physics. It sounds like 
the definition of a strict law is such that only the laws of physics will qualify as strict. Given 
this view, it is strange that Davidson continues to say that there are no such laws in the special 
sciences. The assertion that there could not be expected to be such laws in the special sciences 
is puzzling. If, by definition, strict laws are only to be found in physics (because of its aim of 
closure) it seems to follow immediately that these laws are not to be found elsewhere.  
 It seems to follow from Davidson’s admittance that homonomic laws are not the same 
thing as strict laws. Strict laws should not be confused with other regularities. In his insightful 
article discussing the anomalism of the mental, Brian Mclaughlin has claimed: “A strict law 
(or expression) is a homonomic law (or law expression).... The distinction between 
homonomic and heteronomic laws is just the distinction between strict and unstrict laws.”958 
When the argument for the anomalism of the mental was first introduced, Davidson operated 
with the concepts “heteronomic” and “homonomic” generalizations”. It seems to me that the 
concept of a strict law must be added to this distinction in order to understand Davidson’s 
argument correctly. If this is true, two questions can be raised with respect to Mclaughlin’s 
interpretation.  First,  how  does  it  fit  with  Davidson’s  claim  that  there  are  “[...]  rough, but 
homonomic, laws....”?959 The second question is simply whether Mclaughlin’s interpretation 
is correct. As far as the second question is concerned, Mclaughlin’s view depends on his 
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interpretation that: “A law is strict when but only when it is couched solely in the extended 
basic vocabulary of a closed comprehensive theory.”960 On the one hand, Mclaughlin refers to 
an extended basic vocabulary, which may contain terms which are linked to the basic 
vocabulary via bridge laws. On the other hand, he mentions that a more restricted version of a 
strict law could be defined. According to this definition, a law is strict if formulated solely in 
the basic vocabulary of a closed theory. Mclaughlin assumes that in this sense only, the laws 
of physics would count as strict laws. He however concludes that his liberal definition better 
fits Davidson’s use of the term. With respect to the first question it is difficult to accept the 
view that, given Davidson’s definition, a strict law could be “rough.” Yet, since Mclaughlin 
identifies strict laws with homonomic laws, he should interpret Davidson as suggesting that 
rough homonomic laws are the same thing as rough strict laws. But what could this mean? 
 Looking back to “Mental Events”, it could be claimed that Mclaughlin’s interpretation 
perhaps fits better with Davidson’s use of the concept of a strict law than the interpretation 
according to which strict laws must be couched solely in the basic vocabulary of a closed 
theory. However, if we look to “Laws and Cause”, which is partly a refinement of “Mental 
Events”,  it  seems  evident  that  Mclaughlin  cannot  be  correct.  Strict  laws  cannot  be  “rough”  
and they must be couched in the vocabulary of physics. This being said, I believe that we 
must still somehow squeeze out an interpretation which in essential respect resembles the one 
given by Mclaughlin. Why? Because by taking seriously the stronger interpretation, we 
encounter a problem which may turn out to be fatal for the argument against the possibility of 
strict psycho-physical laws. Since I think that the argument against psycho-physical laws is, 
by and large, interesting, I try to clear out the problem which the strong interpretation creates, 
and thereby to defend the consistency of Davidson’s views. The seriousness of the problem 
depends, on the one hand, on our understanding of the notion of a strict law; on the other, it 
also depends on our understanding of the notion of a physical science.  
 An essential question is that of which predicates are suitable for strict laws. Only 
predicates suitable for strict laws can be reduced to each other. It seems that, if we listen to 
Mclaughlin, the possible predicates must be either the predicates of physics or predicates 
which are reducible to these predicates. However, by definition, strict laws are only to be 
found in developed physics, so how could there be a possibility that predicates from other 
“physical sciences” could be reduced to these “strict” predicates via “strict bridging laws”? 
There  seems  to  be  no  possibility  for  such  a  reduction.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  Kim’s  
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observation that reductions in the sciences are impossible if Davidson’s view is accepted must 
be taken seriously. Kim’s conclusion is:  
 
[...] if we are allowed to begin with the nonexistence of strict laws outside basic physics as a premise, 
we can cut away all the complex and obscure arguments... for mental anomalism and reach the desired 
conclusion in a single step. For since strict laws can exist only in basic physics, there of course cannot 
be strict laws in psychology or between psychology and anything else!961  
 
This is a very interesting observation and, if correct, it makes one wonder why Davidson 
wants to provide arguments against strict psycho-physical laws if, by stipulation there cannot 
be strict laws anywhere outside physics. Moreover, if there are no strict bridging laws 
between physics and anything else, our mental vocabulary does not deserve special status 
when  compared  to  any  other  special  science  vocabulary,  which  also  turns  out  to  be  
irreducible. The mental would not be a special category in any way.962 It  seems to  me that  
Kim’s interpretation must be rejected if the thesis about the lawlessness of the mental is to 
remain interesting. This, however, is very difficult because Davidson explicitly admits that 
strict laws exist only in a developed physics. I think that we should try to find a way to make 
room for strict bridging laws between physics and other domains. Mclaughlin’s interpretation 
should be defended against Kim’s, although given Davidson’s own comments the latter 
sounds more plausible. Another way to argue against Kim is to explore the possibility of non-
strict bridging laws. 
 Let us for the moment ignore Davidson’s views about the connection between strict 
laws and physics. In the article where this connection is explicitly made, Davidson also notes 
that the sign of a heteronomic generalization is that it is not in the form of a strict law and not 
reducible to such.963 This suggests that some generalizations, presumably homonomic, either 
are strict laws or are reducible to such laws. Indeed, when discussing “rough homonomic 
laws”, Davidson argues that there are laws which “back the homonomic laws up” and these 
laws are such that there is no improving on them in points of precision and 
comprehensiveness. It seems that these are the “real” strict laws, because they are such that 
they cannot be sharpened anymore. This is of course one reason to reject Mclaughlin’s 
suggestion that homonomic laws are strict, because it is not the case that every homonomic 
law is a strict law. The former can be improved, the latter not. The important question is 
whether homonomic generalizations can be nomologically reduced to strict laws? If they can 
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be so reduced, certain domains could be reduced to the vocabulary of physics. If they cannot 
be reduced, it would seem that in this respect homonomic generalizations would stand on the 
same level as heteronomic generalizations. This being the case, one could further argue that, 
in  the  end,  the  case  of  psycho-physical  laws  is  no  worse  than  the  case  of  physical-physics  
laws. The irreducibility of the mental would thus not amount to a very interesting claim. But 
if rough homonomic generalizations are reducible  to  strict  laws,  then  there  must  be  bridge  
laws which are not strict and which make the reduction between domains possible. One could 
think of homonomic generalizations as being laws of some natural science. Such a law of 
domain S (the science in question) cannot be reduced to the laws of physics via strict laws 
because strict laws exist only inside physics. Yet, homonomic generalizations can be 
“improved”, which I take to mean that they could be sharpened, in theory at least, into strict 
laws.    
 Saying that in the questions of reducibility mental and physical vocabularies are not 
very different or far apart is not how most commentators have interpreted Davidson’s 
position. A standard interpretation of Davidson’s view is that our physical and mental 
vocabularies are essentially different. This kind of view is strongly suggested, for example, in 
Davidson’s early article “On Mental Concepts and Physical Concepts”. Events falling under 
our mental vocabulary are not predictable or explainable by strict deterministic laws, whereas 
events falling under our physical vocabulary are. The following captures the general intuition 
that I take to have motivated “Mental Events”. Davidson asks: “Can intentional human 
behavior be explained and predicted in the same way other phenomena are?”964 The part of 
the  answer  which  is  relevant  to  making  the  point  that  I  am pressing  is  that  “there  are  good 
arguments against the view that thought, desire and voluntary action can be brought under 
deterministic laws, as physical phenomena can.”965 The claim is that explanations in terms of 
mental concepts are different than all other explanations. This being the case, it is tempting to 
think that there must be a sense in which our mental vocabulary cannot ever reduce to physics 
in  any  relevant  sense,  whereas  other  vocabularies  do,  or  may,  reduce.  It  is  this  assumption  
which leads to the statement that explanatory: “[...] accounts of intentional behaviour operate 
in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of physical law....”966, or more 
generally that “mental events... resist capture in the nomological net of physical theory.”967 
We should consider how strange it would be to say that physical events resist capture in the 
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nomological net of physical theory. A physical event should surely be explainable and 
predictable inside its nomological net, and this net covers everything. 
 It seems obvious that a strong and principled distinction between mental events and 
physical  events  must  be  drawn.  Otherwise  we  would  have  to  state  something  as  absurd  as:  
mental events, as well as physical events, resist capture in the nomological net of a physical 
theory. I think we must find out whether Davidson makes a principled distinction between our 
mental and physical vocabularies. If he does make it, on what is it based? I think we should 
also explicate the sense in which physical events are reducible to physics, if they indeed are. 
The way in which they are reducible must be such that this kind of reduction is impossible in 
the case of mental events. Kim argues that since strict laws can be found only inside physics, 
there cannot be reductions via strict laws to physics. It seems that if Davidson is to allow the 
in-principle reduction of physical events, such a reduction cannot require strict laws. 
 Whether a principled distinction between the mental and the physical can be made can 
be clarified by considering whether Davidson draws a line only between the “physical 
sciences” and psychology, or whether he distinguishes physics as a separate domain from 
which all other sciences should be separated because of their irreducibility. If he draws only 
the former line, there is some reason to argue that sciences or vocabularies using mental 
concepts should be separated from vocabularies that do not use these concepts. The latter as 
well as the former make up autonomous domains with their own constitutive principles, laws 
and concepts. If, on the other hand, Davidson separates reality into more conceptual domains 
than two, physics being one of them, it is not clear what the relations between them are. Most 
importantly, the relation between the mental and the rest becomes obscure because there 
seems to be no special reason to emphasize the irreducibility of the mental if other 
vocabularies are also irreducible to physics. I think that if it turns out that, say, geology is as 
irreducible to physics as psychology, we could nevertheless ask why the mental vocabulary is 
irreducible and see whether something makes the irreducibility of the mental a special case 
after all. The question would be whether the irreducibility of the mental differs from the 
irreducibility of the geological. 
 According to Davidson the anomalism or irreducibility of the mental is a fact which is 
known a priori. Remarks that confirm this are found all over his writings. Our mental 
vocabulary, and therefore psychology which uses mental concepts, cannot be reduced to 
physics, natural sciences or to our physical vocabulary. This is to say that our common-sense 
understanding of ourselves, being formulated in the mental vocabulary, is irreducible. 
Davidson uses terms like “physics”, “natural sciences”, “physical sciences”, “physical 
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vocabulary”, “physical laws”, “physical terms” or “physical events”, often in a quite an 
overlapping and sometimes in an inconsistent manner. For example, in a statement like: “A 
particular physical event, state or disposition is one that can be picked out… using a 
vocabulary drawn from some physical science”968 we are not told what counts as a physical  
science. However, the domain of the physical sciences can be quite clearly defined, and we 
can assume that Davidson refers to these sciences by the term “physical sciences”969.  
 As  long  as  we  stay  within  the  vocabulary  of  the  various  physical  sciences,  it  is  
possible to ask whether there is a reason for the irreducibility of the special sciences, which do 
not use mental vocabulary. There are few remarks which suggest that, according to Davidson, 
such a reduction is not possible. He notes, for example, that: “The best descriptions we are 
able to give of most events are not descriptions that fall under, or will ever fall under, strict 
laws.”970 This is a very strong view. Our best descriptions of most events will never fall under 
strict laws. But what can the expression “best description” mean in this context? Let us 
consider  an  event  E,  which  is  a  physical  event,  a  chemical  event,  a  behavioral  event  and  a  
psychological event. Which one of these descriptions is the “best”? As I have shown, 
Davidson thinks that one explanation cannot be better than another outside the context in 
which it is offered. Shouldn’t the same be said about descriptions? If the answer is 
affirmative, then it makes no sense to say that the best descriptions of most events cannot fall 
under strict laws. If the answer is negative, then it should be asked what makes one 
description better than another, and what the best descriptions of events are. A plausible – but 
not very convincing and not easily defended – suggestion is that, according to Davidson, the 
best description of an event would be the description of it given in the language of ideal 
physics. But if this is the case, then the “best description” of an event falls under a strict law.  
 The suggestion above surely gives the impression that most vocabularies in which 
events are described are such that they do not involve strict laws, and more importantly, 
cannot be reduced to such laws. Indeed, as Davidson notes: “I suppose most of our practical 
lore (and science) is heteronomic.”971 When Davidson mentions the prospects of reduction in 
the special sciences, his general tone is surprisingly skeptical: “The assumption that biology 
and neurobiology are reducible to physics... is probably false”972 or “there may be a 
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significant sense in which geology, etc., cannot be reduced to physics”973 and “aerodynamics 
and biology... almost certainly will not be reduced in any strong sense to basic physics.”974 
These  kinds  of  remarks,  especially  if  they  are  based  on  the  view  that  reduction  is  not  
forthcoming because the relevant events are not describable in a vocabulary which falls under 
strict laws, give rise to Kim’s criticism. The criticism, which challenged the need for the 
arguments for the anomalism of the mental, has also another component – namely, that there 
isn’t going to be any reduction anywhere in science. This suggestion is obviously false, 
because there clearly have been reductions in science; Kim’s argument is thus meant to show 
that Davidson’s view of reducibility is unrealistic.  
 I think it is important to note that Davidson does not give any clear reasons or 
arguments why we should be so pessimistic in the case of our non-mental vocabularies. This 
being the case, there is not much point in trying to speculate about what Davidson means by 
his  remarks  that  the  assumption  of  reduction  is  “probably  false”,  or  that  certain  sciences  
“almost certainly” will not be reduced to physics “in any strong sense”. It seems to me that 
the suggestions are mere empirical speculation or Davidson’s personal opinions, ones which 
are not defended by arguments. The irreducibility of neurobiology would certainly be 
challenged by reductivists, although they might agree that neurobiology will not reduce to 
physics. From the perspective of neurobiology this is an irrelevant or uninteresting claim. So 
what if neurobiology does not reduce to physics? Davidson on the other hand – unlike the 
scientist – is interested in the principled obstacles to an ultimate reduction to physics, which is 
the ultimate science. 
That Davidson does not know the reasons for the supposed irreducibility of the special 
sciences becomes evident when he comments: “The laws of many physical sciences are also 
not like the laws of physics, but I do not know of important theoretical... reasons they cannot 
be reduced to the laws of physics.”975 Here a critic like Kim could reply: “There is a 
theoretical reason, namely, if bridge laws are strict laws and there are no strict laws outside 
physics, then there cannot be reduction outside physics.” But, contrary to the above, Davidson 
seems to argue that there could be reductions outside physics. An example clearly showing 
this is the following:  
 
I suppose it possible that there are no meteorological or geological events that cannot in theory be 
explained by the physics we know; in theory we could describe these events...in the language of pure 
                                               
973 Davidson, 1987a, 114.  
974 Davidson, 1999a, 620. 
975 Davidson, 1987a, 112. 
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physics. We could then apply the laws of physics to give explanations and predictions of the weather or 
plate tectonics as precise as the fundamental laws of physics allow...This would mean that all the 
concepts we use in the natural sciences could be expressed in the vocabulary of physics.976  
 
It is unclear how this claim fits in with the views described earlier. The passage nevertheless 
clearly shows Davidson’s views about the theoretical possibility of reductions between 
vocabularies that belong to the same conceptual domain.  Here  Davidson  suggests  that  a  
reduction of the special sciences to the language of physics is possible, at least in theory. This 
kind of reducibility is impossible in  the  case  of  the  mental.  Mental  concepts  cannot  be  
formulated in the language of physics and, this being the case, the laws of physics cannot be 
used to explain and predict mental events, whereas geological events, for example, might be 
so predicted. “Geological determinism” but not psychological determinism, is a possibility. 
 In some sense, the physical and natural sciences belong to the same conceptual 
domain.  Since  psychological  descriptions  are  not  reducible  to  this,  i.e.  to  the  whole  of  our  
physical  vocabulary,  they  are  not  suited  to  incorporation  into  any  strict  system of  laws.  On 
occasion Davidson uses the very expression “strict system of laws”; this raises the question of 
whether  it  is  only  meant  to  denote  the  system  of  strict  laws  of  physics  or  also  some  other  
systems that have laws that could be reduced to the laws of physics. Davidson’s view suggests 
that there is a general scheme, our physical vocabulary including everything but the mental, 
which is nomological and to which the mental does not reduce977. Reduction between 
nomological schemes like physics, neurology and biology is possible, at least in principle. 
Why? Because “we think that though the concepts of biology may not be definable in the 
concepts of physics, the phenomena of which biology treats can be understood as belonging 
to the same conceptual domain as that of an inclusive physics.”978 More precisely: “one can 
hope for strict connecting laws... when the concepts connected by the laws are based on the 
criteria of the same sort....”979 It is thus suggested that strict connecting laws – bridge laws – 
can exist only in cases where the concepts in the laws are based on criteria of the “same sort.” 
But what concepts are of the same sort? Davidson does not give a clear answer, but in light of 
what  has  been  said,  I  conclude  that  it  is  plausible  to  think  that  our  whole  “physical  
vocabulary”, which includes everything except mental phenomena, is based on the same sort 
of criteria. Indeed, the definition of a homonomic generalization from “Mental Events” 
suggests that these generalizations are such that they can be improved by drawing on the 
                                               
976 Davidson, 1993e, 312. 
977 This  is  the  way that  many read  him.  Stoutland (2005)  notes  that  for  Davidson the  term ”physical”  usually  
denotes the nomological. 
978 Davidson, 1999n, 124, my emphasis. 
979 Davidson, 1991, 162. 
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vocabularies from the same field as the original vocabulary in which the generalization was 
stated. In this process, the generalization could, in principle, be turned into a strict law which 
would be a law of our developed physics.  
 The concepts of physics are all based on the same sort of criteria; but I take Davidson 
to be suggesting that the principles governing the use of a broader physical vocabulary are in 
some  sense  similar  to  those  of  physics.  The  interpretation  that  all  physical  properties  or  
predicates are based on the same kind of criteria is supported by Davidson’s admittance that:  
 
In the case of causal properties like elasticity, slipperiness, malleability, or solubility we tend to think, 
right  or  wrongly,  that  what  they  leave  unexplained  can  be  (or  already  has  been)  explained  by  the  
advance of science. We would not be changing the subject if we were to drop the concept of elasticity 
in favour of a specification of the microstructure of the materials in the airplane wing that cause it to 
return to its original shape when exposed to certain forces.980  
 
This suggests that generalizations involving concepts like “solubility” could be sharpened to a 
point where the relevant laws could not be improved any more. Because a physical concept 
like solubility belongs to the same conceptual domain as the concepts of physics, this concept 
could be replaced with a description of a mechanism or ultimately a microstructure which 
explains why something is soluble or what solubility is. Nothing that is relevant for physical 
explanation would be lost if a detailed description of microstructure, instead of the term 
“solubility”, were to be used. On the contrary, the explanation that refers to the microstructure 
would explain why a sample S dissolves whereas sample S1 does not, although both samples 
seem relatively similar at the macrolevel. An explanation that one sample is soluble and the 
other  is  not  merely  indicates  that  there  is  something which explains the difference; an 
explanation not referring to solubility would explain this problem away. 
 But when and why do events fall under the same conceptual domain? If we consider 
the view given earlier, namely: “It is a feature of physical reality that physical change can be 
explained by laws that connect it with other changes and conditions physically described”,981 
then we get an answer to the question of why we should think that the physical vocabulary 
constitutes a homogeneous conceptual domain. Although there is conceptual diversity 
between  the  various  physical  vocabularies  we  use,  in  the  sense  that  they  use  very  different  
concepts and function at very different levels, there is nevertheless an idea of explanatory 
unity. Why? Because our concept of a physical object or event is allegedly such that its 
behavior is law-governed, and every physical science studying these objects and events 
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attempts to formulate laws in terms of which physical explanations could be given. It could be 
argued that all physical characterizations, as long as they are meant to be predictive, are meant 
to describe the general patterns of changes that their respective objects undergo. The 
articulation of these general patterns amounts to providing a body of laws or lawlike 
generalizations. When this idea is further generalized, it can be suggested that there exists, at 
least in theory, a closed and deterministic system of laws into which physical events fit. So, 
there are our physical vocabularies which are “law-governed”, and there is our mental 
vocabulary which is governed by normative principles. These two domains are conceptually 
too different for strong connections to exist between them.   
 It is quite obvious that “the mental” should be contrasted with the physical, not with 
physics. Explanations in physics, insofar as they can be called explanations, answer to the 
highest standards of nomologicality that can be imagined. It is therefore philosophically 
instructive to ask whether psycho-physical laws could ever be as precise as the strictest of 
known laws.982 The  main  interest  of  this  question  is  theoretical  or  perhaps  we  should  say,  
philosophical. I suggest, however, that because of questions relating to human freedom we are 
interested in knowing whether mental events could somehow elude prediction in terms of the 
strictest laws available. This is a pragmatic question. The answer to the question of whether 
psycho-physical laws could be strict would be affirmative if these laws would themselves be 
strict laws or if they could be reduced to such laws. Davidson denies both possibilities. The 
case of “non-mental” sciences is different. Although the laws of these sciences are not strict, 
their vocabularies could, in principle, be reduced to physics. Although Davidson is not always 
clear on this question, it seems nevertheless to be the case that the “laws” governing mental–
physical or mental–mental relations are different in kind than the laws involving purely 
physical events. It seems to me that Davidson’s notion of a “physical law” is meant to refer to 
laws between physical events and not to the laws of physics. Physical laws are such that they 
can, in theory, be sharpened into strict laws, whereas this is not possible for psycho-physical 
or psychological laws.   
 The  mental  should  be  contrasted  with  the  physical  and  an  additional  physical  –  
physics distinction based on the irreducibility of the former should not be drawn. However 
there remains the question, suggested by Kim, of how the reduction of the special sciences 
                                               
982 As Davidson (1987a, 111) says: ”Since I was interested in the question whether reason-explanations are or 
ever could be just like the best explanations for which physics strives, I set very high standards for what I called 
‘strict’ laws….“ Most commentators read the message of “Mental Events” differently. They thought that the 
claim was that there cannot be any kind of laws between the mental and the physical. Davidson’s redefinition 
makes the original argument much weaker than what critics thought it to be.  
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could be possible, even in principle, if there cannot be strict bridge laws outside physics. 
Davidson notes that the anomalism of the mental rules out psycho-physical reduction “by way 
of strict bridging laws....”983 But if it is the absence of strict psycho-physical laws which rules 
out this kind of reduction, the absence of strict “physical–physics” bridge laws should rule out 
the possibility of reduction in the special sciences as well. However, Davidson seems to claim 
that bridge laws between physical events are possible. Although Davidson talks about strict 
bridge-laws, it is by no means clear that the term “strict” should be understood in the same 
sense  as  in  the  claim  that  strict  laws  are  to  be  found  only  in  physics.  Davidson’s  use  of  
inaccurate terminology is perhaps thus a very simple solution to Kim’s problem.  
 I think we should conclude that in Davidson’s terminology, the term strict law is 
meant to refer just to the laws of physics. It is not surprising that only the laws of physics are 
strict, since their strictness could be taken to be a definitional feature of them – i.e. the best 
laws of physics are, by definition, strict. Whether those kinds of laws can ever be found is an 
open question, but since these laws are generalizations which are “as deterministic as nature 
can be found to be”, it seems that what counts as a strict law depends, in some sense, on our 
opinion concerning whether or not we have reached a sufficient level of determinism. It is, of 
course, also possible to claim that the most basic laws of physics count as “strict laws” no 
matter what their strictness. On the other hand, as we saw in section 3.1, Davidson has 
explained in detail the nature of strict laws. But it is necessary to understand on what this 
view is based. Is the exact definition of strict law just Davidson’s invention?   
 Davidson claims that physics “sets out” or “strives” to provide exceptionless laws. 
This being the case, the crucial question is whether certain phenomena can be reduced to the 
concepts that physics uses. Since, according to Davidson, every event is an event that can be 
described in the vocabulary of physics and every causal relation can be described in the 
vocabulary of physics, on a Davidsonian account it is possible to dream of a “full coverage” 
where the behavior of every physical event and object could be explained and predicted in the 
vocabulary of physics. Perhaps this is an idle dream, but if in the spirit of O-physicalism it is 
supposed that reality is thoroughly physical, what does this mean other than an expression of 
the conviction that the nature of this reality could be completely captured by physics, which 
has this very task as its aim. Since all events and objects are physical, the question of whether 
they can be candidates for strict laws depends, partly, on whether they can be identified in the 
vocabulary  of  physics.  I  believe  that  with  respect  to  this  question,  the  issue  of  the  
                                               
983 Davidson, 1994a, 232. 
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irreducibility of the mental is extremely relevant. However, the original argument against 
strict psychophysical laws seems not to depend on this, at least not entirely.  
 Let  us  now  turn  to  a  discussion  of  what  prevents  the  formulation  of  strict  laws  
between mental and physical phenomena. The original thesis of the anomalism of the mental 
was that there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be 
predicted and explained. As I have noted, Davidson later claimed that at the time of the 
original statement he thought that strict deterministic laws could exist only in a developed 
physics. The original claim should therefore be understood as suggesting that mental-physical 
laws cannot ever be as precise as the laws inside the most developed physics. Perhaps this is 
indeed what Davidson intended already in 1970. But this is not how most critics have 
interpreted him.984 Their interpretation of Davidson’s claim was that bridge laws between the 
mental and the physical are impossible. They thought that in the argument against type-
identity, the expression “bridge law” does not have to be understood as strictly as Davidson 
intends. Thus, Kim asks:  
  
Why insist on reduction by strict laws only? What’s wrong with non-strict psycho-physical laws as 
‘bridge’ laws?.... This [reduction via strict laws] surely cannot be a sense of reduction that holds serious 
philosophical interest for us. If psychology is reducible by the same standards that apply to the best 
cases of theory reduction in the sciences… why isn’t that reduction enough?985 
 
This is surely an important and interesting question. Kim questioned whether there is any 
need for an argument for the anomalism of the mental if it is the case that, by definition, there 
cannot be the kind of laws that are being denied. Here he asks what Davidson’s argument 
against non-strict bridge laws is, and whether their existence would show that psychology is 
as reducible as any other science that reduces via non-strict laws. I have already argued that 
Davidson sees a principled difference between our mental and physical vocabularies. But, 
interestingly, Davidson thinks that the existence of non-strict bridge laws would not show that 
the mental is reducible to the physical. As he claims: “if the [psycho-physical] laws are not 
strict the threat [of reduction] is averted and the promise [of reduction] is false.”986 Why non-
strict laws do not hold a promise of reduction will be clarified in more detail in later sections. 
 One possibility is to argue that Davidson’s anomalism of the mental is a result of his 
acceptance of laws which are too strict and drawn from physics, which for Davidson is the 
master science. It could be claimed that anomalism looks plausible only if the ideal laws of 
                                               
984 For discussion see Robinson, 2001. 
985 Kim, 1993, 26.  
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physics are accepted as a yardstick, in terms of which mental events cannot be predicted. 
Davidson does not give a clear answer to the question of what is wrong with non-strict bridge 
laws, and I think that Kim is right in his observation that the possibility of reduction through 
non-strict laws “is not an idle question; nor is it merely a verbal issue.”987 What seems to be 
also correct is Kim’s observation that “‘non-strict laws’ are bad news for anomalous monists. 
In embracing them we may end up losing anomalism from anomalous monism.”988 Indeed, 
Davidson himself has noted that his position is not, in essential respects, different from the 
position of Fodor, who defends a token-identity theory and claims that there are intentional 
causal laws which are not strict. Davidson notes: “In the sense in which Kim and Fodor think 
there are laws linking mental and physical concepts, I also think there are laws….”989 This 
important admittance is often neglected by commentators. Kim defends reductionism –as, 
despite his occasional remarks on the contrary, does Fodor.  
 That Davidson likens his position to Fodor’s and Kim’s is puzzling. He actually 
claims that there are endless type–type uniformities or laws on which we depend all the time. 
The essential claim of AM is only that these uniformities cannot be turned into strict laws of 
the sort that physics sets out to provide. This means that, according to Davidson, AM is not in 
conflict with reductive naturalistic theories of the mind but is in fact consistent with them.990 
This is certainly not how most commentators have interpreted the status of AM. Antony, for 
example,  claims  that  “Davidson  categorically  denies  the  possibility  of  any systematic 
empirical treatment of psychological states and events.”991 But this is simply false.992 For 
example,  in  one  of  his  earliest  articles  Davidson  explicitly  stated:  “Nothing  I  have  said  
implies that we cannot give causal scientific explanations of particular human actions, 
thoughts and the like.”993 Later he has claimed: “[…] there is no difficulty in general in 
explaining mental events by appeal to neurophysiological or physical causes….”994 These are 
not anti-reductionist remarks. On the other hand, Davidson has claimed that psychology and 
the social sciences are impossible and that no non-mental science could be expected to 
explain  thinking  or  the  states  of  belief.  It  is  this  official  anti-reductionist  side  of  Davidson  
which leads commentators to the following kind of interpretations: “Davidson has to say that 
                                               
987 Kim, 1993, 26. 
988 Ibid. 
989 Davidson, 1993d, 194. 
990 See Davidson, 1993d, 2001f. Davidson goes even as far as claiming that, although Fodor does not realize it, 
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there is a point in our investigation of mental phenomena where nothing more can be said 
which will inform us about how these phenomena are related to phenomena described in the 
physical vocabulary.”995 
 All this being said, we should note that for Davidson the question of the nature of 
bridge-laws may be partly terminological. Although the different formulations of the thesis of 
the anomalism of the mental  are – presumably – meant to express the same view, they may 
cause confusions. I have already discussed what the claim was in 1970 and how it was 
described later in “Thinking Causes”. It could be claimed that I am just quarrelling about 
mere terminological matters. I believe, however, that we must be very clear on what is 
actually being denied. The pressing question is what, if anything, is wrong with non-strict 
reductive bridge laws. There seems to be something wrong with them, because Davidson 
claims: “…if the [bridge] laws are not strict, the threat [of reduction] is averted.”996 But this 
view sounds obscure if the claim that strict laws are to be found only inside physics is also 
accepted. If strict laws are found only in physics, then Kim is right that Davidson cannot 
expect to find reduction to physics anywhere. 
 Davidson has formulated the thesis of the anomalism of the mental in different ways. 
He notes: “We do not have and cannot expect to find, a way of mapping events described in 
the physical vocabulary onto events described in the mental vocabulary.”997 This view 
resembles the one given already in 1964: “The network of mental concepts and the network of 
physical concepts are not like two alternative schemes where we can pass in some systematic 
way from one scheme to the other. There is no formula for doing this.”998 This claim 
emphasizes that these two vocabularies are not alternatives to each other. I stressed this point 
earlier when I claimed that the vocabularies are different; they are based on different kind of 
evidence and have differing functions. In the quotes above, it is claimed that there is no 
“mapping” between the two vocabularies. It is not entirely clear what the term “mapping” 
means. Does it mean that there cannot be bridge-laws of any kind between the domains? This 
is  a  plausible  interpretation  because  the  claim  is  that  mental  and  physical  events  cannot  be  
related. Davidson writes also: “There are no empirical laws linking mental phenomena to 
physical phenomena,”999 and we read that mental concepts are not reducible by “natural law” 
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to physical concepts1000. What is the role of the term “empirical” in this claim? What is an 
empirical law? Is a natural law a law of physics? Does Davidson claim that empirical laws 
linking mental and physical phenomena do not exist, or is he claiming that such laws cannot 
be found? Is he suggesting that one cannot find laws of this sort or that there are no such 
laws?  Is  there  a  real  difference  between  these  two  options?  If  Davidson  is  denying  the  
possibility of strict bridge laws, is he also denying the possibility of non-strict bridge laws? 
He writes: “Ontological reduction does not imply that there are causal or bridging laws 
relating events classed by mental properties with event classed by physical properties.”1001 It 
is unclear to me what the terms “causal” and “bridging” laws mean,  but the impression that 
there are no bridging laws whatsoever between the mental and the physical is quite natural. 
Indeed, Davidson’s general conclusion is: “There are no precise bridging laws that firmly and 
reliably relate mental events to physical events.”1002 
 The expressions “precise bridging laws”, “firmly” and “reliably” are open to 
interpretation and therefore the previous statement is extremely vague. Perhaps Davidson 
intended the expression “precise bridging laws” as a synonym for “strict bridge laws”. A 
further complaint is that sometimes Davidson talks about the impossibility of laws which 
connect properties, and sometimes he talks of the impossibility of laws connecting events. 
The first claim is curious given Davidson’s view about properties. If there are no such things, 
there cannot be laws connecting them either. The second claim is curious because, as far as I 
can see, it is unclear how particular events could be related. The only way to understand the 
latter claim is to acknowledge that events enter law-relations only by having properties which 
earn them a membership in a certain type.  
 I think that at this point we have to settle for the view that Davidson is claiming only 
that the laws involving the mental and the physical are not as precise as the laws of the most 
developed physics. This would mean that Davidson’s position would agree in spirit with 
modestly reductive theories of mind, although the motivation to develop “a theory of mind” 
differs between Davidson and reductivists. This is a disappointing result, especially since it 
leaves open Kim’s pressing question about what the problem of non-strict bridging laws is.  
 
 
                                               
1000 Davidson, 1993d. 
1001 Davidson, 1985, 244. It should be noted how easily Davidson here talks about properties in terms of which 
events are classed. 
1002 Davidson, 1995a, 11. 
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3.1.2 Why strict psychophysical laws are impossible: A Concrete example 
 
Let us consider the following kind of bridge-law:  
 
“X is water iff X is H20”. 
 
From this  we  can  conclude  that  a  sample  of  water  is  also  sample  of  H20. The law makes a 
claim about identity, but it could also be claimed that the law refers to two realms of concepts; 
it refers to the ordinary concept “water” and to the chemical concept “H20”, formulating a 
bridge-law between the concepts. The established identity is a result of empirical 
investigation. Von Wright has noted that an identity statement like “water is H20” is 
contingent, but if we conclude that chemical composition is the best way to identify water, if 
chemical structure is the surest criterion, then the identity claim is no longer contingent.1003 
The suggestion that the status of the identity claim depends on the question of how to identify 
something as a sample of water is interesting when applied to the alleged mental-physical 
identities. It suggests how to think of the status of the alleged identity. After all, philosophers 
are not unanimous in their views about whether or not identity claims like the one above 
should be thought as being necessary or contingent.1004 
 Consider  a  set  of  mental  concepts  (M)  and  a  set  of  physical  concepts  (P).  We have  
formulated a bridge law between water, an everyday concept, and H2O, a scientific concept. 
Why is it impossible to formulate bridge-laws between mental concepts, which are part of our 
commonsense vocabulary, and physical concepts which are part of our scientific picture of the 
world? Mental–physical bridge laws would be important for the reductivist because they 
would enable the reducibility of “theory” T (a common sense vocabulary) to theory T1 (a 
neuroscientific theory); such reducibility would be shown if the terms of T could be 
formulated in the language of T1. With bridge laws connecting mental and physical properties, 
the correctness of reductive physicalism or eliminativism could be shown. Every property 
would be a physical property and a unity would be reached at the ontological and at the 
explanatory levels. But why are laws of the form (where “m” refers to a mental state and “p” a 
physical state) impossible: 
 
 
                                               
1003 Von Wright, UPg. 
1004 For recent discussions, see, for example, Barnett, 2000, Anderson, 2005 and Bird, 2001. 
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“Necessarily, a person is in m iff a person is in p” 
 
or  
 “Necessarily, a person is in p iff a person is in m” 
or 
 “Necessarily, whenever a person is in m at time t he will be in p at time t1” 
or    
 “Necessarily, whenever a person is in p at time t he will be in m at time t1” 
 
Generally speaking why is it the case that there are no true statements of the form:  
 
“X is m iff x is p”? 
 
A trivial answer is that certain identity claims are contingent. So the laws or statements 
described above cannot be necessary. The statement “X is m iff x is p” is only contingently 
true. However, as von Wright notes, the statement “Water is the same as H20” can be thought 
to express a non-contingent truth if the chemical composition of H20 is taken to be a criterion 
of water. Why are the identity statements involving mental and physical terms different than 
the claims involving just physical terms? Bridge-laws connect physical vocabularies. Laws of 
succession, relating physical vocabularies, state that if something of a certain type exists at 
some time, then something of another type exists at a related time.1005 Why are these kinds of 
laws are impossible when one of the vocabularies is mental?  
  A mental–physical bridge law connecting M and P could state that whenever a person 
believes that “snakes are reptiles” he is in a certain physical state, which occurs always when 
this belief occurs; thus, the states, or properties M and P are identical. It is plausible to think 
that person’s belief that such and such prevents her from believing something else. If a person 
believes that A, normative principles of belief-attribution prevent her from believing not-A. If 
A entails B and a person believes that A, she should not believe that not-B. But let us now 
suppose that a bridge law connects the belief A with a physical state P. Let us also suppose 
that  another  bridge  law  connects  the  belief  not-A  with  a  physical  state  R.  If  we  know  that  
someone believes that A, we can infer that he does not believe not-A. Likewise, if A entails B 
and a person believes that A, she should not believe that not-B. But what would it mean to say 
                                               
1005 I assume that Davidson’s term ”causal laws” refers to these kind of laws.  
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that we can infer from being in P to not being in R? It could mean that we believe that P and 
R are physically incompatible. But what would it mean to say that, when events are described 
purely in physical terms, one event should not have a connection to another?  
 Physical states of course have certain kind of connections between them. But 
whatever these causal connections actually are, they cannot be a reason for saying that they 
should be in a certain way. We can say that given our expectations concerning the results of a 
specific physical experiment, a certain result should occur. But this is surely not the same way 
in which we say that a person who believes that “It is raining” should not believe that it is not 
raining. In the former case the “should” reflects our expectations about the outcome of the 
experiment, and there are no principled reasons why those expectations could not fail. In the 
latter case, at least according to interpretationism, the existence of the belief “It is raining” 
depends on our view that if one has it, then one should not have the belief that it is not 
raining. The identity of a belief depends on the connections it has to other beliefs. If a person 
seems to hold beliefs “It is raining” and “It is not raining”, we have to question whether either 
one of these beliefs can be attributed to her. In the psychological or mental reality, the idea 
that somebody ought to think something given what else she thinks is a guiding principle. In 
physical reality certain empirical and logical principles constraint the mode of being of things, 
but there is no sense in which objects ought to be one way rather than another. The “ought” is 
not a constitutive principle of the physical. Likewise, empirical constraints are not relevant 
constitutive principles of the mental. The structure of mental reality is constituted in 
interpretation, and this process is governed by non-empirical principles. Whether or not 
something is soluble is an empirical question, but the question of whether or not a thinker 
subscribes to the basic principles of rationality is not empirical.1006   
 The argument against strict psycho-physical laws is certainly difficult to accept for 
those who do not share Davidson’s view about the necessity of interpretation. The following 
two statements suggest why strict laws connecting the mental and the physical vocabularies 
are impossible, and how this is related to the Davidsonian conception of the mental. Davidson 
notes:   
 
                                               
1006 Davidson (1986, 208) notes: ”[…] with desire as with belief, there is a presumption… that similar causes 
beget similar evaluations in interpreter and interpreted. This is not, I should emphasize, either an empirical claim 
or  an  assumption  for  the  sake  of  good  science.  It  is  a  necessary  condition  of  correct  interpretation.”  In  the  
physical realm, the assumption that similar causes beget similar effects is an empirical claim or an assumption 
for the sake of good science. It can be thought of, as von Wright notes, as a scientific norm guiding research, but 
violations of it are certainly possible. Not so in the case of interpretation. 
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There are no strict laws because of the disparate commitments of the mental and  physical schemes…. 
There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source 
of evidence.1007  
 
Moreover:  
 
[…] to allow the possibility of such laws would amount to changing the subject. By changing the 
subject I mean here: deciding not to accept the criterion of the mental in terms of the vocabulary of the 
propositional attitudes.1008  
 
What may sound mysterious is, on the one hand, the claim that different schemes would have 
disparate commitments and, on the other hand, the claim that tight connections are impossible 
if each scheme is to remain faithful to its proper source of evidence. Could it not be argued 
that there is no reason why a scheme should retain allegiance to its “proper source of 
evidence”? Davidson’s conclusion would be that by allowing this “a change of subject” would 
occur; the result of such change would be that mental phenomena would not be understood in 
terms of propositional attitudes.1009 Interestingly, Malcolm has noted:  
 
We say we know our friend is crying from pain, because we saw him crack his shin on the porch step. 
But if we were asked whether we are sure that such-and-such a process is taking place in his brain, we 
should not understand the relevance of the question: it would be an irritating change of subject. 1010 
 
We can note that Malcolm and Davidson wrote about the “change of subject” only a year 
apart.  Their  argument  can  be  said  to  be  based  on  a  Wittgensteinian  distinction  between  
symptoms and criteria. That Malcolm makes much use of this distinction is clear, but it seems 
to me that the distinction works as a guiding principle also behind “Mental Events”. 
  I claim that from the Davidsonian perspective, the real reason against the possibility of 
psycho-physical laws is thus our unwillingness to give up the vocabulary of folk-psychology – 
our unwillingness to change the subject. Both Davidson and Malcolm agree that, in some 
sense, one could decide not to accept the current criteria for the mental as constitutive criteria. 
I think that this decision, if it were honestly made, should then have wider consequences; 
brain processes would be the criteria on the basis of which mental phenomena would be 
attributed. What kind of consequences would this have for human life? Malcolm notes that if 
somebody did not agree with us, if he decided to use different criteria for the attribution of 
mental phenomena, then “We could not say that he was wrong… but he would be different. 
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He would not have the concepts of pain, of consciousness, or of any mental predicates, in the 
same way we do. I am also inclined to say that he does not have the concept of a person, or at 
least not the same one we have.”1011 This kind of view has been subsequently emphasized by 
Bennett  and  Hacker.  We  can  talk  of  brains  which  make  interpretations  or  decisions,  or  
machines which believe this and that. If we accept this kind of talk, we must realize that the 
conceptual connections which the concepts of decision or belief have in our current ways of 
talking are lost when the concepts are used outside their usual field of application. Then it is 
very questionable whether the terms – superficially similar to our familiar concepts – would 
be the same concepts at all to which we are used to. 
 One reason for Davidson’s unwillingness to give up the common-sense criterion for 
mental phenomena is his conviction that we have no alternative to our folk-psychological 
interpretation-based understanding of mental phenomena. But if the real reason, or 
motivation,  for  the  anomalism  of  the  mental  is  our  unwillingness to eliminate folk-
psychology, the argument seems to be no good against those eliminative materialists who 
claim that elimination of  folk-psychology  is  precisely  what  is  wanted.  It  seems  to  me  that  
Davidson would grant that psycho-physical laws are possible if an elimination of folk-
psychology can be tolerated as a consequence. In one of his earliest articles Davidson  writes: 
  
 […]  there  is  nothing  that  forces  us  to  apply  mental  concepts….  It  is  partly  an  empirical  
 question where and when we can meaningfully apply mental concepts, but  it  is  partly  a  
 matter for our choice. We can choose to treat men under physical concepts, if we 
 wish….1012 
 
If eliminative materialists think that they can explain all those aspects of human mental life 
which matter to us, they can choose to describe humans in terms of physical concepts. But if 
this choice is made there should be no explanatory residues; I think we should insist that the 
eliminativist  should  explain  those  facts  which  we now explain  in  terms  of  mental  concepts.  
The eliminativist conception should perhaps explain something more; why else would we be 
willing to adopt it? 
 It could be argued that the impossibility of psycho-physical laws follows from our 
view of what kind of being a human is. As Davidson writes: “The limit…  placed on the 
social sciences is set not by nature, but by us when we decide to view men as rational agents 
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with goals and purposes, and as subject to moral evaluation.”1013 The conviction that humans 
are free agents leads to the conclusion that the “nomological slack between the mental and the 
physical is essential as long as we conceive of man as rational animal.”1014 Obviously, one 
cannot be forced to decide to view men as rational agents. According to Davidson, if we make 
this choice, we have to accept the vocabulary of propositional attitudes, because rationality 
depends on logical relations between the attitudes. He writes: “Thoughts, because they have 
propositional content, are unlike everything else in the world except for utterances in having 
logical relations to each other.”1015 Of course, this does not matter much to an eliminativist, 
who claims that human cognition, computation or memory have nothing essential to do with 
sentences or propositions or with the inferential relations between them. According to the 
eliminativist, a brain-centered conception which does not assign language an important role is 
now challenging the language-oriented conception of cognition.  
  It  is  clear  that  competing views about the nature of our self-conception exist,  and  
what kind of conception one is willing to defend is, as Davidson claims, based on a decision. 
Paul  Churchland  notes  that  what  is  at  stake  in  the  debate  is  precisely our current self-
conception which consists of “our shared portrait of ourselves as self-conscious creatures with 
beliefs, desires, emotions and the power of reason.”1016 In his opinion, we should ask whether 
“our basic conception of human cognition [is] yet another myth…”1017 and whether “…a 
proper theory of brain function present[s] a significantly different or incompatible portrait of 
human nature?”1018   
 The general motivation for the anomalism of the mental is thus clear. Commentators 
have, however, questioned whether the need to see humans as rational agents can be a reason 
to deny the possibility of psycho-physical laws. Antony notes: “If there are tight connections, 
there are tight connections – what can we do about it? If psychologists can begin to read our 
minds by scanning our brains, we will have to learn to live with it. It is not as if any of this is 
up to us.”1019 She recognizes, correctly in my opinion, that in the end it is up to us, according 
to Davidson. This explains why Davidson uses conditional expressions when dismissing the 
                                               
1013 Davidson, 1974b, 239. Davidson sees an interesting connection between ”goodness” and ”intentionality” 
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possibility of psycho-physical laws. He claims, for example “to allow the  possibility  of  
[psychophysical laws] would amount to changing the subject.”1020 Antony  argues  that  
Davidson’s purpose is to block a certain possibility, namely, the competition between rational 
and non-rational evidence in the attributions of mental states.1021 But as I have noted, 
Davidson is not denying the possibility of describing human behavior in physical terms. There 
is no real competition between neuroscientific evidence and folk-psychological evidence, 
because we first have to decide what kind of evidence we want to use, and this comes back to 
the question what kind of self-conception we want to hold.  Eliminative materialists are 
entitled  to  their  position  if  they  are  willing  to  accept  its  consequences.  If  one  is  willing  to  
reject the view that mental phenomena should be described in folk-psychological terms, then 
the question of competition does not occur.1022 It occurs if the Davidsonian criterion of mental 
is accepted and then the connections between physical and mental realities are being claimed. 
This being the case, the question of why our mental vocabulary is not an optional part of our 
conceptual resources (i.e. why this vocabulary is important and indispensable) becomes 
essential. The question of why a folk-psychological conception should be accepted is crucial 
when  considering  how  to  correctly  understand  the  irreducibility  of  the  mental.  Here,  so  it  
could be argued, lies the ultimate and extremely important “competition” between a folk-
psychological and neuroscientific conception of human beings. These understandings can 
surely compete, and therefore attention must be paid to the question why we want to preserve 
our everyday mental vocabulary and why it matters to us. 
 It could be claimed that the “anomalism of the mental” is far less principled than 
critics have assumed, because as Davidson notes: “The extent to which mental concepts fall 
short of being reducible to physical concepts measure the degree of anomaly.”1023 The degree 
of anomaly depends on the degree of reducibility. The question about anomalism thus really 
comes back to the question of whether mental concepts or phenomena can be reduced to 
physical concepts or phenomena without bridge laws. The argument for the anomalism of the 
mental does not really work against the eliminativist, who is willing to reject the Davidsonian 
conception of the mental. However, I believe that the reasons for the irreducibility of the 
mental are  such  that  an  eliminativist  cannot  ignore  them.  It  must  be  realized  that  Davidson  
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would grant the possibility of the kind of bridge-laws whose existence an eliminativist or 
reductive materialist attempts to show. Churchland has claimed that the purpose of reductions 
is not to “try to establish, that there is any sort of necessary connection….”1024 The modest 
purpose of a reductivist is not to claim that mental phenomena are “logically supervenient” 
upon physical phenomena or that the identity in question is a “metaphysical necessity” – or 
even that there is any form of “nomological” or “lawlike” connection between the two 
phenomena. Churchland points out:  
 
[…] all of these diverse modal relations are philosophical extravagances or confusions imposed, post 
facto, on successful cases of historical intertheoretic reductions, all of which were achieved without the 
help of such modal relations, and none of which displays any of them.1025  
 
So, according to Churchland the arguments of, for example, Chalmers, Kripke and Davidson 
are irrelevant for the question of whether mental–physical identities can be established. This 
kind of view seems to reflect more generally the view of those scientific philosophers who are 
looking for empirical solutions to philosophical problems. What this shows is that the 
reductions or identities that an eliminativist is looking do not meet the standards of certain 
philosophers.1026 What this in turn shows is that the existence of these kinds of reductions or 
identities is something that a philosopher like Davidson is not denying, or at least does not 
have to deny. Davidson notes that certain philosophers may have in mind different standards 
of reduction than he does, and if this is the case, then the issue is mainly verbal.1027 I  think 
that certain misreadings may be a result of ignorance, and this is one reason why Davidson’s 
position must be carefully clarified.  
 Davidson is after for a much more fundamental and theoretical answer than 
Churchland when he asks whether there is some kind of important difference between psycho-
physical laws and other bridge-laws. Davidson is asking whether the mental–physical relation 
can be as tight as the connection between physical concepts. His question is whether there can 
be strict, exceptionless psycho-physical laws. Likewise, von Wright is asking whether 
mental–physical connections are necessary because he thinks that this question is what 
interests a philosopher. Von Wright’s conclusion is the same as Churchland’s: they both 
claim that the connections are not necessary but contingent. Malcolm thinks that this is a 
crucially important observation for the philosophy of mind, because it shows that materialism 
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is a confused position. As he claims: “It is logically impossible that the claimed contingent 
identity of mental events with brain processes could be proved or disproved empirically. It is 
not a possible scientific hypothesis.”1028 In Malcolm’s view the contingent relation cannot be 
philosophically interesting and it cannot be proven by science.  
 We can conclude that the original thesis of the anomalism of the mental does not rule 
out the kinds of identities that an eliminativist or a reductionist is searching for, and 
dismissing the possibility of these identities was not Davidson’s intention. Accordingly, a 
criticism which suggests that Davidson has not shown that there cannot be laws involving the 
mental  and  the  physical  simply  misses  its  mark  because,  as  Davidson  makes  clear  in  
“Thinking Causes”, his purpose was only to establish that the mental–physical laws cannot be 
strict. He gladly admits the existence of useful mental–-physical generalizations. However, 
whereas the motivation to argue against strict psycho-physical laws is clear and rejecting it 
casts doubt upon the argument for the anomalism of the mental, it is nevertheless interesting 
to consider whether sense can be made of the argument while rejecting the motivation for it. 
The argument for the anomalism of the mental resembles the argument of Bennett and Hacker 
that mental phenomena cannot be attributed to a brain, because brains do not and cannot 
fulfill the criteria in terms of which mental phenomena are attributed in the course of life.1029 
Bennett and Hacker claim that the use of concepts becomes nonsensical if the application 
conditions of concepts are violated. We have seen that according to Davidson, certain 
constraints govern the application of mental concepts, and dismissing the role played by these 
constraints leads to a change of subject and thence to conceptual confusion.  
 As we noted in chapter two, Davidson has a detailed view about the nature of the 
mental  which  is  based  on  the  conviction  that  the  whole  truth  about  the  mental  realm  is  
captured in the process of interpretation. The constitutive roles of holism, externalism and 
normativity are essential for the argument for the anomalism of the mental. One could try to 
argue that these characteristics are not essential features of mental phenomena. For the 
moment, let us nevertheless proceed from the observation that Davidson thinks he has shown 
why and how holism, externalism and normativity are constitutive for propositional attitudes.  
 The important property of mental reality is that “the attribution of the mental 
phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the 
individual.”1030 We cannot attribute propositional attitudes to a person outside the framework 
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of a theory of her beliefs, desires or intentions because “we make sense of particular beliefs 
only  as  they  cohere  with  other  beliefs,  with  preferences,  with  intentions,  hopes,  fears,  
expectations, and the rest.”1031 Mental reality is holistically constructed and the relations in 
this holistic web are influenced by the normative decisions of the interpreter. Malcolm can be 
seen as defending a similar kind of view when he writes: “Our reactions, our natural attitudes, 
towards the expressions, movements and utterances of people constitute a dimension of our 
mental concepts. This dimension is contributed by the perceptive, responding subject.”1032 A 
situation where the constitutive principles of our mental vocabulary would break down and 
we would still be using mental concepts is unintelligible. We mean and have to mean 
something with our concepts, and to abandon the application conditions of concepts would 
amount to changing the subject. If the constitutive principles changed, we would not be 
talking about the same things as before, and we would not be using the same concepts 
anymore. A reduction of the mental could lead to a change of our current mental concepts or 
to changes in the ways we use these concepts. The question relevant for the argument for the 
anomalism of the mental is that of the nature of our current concepts and their correct usage. 
 Because of their interconnected meanings, the constitutive principles of vocabularies 
are a priori. Davidson claims that the conditions for the application of mental concepts which 
he describes are necessary conditions. We hear: “Nomological statements bring together 
predicates that we know a priori are made for each other – know, that is, independently of 
knowing whether the evidence supports a connection between them.”1033 If we know, a priori, 
when the predicates are made for each other we presumably also know when they are not 
made for each other.  This,  so it  seems to me, also applies in the case of the mental  and the 
physical. Rationality and its governing normative principles are essential characteristics of the 
mental, whereas the absence of rationality and normative principles is a characteristic of the 
physical. If there were strict bridging laws between mental and physical concepts, the 
characteristics of the mental which have no echo in any physical theory would be transmitted 
to the physical realm, and vice versa.  Because of the special features mental and physical 
concepts, the connections between them have to remain.  
 Davidson claims that whether a statement can be considered to be law-like or not 
depends on how the predicates in it can be paired or matched. We must consider not just 
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individual predicates, but the question of how different predicates can be related. As Davidson 
writes:  
 
[…] the fact that what inductions are reasonable concerning a class of objects… depends on the nature 
of the class. If this is so, it follows that we can’t simply say of a class or predicate or property that it is 
suitable for inductions; the reasonableness of the induction depends on the class (predicate, property) 
we team it with.1034 
 
The impossibility of strict psycho-physical laws is shown if we are able to demonstrate that 
mental  predicates  pick  out  classes  of  events  which  do  not  match  up  perfectly  with  physical  
predicates. This being the case, no precise laws between the predicates can be formulated. 
 If we accept that constitutive principles cannot be violated without creating 
nonsensical claims, it is easy to understand what Davidson means by saying that to allow the 
possibility of strict psycho-physical laws would amount to a change in the subject. With the 
existence of bridge-laws, attributions of mental states could be influenced by principles and 
evidence which are not part of the constitutive features of mental reality. What would be our 
reason for saying that it is mental states  that  we  are  talking  about  in  this  case?  A  concept  
would have been used outside its application conditions. Why would we think that it would 
still be the same concept? Wittgenstein once wrote about pain:  “Pain has this position in our 
life; has these connexions;  (That  is  to  say:  we  only  call  ‘pain’  what  has  this position, these 
connexions)”.1035 How could we cut of these connections and still  claim that we are talking 
about pain?   
   Considering how difficult it would be to give up the idea that physical phenomena 
have a location in time and space may lead us to appreciate the strength of the constitutive 
principles of the physical. Imagine a situation where the axioms, laws, or postulates for the 
measurement of length would be rejected, but we would still continue to rank objects in terms 
of their lengths. What would be the meaning of the term “length” in this kind of situation? We 
cannot give up these axioms if we want to talk about lengths or rank objects in terms of this 
property. As Davidson notes: “The satisfaction of the conditions for measuring length or mass 
may be  viewed as  constitutive  of  the  range  of  application  of  the  sciences  that  employ  these  
measures….  It is not easy to describe in convincing detail an experiment that would persuade 
us that the transitivity of the relation of heavier than had failed.”1036 He concludes: “If the law 
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of transitivity fails in a single case, the entire theory of measurement of length is false, and we 
are not justified talking of physical lengths.”1037  
 If  we  feel  confident  enough  to  say  that  there  are  constitutive  principles  of  the  
physical which cannot be violated without changing the subject, why would we be reluctant to 
say this in the case of mental? What would be the reason to think that the constitutive 
principles of the mental would be “less constitutive”? According to Davidson, the constitutive 
principles of the mental seem to be stronger than  the  principles  governing  the  physical.  He  
says: “It is not merely, as with the measurement of length, that each case tests a theory and 
depends upon it, but that the content of a propositional attitude derives from its place in the 
pattern.”1038 An isolated propositional attitude, which is not part of the rational pattern that an 
interpreter has to force on the interpretee, is nonsensical. Whether propositional attitudes 
capture the basic structure of human cognition is one question. But concepts in terms of which 
we understand each other have relations that cannot lose their relations to other concepts 
while remaining the same concepts. Without constitutive relations implicating other concepts, 
a concept is meaningless. We cannot make sense of certain concepts if they are detached from 
their ordinary usage. 
 An example of how the loss of such constitutive relations leads to an 
incomprehensible situation is well described by Stephen Stich’s case of Mrs. T.1039 She is an 
elderly woman suffering from a memory loss that is getting worse and worse as the years go 
by.  She  remembers,  for  example,  that  president  McKinley  was  assassinated;  yet  she  cannot  
say whether McKinley is dead or alive. The question that Stich asks is:  
 
Did she… believe that McKinley was assassinated? For just about everyone to whom I have posed this 
question, the overwhelmingly clear intuitive answer is no. One simply cannot believe that McKinley 
was assassinated if one has no idea what an assassination is, nor any grasp of the difference between 
life and death.1040 
 
Stich’s general view is that:  
 
[…] intuitive judgments about whether a subject’s belief can be characterized in a given way and 
intuitive judgments about whether a pair of subjects have the same belief are often sensitive not only to 
the potential causal interactions of the belief(s) in question but also to other beliefs that the subject(s) 
are assumed to have The content we ascribe to a belief depends, more or less, holistically on the 
subject’s entire network of related beliefs.1041 
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Stich notes that this is the way that “intuitive judgments” work. When asked whether Mrs. T 
believes that McKinley was assassinated although she does not believe that McKinley is dead, 
most people will “intuitively” say no. But I would assert that concepts like “life”, “death” and 
“assassination” are just everyday concepts, and there is no more to their meaning than the 
intuitions of those who use these concepts. As Stich notes, the content of a propositional 
attitude depends on the subject’s entire network of propositional attitudes. This is what 
Davidson also claims when he emphasizes the constitutive role of holism for the identity of 
propositional attitudes. As he says: 
  
 [The] obvious logical relations amongst beliefs; amongst beliefs, desires and intentions; between 
 beliefs and the world, make beliefs the beliefs they are; therefore they cannot in general lose these 
 relations and remain the same beliefs. Such relations are constitutive of the propositional attitudes.1042 
 
How could this view be challenged? Let us suppose someone is arguing that the content of a 
belief does not depend on its relations to other beliefs. What would the claim that “Mrs. T 
believes that McKinley was assassinated” mean according to this kind of view? If we try to 
answer this question, we have to refer to Mrs. T’s other beliefs. Most of us understand what it 
means to believe that someone was assassinated. If we hear that somebody believes both that 
McKinley was assassinated and that McKinley is still alive, our understanding fails. 
Situations like the case of Mrs. T where the connections between concepts are distorted show 
how obvious these relations are. We do not realize their importance in ordinary cases, but the 
consequences are dramatic when the connections are distorted. 
 Davidson stresses the importance of these conceptual connections in varying 
degrees. He notes, for example: “The contents of propositional attitudes are determined in 
logical part by their relations with the contents of other attitudes; to the extent that these 
relations of a particular attitude are broken or confused, the identity of that attitude is rendered 
less precise.”1043 Davidson writes also: “Each belief must be involved with other beliefs with 
which it is consistent if it is to be identified as having a clear content.”1044 Here the claim is 
that if the relations between attitudes are endangered, only the precision of the content is 
questioned.  If  a  belief  is  not  a  part  of  a  consistent  web of  beliefs,  it  cannot  be  identified  as  
having a clear content. Mutual understanding may be endangered if the relations between an 
interpretee's attitudes differ from the relations between the interpreters’ attitudes. Confused 
relations do not, however, imply the non-existence of the underlying attitudes. This relaxed 
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view about the nature of holism should be compared to the following: “Beliefs… are largely 
identified by their logical and other relations to each other; change the relations, and you 
change the identity of the thought.”1045  This is a stronger claim, suggesting that the identity of 
a belief changes if its relations to other beliefs change. The final conclusion is: “Many 
concepts are fairly directly connected, through causality, with the world, but they would not 
be the concepts they are without their connections with other concepts, and without any 
relations to other concepts, they would not be concepts.”1046 
 An isolated concept or propositional attitude would make no sense. Our concept of 
such attitude or concept would not make sense. It seems to me that sometimes Davidson goes 
too far when he tries to demonstrate how the holism of the mental should be understood. He 
claims, for example: “I can believe a cloud is passing before the sun, but only because I 
believe there is a sun, that clouds are made of water vapour, that water can exist in liquid or 
gaseous form; and so on, without end.”1047 Davidson gives a list of what one must believe in 
order to believe that a cloud is passing the sun. Similar suggestions are made when Davidson 
claims that in order to have the idea of what a snake is, you must believe things like “…a 
snake is an animal, it has no feet, it moves with sinuous movement, it is smaller than a 
mountain.”1048 To have the concept of a tree, you must believe that “they are growing things, 
that they need soil and water, that they have leaves or needles, that they burn.”1049 To have the 
concept of a spider, you must believe that “it is a living animal, that it is self-locomoting, that 
it  has  many  legs,  that  it  is  apt  to  spin  webs,  that  it  must  eat  to  continue  living,  that  it  will  
evade what it senses as dangerous….”1050 It  is  difficult  to  say  how  these  kinds  of  claims  
should be interpreted. What Davidson should say, in my opinion, is that there is no fixed list 
of beliefs that one must have in order to have the belief B, and the lists given above are just 
examples of the kinds of beliefs that one must have in order to have a certain belief. But if this 
is the case, then it seems that we cannot give any examples of the specific beliefs that one 
must have in order to have a certain belief. It seems possible that one can have beliefs about 
clouds without having any beliefs about the properties of water, or that one can believe that 
something is a tree without knowing that trees burn. But this is certainly an issue where 
intuitions differ. Davidson’s examples show how strongly he refers to common-sense 
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understanding as a determinant of the “correct” use of concepts. For example, the criterion of 
the concept of “spider” would perhaps be different for a biologist than what Davidson 
suggests. 
I shall now clarify how the constitutive principles of the mental stand in the way of 
strict psycho-physical laws: Let us suppose that we have formulated laws of the form:  
 
1) Necessarily, M occurs to person S at t iff N occurs to S at t. 
2) Necessarily, M* occurs to person S at t iff N* occurs to S at t. 
 
We also know that: 
 
3) Necessarily, if M occurs at t, M* occurs at t. 
 
From this, it follows: 
 
4)  Necessarily, if N occurs at t, N* occurs at t. 
 
The example is borrowed from Kim.1051 In the example, M and M* are mental events which 
are connected to neural states N and N* by strict psychophysical laws (1) and (2). Statement 
(3) expresses a psychological entailment between M and M*, an entailment which is secured 
by our normative principles governing beliefs. Kim’s claim is that we could “read off” a 
physical law (4) from a purely psychological entailment (3), and this would mean that the 
transition from N to N* would be supported and secured by the normative principles of 
rationality and coherence. But this would mean that we would have transferred to the physical 
realm principles which have no echo in that domain, i.e. principles which have no application 
or relevance there?  
 Let us suppose that we could transfer the constitutive principles across schemes. We 
would attribute mental states according to the constitutive principles of the physical. This 
would certainly be a situation, warned about by Malcolm and Davidson, where the subject 
would  have  been  changed.  The  attributions  of  mental  states  would  not  be  done  in  terms  of  
propositional attitudes but in terms of, for example, neuroscientific predicates and laws. It 
seems to me that in this kind of situation we would have no reason to say that we were talking 
                                               
1051 Kim, 2003. 
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about mental states any longer, and since the mental aspect would have been dropped how 
could we talk about mental–physical connections either? In the connecting laws, phenomena 
mentioned on one side of the connective constrain the phenomena mentioned on the other 
side. This is one essential point of connecting laws, viz. to express dependencies between 
phenomena. If “x is M iff x is P” were true, then whenever there existed a physical state P, 
there would exist  a mental  state M. But,  in the absence of additional mental  evidence, what 
would or could convince us of this?  
 What would guarantee that P would always “underlie” M? An obvious answer is that 
the existence of a strict psycho-physical law would be such a guarantee. But what would be 
the reason to think that this law would hold for future cases? The law expressing identity 
between H2O and water is based on the observations of the structure of the substance which at 
a macrolevel is identified as water. But it is implausible to think that we could, in a similar 
way, observe the physical structure of mental phenomena? The question of whether mental 
phenomena can be found in the brain, whether they can be actually located in the brain is 
pressing when considering the question about the possibility of psycho-physical laws. An 
identity claim which is understood as a law must be based on evidence that explains the 
identity. Let us imagine that we doubted that  each  sample  of  water  is  a  sample  of  H20. To 
remove this doubt, we could literally check each sample and see that its structure is such that 
one molecule of water has two hydrogen atoms covalently bonded to a single oxygen atom. 
The identity claim “water is H20” is just a generalization of the observations that samples of 
water have this molecular structure. What makes this identity claim non-problematic is that 
the molecular structure of water can be observed. The alleged mental–physical identity is 
problematic because mental phenomena are certainly not physical phenomena, as water 
without  doubt  is.  Let  us  suppose  that  an  identity  claim  that  “M  is  P”  has  been  established.  
Whereas the correctness of “water is H20” can be tested in the above-mentioned way, how 
could we test the correctness of the claim that “M is P”? The claim itself would be an 
outcome of a complicated theory, the nature of which it is hard to even imagine.  
 The  science  which  would  provide  such  a  theory  would  have  to  relate  everyday  
psychological phenomena to states of the brain. But there is not even a psychological theory 
which would comprise the totality of facts about human mental life. Is an all-encompassing 
psychological theory possible? It would have to include all the mental phenomena we 
intuitively take to be mental, including all the possible beliefs that a person could hold. What 
kind of theory could this be? To make things worse, even if such a utopian psychological 
theory existed, there would still remain the tremendous task of identifying all the mental 
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phenomena in the realm of the brain. How this could be done in a way that would show that 
mental–physical identifications amount to identities and not to contingent token-correlations 
is beyond comprehension. How, for each and every mental phenomenon, a nomologically 
necessary and sufficient physical condition could be provided is a question that remains 
without an answer. In order to establish “bridge-laws” between the mental and physical 
domains, a comprehensive psycho-neural theory of the human mind would be required, but no 
one has even tried to suggest how such a theory could actually be constructed.1052  
 It may be tempting to think that the relation between a mental phenomenon and a 
physical phenomenon is the kind of identity that exists between water and H20; however, it is 
clear that the analogy cannot work. What enables us to claim that it is a law that “water is 
H20” is the fact that there exists a comprehensive theory, namely chemistry, which explains 
what this statement means and, as noted already, which enables us to check whether the claim 
is true or not. In order to show that “Donald believes that cats are animals iff his brain is in a 
state P” is true, a theory which would explain what it means for a belief to be a state of brain 
is  required.  The  description  of  state  “P”  would  have  to  be  replaced  with  a  description  of  a  
physical property of the brain. Would a description of the molecular structure of a certain 
brain  state  be  the  right  kind  of  answer?  The  problem is  that  we  simply  do  not  have  a  view 
about what kind of description would be satisfying. Perhaps each level of explanation would 
satisfy some epistemological desires; but would it make sense to ask which level is the correct 
level of description? If you are interested in knowing “How Molecules Matter to Mental 
Computation”,1053 then the molecular level could indeed be the right level of identification. 
But what if you are interested in knowing how atoms matter to mental computation? Then the 
right level of mental–physical identification would be the atomic and not molecular level. 
What would be the reason to stop here; would it not be reasonable to try to find the relevant 
correlates at the sub-atomic level?  
 It is not easy to see how mental states and brain states could have compatible identity 
conditions.  Some,  like  von  Wright  and  Malcolm,  say  that  mental  phenomena  simply  do  not  
have spatial location. Brain states, on the other hand, have such a location. This means that 
states of the brain have a property that mental phenomena do not have, and vice versa. From 
this it follows that mental and physical phenomena do not have compatible identity 
conditions. This can be seen as a background assumption in Davidson’s argument against 
bridge-laws. Jeffrey Polger, who has recently defended an identity theory, claims that: “If we 
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are certain that two things… have incompatible identity conditions… then they are not even 
candidates for identity.”1054 This  resembles  the  view  of  Alan  Sidelle,  who  discusses  the  
question of how to distinguish the cases where there is a possibility of scientific identity from 
those where there is no such possibility.1055 Sidelle points out, correctly I think, that in order 
to establish an identity between two things, we must already know something about the things 
in question. We must know whether the two things are similar enough, i.e. whether they share 
something in terms of which they can be seen as being identical. Polger has concluded that:  
 
We do not know how to individuate brain states, properties, processes, events...Not only do we not how 
to  individuate  these  things,  we  don't  really  even  have  a  clue  what  such  things  are...  as  a  matter  of  
empirical fact at this time we do not know the identity conditions for brain states, properties, processes, 
events....1056 
 
One crucial problem is that philosophers keep talking about brain states without having a 
theoretical account of what a brain state is. But what exactly is a brain state? This question 
has not received much attention from philosophers.1057 Can mental–physical identities be 
established if it is unclear with what the mental side should be identical?  
 On a Davidsonian account, mental events are physical events and physical events fall 
under strict laws; how can it be possible that mental events do not fall under such laws? After 
all, mental events just are the events which already fall under strict laws. An obvious answer 
is Davidson’s view that events fall under laws only when they are described in a certain way. 
Physical events, when described as mental, do not fall under strict laws. But what should be 
said of the following case? Let us suppose that we have formulated a law:  
 
“Necessarily, if x is in M at time t he will be in P at time t1”. 
 
The law states that whenever a person is in a mental state M at time t he will be in a physical 
state P at time t1. Since M is also a physical event, why couldn’t we formulate a law stating 
that “Necessarily, if x is in Pd at  time t  he  will  be  in  Pd1 at  time t1” where Pd is a physical 
description of M? We can imagine that this could be possible. However, this possibility is of 
no interest with respect to the question of whether the fact that physical events are governed 
by strict laws implies that mental events fall under such laws as well. First of all, most 
obviously, Davidson’s claim is that there are no strict laws between the mental and the 
physical. “Necessarily, if x is in Pd at time t he will be in P at time t1” is a law which mentions 
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1056 Polger, 51-52. 
1057 For a discussion of this problem see, Brown, 2006. 
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only  physical  events,  and  as  such  it  is  a  law the  existence  of  which  Davidson  would  allow.  
The existence of this kind of law is necessary if the PNCC is true. Second, the formulation of 
the  law  “Necessarily,  if  x  is  in  Pd at  time  t  he  will  be  in  P  at  time  t1”  from  the  law  
“Necessarily, if x is in M at time t he will be in P at time t1” obviously requires a way to 
actually reduce M to Pd. This, in turn would require a bridge-law of the form “x is M iff x is 
Pd”, which is not available. Thirdly, let us suppose that somehow we have formulated a law 
“Necessarily, if x is in Pd at time t he will be in P at time t1” where Pd refers to a mental state. 
Well, since Pd is a physical state, it is clear that a change of subject would have occurred 
along the way, and we would have no reason to think the law as saying anything about a 
mental event at all. 
 The  intuition  on  which  Davidson’s  argument  is  based  is  easy  to  follow.  However,  a  
critic could surely raise the following complaint. We have already agreed that every mental 
state is a physical state, a state of the brain or at least a physical state of the person. What 
kinds of connections exist between mental and physical states must be an empirical question. 
This being the case, it makes no sense to claim on a priori grounds that strict laws between 
the mental and the physical are impossible. Mental states are a part of nature and we cannot 
imagine what kinds of techniques for investigating nature might be possible in the future. We 
cannot say at the moment what kinds of laws the bridge laws between the mental and the 
physical will turn out to be. The fact that Davidson’s argument against the possibility of 
psycho-physical laws is a conceptual argument is surely a reason that philosophers with a 
certain kind of naturalistic attitude do not take it very seriously. A philosopher who does not 
want to take this kind of argument seriously thinks that we can draw a clear distinction 
between the way things are the way we talk about them. It is argued that we can find out how 
mental states are connected to physical states, or better yet, how they are identical with them, 
and whatever these answers turn out to be, they may be such that our current understanding of 
the nature of mental states has nothing to do with them.  
 To sum up how the disparate commitments of the mental and the physical prevent the 
formulation of laws between them, let us say the following. When we interpret the behavior 
of an individual, we attribute intentional actions which can be rationalized by citing the 
relevant beliefs and desires of the individual. This, the possibility of giving rational 
explanations, is the main purpose of our mental vocabulary. If beliefs and desires are to have 
this explanatory role they must, in virtue of their propositional content, provide the 
individual’s reason for  engaging  in  the  course  of  action  in  question,  where  that  course  of  
action is also propositionally characterized. In interpreting an individual we must attribute 
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those intentional actions and propositional attitudes that it makes sense, from our point of 
view, for the individual to perform or to have. This cannot be done without attributing at least 
a minimal degree of rational coherence to the interpretee. It is clear that the constitutive 
principles of the mental, namely, holism and normativity, are the key to the anomalism of the 
mental.  The  main  characteristics  of  Davidson’s  conception  of  the  mental  are  also  the  main  
reasons for the anomalism of mental. The acceptance of the view that there cannot be strict 
psycho-physical laws requires that the Davidsonian view about the mental is also accepted; 
the anomalism of the mental cannot really be challenged without challenging the Davidsonian 
conception.  The  properties  of  mental  states  have  no  counterpart  in  our  understanding  of  the  
world as a physical system. By the time of “Mental Events” Davidson’s views about the 
nature of holism and normativity were not fully developed; yet he clearly states them as the 
most important reasons for anomalism. We are told: 
 
What lies behind our inability to discover deterministic psychophysical laws is this. When we attribute 
a belief, desire, a goal, an intention or a meaning to an agent, we necessarily operate within a system of 
concepts in part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires of the agent himself. Short of 
changing the subject, we cannot escape this feature of the psychological; but this feature has no 
counterpart in the world of physics.1058  
 
Or, 
 
[...] the attribution of mental phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons, beliefs and 
intentions of the individual...when we use the concepts of belief, desire, and the rest we must stand 
prepared...to adjust our theory in the light of considerations of overall cogency: the constitutive ideal of 
rationality partly controls each phase in the evolution of what must be an evolving theory.1059  
 
Davidson concludes: “Clearly this holism of the mental realm is a clue both to the autonomy 
and to the anomalous character of the mental.”1060 What should be noted with interest is the 
remark that the nature of the mental realm is a reason why we cannot discover psychophysical 
laws.  One  could  claim that  this  is  not  a  reason  against  the  existence  of  these  laws  and  that  
Davidson is again confusing an epistemological and ontological question. This would be a fair 
challenge if Davidson accepted the clear separation of ontology and epistemology; ontology 
recapitulates philology. But we should also note that on occasions Davidson seems 
nevertheless to argue that there do not exist psychophysical laws. “We don’t know precise 
laws for explaining and predicting [psychological events]; but unlike the situation in the 
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natural sciences, this isn’t because we haven’t discovered them yet; it’s because there are no 
such laws.”1061 This is an interesting claim because Davidson’s view is that “laws are 
linguistic” and therefore one should not be able to find them from reality. But if laws are not 
“out there” to be found, how can Davidson be so sure that there are no psycho-physical laws? 
What does it mean to say that in the natural sciences we can discover laws? Can these laws be 
discovered from “reality”? If the answer is affirmative, is this yet another difference between 
psycho-physical and other laws? Davidson has claimed that psycho-physical laws differ not 
only in degree but in kind from purely physical laws.1062 His insistence that there are no 
psycho-physical laws bears a curious resemblance to Wittgenstein’s view from 1938:  
 
Determinism applies to the mind as truly as to physical things.’ This is obscure because when we think 
of causal laws in physical things we think of experiments. We have nothing like this in connexion with 
feelings and motivation. And yet psychologists want to say: ‘There must be some law’ although no law 
has been found… to me that there aren’t actually any such laws seems important.1063 
 
The psychologists of Wittgenstein’s times were insisting on the same ideas as the naturalists 
of our times are: there must be psychological or psycho-physical laws. Both Davidson and 
Wittgenstein deny this. There is also an interesting similarity in their views about why this is 
so. As we have seen, Davidson claims that certain features of the mental have no echo in the 
physical world; the interpreter brings to the situation a feature which has no counterpart in the 
world of physics. The normative element of interpretation forces us to consider what seems to 
be an intelligible interpretation from our point of view. But as Davidson notes: “Nothing in 
physics corresponds to the way in which this feature of the mental shapes its categories.”1064 
In his 1932–33 lectures, Wittgenstein considers how we could analyze the cause or reason of 
somebody’s laughter. He concludes that as far as person’s reason to laugh is concerned, “The 
success of the analysis is supposed to be shown by the person’s agreement. There is nothing 
corresponding to this in physics.”1065 It  is  a  peculiar  coincidence  that  both  Davidson  and  
Wittgenstein use the same expression when they discuss the way how certain features of the 
mental do not exist in non-mental reality. 
 So are psycho-physical laws possible or not? I would strongly emphasize that 
Davidson is actually giving reasons why we cannot allow the  possibility  of  these  laws.  We 
cannot allow the possibility of strict laws as long as we want to maintain a certain picture of 
                                               
1061 Davidson, 1993e, 312, my emphasis. 
1062 See Davidson, 1985 and Davidson, 1999n. 
1063 Wittgenstein, 1966, 42. 
1064 Davidson, 1995a, 6. 
1065 Wittgenstein, 1979, 40. 
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humans and of mental reality. Whether we want to maintain it depends, among other reasons, 
on whether we take it to be useful. The possibility of psycho-physical laws entangles with the 
question about the prospects of “scientific psychology” and about the status of folk-
psychology. The possibility or impossibility of strict psycho-physical laws is tied to the 
concept of human beings that we want to hold. It seems that certain kinds of psycho-physical 
laws are perfectly possible for a philosopher who would reject Davidson’s conception of the 
mental and, more provocatively, who would be willing to reject a certain image of man. 
Without a Davidsonian view about the mental – and without reasons to think that the 
preservation of our mental vocabulary is something valuable, that the motivation to defend 
anomalism is important – the argument for the anomalism of the mental does not really make 
sense. 
 Should  we  say  that  the  anomalism  of  the  mental  is  a  true  thesis?  Davidson  himself  
admitted that there was no proof that the thesis is true. I believe the most interesting part of 
the argument is the claim that we must reject the hope for strict psycho-physical laws as long 
as we take our mental vocabulary to have a function and purpose that cannot be captured by 
the physical vocabulary. Davidson notes: “[...] the application of mental concepts is governed 
by a different set of purposes,  is  anchored  to  a  different  weighting  of  evidence  than  the  
physical concepts.”1066 Whether these purposes are something that should be defended is a 
very complex question, and one which has concrete implications beyond philosophy. Do we 
want to defend a folk-psychological conception of ourselves or are we willing to hand over to 
experts the possibility of passing a final verdict about the mental nature of humans? The 
expert view would be based on physical, objective evidence. I think we must conclude that we 
cannot  easily  decide  whether  the  anomalism  of  the  mental  is  a  correct  description  of  the  
connections between mental and the physical. The best way to evaluate its plausibility is to 
see whether we would be willing to give up our mental vocabulary and what the consequences 
of the possible rejection of this mental vocabulary would be.  
 
3.2 Why the mental has a priority over the physical 
  
In the previous section, we reached the conclusion that there cannot be tight connections 
between the mental and the physical if each  is  to  remain  faithful  to  its  respective  evidential  
basis. This is the essential point of the anomalism of the mental. A critic would say that there 
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are no constitutive principles which could not be ignored, and would claim that the question 
about the nature of the mental–physical relation is empirical. But we also saw that there is a 
strong pragmatic element in the argument for the anomalism of the mental. Davidson claims 
that we cannot allow the possibility of strict psycho-physical laws; the limit placed on the 
social sciences is a limit placed by us. I think that with these claims Davidson takes a stance 
on the question of how we should react in a case where rational and non-rational evidence 
would compete around the question what kind of states can be attributed to a subject. To 
claim that non-rational evidence cannot generally override rational evidence is to claim that 
ultimately mental evidence has some kind of priority over physical evidence. This in turn 
suggests that mental reality enjoys a special kind of autonomy over physical facts.  
 Von Wright strongly stressed this point when he defended the autonomy of 
psychology and the need for a psychological understanding of a human being. I believe that 
von Wright's views about the priorities between vocabularies provide a very useful picture, 
which helps to clarify the sense in which mental phenomena are autonomous in relation to 
their physical counterparts. My claim is that the von Wrightian view clarifies also Davidson’s 
views about the anomalism as well as the Davidsonian claim that any attribution of mental 
phenomena must remain faithful to its proper source of evidence. Von Wright’s view clarifies 
how the status of constitutive principles can be understood. I claim that he makes an 
important contribution to the current debate about the status of non-reductive physicalism. 
 We can consider the strength of the criticism that there are no constitutive principles 
constraining mental reality and the subsequent claim that the question about the nature of 
mental–physical laws is an empirical question by considering the following thought 
experiment, which gives a concrete example of the autonomy of the mental. Through it we 
can appreciate why the mental has a certain priority over the physical. Let us suppose that at 
birth a child were to be transferred to a laboratory environment. He would grow up to be a 
somewhat normal, thinking adult. With techniques currently only imaginable, the 
development of the child’s brain would have been scanned and “recorded” so that we would 
have an extensive “map” connecting this person’s propositional attitudes and other conscious 
mental phenomena with the states of the brain. We can imagine that with this kind of perfect 
map, scientists would be willing to say that whenever the child thinks that x, the physical state 
P occurs, whenever he wants y, a physical state Pa occurs, whenever he is in pain, a physical 
state Pb occurs, and so on. The constructing of this kind of map would obviously be a colossal 
project and it may be the case that such a project is not humanly possible simply because of 
366 
 
some empirical restrictions. Let us nevertheless imagine that with the available future super-
technology, the construction of the mental–physical map would have been achieved.  
 Let us now suppose that the person, Georg, whose brain states and mental phenomena 
have been correlated, is being observed by two groups of scientists. The first group watches 
Georg as he lives in the laboratory environment. The second group consults their computers, 
which provide detailed information about the brain of Georg and interpret this information 
according to the existing map. Group one predicts and explains the behavior of Georg based 
on his linguistic and non-linguistic behavior. In doing this they rely on their general 
knowledge of the human nature, which is the kind of knowledge that each of us already has. 
The second group makes their predictions and explanations based on what they know about 
the relations between brain states and mental phenomena. The question that I want to raise is: 
what is second group’s reason to attribute a propositional attitude to Georg? It is the fact that a 
computer  indicates  that  a  brain  state  P  occurs  in  Georg  at  time t.  Can  the  second group be  
more certain in its opinion that a specific propositional attitude is present than the first group? 
Without seeing and interpreting the person, would they be confident enough to say, for 
example, that Georg is intentionally trying to do X, say, to scratch his back? Would they be 
able to distinguish an intentional scratching from a non-intentional one? If yes, it would have 
to be the case that intention is something that can be found from the brain. Would they be 
willing to identify actions by reference to brain states only? Would they be willing to say that 
if two people are identical, brain-wise, their mental lives must also  be?  These  are  questions  
without answers because currently we can only imagine or speculate about what the answers 
could be. But the questions show the extent of the problem. What can be said is that if the 
verdict of the second group were to override the verdict of the first group, if we were to trust 
the computer over our own skills of interpretation, then this would indicate a major change in 
the way we think about the nature of human life. Perhaps such a change is possible, but it is 
certainly not possible without drastic changes in all areas of life. 
 Both von Wright and Davidson considered the possibility that we would know the 
exact physical details that happen in a person when a mental state occurs. They considered the 
kind  of  possibility  being  realized  that  the  example  of  the  laboratory  and  the  two  groups  of  
scientists is meant to describe. As I noted in section 2.5.4, Davidson’s conclusion was that 
even if all the physical details of the situation were known, we could not avoid the need to 
interpret the behavior of the person if we were willing to know what the person meant or 
believed. It is interesting that at one point von Wright seemed to think otherwise. He claimed 
that it is “logically possible” or “conceivable” that a complete story of an agent’s action could 
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be “read off” from a full description of its counterpart in the person’s nervous system.1067 In 
the end von Wright rejected this possibility and ended up defending the autonomy of the 
mental level. 
 Perhaps our intuitive view is that the majority of human actions could not be 
explained or predicted by studying the brain in isolation. Whereas the neural cause of a bodily 
movement could in principle be found out, in most cases the question of what a certain bodily 
movement means would still remain open. Actions are context-dependent; it is not the case 
that actions are merely identified in relation to the actual life in which they are embedded, the 
situational factors are constitutive for certain actions. For example, Georg cannot sign a death-
sentence if his position in the society does not give him an authority to do so. Georg can be 
thinking that he is signing a death-sentence, but if at the time of signing, unbeknown to him, 
he is deprived of the authority to do so, he is not signing a death-sentence.1068 Whether or not 
somebody is intentionally doing something in a given case cannot be answered 
straightforwardly without considering the act in the context in which it takes place.1069 Even if 
intentions to do something could be located in the brain, the question of what kind of actions 
these intentions actually produce cannot be answered by studying the brain. The bodily 
movement  that  is  the  result  of  a  neural  cause  counts  as  a  complex  action  only  if  the  
appropriate cultural, social and legal institutions exist in terms of which the action can be 
understood.  As von Wright has noted a very simple movement like Georg’s raising his hand 
is a poor example of human action because most things that people do are such that they 
cannot be described by describing physiologically or neurophysiologically what goes on in 
the person’s body at the time of the action. If O-physicalism is true, it is plausible that there is 
a physiological and neurophysiological description of what happens when Georg’s hand is 
rising, or even what (physically) happens when Georg is raising his hand. But what the raising 
of the hand means depends on factors which must be located outside the brain of Georg.  
 It is of some interest to note that scenarios where an outsider can predict the thoughts 
and consequent behavior of others have become increasingly popular in recent works of 
                                               
1067 See von Wright, UPg. This is a curious claim because at times von Wright claimed precisely that the 
meaning-constituting relation between behavior and mental phenomena is conceptual.   
1068 It could be claimed that what matters is only whether Georg thinks that he is signing a death-sentence, 
because there is no difference in Georg in the cases when he is genuinely signing such a sentence and when he is 
not. We would hold Georg responsible of his signing even if it were the case that, unbeknown to him, his 
authority was deprived at the time of signing. Whereas it is true that there is no difference in Georg in the cases 
when he is really signing a death-sentence and when he is not, this merely shows that if we want to understand 
actual human behavior and its consequences, physiology alone cannot help. 
1069 Putnam’s familiar twin-earth scenarios, Davidson’s swampman, and other similar thought experiments are 
meant to show that mental states must to be identified by reference to factors outside the agent. The 
“externalism” of mental states is an essential feature of them. 
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popular-culture. In the imagined scenarios, the possibility that an outsider could know these 
facts before the subject knows them is often entertained. These scenarios are familiar from 
science-fiction movies, but popular culture often reflects the intellectual climate of its time. 
One can speculate that the reason why these kinds of imaginings are currently so popular is 
that scientific evidence is interpreted as pointing to the direction according to which mind-
reading may be possible some day. The thought-experiment involving the two groups of 
scientists is therefore perhaps not as absurd as it may sound. In fact, if we go through the 
recent issues of Newsweek the picture described there is quite contrary to the view about the 
mind described for example by Wittgenstein, Malcolm, von Wright, and Davidson. A brief 
analysis of the current literature shows that neuroscientists are already considering the 
practical problems of mind-reading, like the question of whether the subject’s compliance is 
required in order to draw conclusions from the study of the subject’s brain.   
 Scientists interviewed in a Newsweek article titled “Mind Reading Is Now Possible” 
claim: “The new realization is that every thought is associated with a pattern of brain activity 
and you can train a computer to recognize the pattern associated with a particular 
thought”1070; or we hear: “If our approach could be expanded upon, it might be possible to 
predict what someone was thinking or seeing from brain activity alone.”1071 The author of the 
article, who I assume has not considered Davidson’s argument against strict psycho-physical 
laws, concludes: “If what your brain does when it thinks about an igloo is almost identical to 
what mine does, that suggests the possibility of a universal mind-reading dictionary, in which 
brain-activity pattern x means thought y in most people.”1072 It is interesting that in an article 
which is meant for a wide audience, many of the mistakes or confusions which we have 
discussed in the previous chapters are being made. The author uses the expression “almost 
identical” and draws conclusions about mental–physical connections from it. But what kind of 
identity is this “almost identity”?  It is being claimed, pace the arguments of Bennett and 
Hacker, that the brain “does” something and that it “thinks”. It is also claimed that brain-
activity pattern x means thought  y  in  most  people.  This  suggests  that  a  similarity  of  brain-
states is used as a criterion for the sameness of thoughts. This means that the relation of 
meaning which now exists between mental phenomena and behavior has changed to 
something else.  These are examples of how the conceptual confusions of modern 
neuroscience influence writings which reach a wider audience. It is these more popular views 
                                               
1070 Neuroscientist John Dylan Haynes quoted in Begley, 2008 (my emphasis). 
1071 Neuroscientist Geraint Rees quoted in Begley, 2008. 
1072 Begley, 2008. 
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which will have an impact on the way that people start to think about the mind–brain 
relationship.  
 These kinds of confused suggestions can have an effect on society, and they should 
interest  a  philosopher  of  mind  who  does  not  want  to  alienate  himself  from  the  world.  Von  
Wright’s opinion was that the best thing a philosopher can do is to act as a critic of his own 
time. Here the task of a philosopher is to point out the obscurities in the ways in which the 
mind–brain relation is currently expressed. The Newsweek reporter cannot be blamed for 
drawing these kinds of philosophically problematic conclusions, given that neuroscientists 
have recently published articles like “Decoding Mental States from Brain Activity in 
Humans”1073, “Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain”1074 or “Unconscious 
Determinants of Free Decision in the Human Brain”.1075 These scientific articles are followed 
by more popular articles explaining the results of the research for the public. The titles are of 
these popular articles are telling: “Mind Reading Machine Knows Your Thoughts Before You 
Do”, “Brain Scanner Predicts Your Future Moves”, “Mind Reading Machine Knows What 
You See”. These are not the topics of science-fiction movies, but the topics of articles from 
the publication New Scientist from the years 2006–2009.  
 If we listen to the conclusions of neuroscientific research, there are serious reasons to 
doubt that, for example, Davidson’s claims about token-irreducibility, Malcolm’s claims 
about the nature of dreams and dreaming, or von Wright’s claim about the nature of intentions 
are true.1076 From the perspective of modern neuroscience the claims of philosophers are not 
very convincing. According to Haynes it seems that every thought is associated with a certain 
pattern of brain activity, and a computer can be programmed to recognize this pattern. This 
casts doubt upon Davidson’s claim that beliefs are not little entities lodged in the brain. It is 
being claimed that functional magnetic resonance imaging sheds light on how the brain 
processes visual information, and how “it might one day be used to reconstruct dreams”.1077 
This goes blatantly against Malcolm’s views on the nature of dreams. Von Wright claimed 
that intentions cannot be found from the brain and that one cannot perform tasks by sheer 
will; yet the existence of so called brain-computer interfaces already show that these claims 
are controversial. As I have noted in chapter two, there is an enormous empirical pressure 
against conceptual arguments in the philosophy of mind if and when these arguments go, as 
                                               
1073 Haynes and Rees, 2006. 
1074 Haynes et al. 2007. 
1075 Soon et al. 2008. 
1076 Malcolm, 1959. 
1077 Singer, 2008. 
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they sometimes do in the case of Davidson and von Wright, beyond clarifying what makes 
sense. When competition between an empirical claim and a philosophical argument occurs, 
empirical evidence is relevant. That is why, for example, Davidson’s and Rorty’s arguments 
against token-reducibility are so problematic. 
 But are neuroscientists taking conceptual short-cuts in their reasoning? It is telling that 
in the recent neuroscientific articles the discussion focuses on hidden intentions, unconscious 
determinants or brain activity from which mental states must be decoded. If philosophers have 
ignored empirical results, it seems that neuroscientists have, likewise, ignored the conceptual 
points made by philosophers. Are the concepts of a “hidden intention” or an “unconscious 
determinant of a free decision” coherent? Concrete examples of some of the problems which 
may trouble a philosopher but which are irrelevant for a neuroscientist occurred to me when I 
was a volunteer in an experiment where the functioning of a brain-computer interface was 
tested.1078 A brain-computer interface (BCI), sometimes called a direct neural interface or a 
brain-machine interface (BMI), accepts commands directly from the human or animal brain 
without requiring any physical movement of the subject, and it can be used to operate a 
computer or other technological equipment. What a few years ago would have sounded like 
science fiction, namely controlling computers with your brain, is now a real possibility. Von 
Wright, for example, seemed to doubt whether this could be possible, although in his later 
writings he had to admit that current empirical results “look interesting”.1079.As he says, 
commenting on the mirror-neuron research on monkeys: “these findings about the monkeys 
and their reactions to what (a man does), they are very, very interesting and it’s an advance 
towards not only speculative ideas about correlations, but also findings about generalities.”1080 
It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  appropriate  to  question  whether  this  admittance  puts  the  theory  of  
action and its autonomous rational explanations into a very challenging dialogue with 
neuroscience.1081 Von  Wright’s  admission  that  empirical  research  may  produce  generalities 
puts his view also in an interesting relation to type–type theory. 
 As  a  result  of  discovering  mirror  neurons,  neuroscientists  can  literally  say  what  a  
monkey is doing just by looking into its brain. The kind of “map” imagined in our laboratory-
                                               
1078 For information about the research group and their publications see http://www.lce.hut.fi/research/css/bci/. 
For results, see Kauhanen, Nykopp and Sams, 2006. 
1079 Von Wright (UPg) concluded that man cannot “make things happen” by “sheer willing”. But the way BCI 
works comes, in my opinion, very close to a situation where a person makes things happen by sheer willing. Von 
Wright claimed that if somebody could make things happen by sheer willing, the result would not be anything 
that  we would  call  action.  As  far  as  our  current  concepts  are  concerned this  is  perhaps  true;  but  can  this  fact  
remove the possibility of producing effects by sheer willing?  
1080 As quoted in Petit, 1999, 121-122. 
1081 This challenge for von Wright's position is raised by Petit, 1999. 
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example seems to be, in a modest form, a reality in the case of rats. In the human-case, BCI 
can  be  used  to  connect  brains  to  computers.  Current  interest  in  this  kind  of  research  and  
technology is understandably high. The possibilities of BCI-applications are, at least in 
theory, numerous. People who cannot speak or move could communicate through computer. 
Humans could control machines, like robots, directly with brain activity. People who are in a 
seemingly unconscious state could perhaps be reached through a direct link to their brains. All 
these suggestions and many others have been put forward in the scientific literature in the past 
few years. It seems that since the technology which enables you to move a cursor on a 
computer screen with your brain activity has already been invented, the possibility of 
performing more complex tasks is, more or less, just a matter of engineering.1082 Hayden and 
others conclude that their work on the neural correlates of intentions has:  
 
[...] important implications not only for the neural models of executive control, but also for technical 
and clinical applications, such as the further development of brain-computer interfaces, that might now 
be able to decode intentions that go beyond simple   movements and extend to high-level cognitive 
processes.1083 
 
This is perhaps not surprising. If the mind can be understood as being a physical “thing” and if 
it has a causal role in controlling behavior, it is no surprise that the link between the mind and 
the outer world could be replaced with a BCI. We can already control the cursor on the 
computer screen “with our mind”, the concrete physical link between the computer and our 
mind being our hands! Epiphenomenalist worries aside for the moment, our minds can 
already affect the world; BCI only makes the link more direct. We could therefore defend von 
Wright’s skeptical claim that a person does not make things happen by sheer willing; she 
produces brain states which a machine interprets and makes certain things happen as a result. 
Let us imagine that the machine could be completely left out of the picture. A person could 
make something happen by sheer willing. Would we claim that in this case too there must be 
some mediating link between the willing and the consequence? If we insist that such a link 
must  be  found,  then  it  indeed  seems  to  be  the  case  that  sheer  willing  cannot  have  
consequences. But why demand that there must be a link? 
 Actual participation in neuroscientific research was illuminating because it made me 
realize that scientists were not troubled at all by the question of whether the phenomenon 
which they were measuring was a “state” or an “entity” and they were not very interested in 
                                               
1082 The possibility of brain–computer communication has already raised a number of ethical questions. See, 
Tamburrini, 2009. 
1083 Hayden et al., 2007, 326. 
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the question of what the exact relation between the mental and physical aspects of my 
concentration was. They were not interested in the question of whether the mental aspect was 
identical with the physical aspect in the philosopher’s sense of identity. Polger, who is willing 
to defend type–type identity theory on philosophical grounds and has also participated in 
some  research  in  which  his  brain  was  scanned,  draws  the  conclusion  that  “Each  picture  or  
kind of picture is at best an incomplete representation of what is going on in the brain. None 
of them gives pictures of ‘brain states’ that could play a general explanatory role in science of 
the brain.”1084 Given the recent claims concerning what can be found from the brain, it could 
be tempting to claim that the scientists studying their computers could indeed predict and 
explain everything that the group studying Georg in an old-fashioned way could and, 
moreover, that they could do this with absolute accuracy or at a least with much higher 
accuracy than the group without computers. If we assume that physical events are 
“deterministic”, it is tempting to maintain the vision that prediction in terms of brain states, 
which are physical states, could be much more accurate than prediction in terms of familiar 
mental concepts which refer to physical states of queer nature. Before we accept this vision, I 
think we should consider what von Wright says about this possibility. He suggests an 
interesting way in which mental reality could enjoy autonomy over the physical.  
 Let us reconsider the laboratory example. Neuroscientists already claim that mind-
reading machines can know your thoughts before you do, and that a brain-scanner can predict 
your future moves. In our laboratory example, the “map” which would be used by the 
scientists studying Georg through computers could be something like the “universal mind-
reading dictionary” the future existence of which was predicted in Newsweek.  To  be  really  
useful, the map should contain laws and not just descriptions stating regularities between two 
kinds of phenomena. As Davidson claims: “[…] what we want as a law of correspondence is 
not  an  accidental  correspondence,  but  one  which,  we  have  reason  to  believe,  will  apply  to  
cases which we have not yet examined.”1085 Davidson admits the possibility of non-strict laws 
of  correspondence,  but  their  existence  is  hardly  a  reason  to  think  that  new  instances  of  the  
“same” mental phenomena would have the physical counterparts predicted by the non-strict 
law. A map without strict laws would provide knowledge about mind–physical relations, but 
how  could  we  trust  the  predictions  made  according  to  it?  How  could  we  trust  that  these  
regularities are firmer than the folk-psychological regularities that are already known? As 
Kim  has  observed,  the  claim  that  A  is  an  attribution  condition  for  p  is  more  than  the  
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affirmation of a mere de facto coincidence of A with p; to assert it is to commit oneself to a 
statement with modal force. Let us suppose therefore that the map tells, for example, that 
“Necessarily, if C obtains P occurs” as well as “Necessarily, M occurs iff P”. Here “P” is a 
physical state, “C” describes the conditions under which we can say that P occurs and “M” is 
a mental state. It is easy to make sense of the idea that the occurrence of condition C is 
decisive for P. With the existence of a law “Necessarily, M occurs iff P”, we should draw the 
conclusion that the occurrence of certain set of physical conditions C settles, beyond doubt, 
the question of whether M occurs. In other words, C has become a determining condition for 
M and C is thus a criterion for the presence of M. This is what happens in the case suggested 
by Newsweek, where brain-activity pattern x means thought y in most people.  
 Kim’s interpretation of Davidson’s argument against strict psycho-physical laws 
concludes that with the existence of such laws the criterion of the mental would be changed to 
something which, according to Davidson, cannot be the right kind of criterion. Neural 
attribution conditions cannot be the right kind of attribution conditions for mental phenomena. 
This conclusion can be drawn if we consider what the actual attribution conditions for mental 
phenomena  are  and  how mental  phenomena  are  attributed  in  the  course  of  real  life,  outside  
laboratories. The importance of actual attribution conditions have been stressed by Malcolm, 
von Wright, Bennett and Hacker who, following Wittgenstein, make much use of the 
distinction between a phenomenon being a symptom of a property and a phenomenon being a 
criterion for the presence of a property. Although Davidson does not use these 
Wittgensteinian terms, I believe it is easy to see how his argument relates to the one described 
below. When we consider the nature of the mental one crucial question is: How does a belief 
manifest itself? How does it show that a person has a belief? Von Wright’s answer is: “In that 
I  am likely to answer questions ‘Yes’ and ‘No’,  to do certain things and refrain from doing 
others, make some preparations, warn people, etc. ‘This is how my belief shows itself’”.1086 
Starting from the third-person perspective: “We attribute to a person a belief on the basis of 
complex  pattern  of  his  bodily  reactions  (and  ‘dispositions’  to  react).  This  is  a  
conceptualization of observations under an aspect of intentionality”.1087 Here we see both the 
ways in which a belief shows itself and how beliefs are attributed to others. As I claimed in 
chapter two, the connections of these claims to Davidson’s views about the nature of belief 
and belief-attribution are obvious. According to this view, to “have a belief” is more like 
something we do than something we experience and the having of a belief is nothing physical 
                                               
1086 Von Wright, 1998, 118. 
1087 Von Wright, 1998, 119. 
374 
 
inside the brain in any meaningful sense.1088 But is behavior merely evidence for the existence 
of belief, is it a symptom of belief? If so, what precludes the possibility that there could be 
other kinds of evidence for mental phenomena such as descriptions of the neurological states 
in which the subject without doubt is? The idea of mind-reading machines and brain-scanners 
is clearly based on the view that neurological states would be good and in many cases 
conclusive evidence for the attributions of mental phenomena. 
 Von Wright, however, claims that behavior is not merely evidence for the existence of 
a belief. To say that it is, would be to say that behavior is a symptom of having a belief. But, 
according to von Wright, this is not the right way to understand the relation between mental 
phenomena and behavior. He describes the difference between symptoms and criteria in the 
following way:  
 
The connection between a symptom and that of which it is a symptom is “empirical”. This means, 
roughly,  the  following:  if  A  is  a  symptom  of  B,  the  existence  or  occurrence  of  A  may  make  us  
anticipate, expect or predict, the occurrence or existence of B. But whether B actually occurs or exists 
will have to be established on independent grounds, i.e. on grounds which do not themselves make 
appeal to (the occurrence or existence) of A. These independent grounds, moreover, are sometimes, but 
not necessarily, what we call criteria (as opposed to symptoms) of B.1089 
 
The connection between a symptom and that of which it is a symptom is empirical and can 
thus be established by research and observation. It can be established only in this way. The 
connection between a criterion and that of which it is a criterion is instead conceptual, logical 
or semantic. In this context, these three terms are roughly synonymous and if there is a 
difference between them von Wright does not discuss it. The connection between a criterion 
and that of which it is a criterion of is not empirical; it depends of what we mean by certain 
concepts. Once the meaning of concepts is “settled” in a given linguistic community, the 
conceptual, logical or semantic relations between concepts are established. This is a crucial 
point, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. It is, I think, impossible to prove that 
this is so; it is something which has to be accepted. By this I mean that it is a starting point 
which cannot be further grounded.1090 Yet, this starting point is not difficult to accept if we 
consider the way that linguistic practices actually work. Here it is important to recall the 
Wittgensteinian suggestion that philosophical problems occur when language goes on 
holiday. The actual usage of language is a standard against which the meaningfulness of 
                                               
1088 I challenged these views in chapter two. Here I use them to establish the point of von Wright and Davidson, 
but I am not accepting them as true. 
1089 Von Wright, 1998, 110. 
1090 The difference in their basic points of view is what makes the dispute between Bennett / Hacker and Dennett 
/ Searle so severe. The basic disagreement is well described by Churchland (2005a, 464) when he notes that the 
participants have “a different set of convictions and a very different intellectual agenda….”   
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statements must be compared. Without any standard, the possibility of agreement, 
disagreement and discussion is lost. We do not have to accept that this has to  be  so;  it  is  
merely one attitude towards the nature of philosophical problems. If this attitude is accepted 
we should never forget Wittgenstein’s question: “[…] is the word ever actually used in this 
way in the language-game which is its original home?”1091 This question should be asked 
frequently, especially among philosophers who start to create conceptual structures which 
lose touch with reality. Anything goes if there are no standards. Various things can be 
“proved” by readjusting ordinary language. 
 As  I  have  shown,  Davidson’s  claim  is  that  it  is  possible  to  know  a priori which 
predicates are made for each other. I argue that the reason for this is precisely the fact that the 
criteria for the application of predicates are conceptual, logical or semantic. In this respect, 
the question of whether strict laws between the mental and the physical are possible is wholly 
a conceptual and not an empirical question. In the case of belief and behavior the presence of 
behavioral criteria does not only indicate but  in  fact  means that the subject in question 
believes something; the behavioral criteria of B determine the meaning of the term “B”. As 
von Wright says: “the presence of the behavioural criteria of expectation or of curiosity means 
that the being expects or is curious about something”.1092 Moreover: “The behavioral 
reactions to sound are constitutive of hearing. Their presence (occurrence) means that the 
subject hears something”.1093 Von Wright  claims  that  behavior  has  a  constitutive role in the 
attributions of mental phenomena. If behavior has this role with respect to mental phenomena, 
if it is a criterion, then the question of whether mental phenomena can be attributed in the 
absence of behavior simply does not make sense. The question is wrongly stated and it 
becomes an empty question. If there did not exist behavior which is logically or conceptually 
characteristic of mental states, the statement that a subject has a mental state would not make 
sense. These statements could make sense if the concepts of mental phenomenon or behavior 
were something completely different than they actually are. As things stand with our current 
concepts, the relation between behavior and mental phenomena is essential.   
 Von Wright is making a point about the language of the mental. On the one hand, 
there exists the language game of the physical, and on the other hand, the language game of 
the mental. The concepts used in these “games” show, so to speak, what kind of functions 
they perform. When we say, in the language game of the mental, that Georg is curious we are 
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1093 Von Wright, 1998, 161, first emphasis mine. 
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not, in the first place, indicating that such and such neurological processes are occurring. That 
indication  would  be  an  irritating  change  of  subject.  That  we  are  not  indicating  this  can  be  
verified by consulting the actual users of such language. In our linguistic community, “being 
curious” simply is not a property of the brain. When attributing curiosity to a person, we do 
not mean that her brain is in a certain state; we mean something very different. Although 
“being curious” is a state or process the exact mental nature of which is unclear, we can use 
this expression in a meaningful way and without problems most of the time.  
 A neurological process is not what we mean by the concept “curious” and the 
attribution of curiosity does not depend on anything that we know about the subject’s brain. 
The language game of the mental is structured around different kinds of phenomena than what 
take place in the brain. It is not possible to specify the exact conditions which must prevail for 
us  to  attribute  a  specific  mental  phenomenon  to  a  subject.  Mental  phenomena  are  part  of  a  
broader  context,  and  they  manifest  themselves  in  a  certain  kind  of  “form  of  life”  that  is  
familiar  to  us.  This  form  of  life  is  characteristic  to  humans,  and  we  are  familiar  with  it  
because we grow up in a society in which this form of life is naturally expressed. Von Wright 
notices that: “In attributing reasons for action to an agent we normally also attribute to him 
various abilities, beliefs, desires and inclinations, the understanding of institutions and 
practices of the community, and other things which characterize him as a person”.1094 This 
claim is a remark about the application conditions of mental concepts. The attribution of 
mental concepts is impossible if the application conditions referring to complex social factors 
are lacking; attributions make sense only if the institutions and practices of a community 
exist, as von Wright claims. These are, for example, the institutions of language, morality and 
law as Davidson notes. Our mental vocabulary is so deeply embedded in our actual life-
practices that the concepts would become meaningless if they were detached from their 
everyday context. Likewise, without these concepts the majority of our life-practices would 
collapse. Institutions of law and morality, as we currently understand them, would become 
meaningless if we were to stop describing human behavior without reference to mental 
phenomena like beliefs.1095  
 If interpretationism is taken seriously, we should conclude that an attribution of a 
mental state to a subject is not a description of the inner state in which she is. The attribution 
is rather meant to be a description of a person as a participant in a certain kind of activity, or 
                                               
1094 Von Wright, 1998, 27. 
1095 This is one reason why eliminative materialism is so counter-intuitive a position. As Stich (1993) has noted,  
if we are forced to give up our mental vocabulary we have to give up disciplines like economics, political 
science, sociology, anthropology and all the other areas of inquiry that depend essentially on mental concepts. 
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in a form of life. To say that the subject has mental states is to imply that she is a creature who 
can participate to certain kinds of activities; she is a creature who can live a certain kind of 
life. The study of the logic of the language of the mental amounts to noticing, and then 
describing, how, when and in what circumstances we actually make, can make, or are allowed 
to make psychological ascriptions to others or give expressions of our own psychological 
situation. It could be claimed, as Davidson, von Wright and Wittgenstein do, that to describe 
the logic of our mental language is also to describe the “metaphysical conditions” of thought. 
To insist that in describing these situations and in studying the logic of the mental language 
we are not describing the “real nature of mental phenomena” is to assume that there is an 
independent nature of the mental which could be separated from the ways in which mental 
language is actually used and which could be studied outside this language. What is the 
rationale for believing this? If participation in a certain form of life is a criterion that  a  
creature must satisfy in order to be credited with mental phenomena, then a suggestion that 
mental phenomena could be studied outside this context does not make sense. 
 How does the distinction between symptoms and criteria relate to the question of the 
possibility or impossibility of strict psycho-physical laws? Let us start from the common-
sense observation that we have knowledge of mental states which does not depend on our 
knowledge of the brain. I think it is indisputable that basically all our common-sense 
knowledge about mental states is independent of our knowledge about the brain. Humans 
used mental concepts before they knew anything about the properties of the brain, in fact, 
before they even knew that they had a brain. This important observation shows that the 
application conditions, the criteria, of mental concepts must – in our system of concepts – be 
something which has nothing to do with the fact that humans happen to have a brain, which 
happens to be the organ where “thinking takes place”.1096 Neural discoveries about the mental, 
if it even makes sense to speak in these terms, are irrelevant for the application of mental 
concepts. As von Wright says: “We have these [mental concepts] and know how to handle 
them in linguistic communication…. Unless we had the concepts we should not know how to 
identify the phenomena falling under them….”1097 One can compare this to Davidson’s 
remark according to which “if we never understood anyone, the concepts of language, 
understanding and thought would have no application for us.”1098 The fact that we have 
                                               
198 Given the conclusions of section 2.5.4 we should perhaps say that the organ in which thinking takes place is 
nonsense.  However,  we can  at  least  say  that,  most  likely,  people  could  not  think  if  they  did  not  have  a  brain.  
Brain is required for thinking but from this it does not follow that thinking can be located to the brain. 
1097 Von Wright, 1998, 93.  
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mental concepts, that we know how to apply them, and that we had them before any 
discoveries  about  the  brain  were  made  is  a  reason  to  say  that  these  concepts,  and  the  
phenomena  they  designate,  have  their  own  non-neural  criteria.  Because  the  criteria  of  X  
determine  the  meaning  of  the  term “X”,  it  is  not  possible  that  an  empirical  discovery  could  
change the meaning of X. If an empirical discovery would change the meaning of X, then it 
would not make sense to say that we would be talking about X anymore; we should say that 
the discovery would not change the meaning of X it but it would introduce a new concept X1. 
Von Wright notes, for example, that “[…] a person cannot correctly be said to have pain, if he 
does not feel it and does not exhibit pain behaviour.”1099 He goes on: 
 
[…] a “clear case of pain”; a case in which I necessarily know, “by introspection”, whether I have pain 
or  not.  Such cases… are  the  normal  or  typical  cases;  if  they  were  not  this,  then  our  concept  of  pain  
would be different from what it is now…. Because my certainty, in a “clear case”, that the sensation I 
have is one of pain is my certainty that I know (master) the correct use of the word for it  (in English 
“pain”)1100 
 
Von Wright is describing our current concept of pain. We can suppose that someone, like an 
eliminative materialist, would deny this view about the nature of the concept of pain and thus 
about the nature of pain. Antony, far from categorically denying this view, nevertheless notes 
that  “at  some point,  we  may well  allow that,  strange  as  it  may seem,  people  are  sometimes  
wrong about whether or not they’re in pain.”1101 It is unclear what the statement “He suffers 
pain”  could  mean to  a  critic  who rejected  von  Wright’s  view about  the  nature  of  pain.  It  is  
also unclear how successfully he could use the concept “pain” in discussions with others. He 
could not use it in a way that would fit with our intuitions about the nature of a pain. This 
being the case, there would be no reason to say that an eliminativist would be talking about 
the same thing as we are. We would have to ask of a person who denies von Wright’s view 
about pain what his criteria for pain are, and why we should think that those criteria are 
criteria of pain. Since we would still understand pain according to the old familiar criteria, 
what  would  be  the  reason  to  think  that  his  criterion  of  pain  would  apply  to  the  same  
phenomena as ours? Why, for example, would a brain state serve as a criterion for pain? 
Perhaps a brain state could serve as a criterion through a new convention. But then we would 
have to consider the reasons for inventing such a new convention. 
 Von Wright’s view is not as clear as the previous quotes may suggest. He writes: 
“[…] one can have pain without feeling it. But this surely is a marginal case… a person can… 
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1100 Von Wright, 1998, 57. 
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in marginal cases, be said to have pain without feeling it, but only provided he exhibits pain 
behaviour.”1102 In von Wright’s case, as in Davidson’s, behavior is the main evidential basis 
for  mental  phenomena.  However,  I  think  we should  be  dissatisfied  with  the  suggestion  that  
one can have pain without feeling it. What would the expression “he has pain” mean if not 
that the person in question feels pain? What does it mean to say that Georg has pain but does 
not feel it? If it means that Georg exhibits pain behavior, then the form of behaviorism in 
question seems to be very strong. Von Wright claims, puzzlingly in my view, that the feeling 
of pain is not necessarily required for Georg to have pain if Georg exhibits pain behavior. Yet, 
he comments that: “I differ from behaviourism… in that I cannot accept an identification of 
the mental with the state of affairs in the material world.”1103 I think we should say that for the 
observer behavior is the main evidence on the basis of which he attributes pain to a subject, 
but that in the first person case the main evidence is the feeling of pain. I believe that von 
Wright’s final views about consciousness, which were described in section 2.5.1, come close 
to this kind of position. Any sensations of mine of which I am not aware simply do not exist. 
It would certainly sound strange to say: “I have a tremendous pain but I don’t feel it.” Could I 
attribute the pain to myself on the basis of my pain behavior? Would there be such behavior, 
e.g.  groaning, crying etc, without the feeling of pain?  
 The exact nature of pain as a mental phenomenon is not clear, but it seems to me that 
there is a strong mental component, namely the feeling related to pain, and perhaps it would 
not be inaccurate to say that this is pain. People can suppress their pain by focusing on it or 
they may increase the severity of pain by paying attention to it. Is pain to be identified with 
the physical damage to the body or is it to be identified with the feeling which results from 
this damage? Or is the feeling the subjective aspect of the objective bodily damage? It seems 
strange to say that the damage is identical with the feeling; the physical damage may be in the 
foot whereas the feeling of pain is not in the foot. Perhaps all answers about the nature of pain 
are inconclusive and unsatisfying. The phenomenon of phantom pain, the feeling of pain in an 
amputated limb, could suggest that pain is not to be identified with damage to the body. But 
where is phantom pain? It cannot be in the amputated leg; yet it surely feels as if it is there.  
Von Wright notes that if pain is understood as something “which is there in the body” and of 
which I am not aware, then pain is nothing mental, it is more like something belonging to the 
material world. The subjective, mental, aspect of the pain, which I see as an essential feature 
of  pain  is,  according  to  von  Wright,  a  “marginal  case  of  the  real”.  This  claim relates  in  an  
                                               
1102 Von Wright, 1998, 169, my emphasis. 
1103 Von Wright, 1998, 148. 
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interesting  way  to  von  Wright’s  neutral  monism.  A  pure  mental  state  without  any  physical  
manifestation is a counterfactual construction; to say that a person has pain but does not 
exhibit pain behavior is to attribute to him a (mental) state in which a person is when he 
exhibits certain kind of behavior which would make us to conclude that he is in pain. The 
“impenetrable subjectivity” of the mental is a marginal case because a statement about the 
existence of a pure mental state has to be construed counterfactually in terms which refer to 
physical phenomena. But the same is true of physical phenomena; their status as totally mind-
independent  and  objective  is  also  a  marginal  case  of  the  real,  because  a  statement  of  their  
existence must be constructed counterfactually in terms of sensations. This is the conceptual 
interdependence of mind and matter. 
 The criteria of the mental are behavioral. That the criteria of the mental are behavioral 
and therefore independent from the neurological means that mental phenomena have 
epistemic priority in relation to their neural equivalents. The relationship of the three levels, 
mental, behavioral and neural, can be illustrated in the following way: 
               
                                     Causal relation 
  
Macro-behavior (B)            –             Mental (M)             –        Neural (N) 
             
             Semantic relation    Epistemic relation 
 
Behavior B, for example pain behavior, means for us that a subject S is experiencing a mental 
state of pain, M. The attribution of M is ultimately grounded on the semantic relationship 
between B and M, and the very possibility of such an attribution is based on this relation. 
This, in essential respects, is the point emphasized also by Davidson when he claims that the 
only way to find out whether a creature believes, desires or wants, is to interpret its behavior 
through familiar methods. 
 Once we have identified the presence of M, we can consider what the causal relation 
between its behavioral manifestations and neural states is. What are the neural causes of B? In 
order to answer this question, we must first be sure that the subject S is experiencing M. M 
has thus epistemic priority with respect to the neural, and the existence of M can be decided 
only  from the  presence  of  B.  The  mental  could  be  said  therefore  to  have  a  kind  of  double-
priority with respect to the neural. The presence of M can be judged only by studying the 
behavior of a subject, and this study is essentially something which is guided by our 
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understanding  of  how  to  make  best  sense  of  physical  phenomenon  B.  It  is  thus  the  active,  
mental contribution of the interpreter which answers the question of what B can be taken to 
mean. Pain, as a mental phenomenon, cannot be attributed to a subject who, for example, is 
faking pain. Once the presence of M is established, the question about its relation to N can be 
raised. But the question about the relation of M and N is always secondary with respect to the 
question about the relation of M and B. 
 I think von Wright’s observations have enormous importance. The fact that mental 
phenomena are epistemically prior to their neural counterparts demolishes the philosophical 
motivation for psycho-physical identity theories. In the case of ordinary psychological 
concepts, we have established the existence of the referent of the concept by relying on 
behavioral evidence that is interpreted by the active interpreter. This evidence is not only a 
symptom of the mental phenomenon. It is a criterion which must be satisfied if we are to talk 
about the presence of the phenomenon at all. The reason for this is that the mental is, at least 
on a Davidsonian–von Wrightian view, conceptually construed by placing it in a certain kind 
of context. The possible mental–neural correlations are only derivative from the fact that the 
existence of the mental phenomenon has already been established on independent grounds. 
Even if correlations between the mental and the physical were to be found, the existence of 
such correlations would not be as basic as the fact that mental phenomena have epistemic 
priority with respect to their physical counterparts. When deciding whether a mental 
phenomenon is present, the existence of psycho-physical connections would always be 
secondary when compared to the ways that we usually come to know about the existence of 
the mental. This is to emphasize the distinction between symptoms and criteria.  
 The  epistemic  priority  of  the  mental  and  the  semantic  priority  of  the  behavioral  
suggest that there is a principled reason against the possibility of strict mental–physical 
relations. Even if it made sense to speak of these kinds of relations, their existence would 
depend on the fact that the existence of the mental would have been already established on 
independent grounds. Von Wright claims that the very possibility of correlations between the 
mental and the physical requires that we can assert the presence of one without the other. He 
notes:  “[…] unless one already knows what it is to hear, one cannot make discoveries about 
the neural basis of hearing. Or one would not know that these discoveries are of relevance to 
hearing.”1104 More  precisely:  “In  order  for  us  to  correlate  the  [mental  and  physical]  
phenomena the concepts must be there and have at least so much stability that classification 
                                               
1104 Von Wright, 1998, 92. This point is stressed also by Malcolm, 1971. 
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under them is, in most cases, unproblematic.”1105 If we did not know how to identify 
phenomena falling under mental concepts, we could not establish their correlation with other 
phenomena either. This view is based on the already emphasized obvious fact that we have 
meaningful mental concepts which we use fluently. In answering the question “Is a person in 
a mental state X?”, we rely on a very different kind of criterion than what we would take to be 
relevant in answering the question “Is a person in a brain state Y?”, because mental states 
have properties which the physical states lack. By considering examples of mental concepts 
and physical concepts, we see that the identification criteria for them are essentially different.  
 Consider the case of a person who suffers from cancer. The reason why we conclude 
that she has cancer is not her subjective feeling about her situation. If she just feels that she 
has cancer, we would be suspicious no matter how strong the feeling is. She may complain 
that she has headache, nausea, and that she is tired. She acts accordingly. However, these 
symptoms do not warrant the conclusion that the person has cancer; a blood test or an X-ray 
or some kind of medical examination is required, for the behavior cannot be conclusive. But 
consider now a person who is depressed.1106 According to one understanding of what “being 
depressed” means, we would not say that a blood test or a brain scan would warrant the 
conclusion  that  the  person  is  depressed.  In  this  case,  as  in  the  case  of  pain,  the  subjective  
feeling of the person as well as his statements and behavior are relevant. It would be strange 
to say to a person who seems to be very happy and acts accordingly: “Unfortunately the 
picture of your brain tells us that you are very depressed.” 
 Is neurological evidence irrelevant when considering whether mental states are 
present? Knowledge of the subject’s neurology could certainly be relevant in deciding 
whether, for example, a subject heard a sound. It is plausible to think that the neural could 
play some part in questions about the mental. But as we have already seen, supposing that the 
neural could play a decisive evidential role requires that we have established a mental–
physical correlation, and this in turn requires that we have already established facts about the 
mental independently. These facts would have their criteria in non-neural phenomena. From 
this it follows that the neural criteria would necessarily be secondary in relation to the criteria 
which we take to be constitutive for the mental phenomenon. This means that the neural level 
could  not  function  as  a  criterion  but  only  as  evidence  or  symptoms  for  the  mental.  As  von  
Wright suggests:  
                                               
1105 Von Wright, 1998, 93. 
1106 I am here supposing that “being depressed” counts as mental phenomenon. That is, a feeling of depression is 
necessary if the subject is correctly described as being depressed. 
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If the correspondence [between the mental and the physical] is well established, the neural state in 
question may be regarded as a reliable sign or symptom of the existence of the reason. As long as the 
correlation remains a scientific hypothesis, the neural state fulfils this role of a symptom.1107  
 
There is therefore no principled reason why knowledge of the neural could not be helpful 
when deciding questions about the mental.  
 We conclude that that neurological evidence could have relevance in the questions 
about the mental. We can admit this, and yet insist that we must first know whether a person 
is in a mental state before we can investigate what physical state of her brain corresponds to 
this state. The mental level is epistemologically privileged in a fundamental sense because the 
initial observations of the presence of a mental state must be made without any knowledge of 
the  neural  facts.  From  this,  it  follows  that  the  role  which  we  allow  for  the  neurological  
evidence depends on the question of how well it fits with the already established mental facts. 
This strengthens Davidson’s claim that strict correlations between two domains depend on the 
question of how well the predicates can be related to each other. We have first established the 
connections between mental predicates to each other, and in establishing these connections 
various principles, like the principles of normativity and holism, have been applied. The 
question of how well neural predicates fit into this story is a secondary question.  
 If we once more consider the case of the scientists who study a subject through their 
computer interfaces, what should we say? What would their situation be as compared to the 
group that explains and predicts the behavior of a subject with familiar methods by studying 
his linguistic and non-linguistic behavior in a normal environment? I think we have to 
conclude that we would have no reason to believe that the group studying just the brain could 
ever be sure in their predictions and explanations. This observation applies, of course, also to 
those who study the subject in familiar ways. However, they would be in a privileged position 
in  the  following  sense:  the  scientists  could  use  the  data  from  the  computer  as  evidence for 
their views, but this would not be conclusive evidence and they would therefore be in a worse 
position than those who could study the individual in familiar ways. Familiar ways would not 
be “conclusive” either, but given what we mean by mental concepts, if the subject fulfilled the 
criteria required for the attribution of mental phenomena, there would be no firmer ground for 
attributing these phenomena to him as the ordinary way. The scientists would have to see 
what the subject does in order to check whether their explanations and predictions are correct.    
 Although the situation of the scientists consulting their computers would be hopeless 
in  the  sense  that  they  would  only  have  secondary  evidence  at  their  disposal,  we  could  still  
                                               
1107 Von Wright, 1998, 37. 
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suppose that they might have established correlations between mental and physical states. 
Indeed, they would make their predictions, and after checking them through familiar means, 
they could conclude that the established correlations held, at least with very high probability. 
Should we now say that they have formed psychophysical identities? Should we think that the 
correlations established could be used for the formulation of laws? In answering this question, 
we should consider Davidson’s somewhat cryptic remarks such as the following. 
  
The thesis is... that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements 
relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not 
lawlike (in  a  strong  sense  to  be  described).  If  by  absurdly  remote  chance  we  were  to  stumble  on  a  
nonstochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than 
roughly true.1108  
 
Or, 
 
[...] if we were to find an open sentence couched in behavioural terms and exactly coextensive with 
some mental predicate, nothing could reasonably persuade that we had found it. We know too much 
about thought and behavior to trust exact and universal statements linking them. 1109 
 
Or,   
 
As long as it is behaviour and not something else we want to explain and describe, we must warp the 
evidence… Standing ready, as we must, to adjust psychological terms to one set of standards and 
physical terms to another, we know that we cannot insist on a sharp and law-like connection between 
them….1110 
 
One  could  well  wonder  what  it  means  to  say  that  we have no reason to believe that 
psychophysical generalizations are more than roughly true, or that we know too much about 
thought and behavior to trust exact and universal statements linking them. What does it mean 
to say that in the case of the mental which manifests itself in behavior, it may be that we are 
warping the available evidence? What does it mean that the evidence has to be twisted? The 
way I read these important statements is that they are just specifications of the general view 
that we cannot allow the possibility of strict psychophysical laws. Since the argument is that 
we cannot allow the possibility of psychophysical laws, a “pragmatic” justification lies behind 
Davidson’s reasoning. I think the claims above make sense if the primacy of interpretation in 
establishing facts about the mental is taken seriously. Both von Wright and Davidson insist 
that an ascription of a mental state is always open to revision over the course of time. There is 
always a possibility for re-interpretation which is governed by constitutive principles of the 
                                               
1108 Davidson, 1970, 217, my emphasis. 
1109 Davidson, 1970, 217, my emphasis. 
1110 Davidson, 1974b, 239. 
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mental. We cannot allow the possibility that certain physical facts would conclusively warrant 
our claims about the presence of mental states. If correlations between the mental and the 
physical were established, they would be mere empirical generalizations and not even close to 
strict laws in Davidson’s sense of the term.1111  
 Both Davidson and von Wright emphasize the priority of behavior over neural 
processes in establishing the presence of mental phenomena. But, according to von Wright, to 
ascribe mental states to a creature is not to ascribe a specific behavior or sets of behavior to it. 
Why? Because:  
 
The criteria of… mental phenomena have the following peculiarity: No finite combination of them is 
(logically) sufficient to establish the presence of the phenomenon…. Moreover, no finite combination 
of behavioural criteria is (logically) necessary for  the  presence  of  the  sensation….  For  this  reason  I  
shall say that the attribution of… mental phenomenon to a being has a residue of meaning which is not 
captured by any enumeration of the behavioural reactions which are constitutive of its meaning.1112  
 
Because of the residue of meaning, it makes no sense to say that a mental phenomenon would 
be identical to a set of physical processes or behavior.1113 Both von Wright and Davidson 
have a behaviorist approach to the mental which is not reductive. The view that there is no 
necessary or sufficient physical application condition for a given mental phenomenon leads to 
the conclusion that physical properties are the wrong kind of thing for us to draw mental 
inductive inferences from. This reaffirms Davidson’s claim that mental and physical 
predicates or properties are not made for each other. It seems to me that what von Wright 
argues clarifies what Davidson means when he writes:  
 
When we use the concepts of belief, desire, and the rest, we must stand prepared, as the evidence 
accumulates, to adjust our theory in the light of considerations of overall cogency: the constitutive ideal 
of  rationality  partly  controls  each  phase  in  the  evolution  of  what  must  be  an  evolving  theory.  An  
arbitrary choice of translation scheme would preclude such opportunistic tempering of theory; put 
differently, a right arbitrary choice of translation manual would be of a manual acceptable in the light of 
all possible evidence, and this is a choice we cannot make.1114  
 
Openness of interpretation forces us to be ready to “warp the evidence” in terms of the 
principles of interpretation. Because the mental pattern of a person must obey the constitutive 
ideal  of  rationality,  there  must  be  a  possibility  for  “opportunistic  tempering”,  that  is,  a  
                                               
1111 As  Davidson  (1964,  47)  says:  ”what  we  want  as  a  law  of  correspondence  is  not  an  accidental  
correspondence, but one which, we have reason to believe, will apply to cases which we have not yet examined.” 
1112 Von Wright, 1998, 146. 
1113 The residue of meaning is what also, according to von Wright, accounts for the idea that mental states are 
“hidden” or “private”.  I showed in section 2.6 that, according to von Wright, the “location of the mental” is in 
the residue of meaning. 
1114 Davidson, 1970, 222. 
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possibility for an adjustment according to this ideal. We can suppose that we could translate 
our mental vocabulary into a physical vocabulary. This kind of translation would be an 
arbitrary choice from the perspective of the mental, because we could never be in a position 
where all the mental facts would be available. We cannot know in advance what mental facts 
are relevant for a specific interpretation. No finite combination of the criteria for a mental 
phenomenon is sufficient or necessary for the presence of the phenomenon. No set of 
behavior B or set of neural phenomena N could conclusively justify our attribution of M to a 
subject. 
 Following Davidson and von Wright, I have argued that the mental is epistemically 
prior to the neural. Many find this reasoning unsatisfying. Antony, among others, thinks that, 
contra von Wright, there must be a truth about mentality which exists independently of what 
anybody thinks about these matters. But naturalists have not given a reason why we should 
favor this kind of conception of mentality. The only justification for the view is the question-
begging claim that anything real must be mind-independent. But consider, for example, the 
phenomenon of jealousy. We observe Donald acting in a way which any reasonable person 
would take to be a “certain” sign of jealousy. When asked about the situation Donald denies 
that he is jealous. How are we to decide who is right? Suppose that we can convert Donald to 
realizing that he is jealous by pointing his attention to the obvious signs that we observed. 
Then  Donald  could  actually  admit  that,  also  to  his  own  surprise,  he  is  jealous,  or  he  could  
have a counter-argument which would force us to re-consider our initial opinion. This debate 
could continue until a consensus was reached or perhaps the case would stay unresolved 
forever. What is now, after the consensus, the truth about the situation and how has it been 
reached? Was Donald really in a state of jealousy? Or is it more reasonable to conclude that 
the state of jealousy is a shady state which may be there at one moment and be absent at 
another moment? If mental states are in this sense social objects, it is by no means clear that 
we  should  see  their  nature  in  a  similar  way  to  how  we  see  the  nature  of  objects  or  events,  
which seem to be mind-independent in a clearer sense.  
 However, there seems to be some relation between the mental and the physical, even if 
we think that the relation cannot be expressed in terms of strict laws. Here is a von Wright’s 
conclusion that many contemporary philosophers would find flawed: “What the neurological 
equivalent [of a mental state] is, is not philosophically interesting, nor even whether there is 
an equivalent. The “philosophical” question is whether there must be an equivalent”.1115 Von 
                                               
1115 Von Wright, 1998, 92. 
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Wright thinks that the interesting philosophical question about psycho-physical parallelism is 
whether it must be  true.  He  concludes  that,  in  some sense, its truth must be a contingent, 
because the knowledge we have of the mind–brain correspondence is contingent knowledge. 
As von Wright notes: “Man was familiar with mental phenomena… long before… one knew 
that there was such a thing as a nervous system.”1116 This being the case: “Is it not thinkable 
that everything in the world of the mind, including intentionality of behaviour, went on in the 
way it does even if the brain and nervous system did not even exist?”1117 We should conclude 
that that the relation between behavior and mental states is conceptually independent of 
anything that happens in the nervous system. The connection between behavior and the 
mental is essential whereas the fact that there is a nervous system linking the two is 
accidental. At least on the Davidsonian–von Wrightian account, one important task of 
philosophy of mind is to analyze the language of the mental and this language is conceptually 
autonomous  with  respect  to  anything  that  takes  place  in  the  brain.  I  think  that  von  Wright  
makes a daring claim when he argues that “[...] all philosophical problems about the body–
mind relationship, about ‘the inner and the outer’, and about consciousness can be 
satisfactorily coped [with] while ignoring the fact that human beings... have a brain and 
nervous system.”1118 This is a very challenging claim. Von Wright concludes:  
 
If my argument is correct, it has a remarkable consequence for the ‘place of the brain’ in the body–
mind problem-complex. Since the mental has epistemic priority in relation to the neural… the mental… 
cannot be ‘reduced’ to the neural… I n establishing the neural correlates we rely on the psychological 
phenomena as given to us in experience. From the psychological point of view, the very existence of a 
nervous system, ‘mediating’ between the world of the body and the world of the mind is, logically 
speaking, an accident.1119 
 
I think that the epistemic priority of the mental in relation to the neural is a crucially important 
point, which should be taken seriously in the modern philosophy of mind. It is a similar kind 
of philosophically deep conclusion as von Wright’s observation about the mutual dependence 
of mind and matter. But how could we take seriously the claim that philosophical problems 
about the mind can be coped with while ignoring the fact that human beings have brains? 
Nothing would sound more outrageous from a naturalistic point of view. Von Wright himself 
thought that his statement was a bad and clumsy expression which nevertheless expressed a 
valuable philosophical insight. I think that the most important thing to notice is von Wright’s 
                                               
1116 Von Wright, 1998, 134. 
1117 Ibid. 
1118 Von Wright, UPg, 4.. Von Wright notes that this is the road which Wittgenstein tried to take and it makes his 
philosophy so uncongenial to many. I have suggested that the same is true of von Wright and Davidson. 
1119 Von Wright, UPf, 4. 
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claim that all philosophical problems about the body–mind relationship can be clarified 
without taking into consideration the fact that humans have brains. I am not sure whether this 
is true of all philosophical problems about the body–mind relationship; perhaps the question 
of whether mind is identical with the brain is a philosophical problem.  Because of his 
specific conception of what a philosophical problem is, von Wright would deny this. I believe 
the claim makes sense if von Wright’s view about the nature of a philosophical problem is 
accepted. On the other hand, it seems to me that a philosopher like von Wright, who is 
committed to O-physicalism, must find some substantial place for the brain in the mind–body 
problem. Von Wright notes that making the claim sound plausible is itself a formidable 
philosophical task, because the suggestion goes against strong philosophical tendencies and 
temptations which are driven by trends in contemporary science. The strong philosophical 
tendency is, of course, the naturalistic approach in the philosophy of mind. Von Wright 
wanted to defy the scientific trends in the name of philosophy, although he recognized that 
this approach is: “...a daring adventure which may fail and not succeed.”1120 This remark 
shows that, as I have suggested, von Wright wants to challenge what he sees as the prevalent 
unhealthy scientific philosophy in the name of pure philosophy. When the claim is seen from 
this perspective, it invites us to consider again and again the question of what the task of a 
philosopher is in the explication of the mind–body problem.  
 After suggesting that facts about the brain can be ignored in the philosophy of mind, 
von Wright notes that someone could argue that it is a demand of “scientific intelligibility” 
that there must be  a  neural  equivalent  for  a  mental  state.  But,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  
discussion emphasizing the epistemic priority of the mental in relation to the neural shows 
precisely that this scientific claim about the existence of equivalencies should not be confused 
with the philosophical question of whether such equivalencies are necessary. Let us suppose 
that we used the mental vocabulary to describe the behavior of creatures which turned out to 
be  creatures  without  nervous  systems.  Would  we,  after  this  scientific  finding,  say  that  our  
mental vocabulary does not apply to these creatures? If the answer is affirmative, what was 
our reason to use that vocabulary in the first place? How is its successful usage explained 
before any scientific discoveries were made? How, in the past, would we have explained its 
success if we were completely ignorant about the brain? 
 Although von Wright thinks that it is hopeless to try to argue that psycho-physical 
parallelism is necessarily true, he notes that one can still postulate its  truth  and  use  it  as  a  
                                               
1120 Von Wright, UPg, 5. 
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heuristic device for encouraging brain-research. It is possible to stick to this postulate, as 
naturalists do, and try to find out what kind of connections (if any) there are between mental 
and physical states. Indeed, as von Wright notes: “[…] the details of the [brain-mind] 
correspondence can only be found by scientific, neurophysiological research.”1121 If we stick 
to the postulate the correspondence between the mental and the physical may seem to be an a 
priori feature of reality. In this respect von Wright sees the postulated correspondence as a 
“demand of reason” which we urge ourselves to employ. Likewise, Davidson does not 
exclude the possibility that we could find connections between the mental and the physical, 
and in this sense there is no reason to stop doing brain-research.1122 Nevertheless, because of 
his quite demanding understanding of what it takes for a law to be “strict”, he firmly claims 
that the mental and the physical cannot ever be paired in terms of strict laws. 
 
3.3 The irreducibility of the mental 
 
We should recall, from the beginning of this chapter, what Davidson’s claim about mental 
concepts is: “[…] they cannot be defined in the vocabularies of the natural sciences, nor are 
there empirical  laws linking them with physical phenomena in such a way as to make them 
disposable.”1123 In this section I will consider the question of what it means to say that mental 
concepts cannot be defined in the vocabulary of the natural sciences, and why this is the case. 
The claim that there are no empirical laws linking the mental and the physical was discussed 
in  section  3.1  and  therefore,  as  long  as  we  accept  Davidson’s  arguments,  the  possibility  of  
nomological reduction is already precluded. What I will consider here is the question what the 
impossibility of definitional reduction means and what are the reasons for it. 
 The thesis of the irreducibility of the mental can be approached from various 
directions, and it is closely connected to the thesis of the anomalism of the mental. On the one 
hand  there  is  the  question  of  whether  mental  concepts are irreducible to physical concepts. 
Given that, according to Davidson, the mental is only a conceptual category, this kind of 
conceptual irreducibility could be taken to be all the irreducibility there is. However, we 
should also consider in what sense the mental can be ontologically irreducible. Although 
Davidson’s  philosophy of  mind  is  meant  to  be  ontologically  reductive,  there  is  also  a  clear  
sense in which it is not. If one chooses to defend the irreducibility of the mental, one may lose 
                                               
1121 Von Wright, 1998, 134. 
1122 Although, as I showed in section 2.2, Davidson’s last word on the subject seems to be that we have no reason 
to believe that token-identities could be found.  
1123 Davidson, 1999o, 599. 
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the physical status of the mental.1124 The claim that all events or states or properties are 
physical is obscure if it turns out that we cannot identify mental events or states or properties 
with their physical counterparts at the “lower” ontological level. The problems of type–-type 
and token identities have already been discussed in chapter two. It could be said that by 
emphasizing the irreducibility of the mental we are, step by step, questioning whether the 
basic claims of physicalism make sense. It is unclear whether this was Davidson’s purpose 
since, as we have seen, he wanted to defend O-physicalism. On the other hand, arguments 
defending the irreducibility of the mental undermine the truth of physicalism. It could be 
argued, though, that the irreducibility of the mental only undermines the truth of physicalism 
as usually understood, and that it undermines the importance of traditional arguments in favor 
of physicalism. However, I think that we should consider what is left of physicalism if the 
principled irreducibility of the mental is allowed. I leave this question aside for the moment, 
consider the arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, and then suggest what follows for 
physicalism. 
 There are three reasons for the irreducibility of the mental that can be found in 
Davidson’s views. They are: 
 
1) Normativity, rationality and the subjective nature of thoughts 
2) The dispositional character of mental concepts 
3) Externalism    
 
Before turning to the arguments, something should be said about the kind of reduction that 
Davidson is opposing. The concept of “reduction” is sometimes unclear in the philosophical 
discussion, and problems occur because “reductivists” and non-reductivists” seem to be 
talking about different things.1125 This is a similar kind of problem to the one we encountered 
in  the  discussion  about  the  anomalism  of  the  mental.  Philosophers  talk  past  each  other  
because they have different views of how strict the psycho-physical laws should be, or of 
what kind of identities a philosopher should establish. It is not always clear what a 
philosopher is claiming when he is arguing for reduction; likewise when a philosopher is 
arguing against it.  
 
                                               
1124 As has been stressed, among others, by Kim, 1989, 1998. 
1125 For a general discussion  about reduction see, for example, Beckermann, Flohr, Kim (eds.), 1992 and Hohwy 
and Kallerstrup (eds.), 2008. 
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3.3.1 What does a reduction of the mental to the physical mean? 
 
If we go through the philosophical literature on reduction for the last twenty years, it becomes 
obvious that it is not clear what it means to say that mind could be reduced to matter – or that 
this cannot be done. Most philosophers do not believe in substance dualism, and therefore for 
many the appeal of the old mind–body problem has disappeared. New questions around the 
old mind–body problem are appearing, however. Most modern philosophers think that mind is 
a “physical device”– the brain – and many of the disputes concern the question of what this 
statement means. We may be quite convinced that the mind is indeed a “physical thing”, but 
the question is what puts us in a position to say this. What are the reasons to argue that the 
mind is a physical thing? What are the reasons to argue that it is not, and what could it mean 
to say that the mind is something non-physical? I think that despite the consensus around O-
physicalism, these are pressing questions. 
 With respect to these problems, a lot depends on the question of whether mind can 
be actually reduced to matter. This question may turn out to be crucial also in deciding 
whether one can be a physicalist with a good conscience. The question of reducibility is often 
described in a way which leaves only two options for a physicalist: emergence or reduction. If 
there is no explanation for how mental states reduce to physical states, it has to be accepted 
that mental states are in some sense emergent, which in turn implies that their physical status 
is, at the very least, obscure. If mental phenomena turn out to be emergent phenomena, then 
the status of physicalism is in jeopardy. Crane, for example, has claimed that whether an 
interesting version of non-reductive physicalism is possible depends on whether conceptual 
reduction is possible. He thinks, contrary to Davidson, that this is an empirical question, but 
concludes that since the question is still open, the question about the truth of physicalism is 
open as well.1126 I have emphasized that as long as the mental remains irreducible, we have no 
reason to believe that physicalism is true. If, contra Crane, we accept the Davidsonian view 
that the possibility of conceptual reduction is not an empirical question, then the Davidsonian 
irreducibility, if correct, would seem to show that physicalism cannot be true. 
 Let us suppose that we want to show that mental states reduce to physical states. 
How could this be done? What would assure us that we have succeeded? A fairly standard 
view is that a science or its vocabulary might reduce to another through: a) ontological 
reduction, b) nomological reduction, or c) semantic reduction. All these types of reduction are 
                                               
1126 Crane, 2008. 
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somewhat  vague  and  overlap  each  other.  It  is  not  always  clear  what  a  reductionist  wants.  I  
shall nevertheless try to describe what a reductionist attempts to accomplish and consider 
whether this is something prevented by Davidson’s argument. The purpose of this 
consideration is to place Davidson’s views in a contemporary perspective and to see whether 
his arguments have any relevance any longer to those who defend the autonomy of the 
mental.  One  of  Davidson’s  insights  was  that  –  allegedly  –  one  can  be  a  naturalist  without  
being a reductive physicalist. Non-reductive physicalism in general, and Davidson’s version 
in particular, endorses ontological reduction but stands against nomological or definitional 
reduction. Davidson notes that the concept of reduction, which he accepts, and actually 
defends, is ontological reduction and that it is “trivially obvious” that this weak understanding 
of reduction does not entail definitional or nomological reduction. Davidson complains that 
philosophers often reason from ontological to a stronger form of reduction or simply conflate 
these two. Whereas Davidson strongly endorses ontological reduction, he just as strongly 
argues against the possibility of nomological and semantic reduction. Indeed, as it is by now 
familiar, Davidson tries to establish the truth of a physicalistic monism from the fact that any 
semantic and nomological reduction between the mental and the physical must fail.  
 Weak  ontological  reduction  is  not  what  a  reductionist  really  wants.  He  thinks  that  
ontological reduction can be achieved only through semantic or nomological reduction. A 
contemporary reductionist cannot be satisfied with ontological reduction if it is achieved 
through a conceptual a priori argument. A weak ontological reduction either demands other 
forms of reduction or entails them. It seems to me that two reductionist lines of thought can 
be detected. On the one hand, ontological physicalism is the goal and its truth can be fully 
established only if it can be shown how higher level phenomena reduce to those at the lower 
levels. From this perspective, non-reductive physicalism promises too much when it claims 
that physicalism and non-reductivism make a coherent combination. On the other hand, the 
truth of ontological physicalism can be treated as an assumption, and then the argument is 
that, since everything is physical, a reduction of higher level phenomena must be possible, at 
least in principle. No matter which of these options is chosen, reductions turn out to be vitally 
important for a reductive naturalist.  
 Semantic reduction is one way in which the argument for physicalism has been 
formulated.  In  the  first  half  of  the  20th  century,  the  suggestion  that  any  sentence  S  of  any  
science could be translated into a sentence of a physical language was attractive to many 
philosophers. Logical behaviorism claimed that statements made in our mental vocabulary 
can be analyzed into statements in the vocabulary of physical behavior, was a special case of 
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this general view. Davidson does not spend too much time in his rejection of semantic 
reductionism. In “Mental Events” he briefly notes: “Why are we willing... to abandon the 
attempt to give explicit definitions of mental concepts in terms of behavioural ones?... [it is] 
because we are persuaded, as we are in the case of so many other forms of definitional 
reductionism... that there is system in the failures.”1127 He then emphasizes that when giving 
non-mental conditions for mental events we always find the need for an additional condition 
that is mental in character. In another context, Davidson refers to Frege’s argument that 
intensional sentences seem to resist analysis in terms of extensional sentences, which, given 
Davidson’s views about the mental, means that mental concepts cannot be given non-mental 
definitions. On the whole, Davidson concludes that there is “overwhelming evidence” against 
the view that mental concepts could be defined in terms of physical concepts. This being the 
case, in his philosophy of mind Davidson does not present an explicit argument against 
semantic reductionism. 
 Let us accept Davidson’s view that semantic reductionism does not look promising 
and turn to the question of whether a nomological reduction of the mental to the physical is 
possible. We have already seen why Davidson thinks that this kind of reduction is also 
impossible. There is nevertheless a question as to whether Davidson’s argument really blocks 
the possibility of nomological connections between the mental and the physical, and even if it 
does, whether there is some other sense of nomological reduction which his arguments do not 
touch. Successful reductions in science occur between theories. In the case of mental–
physical reductions, we should not therefore straightforwardly ask whether mental states can 
be reduced to physical states but whether a theory, or vocabulary, which refers to these states, 
reduces to a theory which does not refer to them.  
 The conception of reduction that long dominated the discussion about the possibility 
of mind–body reduction was the model suggested by Ernest Nagel.1128 Reduction of a theory 
Tr to T is achieved when Tr is deducible from T. In many cases the deduction of Tr from T is 
possible only if bridge-laws that connect the expressions between theories are formulated. 
Bridge-laws are meant to be empirical laws stating biconditionals; thus in the supposed case 
of mental to physical reduction, there could exist a bridge-law of the form “for any object x, x 
is in M iff x is in P” where M refers to a mental property and P refers to a physical property. 
Given this view about reduction, the consequences for the mind–brain identity theory are 
straightforward. Mental phenomena are identical with physical states iff psychology is 
                                               
1127 Davidson, 1970, 217. 
1128 Nagel, 1961. 
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reducible to, say, cognitive neurobiology. Mental phenomena are identical with physical 
states,  if  there  exist  bridge  laws  that  connect  each  mental  predicate  with  a  suitable  
neurobiological predicate in a way that the laws of psychology can be deduced from 
neurobiology with the aid of these bridge-laws. This view about reduction suggests that the 
existence of psycho-physical bridge-laws is necessary for any identity theory to be true. As 
we have seen, Davidson denies the possibility of these kinds of mental–physical bridge-laws, 
and therefore denies the possibility that mental states could be Nagel-reducible to physical 
states.  
 In the case of Nagel-reduction as applied to possible mental–physical reduction, the 
interesting question is whether bridge-laws provide identities. A fairly standard interpretation 
is that in Nagel’s model, bridge-laws are indeed meant to provide identities between two 
predicates or properties.1129 But what kind of identities are the consequent identities? If a 
bridge law connects M and P, is it the case that anything that is true of M is true of P, and that 
anything that can be explained by M can be explained b P? Nagel was not sure whether the 
nature of bridge-laws should be seen as being “conventional” or “factual”. The question about 
the nature of bridge-laws is interesting, because if the relation is meant to be factual, then the 
question of whether there can be psycho-physical bridge laws seems to depend, partly, on 
whether sufficiently fine-grained correlations between mental and physical states can be 
found. This is an empirical question, and the question about the possibility of bridge laws was 
usually treated as such when philosophers first started to defend type–type identity theory.1130 
 Nagel-type reductionism, which is essentially the type of reduction that Davidson’s 
arguments for the anomalism of the mental are meant to refute, fell quickly into disgrace. The 
main philosophical reasons why this kind of classical model of reduction was something that 
could not secure a mind–body identity theory were: a) the obscure status of bridge-laws, b) 
functionalism, and c) anomalous monism. Whereas it was first thought that type-identity 
theories could benefit a lot from a general view of how reduction in science proceeds, the 
philosophical discussions concerning the above-mentioned topics soon started to create 
doubts against this optimism. Another reason, which was then used to formulate different 
strategies of reduction, was the realization, based partly on historical evidence, that reductions 
in science do not usually happen in the way described by Nagel.1131 It  was noted that in the 
                                               
1129 For a discussion see Schaffner, 1967, Sklar, 1967 and more recently Churchland, 1989 and Kim, 1998.  
1130 A classical example is Smart, 1959, 1963. 
1131 See for example, Schaffner, 1967 and Hooker, 1981. The general work of Kuhn and Feyerabend was also 
relevant for this realization. On the view put forward by Hooker a new way to think about reduction was formed 
which is continued, for example, by the Churchlands and Bickle.   
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case of two theories Tr and  T,  it  is  not  usually  the  case  that  the  original  Tr can be deduced 
from T without any modification of the original theory. This being the case, it is not actually 
Tr that is being deduced from T, but a corrected version of it. Moreover, this being the case, it 
is unclear that bridge-laws would be necessary for a successful reduction.  
 Let us suppose that theory Tr is in some important respects a false theory and that 
certain  entities  or  properties  of  the  theory  do  not  exist.  Then  there  is  no  reason  to  try  to  
correlate these entities with anything in the reducing theory. Since reductions usually involve 
revision  and  modification,  and  that  is  one  of  their  goals,  we  should  conclude,  according  to  
Patricia Churchland, that “whenever the corrections to the old theory are anything more than 
relatively minor, it is always tendentious to claim that phenomena in the old theory are to be 
identified with phenomena in the reducing theory.”1132 In cases where the modifications to the 
old theory are notable, bridge-laws play no role. Paul Churchland claims that cross-theoretical 
identity claims are not part of a proper reduction and that they are not essential to the function 
that a reduction performs. In the cases where the reduction is not “smooth”, bridge-laws, or 
correspondence rules, as Paul Churchland calls them, can be treated as mere ordered pairs of 
expressions. The important point is this: reduction is possible, and often proceeds without 
strong bridge laws that should be treated as identity claims. This being the case, there is an 
increasing tendency to argue that bridge-laws are not necessary for reduction. After discussing 
certain problems relating to the nature of bridge-laws and concluding that reductions based on 
universal biconditionals are extremely rare or non-existent in the sciences, Kim concludes: 
“...the question whether or not mentality is Nagel-reducible via bridge laws to the physical 
cannot  be  a  significant  metaphysical  issue.  Nor  can  a  refutation  of  reductionism  that  is  
premised on Nagelian reduction be considered a significant philosophical contribution.”1133 
According to Kim, Davidson’s argument refuting reductionism based on bridge-laws would 
thus not count as a significant philosophical contribution.  
 It appears that definitional reduction of logical behaviorism does not seem to be a 
promising option for a reductionist. Nomological reduction, understood in the Nagelian way, 
is not a viable option either because, in addition to the philosophical arguments against it, 
philosophers  have  concluded  that  there  are  cases  of  successful  reductions  which  do  not  
necessarily involve bridge-laws in the Nagelian sense. Since reductions can take place without 
bridge-laws, a reductionist wants to find out whether mental reality is also reducible to the 
physical through these kinds of reductions. Davidson claimed that his physicalistic view does 
                                               
1132 Churchland, 1986, 282. 
1133 Kim, 1998, 97. 
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not entail reducibility through law or definition. We have seen that reducibility through 
definition is implausible, although Davidson also admits that there is no proof against this 
possibility, only “overwhelming evidence.” We have also seen that reducibility through law 
does not seem plausible because reductions take place without the kinds of laws that 
Davidson has in mind. Although Davidson does not explicitly mention Nagelian reduction as 
his target, it is quite obvious that this is indeed the form of reduction that he takes himself to 
be refuting1134. The purpose of the anomalism of the mental is to rule out reduction by way of 
strict bridging laws, laws which connect mental properties with physical properties, as 
Davidson notes. What is interesting and above else challenging to a Davidsonian position is 
the  possibility  of  reduction  of  theory  Tr to T without bridge-laws. As we have seen, this 
possibility is discussed and found wanting, for example, by the Churchlands and many other 
contemporary philosophers.  
 
3.3.1.1 New wave reductionism: A challenge for Davidson’s position 
  
The possibility of reduction without bridge-laws is raised as a challenge for Davidson 
explicitly by neurophilosopher John Bickle, who has become known for his model of “new 
wave” reductionism1135. Bickle’s purpose is to keep identity theory “well and alive”, and he 
claims to be a “full-blooded physicalist”. These commitments require that Bickle defuse the 
Davidsonian  challenge  to  identity  theory.  Without  going  into  the  details  of  Bickle’s  theory,  
we should note that, according to him: “Davidson’s challenge, based upon the impossibility of 
psychophysical (bridge) laws, is entirely without force”1136 since on the new wave model, the 
connecting principles between two vocabularies or theories are not required to effect the 
derivation  of  Tr from T. Bickle notes: “There are no disparate vocabularies to connect 
between premises... and conclusion.”1137 This is a problem for Davidson’s argument because 
it is based on the disparate commitments of the mental and physical vocabularies. Bickle 
concludes: “If the deductive part of reduction has no gap to bridge between the language or 
the ontology of premise and conclusion, then the nonexistence of lawlike connections 
between reduced and reducing concepts or kinds is of no consequence.”1138  
                                               
1134 For this interpretation see for example Mclaughlin, 1985 and Kim, 2003. 
1135 Bickle, 1998, 2003. 
1136 Bickle, 1998, 108. See also Bickle, 1992. 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 Ibid. 
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 Bickle claims that a Davidsonian argument against the possibility of psychophysical 
bridge-laws  is  no  challenge  to  a  conception  of  reduction  which  differs  in  essential  respects  
from the Nagel-type reduction. Bickle thinks it is clear that Davidson offered his view as an 
alternative to a reductionism based on the Nagelian account of inter-theoretic reduction, and 
against this kind of reduction it is indeed a plausible challenge. However, if we recall Kim’s 
opinion that any “refutation of reductionism that is premised on Nagelian reduction [cannot] 
be considered a significant philosophical contribution”,1139 it seems that we should conclude 
that Davidson’s argument against nomological reduction, even if successful, is not a 
significant contribution to the discussion about the possibility of mental–physical reduction. 
The situation seems to be this: Davidson is seen as an important figure behind non-reductive 
physicalism. Yet, he did not contribute to the refutation of semantic reductionism; its failure 
was already established. The Nagel-type reduction which Davidson challenges is of no 
interest to a reductionist in the philosophy of mind, since reductions do not usually occur in 
this way. According to Bickle, new-wave reductionism, the “most plausible” modern view of 
reduction, remains unchallenged by Davidson. So, we can ask whether Davidson’s views have 
any relevance for the contemporary discussion. Crane has commented that this is unlikely: 
“Davidson’s target is a very specific conception of what a conceptual reduction amounts to – 
essentially, reduction by bridge-principles… it is hard to see how the argument can be re-
formulated to apply to the most plausible forms of conceptual reduction.”1140 Unfortunately 
Crane does not tell us what he takes to be plausible forms of conceptual reduction. Whatever 
they  are,  I  believe  it  is  correct  to  say  that  the  original  argument  for  the anomalism of the 
mental cannot  be  re-formulated  so  that  it  would  apply  against  all  forms  of  conceptual  
reduction. But this does not mean that the arguments for the irreducibility of the mental could 
not be effective against other “plausible forms” of conceptual reduction. Crane seems not to 
fully recognize this, because he equates the view that there cannot be any conceptual 
reduction of psychology to physics wholly with the view that there cannot be psychophysical 
laws, that is, with Davidson’s argument for the anomalism of the mental. 
 I think we should agree with much of what Bickle says, namely that Davidson meant 
his argument against the classical form of reduction and that there is a plausible reading 
according to which the possibility of bridge-laws, and therefore of Nagel-type reduction, is 
compromised given Davidson’s arguments. If the possibility of bridge laws is blocked 
because of Davidson’s arguments, then I take this, contra Kim, to be a relevant contribution, 
                                               
1139 Kim, 1998, 97. 
1140 Crane, 2000, 80. 
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at least when seen in the intellectual atmosphere of the time when the argument was originally 
presented.1141 It was, after all, AM and functionalism which were largely responsible for the 
fall of the type-identity theory. Given that the classical model of reduction was the most 
accepted option at the time of “Mental Events” and Davidson challenged it, it  cannot  be  a  
straightforward criticism of Davidson’s view that it does not challenge or refute other models 
of reduction which have been developed later. In chapter two, I wanted to place AM in the 
historical  context  of  its  times.  One  reason  for  this  was  to  consider  how  AM  was  relevant,  
given the intellectual convictions and agendas of the 1960s. One can only guess what counts 
as a “significant philosophical contribution” in Kim’s opinion; I think that the claim that a 
refutation of a reduction based on a Nagel-type reduction does not count as a significant 
contribution is made with the benefit of a hindsight. 
 Davidson’s argument can be seen as effective against classical forms of reduction. 
Does it also challenge the “new wave” approach? I think it is questionable whether the “new 
wave” approach is a feasible model of reduction. It is questionable whether Bickle’s model 
can actually avoid cross-theoretic identities. Endicott, for example, has argued that it can’t.1142 
The essential point in the new way of thinking about reduction is to see reductions as forming 
a continuum from theories that have been largely retained to theories which have been largely 
displaced. Between these extreme ends are vague cases where an old theory has been 
modified to varying degrees. Let us suppose that a psycho-neural reduction in fact falls at the 
retentive end  of  the  continuum.  Then,  as  Endicott  notes:  “[...]  cross-theoretic  property  
identities exist between reduced and reducing theories.”1143 This being the case, 
“biconditional bridge laws exist between reduced and reducing theories”1144 Endicott 
concludes: “If a case falls at the retentive end of the new-wave continuum, then biconditional 
bridge laws exist between reduced and reducing theories.”1145 On the other hand, if it is not 
the case that biconditional bridge laws exist between, say, psychological and physical 
theories, then it seems that psychological theories do not fall at the retentive end of the new-
wave continuum. This being the case, we encounter the following pressing question. If mental 
                                               
1141 As mentioned already, Bickle (1992) recognizes Davidson’s importance to the question concerning the 
possibility of bridge-laws. Also Kim (1989) acknowledges Davidson’s contribution, although he denies the 
importance of his refutation of Nagel-type reductionism.  
1142 Endicott, 1998. 
1143 Endicott, 1998, 67. Consider Paul Churchland’s claim (1979, 83): “A successful reduction of the ideal sort 
described provides an excellent reason for asserting the relevant cross-theoretical identities, the best reason one 
can have”. Patricia Churchland argues (1986, 283): “If a reduction is smooth... then the matching of cohort 
denoting properties can proceed and identities can be claimed.”  
1144 Ibid. 
1145 Ibid. 
399 
 
states, or the science studying them, or the vocabulary which refers to them do not reduce to 
physical states or to physical science, then what should our conclusion be? If definitional and 
nomological reductions fail, why conclude that the irreducible entities or concepts are second-
grade? Answers to these questions are bound to be connected to a given philosopher’s 
intuitions about the nature of such hopelessly broad matters as explanation, science, ontology, 
or the purpose of philosophy.  
 It  is  an  open  question  whether  Bickle  or  someone  else  can  come up  with  a  view of  
inter-theoretic reduction that can completely avoid inter-theoretic identities. But what is 
important is the following. As I noted, one way to defend Davidson’s argument against the 
possibility of mental–physical reduction is to claim that it was meant to discredit a Nagelian 
model of reduction and could not anticipate future models. This defense of Davidson could be 
continued by insisting that his view cannot be applied to forms of reduction which reject the 
view that reduction requires bridge-laws. Looking from the perspective of the 1960s and 
1970s, Davidson could not anticipate what kinds of models of inter-theoretic reduction would 
be  forthcoming,  but  I  would  claim that  it was not his purpose to try to defuse views which 
reject the requirement of bridge-laws. However, this defense, although possibly correct and 
true to Davidson’s intentions, would be unsatisfactory in crucial ways. One defect of the 
defense is that Davidson’s argument is meant to be a philosophical argument. His arguments 
for the irreducibility of the mental are meant to be such that they cannot be refuted by any 
empirical evidence.  This  is  obviously  a  very  bold  strategy  and  the  aim  is  ambitious.  If  
Davidson intends his claims about irreducibility to be irrefutable by any kind of reductive 
account, it is clear that he needs something more than the claim that there are no psycho-
physical bridge laws. His argument must apply also to modern models of reduction.  
 The problem involving reduction still troubling us is that it is not entirely clear what a 
successful reduction would achieve, how it should be done, and why a reduction would be 
desirable in the first place. Among reductionists there seems to be a widespread unity of 
opinion as to why reduction is a good thing. The main reason is that it gives both explanatory 
unification and ontological simplification. The latter may be achieved either through 
reduction and identification or elimination. Interestingly, Davidson would have no reason to 
praise reduction because of these benefits. The main theme in his philosophy of mind is that 
in understanding others we are forced to embrace conceptual dualism, and therefore the 
possibility of explanatory unification is blocked. As far as ontology is concerned, Davidson 
tries to show the truth of monism without reduction. To this view, an additional argument for 
monism which is based on the possibility of de facto reduction does not add anything, because 
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Davidson thinks he has already established the truth of monism on a priori philosophical 
grounds. One could conclude that Davidson does not see ontological reduction as a desirable 
thing, but this conclusion would also be incorrect. The correct way to see the situation, rather, 
is that ontology and reduction can be dissociated, and realizing this helps us to reduce the 
philosophical importance of each.1146 This view is at odds with positions like Bickle’s and the 
Churchlands’, who see ontology following reductions. As Bickle claims: “theory reduction 
first, ontological consequences second and dependent upon it....”1147 His view is 
straightforward:  
 
[…] ’new’ reductionists defend the view that the ontological status of beliefs, desires and the like is 
wholly dependent upon the nature of the reduction relationship obtaining (or failing to obtain) between 
intentional psychology and some future scientific successor.1148 
 
This kind of bold view is shared by most reductive naturalists and eliminativists. That 
questions of ontology must depend on the possibility of vocabulary reduction is a view which 
can be seen as a premise in many of the contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mind, 
and it is a view from which Davidson’s, not to mention von Wright’s or Wittgenstein’s 
approaches differ in crucial respects. But how could one argue that the view of von Wright 
and Davidson is correct? I think that on this issue there cannot be a convincing argument for 
either kind of position. The only thing we can claim is that in philosophy we should take 
seriously those things which actually have an essential role in our lives. To suggest that the 
ontological status of beliefs is wholly dependent on the question of how well these 
phenomena match with a future scientific theory is to blatantly ignore facts which are 
essential to our lives. 
 There are thus very different intuitions about the question of how the connection 
between reduction and ontology should be seen. In addition to this problematic question, there 
is an additional question, namely: how should reduction be actually pursued? There are 
different views about the nature of inter-theoretic reductions, but what is striking is that a 
clear suggestion about how any reduction could be achieved in the case of the mental and the 
physical is lacking. For a programmatic proposal of such an account, one can consider the 
works of Bickle,1149 Paul Churchland,1150 or Patricia Churchland.1151 We could be interested 
                                               
1146 This is Ramberg’s (1999) insightful interpretation of Davidson’s general intention. 
1147 Bickle, 1998, 29. 
1148 Bickle, 1992, 217, my emphasis. 
1149 Bickle, 1998, 2003. 
1150 Churchland, 1995. 
1151 Churchland, 1986. 
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in the details of these proposals, but we could also take Paul Churchland’s word when he 
asks: “Can we reconstruct all known mental phenomena in neurodynamical terms?”  and  
answers: “Not at the moment, we can’t. Not by a long shot.”1152 In a work which attempts to 
defend the irreducibility of the mental, it suffices to note that it is absolutely clear that 
currently the best suggestions do not come even close to establishing mental–physical 
identities. No matter how the successful reduction is actually carried through, it should be 
such (according to Paul Churchland) that it reconstructs, in neurodynamical terms, all of the 
mental phenomena antecedently known to us, and it should teach us some things about the 
nature and behavior of mental phenomena that we did not already know.  
 In considering whether Davidson’s arguments can challenge a version of new-wave 
reductionism, let us briefly evaluate Bickle’s model of reduction, which is described in his 
Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. This is a good proposal to 
consider, because Bickle is a philosopher who also has an interesting scientific agenda. Such a 
position captures well the confusion concerning the nature of philosophy and its relation to 
science, a confusion which in my opinion is an extremely relevant issue for modern 
philosophy of mind and its future. Bickle is one of the most devoted of contemporary 
reductionists. In 1998 he suggested a model of new-wave reductionism which was meant to 
be an improvement to the Hooker-Churchland model of reduction. In 2003, Bickle described 
yet another development in his theory, the key term now being new-wave metascience, on 
which the reductive model is based. The main point of this approach is that we should listen 
only to scientists when evaluating the results and significance of our work. New-wave 
metascience: “eschews all traditional concern with ontology and ‘metaphysics’…”1153 and its 
“job is simply to illuminate concepts like reduction as these imbue actual scientific 
practice.”1154 This  raises  the  question  of  whether  Bickle  is  on  the  same  page  with  other  
philosophers. He is not. As reasonable as the approach of new-wave metascience may sound, 
it is absolutely clear that the guiding intuition behind it differs radically from a view that does 
not see philosophy and science as continuous, but rather as distinct enterprises. Bickle’s 
position is straightforward:  
 
                                               
1152 Churchland, 1995, 211.  
1153 Bickle, 2003, 31. 
1154Bickle, 2003, 32. What does the expression “illuminate concepts” mean here? Given how empirically-
orientated Bickle’s attitude is, surely he is not doing conceptual analysis! 
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New wave metascience doesn’t treat traditional ontological questions as ‘cognitively meaningless’, just 
pointless to pursue as serious intellectual work because they amount to nothing more than 
disagreements over bare intuitions, with no agreed-upon evidence for resolving them.1155 
 
But counts as “serious intellectual work”? In philosophy one rarely offers evidence but instead 
arguments to defend one’s views. It is obvious that many traditional ontological questions can 
be dismissed if Bickle’s reasoning is followed, but why should philosophers agree with the 
ideology of new wave metascience? Von Wright, for example, thinks that the task of a 
philosopher is to clarify conceptual intuitions and evaluate critically the intellectual currents 
of  her  times.  It  is  precisely  our  intuitions, so despised by Bickle, that provide our starting 
point and to which we must refer in the end. Shouldn’t a philosopher discuss  problems the  
possible solutions for which are not based on agreed-upon evidence? Not according to Bickle: 
 
Scientific philosophy as it will be practiced in this book… is heir to a brilliant tradition spanning most 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, until the end of the latter, when ‘speculative metaphysics’ infected even 
philosophy of science and philosophy of particular sciences with ‘external’, ‘pragmatically fruitless’ 
debates that turn on nothing more than clashing intuitions.1156 
 
Bickle praises scientific philosophy and his proposal is meant for scientifically-inspired 
philosophers. The meanings of these definitions are not explicated. Bickle nevertheless claims 
that scientifically oriented philosophers should dismiss certain questions because they are 
“meaningless”. This view, as Bickle acknowledges, is heavily influenced by Carnap and his 
distinction between external and internal questions. I believe we should notice how strongly 
Bickle’s background intuitions guide his reasoning and philosophical work. Here the conflict 
between science and philosophy, emphasized in chapter one, is clearly visible. We are told 
that philosophers should trust neuroscientists, who understand neuroscience much better than 
philosophers, in order to evaluate what their work has accounted for. But if we take this line, 
precisely  who  should  we  trust?  Bickle  is  ready  to  reduce  “minds  to  molecules”  but,  just  to  
take one example, Benjamin Libet, a very scientifically oriented thinker and an acknowledged 
pioneer in the study of consciousness claims that:  
  
As a neuroscientist investigating these issues for more than thirty years, I can say that… subjective 
phenomena are not predictable by knowledge of neuronal function…. conscious mental phenomena are 
not reducible or to explicable by knowledge of nerve cell activities. You could look into the brain and 
see nerve cell interconnections and neural messages popping about in immense profusion. But you 
would not observe any conscious mental subjective phenomena.1157  
 
                                               
1155 Bickle, 2003, 35. 
1156 Bickle, 2003, 39. 
1157 Libet, 2004, 5. We should recall that Sir John Eccles, the Nobel Prize winning neuroscientist, was a dualist!  
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This is what also von Wright claims. I believe we can safely expect that for each scientist 
agreeing with Bickle, we can find a scientist who disagrees with him. Partly due to 
sociological reasons, there is no consensus among “scientifically minded” philosophers about 
the problems of mind. Who are we to trust according to the new wave metascience? One 
could answer that the results of experiments speak for themselves, but isn’t the interpretation 
of experiments strongly guided by “intuitions”, which Bickle so gladly ridicules? This, the 
clashing of intuitions based on a set of different convictions and different intellectual agendas, 
is precisely what the debate between Bennett, Hacker, Dennett and Searle is partly about. 
How the results of neuroscientific research should be interpreted is a question to which 
philosophers can and should make a contribution. 
 In Bickle’s case it has to be questioned whether there is even a possibility for a 
philosopher to evaluate the correctness of Bickle’s account. The prospects are not good given 
that Bickle warns: “If the scope of my concern is too narrow for your philosophical 
sentiments, so be it. Scientists don’t give a hoot for philosophers’ Very Strong Modal 
Intuitions about kind identity across possible worlds, and their enterprises are doing just 
fine.”1158 He continues by noting: “It might be fashionable in post-Kripke philosophy to insist 
that all identity claims hold necessarily, but fortunately scientists don’t bother reading Kripke 
and keep right on making and testing identity claims that purport to hold in the real world.1159 
I think we should find these views quite incredible. They are narrow-minded and show that, as 
suggested in the first chapter, certain naturalists simply do not care anymore about 
philosophical arguments and do not think that they could have any relevance for the 
contemporary mind–body problem. It seems to me, as this specific view of Bickle shows, that 
Bennett and Hacker are precisely right in their criticism that scientific philosophy is seriously 
threatened by the possibility of conceptual confusion. They claim that views of 
neuroscientists are filled with confusion and incoherence.  
 It would be quite naïve to think that current science would be immune to such 
problems. It is symptomatic that some reductionists simply ignore the criticisms of 
philosophers that arise from a consideration of conceptual aspects. By dismissing the 
relevance of philosophical arguments, Bickle seems to think that new-wave metascience 
simply is free of conceptual problems. Dogmatically, it is only scientists who are allowed to 
evaluate the relevance and correctness of scientific arguments. As far as I can see, this attitude 
is  a  perfect  example  of  the  scientistic  attitude  of  our  times,  and  it  seriously  belittles  the  
                                               
1158 Bickle, 2003, 134. 
1159 Ibid. 
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importance of philosophy as a human activity. This attitude was something of which 
Wittgenstein in his times warned about, and of which philosophers like Bennett, Hacker and 
von Wright have reminded us recently. Bickle’s attitude testifies to the fact that these 
warnings and reminders have not been empty. Given Bickle’s view, it should perhaps be 
worthwhile to consider whether he should be taken seriously at all from the perspective of 
philosophy. If he “does not give a hoot” about the philosophical arguments that could be 
raised against his position, why bother presenting them at all?  
 Leaving the ideological aspects of new wave metascience aside for a moment, it 
should be asked how plausible its reductive project seems to be. The purpose is to reduce 
“minds to molecules”. It seems to me that for this to happen, it is required that psycho-neural 
reductionists actually provide psycho-neural reductions. The purpose of new wave 
metascience is to avoid all reference to psychological entities and achieve the explanatory 
scope of current psychology by their “simpler” means. The goal is to have a purely physical 
account of behavioral causes.1160 New wave psycho-neural reductionism is defined as “the 
prediction that as mature theories develop in psychology (TRs) and neuroscience (TBs), 
images (IBs) of the former will be constructible within the models of the latter.”1161 This 
suggestion tells us something about the expected relation between the mental and the 
physical, but what it tells is not much. Here we have basically a suggestion that an unspecified 
super theory of the future will be such that an unspecified psychological theory can be 
constructible in it. But why believe that such a neuroscientific super theory is possible? 
Bickle’s answer is that if we consider the data so far we can see, especially if we keep our 
philosophical arguments to ourselves, that reductions are already being done and there are 
more to come. This of course is not an argument for a super theory, but at best a reason to 
have faith in the possibility of such a theory. It is a dogmatic belief in scientific progress and 
not an argument. 
 In his book Bickle describes the reductions that neuroscientists have already achieved. 
The main case which he presents is the description of how memory consolidation in rats has 
been reduced to the molecular mechanisms of long-term potentiation (LPT).1162 I  am  not  
going to discuss the details of this because, needless to say, my knowledge and understanding 
                                               
1160 I assume that Bickle is not very interested in the conceptual distinctions between reasons and causes, 
behavior and actions. I base this assumption on his views concerning the irrelevance of philosophical analysis. 
1161 Bickle, 2003, 28. 
1162 Another example: According to Bickle a successful reduction of actual psychology to neurobiology is a 
description of the cellular mechanisms of short-term and long-term learning as revealed by studies of the sea 
slug, Aplysia Californica. We will consider the relevance of this reduction below. For other examples of 
suggestions of successful reductions see Bickle, 2008. 
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of molecular neuroscience is not sophisticated enough and the details can be found in Bickle’s 
book. I admit that I am not the kind of “scientifically-inspired” philosopher for whom 
Bickle’s book is meant. But neither are von Wright or Davidson. I believe we can recognize 
the general problems of new-wave reductionism without taking any stance on the 
neuroscientific details provided by the position. We have no reason to doubt that these details 
might not be correct.1163 It  could  be  complained  that  here  we  have  a  typical  example  of  a  
philosopher not understanding and not bothering to study the results of neuroscience, thereby 
missing the important reductive results. This claim is unjustified because, while ignoring the 
details, we can grant what Bickle says and, as we will see, still raise criticisms about his 
conclusions. 
 Let us grant what Bickle says, namely that there is no currently active psychology of 
memory consolidation, and that this is because the link between memory consolidation and 
molecular mechanisms of LPT has been found. I would like to propose four problems which 
are in need of solution if new wave psycho-neural reductionism is to be a relevant 
contribution to the question of whether our mental vocabulary is autonomous and irreducible. 
On the one hand, these problems query whether new wave reductionism is a breakthrough 
when it comes to the question of mental–physical reducibility. On the other hand, they show 
how Davidson’s arguments in favor of irreducibility are, pace Bickle, also still relevant with 
respect to a recent reductive account. The only way to find them to be irrelevant is to ignore 
them, as Bickle indeed does.1164  
 Whereas Davidson’s arguments are considered in Bickle’s earlier writings, new-wave 
metascience is a position which does not need to care for these kinds of arguments or for any 
philosophical arguments whatsoever. But as a challenge for the new-wave model, certain 
questions can be raised: 1) What do the results of the molecular mechanism of LPT in rats or 
the cellular mechanisms of the sea slug tell about the prospects of reducing the totality of 
human psychology to neuroscience? 2) Would an “ontological reduction” of mental 
phenomena show that our mental vocabulary is dispensable? 3) Are there reasons to draw 
eliminativist conclusions from the claims of new-wave reductionism? 4) Does Bickle’s model 
show that Davidson’s thesis about the anomalism of the mental is false? Let us consider these 
                                               
1163 Although I have to note that in a personal discussion, Joe Levine, who in his Purple Haze has famously 
argued that the problem consciousness may not receive a physicalistic answer, claimed that nothing said by 
Bickle is true and that Bickle is “lying”. This was interesting charge from Levine’s point of view, but the 
motivation for it was understandable. Levine, for reasons unclear to me, thinks that psychology is autonomous 
and irreducible to neuroscience and therefore he of course cannot accept Bickle’s views. As a sideline in the 
“sociology of philosophy”, this can be to be found interesting. 
1164 See Bickle, 2003. 
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questions in turn. 1) As long as non-human animal cognition is thought of in purely 
mechanistic terms it is not surprising that there exists an explanation of it in terms of 
molecular mechanisms. Davidson agrees that some cognitive functions can be correlated with 
physical mechanisms. His claim is that propositional attitudes cannot  be  correlated  with  
specific brain-states. The results described by Bickle are not a challenge to this view and they 
do not hold any promise that propositional attitudes would be reducible in a similar way as 
memory  consolidation  is  reducible  to  LPT.  I  think  we  should  also  consider  whether  the  
learning process of a sea slug counts as a psychological phenomenon. Bickle does not suggest 
at all how a complete psychological theory could be constructed, what it would look like, and 
how it would be reduced to a neuroscientific theory. But these questions require answers if 
Bickle is attempting to come up with a neuroscientific theory which would achieve the 
explanatory scope of psychology. The hope that a future neuroscientific theory will replace 
existing psychological theory is empty if we are not told how to construct an image of P 
(psychological theory) in the conceptual framework of N (neuroscientific theory). As Bickle 
notes, the relation between the original psychological theory and its deduced image is 
something which neither Hooker nor Churchland has ever provided.1165  How  this  
construction  of  an  image  should  be  done  for  the  whole  psychological  theory  remains  a  
mystery, and the few existing examples of successful reductions, like the sea slug case, are 
not even a part of the answer. 
 2) Given Davidson’s views, it should be obvious that he could accept, for example, 
the claim, that memory consolidation is LPT and, ultimately, identical to the molecular 
mechanisms of the latter. Something like this seems to be implicitly suggested in Davidson’s 
“Material Mind”.1166 From an ontological point of view they are the same phenomena, 
described at different levels. Does a conceptual reduction follow from this? Bickle argues that 
ontological and conceptual reductions must be closely related. Ontological conclusions follow 
from the reduction relation obtaining in a given case. In this sense ontology is secondary with 
respect to reductive results, although it is closely tied to them. What does this mean with 
respect to our common-sense understanding of mental phenomena? Are there such things as 
beliefs? There are, if the vocabulary which uses them reduces to a future science. But if this 
happens, it seems that our ordinary concepts become otiose. Is there then any possibility for 
an independent and autonomous existence for our mental vocabulary? It seems not; we are 
justified in using this vocabulary but it is a candidate for reduction, and the claim is that when 
                                               
1165 Bickle, 2003, 17. 
1166 Davidson, 1973. 
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a reduction is accomplished, the original vocabulary becomes useless. In this sense the 
ontological and conceptual levels are closely connected, and both are dependent on the 
possibility  of  their  reduction  to  some  future  neuroscience.  When  we  show  that  memory  
consolidation is LPT, we lose the need to use the former term in explanations, and in the ideal 
yet to be imagined case, a whole vocabulary of higher level terms becomes redundant with 
respect to the vocabulary of molecular level. 
 On the one hand it is claimed that through a reduction of psychology we should 
achieve the same explanatory scope that psychology has now, and that the explanatory 
framework would have been achieved by simpler means. This is the goal of scientific 
reduction. On the other hand, once the mental has been reduced, we see that psychological 
explanations pale in comparison with neurological explanations. It would be ill-advised to 
keep on using these inferior explanations. But I think we should consider whether a 
neuroscientific explanation is really simpler than a folk-psychological explanation. Was Ryle 
wrong when he claimed that “We know quite well what caused the farmer to return from the 
market with his pigs unsold. He found that the prices were lower than he had expected. We 
know quite well why John Doe scowled and slammed the door. He had been insulted.”1167 
Are neuroscientific explanations simpler than  these?  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  detailed  
neuroscientific description of what happens when John Doe scowls and slams the door would 
be a simpler explanation than the conclusion that Doe was insulted. 
 What about the claim that reductions from minds to molecules make psychological 
explanations useless because these explanations are inferior when compared to their 
neurological reducers? This is a strange claim for three reasons: A) If psychological 
explanations are different kinds of explanations than causal explanations, how could the latter 
make the former dispensable? B) Let us suppose that token-identities could be established. 
What would be consequence of this for explanations? Without laws describing the relations 
between minds and molecules, the psychological level, with its respective generalizations, 
remains explanatory in itself. What reasons have we to believe that nomological connections 
exist between these levels? C) When the deficiency of psychological explanations is being 
pronounced, we should consider how the term “explanation” is understood. 
 As far as A) is concerned, Bickle is surprisingly insensitive to the possibility that 
rational  explanations  in  terms  of  our  mental  vocabulary  could  be  different  kinds  of  
explanations than the causal explanations of neuroscience. The alleged difference between 
                                               
1167 Ryle, 1949, 306. 
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rational and causal explanations can be summarized by considering two theses from Kim. A 
reference  to  Kim  in  this  context  is  instructive  because  it  shows  that  a  reductionist  can  also  
appreciate the difference between two kinds of explanations. Kim describes a mode of 
understanding which is not causal-predictive in six theses, two of which are:1168 
  
 Thesis 1) Each of us has a need to understand, make sense of, our own actions…  it is 
 an essential part of our nature as reflective agents that we need to render our own 
 actions and decisions intelligible to ourselves. 
 
 Thesis 4) The purpose of this mode of understanding is not predictive; nor is it aimed 
 at acquiring knowledge of the causal mechanisms leading from our desires and beliefs 
 to actions. 
 
Kim made these points long before he started to defend a more reductionist position. More 
recently, perspicuous comments on the differences between rational and causal explanations 
have been made by Stoutland. He notes, in a similar way to Kim, that: “The main function of 
rational explanation is to enable us to make sense of the people we encounter so that we can 
respond to each other as how we are, how we feel, and the ways our lives are shaped.”1169 
This is in essential respects the point of Kim’s first thesis. Stoutland agrees also with Kim’s 
fourth thesis: “A rational explanation… does not aspire to specify any underlying 
mechanisms… that explain the agent’s behavior, which means that a philosophical account of 
rational explanation will not attempt to specify any explanatory mechanisms.”1170 I believe we 
could say that the purpose of rational explanations is also predictive, but that the predictive 
power of these explanations does not depend on the fact that they increase our knowledge of 
the causal mechanism(s) behind the explanation. Rational explanations predict in a very 
different way than causal explanations. Bickle seems to admit that he is interested only in one 
kind of explanation, namely the causal one.1171 But this does not tell us whether he thinks that 
all explanations should be understood as being causally mechanistic. If the answer is 
affirmative, then it is not surprising that causal mechanistic explanations in psychology could 
be reduced to causal mechanistic explanations of the molecular level. Bickle writes: “[…] 
contexts determine whether a causal-mechanistic explanation, given the current state of 
                                               
1168 See Kim, 1984, 316, 318. 
1169 Stoutland, 2005, 145. 
1170 Ibid. 
1171 See, for example, Bickle 2003, 114. 
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scientific knowledge, is genuinely causally mechanistic. In scientific contexts, typically only 
one is treated as such at any given time, namely, the one genuinely available at the lowest 
level….”1172 
 If psychological explanations are causally mechanistic, then following Davidson, we 
can argue that they belong to the same conceptual domain with the physical and there is no 
principled obstacle to reduction. But if the nature of psychological explanations is other than 
causal-mechanistic, then it is questionable whether their explanatory power could be reduced 
to causal mechanistic explanations at the lower level. It seems that rationalizing explanations 
proceed and can succeed independently of any knowledge about the internal mechanisms of 
the agent whose actions are being explained. Rationalizing explanations may not be extensible 
to mechanistic explanations, but this does not affect Davidson’s argument because his claim is 
that they are not supposed to be so extensible. Your knowledge of someone’s mental 
properties does not tell you anything about the internal mechanisms involved; nor is this kind 
of knowledge required in order to explain something in terms of mental properties.   
 A brief hint suggests that Bickle is willing to accept also other forms of explanation 
than just the causal mechanistic variety. He notes: “There are… numerous contexts, both 
everyday and scientific, where the explanatory power of the cellular / molecular 
neuroscientific causal account isn’t important…. In everyday contexts… we are more lenient 
about the number and variety of explanations we offer and accept.”1173 But it is unclear what, 
according to Bickle, the status of these “everyday explanations” is. It is likely that they should 
be counted as second grade explanations because they are not “scientific” explanations. It is 
clear, though, that at least in the case of psychological explanations, their explanatory power 
is less than that of their neuroscientific challengers. We are told:  
 
[…] when we fix our gaze on aspects of scientific practice… we see that psychological explanations 
lose their initial status as causally-mechanistically explanatory… within scientific practice, 
psychological explanations become otiose when the type of cellular / molecular explanation… is 
achieved.1174 
 
Bickle claims that neurobiological explanations make psychological explanations pointless. 
The correctness of this claim could be granted if psychological explanations were seen as 
causal-mechanistic, as Bickle does. Unfortunately, Bickle does not consider the possibility 
that psychological explanations are not causal mechanistic, and therefore he does not really 
                                               
1172 Ibid. 
1173 Bickle, 2003, 110. 
1174 Bickle, 2003, 113. 
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consider the kinds of arguments that Davidson and von Wright have used to defend the 
autonomy of rational explanations. Bickle acknowledges that psychological concepts seem to 
be “intractably dualistic”. What he does not recognize, or at least does not discuss, is that 
while this feature of these concepts may be explanatorily relevant, there may be essentially 
different kinds of explanations as Davidson, von Wright and Stoutland suggest. Given 
Bickle’s admittance that “everyday” practices differ from scientific ones, it remains unclear 
what  it  means  that  certain  explanations  are  otiose  or  pale  in  comparison  to  some  other  
explanations. In the case of rational explanations, do we have a single example showing that 
the explanatory power of this kind of explanation becomes otiose because a neuroscientific 
explanation has replaced it? Do we have a single example showing that the explanatory power 
of rational explanation pales when compared to a neuroscientific explanation which is meant 
to explain the same thing?  
 As  far  as  question  B)  is  concerned,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  new  wave  
reductionism could provide mental–physical identities which would be secured through laws. 
This possibility is in fact denied, and therefore new wave reductionism differs from a mind–
brain identity theory. If mental–physical identities do not exist, how could neuroscience 
explain the same events in the same way as psychology does? The generalizations of the latter 
vocabulary would be absent in the former vocabulary. Moreover, and this is Davidson’s 
question, without laws what would lead us to believe that our observations of the connections 
between the mental and the physical tell something about the future cases? As he notes: “what 
we want as a law of correspondence is not an accidental, but one which we have reason to 
believe, will apply to cases which we have not yet examined.”1175 
 What about question C)? Let us suppose that in reply to the question “Why is Georg 
calling his brother?”, the following answer is given: “He hasn’t heard from his brother for two 
weeks and he is worried because his brother is an alcoholic.” This is certainly a reasonable 
explanation, and in most cases we would be satisfied with the answer; we need to know 
nothing more to be epistemically satisfied. The explanation makes sense of the situation. Kim 
has  noted:  “When  we  look  for  an  explanation  of  an  event,  we  are  typically  in  a  state  of  
puzzlement, a kind of epistemic predicament.”1176 Is the epistemic puzzlement in those cases 
when we are looking for an answer in psychological terms such that it would decrease if we 
were given an answer in neurobiological terms? I think this seems very unlikely. Perhaps our 
overall puzzlement would in fact increase, because we could start to wonder what an answer 
                                               
1175 Davidson, 1964, 47. 
1176 Kim, 1989a, 254. 
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in terms of molecules has to do with Georg and the phone. Kim claims also: “We expect our 
reductions to yield simpler systems – a simpler system of concepts, or simpler system of 
assumptions, or simpler system of entities.”1177 In what sense would a reduction which 
replaces the psychological explanation with a neuroscientific explanation yield a simpler 
explanatory  system?  One  of  Davidson’s  claims  is  that  our  common-sense  understanding  of  
ourselves  is  so  valuable  to  us  precisely  because  it  is,  in  a  sense,  a  very  simple  mode  of  
explanation.  It  is  highly  unlikely  that  a  molecular  explanation  would  be  something  that  we  
could ever use to describe and explain actual everyday situations which occur outside the 
artificial environment of a laboratory. We already know why John Doe scowled and slammed 
the door. Are we, in this case, in need of a further explanation? Are we puzzled? There is 
something implausible in the suggestion that we would need a deeper explanation of why 
John Doe slammed the door than the one we already have. What would this “deeper” 
explanation tell us of the situation in which we encounter John Doe? 
 How we think about the status of common sense explanations depends partly on our 
understanding of the general nature of explanations. If, together with Davidson, we think that 
explanations are always interest relative, then we can hold on to the idea that different kinds of 
explanations can be given of the same event – or of phenomena – and that these explanations 
are independent of each other. We have different kinds of epistemic expectations, and the 
explanations we are ready to accept depend on the expectations we have on each occasion. 
The explanation that Georg’s brother is an alcoholic may be just the kind of explanation that 
we were looking for. Common sense mental explanations usually take place in real situations, 
where  the  complex  context  may give  a  clue  as  to  why certain  kind  of  explanation  is  better  
than some other in the specific situation in question. If we are always looking for a causal-
mechanistic explanation, we surely are looking for a certain kind of answer to the question 
“Why is Georg calling his brother?” and we are seeing the whole situation in a certain kind of 
way. But would we be satisfied, in a real situation, if our question were answered in terms of 
molecular biology? Bickle notes:  
 
The explanation, ‘Kurt remembered that telephone number today that I relayed to him yesterday 
because he rehearsed it mentally fifteen times without retrograde interference for thirty minutes after he 
heard it’ pales in comparison to one that appeals to activity-dependent molecular (including molecular 
genetics) mechanisms occurring in millions of selective neurons….1178 
 
                                               
1177 Kim, 1998, 96. 
1178 Bickle, 2003, 114. 
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Bickle is here talking about the different ways in which we explain or could explain the 
functioning of the memory. I think it is not clear in this case whether the former explanation 
“pales in comparison” to the latter, since it is not clear what it means to say how explanations 
should be compared. What is clear is that if our epistemic interests are geared toward a kind 
of answer like “Georg’s brother is an alcoholic”, we are not satisfied with an answer which 
refers to molecular facts – and in this case a comparison between these answers would be 
utterly inappropriate. Why believe that a mechanistic explanation, even if it could be had, 
would satisfy the expectation that the questioner has on this occasion.  
 Bickle’s  views  about  the  nature  of  explanation  are  not  clear.  Should  we always  aim 
for a causally mechanistic explanation at the lowest level, are explanations interest relative, 
and do rational explanations differ essentially from causal mechanistic explanations? These 
important questions remain without an answer. Bickle claims that: “Scientists tend to do just 
fine with a rough-and-ready understanding of what counts as an ‘explanation’ and what 
distinguishes a ‘good’ one from a ‘poor’ one.”1179 This being the case, scientists do not need 
to offer an account of explanation and they do not need to further analyze the concept of 
“explanation”. But this view seems to suggest that scientists get to decide what counts as a 
good explanation, because they already have a “rough and ready” understanding of what 
explanation is. It is very curious that a “rough and ready” understanding is accepted in this 
context, and yet “rough and ready” everyday explanations of mental phenomena are treated as 
second-grade. To suggest that scientists get to decide what counts as an acceptable 
explanation is merely to repeat the ideology of new-wave metascience. Perhaps the claim is 
true in those cases when a causal mechanism can be explained in terms of a lower level causal 
mechanism. In these cases, scientists may agree that the lower level explanation is “better”. 
As Bickle argues: “In scientific contexts, typically only one [explanation] is treated as 
[genuinely causally mechanistic]… namely the one genuinely available at the lowest 
level.”1180 But  why  think  that  scientists  get  to  decide  whether  or  not  an  explanation  which  
refers to the character of Georg’s brother counts as a good answer to question “Why is Georg 
using the phone?” Bickle claims that it is utterly wrongheaded to assume that psychological 
explanations would remain causally explanatory if lower level neurobiological explanations 
explained the same behavioral data. It is unfortunate that Bickle does not discuss the positions 
of von Wright, Stoutland and others who argue that it is a conceptual confusion to claim that 
neurobiological explanations could explain human actions. 
                                               
1179 Bickle, 2003, 57. 
1180 Bickle, 2003, 114. 
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 To claim, like Bickle does, that we need not have a detailed philosophical view about 
explanation in order to see that psychological explanations become pointless when the 
neurobiological explanations are in place sounds curious. Once the lower level explanations 
are found, psychological explanations become “explanatorily impotent and empty”. We are 
told: “The cellular / molecular neurobiological account explains many key causal processes 
that the psychological account is either completely blind to or leaves as input-output black 
boxes.  In  other  words,  it  explains events that the psychological account leaves 
unexplained.”1181 Bickle does not say a word about a view like Kim’s, and more obviously 
those of von Wright, Davidson and Stoutland, who claim that the purpose of the 
psychological mode of understanding is not predictive; nor is it aimed at acquiring knowledge 
of the causal mechanism or of the “key processes” that Bickle refers to. To say that 
neuroscience explains events that psychology leaves unexplained is not a breakthrough, since 
the same can be said of psychology with respect to neuroscience.1182 Which explanatory 
scheme  is  then  generally  simpler  or  has  a  wider  explanatory  scope?  I  suggest  that  this  
question does not make sense and should therefore not be asked.  
3) The answer to the question of whether new wave reductionism leads to eliminativist 
results  is  straightforward:  it  does  not.  Pace Bickle, it is not the case that neurobiological 
explanations render psychological explanations “pointless”. The main reason for this is the 
fact that new wave reductionism does not appreciate the distinction between rational and 
causal explanations. New wave reductionism is also silent about the conceptual distinctions 
between behavior and action and between reasons and causes. We have seen no good reasons 
to believe that the explanatory power of our mental vocabulary would become otiose or that it 
would pale when compared to the power of neurobiological explanations. In fact, Bickle 
                                               
1181 Bickle, 2003, 113. 
1182 Cf. von Wright (1998, 37): “If the correspondence [between reasons and neural processes] is well 
established, the neural state in question may be regarded as a reliable sign or symptom of the existence of the 
reason. As long as the correlation remains a scientific hypothesis, the neural state fulfils this role of a symptom. 
Only in the very unlikely case that the hypothesis became so well confirmed that we would be extremely 
reluctant to drop it when faced with seemingly contrary evidence could we conceivably use the neural state as a 
criterion of the agent’s having a certain reason for action. And even then the criterion would only be one among 
many,  and  its  usefulness  in  attributing  to  agents  reasons  for  their  actions  would  depend  upon  how  well  it  
contributed to our understanding of the agent as a person and to the agent’s understanding of himself.” It 
certainly seems to be the case that psychological explanations have a dimension which matters for the subject 
himself. An agent can understand how he became jealous because of the events which took place and which he 
understood in such and such way. Somebody may understand why he was offended because he, for example, 
misunderstood something. Both these explanations would be expressed in terms of propositional contents. These 
could be paradigmatic examples of events which can be explained in our mental vocabulary but which the 
neuroscientific explanations leave unexplained. How an agent could understand himself, as a person, in terms of 
molecules? 
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admits that current science does not eschew all mental or psychological causal explanations. 
Moreover:  
 
[…] psychological causal explanations still play important heuristic roles in generating and testing 
neurobiological hypotheses….they suggest where to look for the key cellular and molecular 
mechanisms and how best to construct behavioral paradigms that will generate useful tests of 
hypothesized cellular and molecular mechanisms.1183 
 
The general lesson that Bickle wants to teach philosophers of mind is that they should “re-
orient their interests down levels in the neurosciences.”1184 This view is the opposite of von 
Wright’s, who argues that the mental has an epistemic priority in relation to the neural. The 
role that Bickle grants to psychology is a secondary role; psychology and our mental 
vocabulary are useful for testing neurobiological hypotheses. But if psychological 
explanations are useful in generating and testing neurobiological hypotheses, doesn’t this 
mean that, from an epistemological point of view, they indeed enjoy a privilege over the 
hypotheses of neurobiology just as von Wright claims?  
 Let us suppose that we have framed a neurobiological hypothesis, for example, about 
seeing and we attempt to create a visual sensation by manipulating the molecular level in 
accordance with the hypothesis. How could we know that the test-subject actually sees 
something if we stay at the molecular level? Or to use another actual example: sometimes it 
happens that completely paralyzed people are thought to be in comas. In some cases, a brain 
scan may show that their brains are functioning normally. After the scan is done, a person 
who was  thought  to  be  in  coma is  given  a  technique  to  communicate  with  the  outer  world.  
What, then, is the final verification method – is it the brain scan or is it the actual 
communication produced by the patient? I think there is still a long way to go before we 
would be willing to accept that a brain scan would convince us of the presence of 
consciousness if all other signs were absent. Perhaps this will change in the future, which 
would mean that our notion of consciousness had changed; the state of the brain would 
become the ultimate criterion of the presence of consciousness. On the other hand, perhaps we 
will never be ready to accept the presence of consciousness without behavioral 
manifestations. An interesting way in which states of brain could become a criterion for 
consciousness could be the following. An assumed coma patient would be given simple 
instructions,  for  example,  to  think  about  the  performance  of  a  certain  task.  If  this  thinking  
could be linked to a specific pattern of brain activity, then the patient could be instructed to 
                                               
1183 Bickle, 2003, 114. 
1184 Bickle, 2003, xiii. 
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think about the performance of a task with the intention of producing “yes” and “no” answers. 
A particular pattern of brain activity would then be interpreted as an affirmative answer, and 
as a consequence simple questions could be asked from the patient. Recent research actually 
indicates that fMRI could be used as a form of communication.1185 But  would  the  
communicating state of the brain then count as a brain state or as behavior?1186 If, as von 
Wright claimed, the result of sheer willing cannot be action, how should we understand the 
“fMRI-answer” to a certain question? In normal conditions, “answering” counts as an action. 
If the answer could be produced by sheer wanting or willing, would this invalidate the 
answering as action?  
  Can we conceive of a situation where the heuristic role of psychological explanations 
could be completely dismissed? If  we agree with von Wright,  as I  think we should,  that  the 
neural cannot be a criterion for the mental, it seems that on a very general level, which is also 
at the same time a very fundamental level, the psychological keeps its autonomous status and 
cannot be eliminated. As von Wright has claimed, we cannot be sure whether neurological 
phenomena are relevant for the mental phenomena for which we take them to be relevant if 
we have no independent way to check whether the mental phenomenon in question occurs. 
The status which von Wright grants to the mental is indeed a fundamental one; a neural 
hypothesis could not be verified at all in the absence of the relevant mental phenomena. This I 
take to be a philosophical observation of the utmost importance, and I cannot see how it could 
be rejected. Bickle grants a small role for psychology, but his reason for doing this is that the 
“real” causal mechanistic low-level explanations have not yet been discovered. He claims that 
psychological explanations become useless once the  “real”  explanations  are  found.  But  this  
assumption collapses if the main purpose of psychological explanations is normative 
evaluation, and not causal explanation and prediction. Bickle does not discuss this possibility.  
 We have seen how Davidson’s arguments could be used to refute a type-identity 
theory, and Bickle admits this possibility. A type-theory could lead to eliminativism if all 
mental phenomena could be correlated with physical phenomena; we could possibly lose 
interest in explanations in terms of mental concepts. Bickle acknowledges the importance of 
Davidson’s arguments against Nagelian reduction, but denies the importance and relevance of 
these arguments to the new-wave model, because in this model bridge-laws are not required. 
But as I have emphasized, Davidson’s views about the irreducibility of the mental are by no 
                                               
1185 See, Owen, Schiff and Laureys, 2009. 
1186 For an interesting discussion of how Wittgenstein’s insights about the connection between mental states and 
behavior could be relevant in the cases where patients were in persistent vegetative states, see Gillett, 2001. 
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means  exhausted  by  his  claim  that  there  are  no  strict  laws  between  the  mental  and  the  
physical, and the arguments for irreducibility may be effective against new-wave model. 
 What kind of reductive view is the new-wave model, if it does not require strict 
connections between the mental and the physical? How a new wave reduction between the 
mental and the physical might actually happen remains unanswered. We are not told how an 
“image” of psychological theory would or could be constructed in the vocabulary of 
neuroscience. What Bickle provides is only the prediction that this is going to happen. I think 
that even if new wave reductionism avoids nomological connections between two domains 
and even if a neuroscientific image of psychology could be constructed, there is still a major 
part of Davidsonian irreducibility to be answered – namely the claim that our common-sense 
understanding is not an optional part of our conceptual resources. This is a Davidsonian 
challenge  that  Bickle  does  not  evaluate  at  all.  He  tries  to  defuse  Davidson’s  strict-law  
argument in his earlier works and, apparently thinking that this is all there is to Davidsonian 
irreducibility, he does not mention Davidson’s criticism in his later work where the model of 
new wave reductionism is further developed.1187 When arguing against the irreducibility of 
the mental, Bickle focuses on arguing against functionalism, but the functionalist arguments 
he refutes are not the same kind of arguments as those presented by Davidson, and the charge 
against functionalism does not really work against Davidson’s position. So, unfortunately, 
Bickle leaves entirely without discussion an important part of Davidson’s criticism against the 
possibility of reduction. It is not certain that Bickle himself recognizes this because he notes: 
“[the Davidsonian] challenge boils down to the charge that intentional psychology and the 
physical sciences are composed of very different sorts of linguistic items: nonlaws versus 
laws. It is this difference that is supposed to scuttle the possibility of reduction.”1188 But this is 
not all that there is to irreducibility.  
 It is telling that Bickle does not say anything about the alleged normativity of the 
mental, because this is perhaps the feature of the mental which is the most difficult part for a 
neuroscientific  account  to  solve.  By not  discussing  it,  Bickle  of  course  avoids  the  problem.  
The  same  applies,  to  some  extent,  to  Patricia  Churchland  who  writes:  “Davidson…  has  
proposed antireductionist arguments, and though his work has been widely discussed in the 
philosophical literature, I find Dennett… Fodor… and Pylyshyn clearer and deeper.”1189 We 
cannot of course blame Churchland for thinking that Davidson’s arguments are not clear or 
                                               
1187 See Bickle, 1992, 1998, 2003. 
1188 Bickle, 1992, 228. 
1189 Churchland, 1986, 379. 
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deep; opinions about these matters differ. What should be noted though is that it is quite easy 
to dismiss any arguments by declaring that they are not clear enough or deep enough, and 
therefore the strategy adopted by Churchland is perhaps not the best one for argumentative 
purposes. Be that as it may, it is clear that Dennett’s, Fodor’s or Pylyshyn’s arguments are not 
based on the same views as those of Davidson, and I think that therefore one cannot leave out 
Davidsonian arguments on the grounds that one has considered the others. 
 Bickle’s example of the reduction of memory consolidation to molecular processes is 
well chosen because, or so I think we can conclude, it is not a rational process and therefore 
the  problem  of  normativity  does  not  arise.1190 I  conclude  that  since  Bickle’s  model  of  
reduction remains silent with respect to the problem of the normativity of the mental, it is not 
secured against Davidson’s arguments.1191 We can note here that the same applies to Kim’s 
“functional model of reduction”, which is another recent attempt to reduce the mental to the 
physical.1192 
 4) Does new wave reductionism show that the thesis of the anomalism of the mental is 
false? It does not. Why is this important? Davidson’s claim in “Mental Events” was that there 
are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events could be predicted. I have 
argued that the suggestion is more modest than most critics have taken it to be, but it is also 
very ambitious because it marks a principled difference between mental and physical events. 
If the suggestion is true, a principled autonomy of mental concepts is secured. Nomological 
independence removes the mental from the reach of the nomological net of a physical theory. 
                                               
1190 The fact that the examples concern non-human animals makes this even clearer. When discussing the 
“psychology” of sea slugs, we do not really need to worry about the problems of rationality, at least not about the 
kinds of problems that we encounter when discussing the nature of human rationality. 
1191 What this concretely means will be discussed in the next three sections. It should be noted that there is a brief 
suggestion which could be taken to indicate that Bickle has considered the normativity argument. He says (2001, 
252): “’Anomalousness’ in the sense Davidson stresses for mental predicates does not block a potential new 
wave reduction of theories because of the nonlinguistic (model theoretic) formulation of theory structure and 
relations.” As far as I understand this view, it is meant to suggest that since scientific theories should not be 
understood as “sets of sentences” but rather as model theoretic structures, the remarks about the irreducibility of 
psychological concepts is not relevant to the question of whether psychology, as a theory, reduces to 
neuroscience. This view raises a host of problems. First, the question of whether common sense psychology can 
be understood as being a theory is problematic. Second, accepting the view requires generally accepting a 
structuralistic view about scientific theories. The correctness of this suggestion is a question which cannot be 
dealt here in any detail; nor would I have competence to consider it. Third, we are required to accept the view, 
put forward by Paul Churchland, that knowledge representation and exploitation is not essentially linguistic. 
However, these suggestions are, as Bickle (1992, 228) himself notes, “extremely programmatic”. Fourth, 
suppose that we grant all of  this.  This  would  be  very  generous  since  it  requires  a  whole  new way of  thinking 
about reductions as well as scientific theories. But even if we accept all this, there remains the question about the 
current explanatory power of psychological concepts.  We understand ourselves  and others  in  terms of  mental  
concepts because of the conceptual connections between these concepts. The connection between reasons and 
actions exists at the level of propositional contents. This explanatory power would collapse if we accepted the 
view that knowledge is not represented and manipulated in terms of linguistic items. 
1192 See Kim, 1998. As we will see in section 3.3.3.1, Kim is better aware of the Davidsonian criticism than 
Bickle is; yet this does not show that his account can defuse the Davidsonian challenge. 
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Instead of trying to prove that the anomalism of the mental is true, we could ask for reasons to 
think why it might be false; the thesis of anomalism seems to fit with our common-sense 
intuitions. New-wave reductionism does not offer such reasons, and whatever the fate of new-
wave reductions turn out to be one could still argue that, because of the anomalism of the 
mental, the mental remains unpredictable. This is one way to formulate the autonomy of the 
mental; mental reality remains unpredictable and this is not the case with physical reality.  
 In conclusion, the following can be said about the new wave challenge for Davidson’s 
position.  If  we  are  trying  to  decide  whether  the  mental  lives  of  humans  can  be  reduced  to  
brain-processes, new-wave psycho-neural reductionism is, despite the fierce advertising, not a 
significant breakthrough. First, the examples of how “psychological phenomena” in sea slugs 
have been reduced to the molecular level do not tell us much, if anything, about the prospects 
of  reducing  the  complex  cognitive  states  of  humans  to  lower  levels  of  physical  reality.  
Second, the prediction that a future super-science will reduce  psychology  is  based  on  mere  
faith concerning the possibilities of science and scientific progress. Third, new-wave psycho-
neural reductionists remain silent about the nature of explanation. This raises many questions: 
what is the relationship between rational and causal explanations? How can explanations 
replace each other? How to evaluate the simplicity of explanations? To state, as Bickle does, 
that scientists have a “rough” view about the nature of explanation which suffices for their 
purposes is simply to ignore these kinds of questions. Fourth, an open contempt towards 
philosophical arguments raises the question of how seriously philosophers should take the 
model of reduction that is being suggested. It is unclear whether philosophical arguments can 
move those who do not take these arguments seriously. Philosophers can point out the 
conceptual confusions into which scientists have fallen or are in danger of falling. A refusal to 
consider the relevance of philosophical arguments shows intellectual dishonesty. On the other 
hand, this refusal shows how wide the gap today is between philosophy and scientific 
philosophy. 
 Let us now turn to Davidson’s arguments for why mental–physical identities cannot 
be found, and to his reasons for asserting that our mental vocabulary is not an optional part of 
our conceptual resources. The fact that recent models of reduction do not consider these 
arguments shows a serious defect in their capacity to discuss the alleged irreducibility of the 
mental. 
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3.3.2 The subjective and intersubjective nature of thoughts 
 
We have briefly discussed how the attribution of mental states is governed by normative 
principles and how the purpose of these attributions is meant to reveal the subject as a rational 
animal. According to Davidson, it is a condition of having thoughts that the basic standards of 
rationality  have  application.  In  giving  reason-based  explanations  of  actions,  we  give  the  
agent’s reasons  for  doing  what  he  did.  Following  Davidson,  we  call  these  kinds  of  
explanations rationalizations and say that the reason rationalizes the action.1193 In 
rationalizations normative constraints apply because we have to consider what inconsistencies 
do least harm to intelligibility. The normativity of rationalizations is partly a result of the fact 
that the interpreter has to use his own standards of rationality when attributing mental states 
to others and these standards dictate, in a very authoritative way, the shape of the pattern in 
which  propositional  attitudes  can  be  said  to  exist.  As  long  as  we  want  to  use  reason-based  
explanations, we have to find rationality in the target of attribution. Or to put it the other way, 
we can use reason-based explanations only to the extent that we find rationality in the target 
of attribution. There is no rationality without reasons and there are no reasons without 
rationality.   
 When discussing the anomalism of the mental, we already saw how the normativity 
and holism of the mental leads Davidson to argue that mental concepts belong to a different 
conceptual domain than physical concepts. The normative methodology of interpretation 
arises from the norms of the mental. Although both the physical and the mental are governed 
by  norms,  the  nature  of  the  norms and  the  way they  are  used  in  the  case  of  the  mental  are  
different from those of the physical case. According to Davidson the disparate character of 
these norms explains the “ultimate... difference between understanding minds and 
understanding the world as physical.”1194 He  claims  that  in  contrast  to  the  study  of  the  
physical, norms enter in “... a special and additional way in the study of mental 
phenomena.”1195  
 It is only in Davidson’s later writings that the role of normative methodology and the 
reasons for it become clear. These reasons were already anticipated in his earlier writings, but 
important additional arguments were provided later. Davidson’s essential claim is: “The 
                                               
1193 See Davidson, 1963. 
1194 Davidson, 1991, 218. 
1195 Davidson, 1990b, 98. 
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mental vocabulary... is irreducible because it is normative.”1196 It is clearly the normativity of 
our mental vocabulary which sets it fundamentally apart from the vocabularies of the natural 
sciences. This aspect is not appreciated by those who think that the mental–physical 
distinction does not differ from the distinctions between different physical vocabularies. As I 
have shown, this is apparent in the case of Bickle and Churchland, who dismiss Davidson’s 
arguments without further consideration. To some extent the same is true of Kim who 
observes:  
 
[…] intentional psychology may differ from biology in a way that can make a difference: normativity is 
central and essential to…psychology but has no place in biology. What difference does this make to the 
scientific character of…psychology? This is a question worth pondering.1197 
 
It is strange that Kim does not ponder this question further. The fact that Kim does not pay 
close attention to the arguments about the normativity of psychology is very curious because 
he has also noted: 
 
The right way to save… psychology… is to stop of it as playing the same that ‘cognitive science’ is 
supposed to play – that is, stop thinking of it as a ‘theory’ whose primary reason d’etre is to generate 
law-based causal explanations and predictions. We will do better to focus on its normative role in the 
evaluations of actions and the formation of intentions and decisions.1198 
 
The lesson about the normative role of psychology, the lesson of Davidson, von Wright and 
Stoutland that Kim suggests, is a valuable lesson to Bickle, to the Churchlands and to other 
reductivists. Davidson obviously thinks that the normative / non-normative distinction is the 
reason which distinguishes the two vocabularies and it is therefore no wonder that its 
importance is strongly emphasized. This being the case, it is surprising that critics neglect this 
argument.  
 Essential questions for the argument for irreducibility include ones about how 
normativity infiltrates the descriptions of mental phenomena and why this happens. The 
normativity  of  mental  state  attributions  means  that  we  have  to  use  our  own  norms  and  
understanding when addressing the question of what rationality consists in. The reason why 
we have to do this is that we cannot attribute mental states at all without assuming that the 
subject is rational. There are no specific norms of rationality, and in belief attributions we 
therefore employ our own norms;  the  only  way  to  see  whether  these  norms  are  shared  by  
                                               
1196 Davidson, 1998a, 101. 
1197 Kim, 2003, 133. 
1198 Kim, 1989, 263, fn. 46. 
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someone else is to assume that in large part they are. Every case of norm-governed 
interpretation is unique, and we may have to adjust our interpretation according to the 
contextual factors present on each occasion. This means that interpretation is always an open-
ended project.  
 Perhaps the normative dimension of the mental cannot be clearly separated from 
questions of how our attributions work and why they must work that way. A partial answer to 
the “how” question is that we attribute mental states to others according to our own norms and 
understandings of rationality. A partial answer to the “why” question is that we do this 
because it is the only way to make the interpretee intelligible. This is the only way to 
understand the subject. There is an irreducibly subjective element in interpretation because we 
have to rely on our own norms and understandings when considering the question of how 
intelligibility can be secured. But I believe that a more complete answer to the “why” question 
clarifies in an important way the irreducibility of the mental. In an important passage 
Davidson notes:  
 
When what is studied is the mental, then the norms of the thing observed also enter. When thought 
takes thought as subject matter, the observer can only identify what he is studying by finding it rational 
– that is, in accord with his own standards of rationality. The astronomer and physicist are under no 
compulsion to find black holes or quarks to be rational entities.1199  
 
This quote indicates that the fact that we have to use our norms when describing the mental 
does not in itself take the mental to a conceptual level which is distinct from the physical. It is 
rather the fact that the norms of the thing observed also enter the picture and we are forced to 
consider them. When studying black holes we are not compelled to do anything; we just 
observe. According to Davidson, here lies the ultimate difference between “psychology and 
the rest”;  what is  special  about psychology is that  the objects of study are subjective,  norm-
governed states and these states, in addition of being under the norms of the interpreter, are 
also under the norms of the subject. The fact that there is a mind at both ends forces us to 
consider how to best match the contents of two minds. Such considerations have no place in 
the natural sciences, because when we treat the world as mindless nothing corresponds to the 
normative and subjective dimension of the mental.    
 It is interesting that in his later writings Davidson is eager to point out that the 
difference between psychology and the other sciences or between our intentional and non-
intentional vocabulary comes back just to this: in psychology the object of study is the mind. 
                                               
1199 Davidson, 1990b, 98, my emphasis. 
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It could be argued that this is utterly trivial; in fact what could be more obvious than the fact 
that the nature of conceptual or empirical studies is shaped by the subject matter? Well, if we 
accept the claim that the subject matter is the reason why a certain methodology, a certain 
vocabulary, is required, then we are a step closer to the view that there may be an irreducible 
difference in our ways of studying the mind and the world (the latter as mindless). Those 
reductionists who insist that “minds are just part of the nature”, and that minds could be 
reduced to molecules, do not consider what is distinctive about the mind as compared to other 
physical phenomena. The distinctive feature of interpretation and reason-based explanation is 
that I employ my thoughts and values to construct a picture of another person’s thoughts and 
values. The difference between these kinds of explanations and explanations in the natural 
sciences is thus the fact that the object of my description is itself a rational subject. Many 
seem not to have grasped the fundamental importance of this fact in Davidson’s 
argumentation. Replying to Rorty Davidson notes: “[…] interpreting others is a matter of 
using (not looking at) my own values and thoughts, my norms and rationality, to understand 
someone else’s. I do not expect to find propositional attitudes, or the kind of norms and 
rationality they entail, in a beetle.”1200 To those who appreciate the distinction but suggest that 
it can be overcome in the future when we know more of the physical nature of the mind, 
Davidson replies in a skeptical tone:  
 
I disagree with Ramberg on… one point. He believes it is possible that the difference between our 
mental vocabulary and our many vocabularies suited to describing and explaining the world in non-
cognitive terms may shrink so much that we no longer “change the subject” as we shift from one to the 
other. I do not… What I am convinced of is that when we treat animals as rational, the norms of 
rationality are in play, and such norms have no role in our other ways of thinking.1201 
 
Thirty years after “Mental Events”, Davidson still argues that shifting from a mental to non-
mental vocabulary would be a change of subject. Davidson is also inclined towards the claim 
that our two essentially different modes of explanation and prediction are parts of a 
comprehensive theory, and this holds a promise of a possibility of conceptual unification. 
Davidson contests the idea of such unification and claims instead that the two modes of 
understanding are two different kinds of vocabularies, with neither being reducible to the 
other.1202 The reason why Davidson contests the possibility of unification is precisely the 
rationality of minds. We do not expect that non-rational entities will suddenly turn out to be 
                                               
1200 Davidson, 1999o, 600, my emphasis. 
1201 Davidson, 1999a, 620. 
1202 See Davidson, 1987a and Davidson, 1999n. 
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rational entities and that we could start employing our mental vocabulary with them.1203 But 
what about the other side of the coin? Can we imagine a situation in which we, the humans 
living today, would turn out to be non-rational entities? Can we imagine a situation where our 
physical vocabulary could be applied to our mental lives? If the former possibility sounds 
absurd why would the latter possibility sound any less absurd? Our brain-cells are not 
rational, the molecules that make up those cells are not rational, even our brains are not 
rational. How could we describe our rationality in terms of these physical entities then? 
 We have  a  grasp  of  how normativity  and  rationality  shape  the  way we explain  the  
behavior of agents. When interpretation takes a normative tone, it involves subjective 
elements which do not shape our understanding of the physical. On the one hand, there is the 
subjectivity of the interpretee, but on the other hand there is also the subjective choice of the 
interpreter. Davidson notes: 
 
 [...] an interpreter must separate meaning from opinion in part on normative grounds, by 
 deciding what, from his point of view, maximizes intelligibility. In this endeavour, the 
 interpreter has, of course, no other standards of rationality to fall back on than his 
 own.1204  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, we cannot go outside our norms and check whether they are correct 
without  assuming  that  they  are.  The  only  way  that  our  own  standards  of  rationality  can  be  
compared to the standards of others is to engage in a process of interpretation, which itself 
depends on the use of our own norms. The crucially important lesson is that whereas in the 
physical sciences we can agree on what the standards of judgments are, and in this sense agree 
on how an objective point of view can be reached, this cannot be done when interpreting 
others. Thus:  
 
We cannot in the same way [as in the natural sciences] agree on the structure of  sentences or thoughts 
we use to chart the thoughts and meanings of others, for the attempt to reach such an agreement simply 
sends us back to the very process of interpretation on which all agreement depends.1205  
 
We cannot step outside interpretation in understanding others, in getting information about 
their mental states. But why not? Those who think that Davidson’s views imply 
instrumentalism or antirealism would ask this question. I think that Davidson is here raising a 
                                               
1203 It is of course possible that we would start to see black holes or stones as rational entities. But it is not easy 
to think what kind of evidence could convince us of their rationality. Rational black holes would have to be 
interpreted in the same way as people, and this means that they would have to exhibit something resembling 
human behavior. 
1204 Davidson, 1991, 215. 
1205 Davidson, 1991, 218. 
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very important point when he asks what the criteria for mental state attributions are. He is 
claiming that the interpretation of others forms the basis of our capability to understand 
anything. If you and have a different opinion, it is because we can understand each other; the 
grounds on which I can understand you cannot be derived from outside me. If I cannot make 
sense of you, then to whom may I turn for advice? I can always consult another person but 
this requires that I understand him and the process of interpretation continues. Davidson 
claims:  
 
You and I cannot come to agree on the interpretation of our sentences as a preliminary to using them to 
interpret others, for the process of coming to such an agreement involves interpretation of the very sort 
we thought to prepare for. It makes no sense to ask for a common standard of interpretation, for mutual 
interpretation provides the only standard we have.1206 
 
We have reached a situation where the irreducibility of the mental is no longer a matter of the 
“disparate commitments” of the mental and the physical. Instead we see how the irreducibility 
of mental concepts comes back to the fact that they are the base level upon which all 
agreement or disagreement depends. Intersubjectivity is required for thought. The possibility 
of communication and the knowledge of other minds – knowledge about the mental – form 
the basis of our concept of objectivity. There is no going outside this standard to check 
whether or not it is correct. There are application conditions for mental concepts which cannot 
be violated without changing the subject. Mental concepts, in turn, are a prerequisite for the 
concept of objectivity, which for Davidson is the mark of thought. To question the application 
conditions of mental concepts would, ultimately, require questioning our standard of 
objectivity. This cannot be done because this standard is the one against which all other 
standards are measured. The Wittgensteinian tone of Davidson’s position becomes clear from 
the following: 
 
Understanding the mental states of others and understanding nature are cases where questions come to 
an end at different stages. How we measure physical quantities is decided intersubjectively. We cannot 
in the same way go behind our own ultimate norms of rationality in interpreting others.1207  
 
There is a point where questions about the mental come to an end. In my opinion Crane’s 
claim that: “Davidson has to say that there is a point in our investigation of mental 
phenomena where nothing more can be said….”1208 is therefore correct. But the reason that 
                                               
1206 Davidson, 1997c, 83. See also, Davidson, 1998 and especially Davidson, 1991. 
1207 Davidson, 1994a, 233. 
1208 Crane, 2008, 80. 
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we have to stop asking further questions about the nature of the mental is more fundamental 
than  what  Crane  suggests.  It  is  not  merely  that  there  is  a  point  beyond which  nothing  more  
can  be  said  about  mental–physical  relations.  It  is  rather  that  when an  ultimate  disagreement  
about mental facts arises, we cannot seek an answer from any other source than from 
ourselves; in the end everything must come back to interpretation.  
 As  long  as  we  think  that  mutual  interpretation  is  the  only  way  to  find  out  what  
someone believes, we seem to be trapped in a situation where the only objectivity that we can 
get for our norms and standards of rationality come from us, and this in turn requires the 
knowledge of other minds. This problem is stressed on many occasions by Davidson: “The 
trouble with the study of thoughts is that the standards of rationality are not agreed upon. We 
cannot compare our standards with those of others without employing the very standards in 
question.  This  is  a  problem  that  does  not  arise  when  the  subject  matter  is  not  
psychological.”1209 The “subjectivity” of interpretation becomes evident when Davidson 
notes: 
  
If we ask what the criteria are for saying that some object is three feet long, the criteria themselves are 
objective in the sense that we can agree with other people as to what the criteria are. When it comes to 
keeping  track  of  what  is  in  somebody  else’s  mind,  there  is  no  way  to  agree  on  criteria  because  our  
contacts with other minds were the basis of the criteria. So, when we ask ‘what does somebody think, 
believe, or want?’ all we can do is to relate their states of mind to our own states of mind. There is only 
a subjective yardstick.... This is what I take to be the deep difference between the social sciences and 
the physical sciences. There is a sense in which the yardstick we use is unshared when we talk about 
other people, whereas when we are talking about the outside world, it is shared.1210 
 
This captures something of the logic of mental and physical concepts. These conceptual 
reasons are the most effective arguments against mental–physical reducibility. Needless to 
say, these reasons are usually dismissed by scientifically minded philosophers. Davidson 
argues that physical objects and events lie, so to speak, halfway between people and this 
makes  them objective  in  a  different  sense  than  the  concepts  that  apply  to  mental  states  and  
events.  He  notes:  “[…]  external  objects  are  at  an  equal  distance  between  us  and  we  try  to  
triangulate them. But if we ask ourselves about the type of communication between two 
minds, the feature is different.”1211 In the mental case, “the measuring stick is not shared”. 
This  comes  close  to  von  Wright’s  observation  that  the  criteria  for  mental  state  attributions  
differ from the criteria for physical states. 
                                               
1209 Davidson, 2001f, 131. 
1210 Borradori, 1994, 51-52. 
1211 Borradori, 1994, 52. 
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 An interesting question is how much the “subjectivity of the yardstick” depends on the 
fact that interpreter and interpretee have unique collections of mental states. Every object that 
is three meters long is similar to other objects that are three meters long in this sense: they 
share a physical property of being three meters long. How about a group of people who all 
believe that snakes are animals? It is not clear that all these people are similar to each other in 
any interesting respect. It is clear that that they need not share any physical property which 
would correlate to their respective beliefs about snakes. When we talk of people “having the 
same belief” or “sharing a belief”, we mean that they are in states that we can understand. 
The only way we can understand others is to evaluate their states of mind from the 
perspective of our own states.  
 The previous lengthy quote is not just a comment on the difference between the social 
and natural sciences. It is rather a more general observation that our understanding of other 
minds and our understanding of the physical world are different. Someone disagreeing with 
this claim does not grasp the basic idea that Davidson is suggesting, namely, that arriving at 
an understanding of a speaker’s language and thought involves a different kind of procedure 
than arriving at a theory in physics or chemistry. Only the former is called interpretation, and 
this task is governed by different principles than scientific investigation or explanation. This 
simply is Davidson’s reason for believing why the social sciences cannot be reduced to the 
natural ones, or why the notions essential to interpretation cannot be reduced to non-mental 
notions. We have discussed the explanatory functions that Davidson takes mental concepts to 
perform. The variety of these functions can be considered simply by considering how we use 
mental concepts in our life. Two features of mental concepts, which have no echo in physical 
theory, should be emphasized. First, in our mental reality, there is the idea that something 
ought to be in a certain way. Given what a subject thinks, certain implications should follow. 
In the physical realm there is no sense in which objects and situations ought to be one way 
rather  than  another.  If  we  occasionally  use  the  expression  that  things  should  be  this  or  that  
way when describing physical reality, we are merely expressing our expectations about the 
nature of physical phenomena.  
 But the identity of physical objects and events is obviously not governed by normative 
principles. In mental reality, the distinction between is and ought is a constitutive distinction. 
The second aspect that is clearly essential to our mental vocabulary but which is absent in our 
physical vocabulary is the idea of reasonableness. It is hard even to try to describe the 
meaning of this term without using the mental vocabulary to which reasonableness is so 
closely tied. How do you explain in a physical vocabulary that “If S believes that P, it is 
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reasonable for him to believe that Q”? Reasonableness seems to be a crucial feature of 
rational explanations, because when giving these explanations we have to weigh evidence 
according to our own view concerning what seems reasonable. Both these features of mental 
concepts come back to the fact that by using these concepts we are trying to give a certain 
kind of explanation.  
 In what sense does the difference between interpretation and scientific investigation or 
explanation imply the irreducibility of the mental to the physical? It is interesting that the 
difference between these tasks is what, in Davidson’s view, rules out strict psycho-physical 
laws  and  in  this  respect  the  argument  seems  just  to  repeat  the  claim  that  the  conditions  of  
coherence, rationality and consistency have no echo in physical theory, and that bridge-laws 
can exist only between conceptual domains which are, in an abstract sense, similar enough. 
But I think that the more general point is that since any understanding of another mind differs 
in kind from the understanding of the mindless world, there is no way in which the former 
study could be conducted with a methodology that is appropriate in the latter case. It should 
be obvious why cases of interpretation differ from situations where we treat the world as 
mindless. Since normative considerations are absent in the case of, say, biology and geology, 
these sciences can be seen to belong to the same conceptual domain as physics, whether or not 
they in fact reduce to physics. Natural sciences treat the world as mindless, and this is what 
puts them on the same conceptual level with each other.  
 An interesting question is whether mental phenomena should be thought of as being 
essentially different than the phenomena described by the physical sciences. Davidson would 
deny this, because in his view mental phenomena are physical phenomena and a mental 
description of a phenomenon is just one description among others. Kim asks: “If beliefs are 
essentially normative and are posited because of our normative requirement, are there beliefs 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  there  are  physical  objects  and  events,  like  trees  and  
explosions?”1212 This question is obscure, however. What would it mean to say that there are 
beliefs “in the same sense” as there are trees? What would an affirmative answer require? I 
believe that we indeed have to conclude that mental phenomena are different than physical 
phenomena; there are no beliefs in the same sense in which there are physical objects. What 
von Wright has noted about the mode of being of mental phenomena should be taken 
seriously: they have no spatial location and include an irreducible subjective aspect. 
                                               
1212 Kim, 2003, 134. 
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 Because Davidson rejects mental antirealism, he would say that from an ontological 
point of view there is nothing second-grade about mental phenomena and that attributions of 
mental phenomena are as objective as the attribution of physical phenomena. But it seems to 
me that from what has been said above, we should conclude that there is something different, 
something peculiar, about mental states and therefore I believe that Davidson’s claim that 
“judgments concerning these [mental and physical] phenomena are true or false in the same 
way”1213 must be modified. True, mental and physical statements are true “in the same way” 
in the sense that both are responsible to their respective regulative principles and must respect 
them. This, as we have seen, is one reason for the anomalism of the mental. But, as Davidson 
notes,  “[…] there  is  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  case  between the  kind  of  knowledge  we 
have of other minds, and the kind of knowledge we have of external objects.”1214 I think this 
statement raises the question that Kim asks, and although the question is perhaps not as 
ontological as Kim thinks, it certainly seems that there is an essential difference concerning 
the attributions of mental and physical states. Whereas Davidson’s physicalism may lead us to 
think that the physical description of an event is privileged and, consequently, may lead to 
accusations of eliminativism, instrumentalism or antirealism with respect to Davidson’s 
position,  I  think  that  we  should  draw  the  very  opposite  conclusion  about  the  status  of  
Davidson’s position. Given that our understanding of other minds is the basis for our 
knowledge about other things, it follows that “if our judgments of the propositional attitudes 
of others are not objective, no judgments are, and the concept of objectivity has no 
application.”1215 So, pace Bickle, the role of psychology is not to function as a servant for 
neuroscience.  If  we  have  to  put  psychology  and  other  sciences  or  our  mental  and  physical  
vocabularies in order in terms of their epistemological importance, it is psychology which 
leads the others. 
 The irreducibility that we are discussing here is best understood as methodological 
irreducibility. A conflict occurs if there is a methodological difference between the study of 
the mind and the mindless world, and if the reducibility of a theory to another is thought to 
imply that the use of the vocabulary of the reduced theory can be stopped. That mental 
concepts are norm-determined is a description of a feature of their application. There is a 
conviction, for which reasons have been offered, that we have to use two different kinds of 
vocabularies when describing and explaining reality, and Davidson is describing what the 
                                               
1213 Davidson, 1973, 254, my emphasis. 
1214 Borradori, 1994, 54. 
1215 Davidson, 1997c, 84. 
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essential characteristics of each vocabulary are and why these characteristics make the mental 
vocabulary irreducible. As I have emphasized, the irreducibility due to normativity has been 
left without discussion by many critics. “Irreducibility” in this context means “only” that with 
our mental vocabulary it is possible to give descriptions and explanations which cannot be 
given in our physical vocabulary. As long as these descriptions are useful, there is a reason to 
preserve our mental vocabulary and clarify its features and application conditions.  
 It could be argued that the irreducibility of psychology and mental concepts arises 
from a very practical source, namely, from our special interest in interpreting human agents as 
rational agents. We seem to have an interest, perhaps largely biological in nature, for the 
reasons for our actions and other psychological phenomena. Davidson claims:  
 
The constitutive force in the realm of behavior derives from the need to view others, nearly enough, as  
like ourselves. As long as it is behavior and not something else we want to explain and describe, we 
must warp the evidence to fit this frame.... Standing ready, as we must, to adjust psychological terms to 
one set of standards and physical terms to another, we know that we cannot insist on a sharp and law-
like connection between them. The limit thus placed on the social sciences is not set by nature, but by 
us when we decide to view men as rational agents with goals and purposes, and as subject to moral 
evolution.1216  
 
Davidson argues that the irreducibility of the mental is not set by nature but by us. In one of 
his  first  articles  Davidson  admits  that  we  can  choose to treat human beings under physical 
concepts if we wish.1217 We have seen that Bickle, for example, claims that Davidson’s 
argument is without force against new wave reductionism. But this claim neglects Davidson’s 
view about the “deep difference” between psychology and the physical sciences. Bickle’s 
interpretation is based on his reading that: “Anomalousness itself implies nothing about the 
explanatory power of intentional psychology compared with physical science. According to 
Davidson, neurobiological theories might prove to have complete explanatory and 
displacement potential....”1218 Bickle seems to recognize the Davidsonian claim that we can 
choose to treat humans under physical concepts if we wish. Bickle’s interpretation, however, 
suggests that intentional psychology could be compared to physical science, and in doing this 
we would come to realize that the latter is superior and has complete explanatory and 
displacement potential with respect to the former. This cannot be Davidson’s view, since he 
insists that we need two different modes of description, explanation, and prediction to 
understand reality.  
                                               
1216 Davidson, 1974b, 239, my emphasis. 
1217 Davidson, 1964. 
1218 Bickle, 1998, 113. 
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 It is interesting that although Bickle sees Davidson as a contemporary dualist, he 
argues that Davidson can be interpreted also as being a reductive physicalist or eliminativist. 
Bickle quotes Davidson’s following statement: “The nomological irreducibility of the 
psychological... does not mean that there are any events that are in themselves 
underdetermined or unpredictable... events described in appropriate physical terms, are as 
amenable to prediction and explanation as any.” He claims that this justifies the eliminativist 
interpretation.1219 Bickle notes also that, according to Davidson’s monistic view, every mental 
event has also a physical description. Surprisingly, Bickle has failed to note Davidson’s 
conviction that “even if someone knew the entire physical history of the world, and every 
mental event were identical with a physical, it would not follow that he could predict or 
explain a single mental event....”1220 If we recognize that a description formulated in our 
physical vocabulary is not a competitor to a description formulated in our mental vocabulary, 
then questions about explanatory and displacement potential seem to lose their importance 
and in fact, their very intelligibility.  
 
3.3.3 The dispositional character of mental concepts 
 
When discussing the reasons for the irreducibility of the mental, we must keep firmly in mind 
that the discussion of the previous and present sections is based on the view that reduction is a 
relation between linguistic categories, and not between ontological categories. If we think that 
the conceptual framework of folk-psychology or common sense is both useful and 
indispensable, then there is a rationale for studying the logic and principles of this framework 
and the reasons for its irreducibility and indispensability. The main motivation for defending 
our mental vocabulary comes from the conviction that we can do things with this mental 
vocabulary  that  we  cannot  do  with  our  physical  vocabulary.  Because  of  their  propositional  
contents, psychological concepts can be used in reason-based explanations. Given that there 
are these tasks which mental concepts are meant to perform, it is important to realize what it 
is about the concepts that enable us to do this. What kind of concepts are mental concepts?     
 According to Davidson, an essential feature of mental concepts is their holistic and 
normative nature. These features demand the use of interpretative principles which cannot be 
expressed in a vocabulary which is devoid of propositional content, and therefore devoid of 
the logical connections which relate mental phenomena to each other, and which matter for 
                                               
1219 Ibid. 
1220 Davidson, 1974b, 224. 
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psychological explanations. Another aspect of mental concepts that has a role in the 
discussion of the irreducibility of the mental is their dispositional character. Davidson refers 
to this aspect by claiming that mental concepts are causal concepts. This feature was not 
stressed in “Mental Events”, but is something which Davidson strongly emphasized in his 
later writings. Interestingly, Davidson notes that he has “almost from his first essay” 
emphasized the essential and ineliminable way in which causality is built into mental concepts 
and explanations.1221 This is a very interesting remark for the following reason: Davidson is 
often seen as the key figure in restoring philosophers’ faith in the idea that reasons must be 
causes. The previous comment could be read as a suggestion along these lines, that is, as a 
suggestion that Davidson has since the beginning emphasized that mental concepts and 
explanations are causal. This “reductive” reading of Davidson’s position, which equates 
reasons  with  causes,  has  been  the  standard  reading.  But  it  seems  clear  to  me  that  what  
Davidson is saying here means that he has from the beginning emphasized the ineliminable 
causality of mental concepts in the sense that this feature makes these concepts irreducible 
and irreducibly different from physical concepts. 
 In chapter two it was noted that it is part of Davidson’s definition of a strict law that it 
does not deploy dispositional terms or use causal concepts. Davidson claims that certain 
concepts cannot be clearly understood without appealing to causality. These concepts are 
irreducibly causal. Some examples are the concept of favism, of an infectious disease, or of 
sunburn. The first is the concept of an allergic reaction which is caused by the broad bean, the 
second is the concept of a disease which is either capable of causing infection or is caused by 
a micro-organism, the last is a state necessarily caused by the action of the sun. Davidson 
claims that the concept of acting with an intention and the concepts of belief and desire 
belong to these kinds of irreducibly causal concepts. The reason is that an intentional action is 
something which is caused, in the right ways, by beliefs and evaluative attitudes. Mental 
states in general are partly identified on the basis of their causes and effects.  
 Davidson claims, perhaps surprisingly, that getting rid of causal or dispositional 
concepts is a mark of progress in a science. The most developed level would be the level of 
“developed physics”, where all references to causal concepts would have been removed. 
Davidson claims that the promise that all reference to causal concepts can be dropped is 
“intrinsic to physics”.1222 What is meant by the claim that science tries to dispense with causal 
concepts is that in a mature science we would not be satisfied if told, for example, that a glass 
                                               
1221 Davidson, 1999y, 106. 
1222 Davidson, 1997c). 
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broke because it was fragile. It is just when the relevant physical mechanisms are unknown 
that diseases are defined by their causes or symptoms and the breaking of a glass is explained 
by its frangibility. When the mechanism is known, the explanation of why a glass broke will 
not refer to the causal concept of frangibility. The concept “fragile” is no longer needed to 
explain the breaking of the glass.1223 An appeal to causal dispositions leaves something 
unexplained, because it fails to tell what it is about objects that make them behave as they do. 
When we attribute a causal power to an object we say that there is something about it that will 
cause certain effects given the right conditions. This implies that a “deeper” answer is 
available,  an  answer  which  explains  the  causal  properties  of  the  object.  In  the  physical  
sciences which approach, or at least try to approach, the ideal of explanatory unity, there is a 
promise that explanations can be replaced and sharpened without loss. If we can explain the 
mechanism behind favism, as I am sure we already have, and dismiss with the original 
concept, we have not lost anything relevant for explanatory purposes, at least not from the 
perspective of physical science and from the perspective of causal explanations. Davidson’s 
claim is that in the physical sciences there is no reason, save ignorance, why we could not 
substitute non-causal concepts for causal concepts. We should recall what has been noted 
already: sciences, or phenomena, which are not constrained by normative considerations, 
belong to the same conceptual domain. 
 Mental concepts are not like physical concepts because their causal aspect cannot be 
dismissed. It is misleading to say that ordinary common-sense physical concepts, like that of 
solubility, and our mental concepts, like that of belief, are irreducibly causal in the same way. 
It is true that ordinary physical concepts are identified in part also by the sorts of happenings 
they are prone to causing, given the right conditions. But in these cases there is a promise that 
a more detailed explanation for why certain things happened can be given. In the case of 
mental concepts their causal character cannot be dispensed with. Why not? Because: “[Mental 
concepts]... appeal to causality because they are designed, like the concept of causality itself, 
to  single  out  from  the  totality  of  circumstances  which  conspire  to  cause  a  given  event  just  
those factors that satisfy some particular explanatory interest.”1224 Mental concepts have this 
feature because rational explanations are interest-sensitive in a very strong sense. As 
Davidson claims: “When we want to explain an action…  we want to know the agent’s 
reasons,  so  we  can  see  for  ourselves  what  it  was  about  the  action  that  appealed  to  the  
                                               
1223 We can recall Bickle’s comment that there is no such thing as a “psychology of memory consolidation” 
because we already know, at a lower level, what memory consolidation is. When we know what “frangibility” is, 
not just functionally, but, say, on the molecular level, all explanations referring to “frangibility” become otiose. 
1224 Davidson, 1991, 216. 
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agent.”1225 We should consider what is being done with mental concepts and how this 
explains some of their features. Remove these features and the concepts cannot perform the 
tasks they were originally meant to perform any longer. We could claim that removing certain 
essential features of mental concepts would make them unsuitable for the language-game 
which was originally their home. 
 According to Davidson, both mental concepts as well as the concept of causality itself 
are “designed” to single out a factor or factors that answer to our explanatory interests. When 
we want to explain an action, we select,  interpret,  the  agent’s  reason(s)  so  that  we  can  see  
what it was about the action that appealed to the agent – and by doing this, we rationalize the 
action. For this kind of explanation of action, we have to select the right conceptual 
connection that the agent saw, or thought he saw. Likewise, in the case of physical events, we 
often choose the cause in a way that depends on our explanatory interests. This means that, 
depending on the vocabulary we use to identify an event, different sorts of explanation are 
appropriate. The language of causality itself has no place in strict laws, because when we use 
the language of causality we select causal factors whereas strict laws don’t select; that is 
precisely what, in Davidson’s opinion, makes laws strict. Perhaps the view that mental 
concepts are designed to single out specific causal factors already explains why they cannot 
be reduced to strict laws. But there is an additional reason that prevents the reduction. It is the 
way that we choose what the specific causal factor is. Namely:  
 
[...] beliefs, which are also causal dispositions, are specified in terms of their relations to one another 
and  to  the  events  and  objects  in  the  world,  and,  in  judging  the  relevance  of  these  relations  to  the  
identification of particular beliefs, norms are necessarily employed. In order to keep intact the 
normative features that help define beliefs and other thoughts, a degree of looseness in their 
connections with events as described in non-cognitive terms is required.1226 
 
Not surprisingly, it is again the normative dimension of the mental which makes the causality 
of  mental  concepts  a  special  case.  The  holism  and  externalism  of  mental  states  are  used  to  
defend  the  claim  that  mental  concepts  are,  so  to  speak,  “doubly-causal”,  since  they  are  
identified both in relation to each other and with respect to the outside world. These relations 
cannot be observed to hold without the infiltration of some normative methodology. As 
Davidson notes, the normative features must be kept “intact”, which is to repeat the claim that 
in belief attribution we cannot step outside our conceptual framework of the mental, which 
does not share its constitutive features with the physical. In the case of the mental, causality is 
                                               
1225 Ibid. 
1226 Davidson, 1990b, 98, my emphasis. 
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connected with the normative demands of rationality; causality enters the picture in a very 
different way than in cases where we describe physical objects and events in terms of causal 
concepts. Perhaps it could be said that in the case of physical events and objects one can, in a 
sense, see that there is a causal relation between physical phenomena. It is of course an old 
idea that one cannot really see the relation of causality itself, the relation is inferred. But 
consider the paradigmatic example, a billiard ball B hitting ball B1 thus causing B1 to move. 
In the colloquial language we certainly say that we saw that  B  caused  B1’s movement. We 
cannot  in  the  same way say  that  we  saw a  belief  causing  an  action  or  that  we  saw how the 
belief  caused  an  action.  I  suspect  that  a  large  part  of  the  problem  of  mental  causation  is  a  
result  of  the  fact  that  our  concept  of  causality  is  applicable,  first  and  foremost,  to  physical  
objects and events, to those objects and events that can be publicly observed.  Therefore the 
problem of mental causation is, above all else, a result of a conceptual confusion. The concept 
of  causation  is  from  the  physical  realm  and  we  attempt  to  apply  it  to  mental  reality;  this  
results in confusion. 
 Strict laws do not employ causal concepts, and since mental concepts are irreducibly 
causal they cannot occur in strict laws. An interesting question is whether mental concepts are 
unsuitable for strict laws because they are irreducibly causal concepts or whether they are 
causal concepts because they are irreducible. Should the causal nature of mental concepts be 
used  to  defend  their  irreducibility  to  strict  laws,  or  should  we  conclude  that  these  concepts  
operate in a different way than physical concepts precisely because they cannot be 
incorporated into the realm of physical concepts? Is there a reason to argue that the situation 
could be seen in both ways? Davidson notes: “[...] belief, desire, intention and action... are 
concepts that cannot, without losing the explanatory power they have which binds us to them, 
be reduced to the concepts of an all-encompassing physics.”1227 He claims also that “the fact 
that [mental] concepts are causal concepts makes those concepts ineligible for inclusion in 
strict laws.”1228 Here the claim is clearly that mental concepts, because they are causal, 
cannot be used in strict laws. Their special explanatory power, due the fact that mental 
concepts are causal concepts, prevents their reduction to physics. Psychology concentrates on 
the causal role of reasons. But this view should be compared to the following: “I have been 
suggesting that appeal to causal concepts is appropriate to the explanation of action in part 
precisely because strict laws are not available”.1229 Here the suggestion seems to be that since 
                                               
1227 Davidson, 1995c, 216. 
1228 Davidson, 1993e, 312. 
1229 Davidson, 1987a, 109. 
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there are no strict laws of action, or more generally, strict laws involving the mental, the idea 
of causal powers, of certain things making other things happen, has survived in the case of 
mental, whereas this idea becomes extinct in physics. If appropriate laws were available, there 
would be no need to describe causes in terms of the effects they tended to produce.  
 It seems that with respect to this question Davidson has gone through a change of 
mind, or he has at least later clarified his earlier views to a notable extent. In 1973 Davidson 
writes: “Unavoidable mention of causality is a cloak for ignorance; we must appeal to the 
notion of cause when we lack detailed and accurate laws. In the analysis of action, mention of 
causality takes up some of the slack between analysis and science.”1230 From this statement 
we get the impression that an appeal to the concept of cause is necessary because we are 
ignorant of the strict laws that back up the causal relation. This, of course, relates to 
Davidson’s view that each singular causal relation must be covered by some strict law. In the 
analysis of action, the law would be expressed in terms of our physical vocabulary, and 
ultimately, in terms of our finished physics. But we do not have knowledge of the relevant 
law; we are ignorant about it. However, in 1990 Davidson writes: “The ‘unscientific’ concept 
of cause takes up the slack [between beliefs and events described in non-cognitive terms]. 
This slack is not the slack of ignorance: it is the slack that must exist between two schemes of 
description and explanation, one, the mental, being essentially normative, the other not.”1231 I 
think we can conclude that also the argument against reducibility, which is based on the 
dipositional character of mental concepts, comes back to the view that mental concepts serve 
different purposes than physical concepts – and this is what creates the real slack between the 
two vocabularies. What in my opinion is essential is Davidson’s later view that this slack does 
not occur because of ignorance, it occurs because there cannot be strict psycho-physical laws 
and thus some slack between the mental and physical must exist.  
 Here we encounter another reason why strict psycho-physical laws are impossible: if 
mental concepts were reduced to physical concepts, they would lose their essential causal 
character (which connects with the normative demands of rationality) – and this reduction 
would, once again, amount to changing the subject from the mental to the physical. 
Davidson’s change of mind about the dispositional nature of mental concepts is important for 
the following reason: if we are under the assumption that the mention of causality is due to 
ignorance, we may be tempted to conclude that this ignorance may be cleared once our 
scientific knowledge increases. This, in essential respects, is how eliminativists or reductivists 
                                               
1230 Davidson, 1973b, 80. 
1231 Davidson, 1990b, 98, my emphasis. 
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think. They claim that the explanatory power of mental explanations is not special and will 
eventually be explained in terms of physical mechanisms; this will make the former 
explanations redundant. If the explanatory power of mental explanations will not be explained 
in terms of physical mechanisms, the explanations will be considered pseudo-explanations 
and will ultimately be eliminated. If one is not willing to accept the radical Davidsonian 
conclusion, one is perhaps tempted to think that the irreducibility of the mental is just a 
practical matter which troubles us now, but which can be solved in the future. This would 
mean that the irreducibility of the mental is not principled. Davidson’s reformulated claim 
that the slack between the mental and the physical must prevail dismisses the possibility that 
the slack could be removed as science progresses.1232 
 
3.3.3.1 AM’s relation to the functional model of reduction 
 
In section 3.3.1.1, the question of whether new wave reductionism can avoid Davidson’s 
challenge was considered. The conclusion was that Davidson’s views about the irreducibility 
of the mental have not been fully addressed by Bickle. Because the model of new wave 
reduction is still programmatic, the final verdict about its relation to the Davidsonian view 
cannot be fully stated.  In this section I claim that also another new form of reduction, Kim’s 
model of functional reduction, can be challenged by Davidson’s arguments. Kim recognizes 
this.1233 He leaves Davidson’s arguments without discussion. My purpose is to consider how 
the model of functional reduction could be evaluated from a “Davidsonian perspective”. Kim 
offers his model of reduction as the best, and perhaps only, alternative for saving physicalism, 
and therefore its success is relevant for those who doubt the prospects of physicalism. 
Evaluating how the “best” model of reduction relates to Davidson’s arguments against the 
reducibility of the mental is also helpful in deciding whether Davidsonian views are still 
relevant. A thorough analysis of Kim’s position cannot be done here, so my exposition will be 
somewhat cursory and tailored to the above purpose. 
 As I showed in the previous section, Davidson argues that mental concepts are 
irreducibly causal. This claim has certain similarities to Kim’s view that mental concepts are 
functional concepts. The basic idea of functionalism is that mental states are constituted by 
their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. AM’s 
                                               
1232 It is not clear whether Davidson changed his mind. If not, the later way to put the issue is more illuminating. 
Davidson (1993e, 312) himself notes that the previous formulation was “misleading”. 
1233 See Kim, 1998, 93 fn. 7. 
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relation to functionalism is an interesting question.1234 Notwithstanding Davidson’s relation to 
the “program of functionalism”, he nevertheless thinks of mental states in roughly the same 
way as many functionalists do. Although Davidson does not think of mental states as internal 
entities  mediating  between  input  and  behavioral  output,  he  thinks  that  mental  states  are  
specified in terms of their relations to each other and to events and objects in the world. From 
this an interesting question follows. Kim has claimed that:  
 
If the functionalist conception of the mental is correct… then mind-body reduction is in principle 
possible… This is contrary to one piece of current philosophical wisdom, the claim that 
functionalism… is a form… of mind–body antireductionism. What I am urging… is the exact opposite 
– that the functionalist conception of mental properties is required for mind–body reduction.1235 
 
The interesting question is this. Davidson insists that mental concepts are causal concepts and 
Kim insists that mental concepts should be defined in terms of their causal roles if mind–body 
reduction is to be a possibility. Does Davidson’s understanding of mental concepts therefore 
actually lead to the possibility of their reducibility? 
 Kim’s occasional claims about the nature of mental properties actually come quite 
close to Davidson’s view. First of all, Kim suggests that we should stop thinking of mental 
properties as higher level properties and should instead formulate the discussion in terms of 
higher level concepts. This is surprising given that Kim insists that the problem of mental 
causation is, above else, the problem of how the “mental qua mental” can be causally 
efficacious. We have also seen that Kim wants to address the “robustly metaphysical” 
problem of mental properties. Sometimes Kim however argues that we should give up the talk 
of second-order properties in favor of second-order concepts. As far as I can see, this is 
essentially the Davidsonian view. As I have shown, in his view the mental is a conceptual 
category and Davidson wants to have the discussion in terms of mental predicates and not in 
terms of mental properties. In fact, the following statement of Kim could be from Davidson:  
 
The use of second-order property designators probably is unavoidable, and we should recognize that 
these designators introduce a set of useful and practically indispensable concepts that group first-order 
properties in ways that are essential for descriptive and communicative purposes.1236 
                                               
1234 For considerations about AM’s relation to functionalism, see Mcdowell, 1985. We have already seen that 
Davidson’s arguments for the irreducibility of the mental are essentially different than the standard argument of 
functionalism, which refers to multiple realizability. Therefore, as I noted in section 2.1.1, AM and functionalism 
are often referred as two different arguments against type-physicalism. As Kim (2003) correctly notes, 
Davidson’s antireductionist arguments differ from functionalism in an important respect, namely, whereas 
functionalism allows local reductions, the anomalism of the mental disallows even one-way laws like the ones 
that are supposed to connect mental states to their physical realizers. In fact, it seems to me that it is questionable 
whether functionalism should be considered as a form of non-reductive physicalism.  
1235 Kim, 1998, 101. 
1236 Kim, 1998, 105. 
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This view comes actually very close to Quine’s view. When Quine accepted AM he claimed 
that mental concepts are practically indispensable and insisted that we have to settle for a 
dualism of concepts. The only thing a “Davidsonian” would change from the previous quote 
is the term “probably” and would argue that, in the case of the mental, the use of second-order 
property designators is necessary. It seems to me that Kim’s view here is in essential respects 
similar  to  the  view  that  I  briefly  considered  and  suggested  as  an  answer  to  the  question  of  
whether mental properties are physical properties.1237 The view is that “the concepts 
introduced by second-order designators pick out first-order properties disjunctively”.1238 So 
far there is no fatal disagreement between Kim and Davidson.1239 Moreover, although Kim 
does mention Davidson in this context, the suggestion that multiply realizable properties, for 
example mental properties, are causally and nomologically heterogenous kinds is basically the 
view which was suggested already in “Mental Events”. Consider Kim’s claim:  
  
What lends unity to the talk of dormitivity and such is conceptual unity, not the unity of some 
underlying property. Qua property, dormitivity is heterogenous and disjunctive, and it lacks the kind of 
causal homogeneity and projectibility that we demand from kinds and properties useful in formulating 
laws and explanations. But dormitivity may well serve important conceptual and epistemic needs, by 
grouping properties that share features of interest to us in a given context of inquiry.1240 
 
Given the view that was suggested in section 2.3.6 we should  agree  with  this  proposal;  the  
quote  seems to  also  agree  with  the  spirit  of  Davidson’s  argument.  But  Kim also  thinks  that  
mental states are locally reducible to physical states. Should we agree with this? Accepting 
the claim that local reducibility of mental is possible surely seems to undermine the strong 
commitment to the irreducibility of the mental. It could be claimed that Davidson is dogmatic 
about the irreducibility of the mental when he claims that this irreducibility is principled. On 
the other hand, he has also discussed the possibility of local token-reductions. Perhaps the 
reducibility of the mental is a possibility if the requirements of reduction are loosened. We 
have seen that Davidson has very high standards of reducibility in mind, and this being the 
case it is possible that reduction with looser requirements could be accepted from Davidson’s 
                                               
1237 See section 2.3.6. 
1238 Kim, 1998, 105. 
1239 Although I do recognize the possibility that if one interprets Davidson as a nominalist he would perhaps 
dismiss the suggestion that mental properties are physical properties. But as we have seen, Davidson does not 
seem to be uncomfortable speaking of physical properties. 
1240 Kim, 1998, 110. 
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point of view.1241  Therefore, we should not dismiss the possibility of functional reduction 
straightforwardly but consider its plausibility by evaluating Kim’s view. 
 In the following I will briefly consider how Kim’s functional model of reduction is 
supposed to work.1242 Let us suppose that we want to reduce a mental  property M to a base 
domain  of  properties  B.  The  first  step  is  to  functionalize  M,  by  construing  it  as  a  property  
defined by its causal / nomic relations to other properties. We construe M as a second-order 
property, which is defined by its causal role .1243 We give a causal specification H which 
describes the typical causes and effects of M. As a result, we understand M as a property with 
certain  causal  potentials.  What  is  important  is  that  the  functionalization  of  M  requires  a  
functional definition of M, which takes the following form:  
 
 Having M = def. having some property or other P (in the reduction base 
 domain) such that P performs causal task C.1244 
 
The property, for example, of being a gene is a second order property or second order 
concept. We define it as being a mechanism that encodes and transmits genetic information. 
This is the causal task C. On this model, being a gene (property M) is defined in terms of its 
causal task (C) and, by definition, P is the property which performs this causal task. 
Functionalization of M thus requires conceptual connections – definitions – which provide 
conceptual or semantic relations between the phenomena at higher and lower levels. The 
second  step  is  to  find  the  realizer(s)  of  M  in  the  base  domain  B,  that  is,  to  find  those  
properties or mechanisms in B that perform the task C. This means that in order to reduce M 
we have to identify it with its realizer P. The third step is to construct a theory explaining how 
P performs the causal task C. This model involving the three steps is precisely Kim’s 
functional model of reduction. It consists of: 1) functionalizing M; 2) finding the realizers of 
M in B; and 3) constructing a theory about how the realizer performs the causal / functional 
task which is assigned to it in the first step. 
 All of this looks good in theory and on paper. But I think that the explanatory answers 
that Kim obtains sound too good. For example, to the question “Why is it that whenever a 
                                               
1241 Davidson notes (1987a, 111): “I was interested in the question whether reason-explanations are or ever could 
be just like the best explanations for which physics strives.” A reason why Kim does not consider Davidson’s 
arguments is precisely that, according to Kim, Davidson’s requirements for reduction are unrealistic. 
1242 The details can be found in Kim, 1998, 1999, and 2005. 
1243 As was noted earlier it is perhaps better to think of M as second-order property designator or second-order 
concept than as a second order property. 
1244 Kim, 2005, 101.  
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property P is realized in a system s, it instantiates a mental property M?” Kim answers: “[…] 
by definition, having M is having a property with causal specification D, and in systems like 
s, P is the property (or one of the properties) meeting specification D. For systems like s, then 
having M consists in having P.”1245 Why  does  the  system  s  instantiate  M  and  not  M*  
whenever it instantiates P? Because in systems like s, P is a realizer of M and not of M*. 
These are satisfying answers according to Kim. But are they really? Obviously, it is possible 
to state by definition that having M is having a physical property, which performs such and 
such functions – and that there is a certain low-level property which performs this function. 
But what does this definition tell us without actual functionalizations? Does it tell us anything 
more than von Wright’s observation that token physicalism can be taken to be trivially true? 
Without actual functionalizations, Kim’s model says very little about the actual connections 
between M and P properties.1246 Indeed, as Kim himself notes, “definitions are free” – if we 
please, we can define M as “having some property or other P such that P performs causal task 
C.” But what does this tell us about the prospects of the actual reducibility or irreducibility of 
the  mental?  A  wise  move  on  Kim’s  part  is  the  following:  In  “Having  M  =  def. having some 
property  satisfying  causal  role  C”,  we  do  not  refer  to  a  property M.  If  M  here  refers  to  
anything, it refers to the concept or term M. The definition gives information about the 
concept M or about the meaning of M. This is a clever move because it allows Kim to say that 
such a definition in reductive explanations does not violate the following constraint on 
reductive explanations:  
 
(R) The explanatory premises of a reductive explanation of a phenomenon involving 
property F (e.g., an explanation of why F is instantiated on this occasion) must not 
refer to F.1247 
 
If  we  want  to  reductively explain  M  (“F”  in  the  above  constraint),  we  have  to  explain  it  
without invoking the property M or other properties at the level of M. Otherwise the 
                                               
1245 Kim, 1998, 24. 
1246 We should, of course, acknowledge that Kim’s model of reduction is a philosophical suggestion which is 
meant to give one possible picture of the relation between mind and matter. Kim argues that the relation must be 
something like this if we would like to give a reductive answer to the problem of mental causation. This is 
actually Kim’s whole point in his 1998 and 2005. But it seems to me that without actual reductions, there is no 
way  to  defend  Kim’s  model  as  an  answer  to  the  question  of  whether  M  properties  really  do  reduce  to  P  
properties. Kim’s philosophical point is that given certain assumptions of physicalism, local reductions must be 
possible. This is an interesting conceptual argument, but its merit depends on the question of whether other 
physicalistic principles are accepted. 
1247 Kim, 2005, 105. 
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explanation would not be reductive – reduction would not be achieved. So, why does x (a 
person or a system) have M at time t? We have the following kind of explanation (E): 
 
 x has P at t. 
 P satisfies causal role C (in systems like x). 
 Having M = def. having some property satisfying causal role C. 
 Therefore, x has M at t. 
 
According to Kim, the third line in the explanation does not refer to property M, but to the 
concept M. In order to reductively explain why x has M, we must formulate a definition like 
the one given on the third line in the explanation. 
 Let us suppose that we want to know why “Jones is in M” where M refers to a certain 
mental state. Would the kind of explanation given above be a satisfying answer? In some 
sense it could be claimed, yes. Let us suppose that we have defined M functionally and we 
have found its realizers. Then we could say that Jones is in M because he is in P. It is, 
however,  unclear  how  well  or  whether  this  would  satisfy  our  epistemic  interests  on  the  
occasion  –  but  we  can  grant  that  the  explanation  would  at  least  give  one answer to the 
question of “Why Jones is in M.” If this kind of explanation were available, perhaps that 
would be all we would want from a physicalistic perspective. The answer “M is there because 
P is there” is all that a physicalist studying the brain would want to know. This explanation 
would be a contribution to physicalism. However, even if we grant this, I believe there are 
reasons to be dissatisfied with the functional model of reduction. 
 First, how should we functionalize specific beliefs? How do you individuate beliefs? 
Whereas “gene” can be defined as “the mechanism that encodes and transmits genetic 
information”, what should we say of a belief that “Snow is white”? It is hard to think how we 
might start functionalizing it. If the functionalizability of specific beliefs is not required, then 
what grounds have we for the claim that we have “reduced minds”? Kim recognizes this 
problem of functionalizability, but comments:  
 
[…] partial functional analyses of these [mental] properties… can get us going with the scientific 
projects of searching for the underlying physical / biological mechanisms. We don’t have to know all 
the things that belief does before we start work on uncovering its possible neural mechanisms….1248 
 
                                               
1248 2005, 167. 
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But this view, as with so many other physicalistic assumptions, seems to be based on faith. 
Why suppose that partial functional analyses are available and why suppose that these would 
get us going with the scientific projects? What is a partial functional analysis of jealousy or 
love? Kim does not give answers. He does not suggest how we might actually functionalize 
mental properties, and the claim is basically that he does not see principled obstacles for 
functionalization and that he remains unconvinced by arguments to the contrary.1249 
 Second,  a  closely  related  question  is  that  of  how  to  find  the  realizers  of  mental  
properties. Kim’s only suggestion in this regard is that this is the task of the scientists. 
Whereas Kim is carrying on a philosophical project, he gladly seems to hand the final task of 
reduction to scientists. But this proposal simply ignores the arguments of von Wright, 
Davidson, Malcolm and Wittgenstein. How can the realizers of mental phenomena be found if 
the very idea of token identity is confused? Third, Kim is almost completely silent about the 
question of whether Davidsonian arguments against the reducibility of the mental could be 
relevant when considering the plausibility of functional reduction. There are reasons to think 
that they could be relevant, and in fact there are a few hints which suggest that perhaps, 
despite his dismissal of Davidson’s argument based on the non-availability of strict laws, Kim 
thinks so too. We should remember that the question here is whether psychology, the concepts 
it uses, or the phenomena to which it refers, reduce to lower level sciences. Kim notes:  
 
Davidson’s argument depends on mental anomalism, which in turn depends on the supposed special 
character of mental phenomena… namely their normativity and rationality. For this reason there is no 
reason to think that his argument can be generalized outside the mental domain.1250 
 
This  is  a  very strange comment given that the issue is precisely one of the reducibility or 
irreducibility of mental domain! On the one hand, Kim says that if psychology is reducible by 
the same standards that apply to the best cases of theory reduction in the sciences, would it 
not be enough? But on the other hand, as we have seen, Kim himself raises the problem that 
psychology may differ from biology because of the normative role of the former and notes 
that this question should be considered in the discussion about the reducibility of the mental. 
Unfortunately he does not consider it. However, Kim’s comment that he has not come across 
“a totally convincing refutation of Davidson’s argument”1251 suggests that an argument based 
                                               
1249 Perhaps Kim would say that the actual functionalization is not a philosopher’s task. This could be a plausible 
reply but without a suggestion about how mental properties could be functionalized, is the model offered 
anything more than a proposal that we reduce mental states to physical states by showing what the physical 
counterparts of mental states are? This sounds trivial. 
1250 Kim, 1998, 92. 
1251 Kim, 1993a, xiii. 
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on the normativity of the mental could, also according to Kim, be relevant for the question the 
(ir)reducibility of the mental and the reducibility of the physical. From a personal 
correspondence with Kim I got the impression that in his view a functional reduction could 
suffice to explain the causal powers of mental states, but it would not completely reduce the 
mental because functional reduction misses the normative aspect of mental states. This 
answer, insofar as it admits that the normative aspect of mental is irreducible to the physical, 
would satisfy a Davidsonian, who would not insist on anything more. 
 A fourth problem which connects with the previous question is this. Although 
Davidson thinks that beliefs are specified in terms of their relations to each other, he insists 
that in judging the relevance of these relations norms are necessarily employed. In section 
3.3.2 we saw how this should be understood; there is, in a sense, an irreducibly subjective 
aspect in interpretation that cannot be eliminated. Any attempt to eliminate it is itself an act of 
interpretation. It seems that there is therefore a very general question as to whether, even if a 
functionalization of mental properties were possible, the identities so established would be 
subordinate  to  our  normal  attributions  of  mental  properties.  If,  as  von  Wright  claims,  the  
behavioral level has a semantic priority over the mental and the mental level has an epistemic 
priority over the neural, then it seems to follow that explanations like (E) are secondary when 
compared to our ordinary ways of establishing whether or why “Jones  is  in  M at  t”.  I  think  
that although (E) gives one kind of answer to the question of “Why Jones is in M”, the answer 
in terms of mental concepts would, because of the epistemic priority of the mental, be more 
basic than (E). It is not clear that Kim would have to absolutely oppose this, because he does 
not draw eliminativist consequences from the possibility of reductions. To grant the epistemic 
priority of the mental is to grant the irreducibility or autonomy of the mental.  
 The discussion here may give the impression that I associate Davidson’s views with 
functionalism and that a functional model of reduction looks plausible. With respect to both, 
the opposite is true. I think it is unclear what a philosopher claims when he says that mental 
states are “functional states”. A common understanding is that what makes something a 
mental state is the role which it has in the system of which it is a part. The identity of a mental 
state is to be determined by its causal relations to sensory stimulations, to other mental states, 
and to consequent behavior. But consider how we attribute beliefs to Georg. Let us suppose 
that we do it more or less in the Davidsonian way. Davidson, von Wright and Kim agree that 
intentional states are supervenient on behavioral and other observable physical facts. As a 
result of observing Georg’s behavior, we attribute to him the belief that “It is going to rain.” 
The important question which we have already considered is: what kind of an entity are we 
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attributing  to  Jones?  This  was  the  question  of  section  2.5,  and  the  conclusion  was  that  von  
Wright  and  Davidson  do  not  think  of  mental  states  as  internal  entities.  This  being  the  case,  
they would say that an attribution of mental states is not an attribution of brain states to the 
subject. The further questions which may arise from the attributions of mental states are 
secondary to the insight that these states are necessarily related to behavior. The necessity 
should be understood in the light of von Wright’s claim that behavior is the criterion of the 
mental and that the nature of the “purely mental” can be only be grasped through a 
counterfactual move. The relation between mental and neural states is accidental, whereas the 
relation between behavior and the mental is not.  
 One could understand functionalism also in a way which does not imply that a mental 
state is a brain state mediating between inputs and outputs; perhaps the state could be 
understood as a state of the whole person. Putnam, a former defender of functionalism asks: 
“Does it… make sense to suppose that what I am doing when I ascribe a belief… to someone 
is engaging in a bit of proto-scientific speculation about the internal causes of their 
behavior?”1252 According to Putnam, the functionalist conception of a psychological state 
accepted by Kim posits the existence of psychological theory which treats psychological 
states as theoretical entities which are to be identified with internal physical states of the 
subject. It is claimed that common-sense psychological concepts refer to these theoretical 
entities  and  are  meant  to  give  causal explanations of behavior in terms of functionally 
characterized internal states. Like Putnam, interpretationists would say that in attributing 
mental  states  we  are  not  engaging  in  proto-scientific  speculations  about  internal  causes.  As  
Child  notes,  “interpretationist  [claims]  that  part  of  what  it  is  for  a  creature  to  have  a  given  
attitude is for it to have a certain rationally specified disposition.”1253 As we saw in sections 
3.3.2 and 3.3.3, this is Davidson’s view about attitudes. But this view, as Child also notes:  
 
[…] is much weaker than common-sense functionalism...  for… [common sense functionalism]… 
requires, not just that a creature as a whole be organized in such a way that it has the relevant 
dispositional property, but that the psychologically specified causal roles be played by internal states or 
properties naturally identifiable in non-psychological terms.1254 
 
If we agree with von Wright and Davidson that the supervenience relation between the mental 
and the physical is a semantic relation, then there is little reason to think that that a similarity 
                                               
1252 Putnam, 1999, 114. 
1253 Child, 1994, 80, my emphasis. 
1254 Ibid. 
445 
 
at the mental level implies a similarity at the physical level.1255 Whereas it is conceivable in 
the context of O-physicalism to think that if Donald and Georg are identical physically then 
they are identical mentally, what reasons do we have for thinking that “mental identity” would 
imply physical identity? Kim’s model of functional reduction requires the existence of 
species-specific or structure-specific bridge-laws. But why accept the existence of even such 
laws, i.e. why think that if I now believe that Q (I thus have the property M) and “having M = 
def. having  some  property  satisfying  causal  role  C”  and  given  that  P  satisfies  this  role  C,  it  
would be the case that if I believed Q, tomorrow it would be because I am in P? Do structure-
specific laws apply for future cases? Kim’s view about the nature of these laws is not entirely 
clear. He insists that, at the very least, there have to be local reductions even if they are only 
for single individuals at a particular moment of their lives.1256 But would anyone, except a 
strong substance dualist, deny this?1257  
 Let us suppose, to continue our example, that we have attributed the belief “It is going 
to rain” to Georg. Let us in addition suppose, in favor of Kim and pace the interpretationists, 
that this belief is a certain physical property P of Georg. For reducing the mental property of 
Georg to a physical property, the former must be functionalized. As we have seen, Kim often 
uses the properties of “being a gene” and “being in pain” as examples of properties which 
have been functionalized. Let us not dispute the case of “being a gene”, which is a higher 
order physical property. But what can be said about pain? Kim suggests that “for an organism 
to be in pain is for it to be in some internal state that is typically caused by tissue damage and 
that typically causes groans, winces, and other characteristic pain behavior.”1258 But obviously 
an organism could be in pain without suffering any tissue damage, as the phenomenon of 
phantom pain shows. An organism can be in pain even though it does not groan and wince; I 
could just assert very calmly that I am in pain. I can be truly in pain without suffering tissue 
damage or without wincing and groaning; we have agreed that there is an irreducible 
subjective element related to pain which cannot be captured in terms of behavioral criteria. If 
being in pain is “typically” caused by certain factors or is “apt” to cause certain reactions, 
what does this definition tell us about the question of whether pain is reducible to property P? 
It is interesting that, according to Kim, a functional definition of property M is actually a 
matter of establishing a conceptual or definitional connection between M and the causal role 
                                               
1255 See section 2.3.6 
1256 Kim (2005, 25) notes: “[…] individual pains must… reduce to their respective neural / physical realizers.”  
1257 The problem comes back to the question of what kind of entities mental states are. I may be perfectly entitled 
to ascribe the belief “Paris is the capital of France” to Donald without there being anything which is this belief in 
the brain of Donald.  
1258 Kim, 1998, 19. 
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that it is meant to perform. He claims that conceptual decisions are often based on empirical 
knowledge of the relations in which M is embedded, and in practice the boundary between 
what is conceptual and what is not is going to be vague and shifting.1259  
 We cannot specify what it is to believe that it is going to rain; how could we define a 
functional role which could be associated with this belief? We can roughly specify in mental 
terms a causal role characteristically played by a certain type of belief. But this specification 
is guided by our considerations of what is or would be rational for the interpretee to believe, 
and  the  specification  is  thus  guided  by  the  norms of  the  interpreter.  Whereas  Kim says  that  
conceptual decisions are often based on empirical knowledge, Davidson thinks otherwise. 
According to him attitudes are dispositions; but they are not merely physical dispositions, 
they  are  also  rational  dispositions.  This  entails  a  conceptual connection between having an 
attitude and having a tendency to act in certain ways. But since the ascription of attitudes is 
constrained by normative considerations, the question of what attitudes a creature has cannot 
be  wholly  an  empirical  question.  Nothing  can  count  as  a  belief  if  it  does  not  meet  the  
standards of rationality. When Kim says that the nomic / causal involvement of M is defining 
or constitutive of M, he is claiming that we can empirically find out what kind of relations M 
has to other things. But how could we? We could observe how the belief that it is going to 
rain manifests itself in the behavior of Georg and how it is related to his other beliefs, but in 
observing this we would have to evaluate the relevance of these relations from our point of 
view according to the norms of rationality. This being the case, the functional definition of M 
would actually be an artifact of interpretation and it would not, pace Kim, be based on 
empirical knowledge. This fact sends us back to the situation where the mental level, with its 
norms, is always privileged over the functional definitions that are a result of interpretation at 
the mental level. This is the point that, in their respective ways, both Davidson and von 
Wright make. 
 
3.4.4 Externalism 
 
One more reason for the irreducibility of the mental, which despite its importance does not 
receive much discussion in Davidson’s writings, is externalism. The alleged externalism of 
mental states is an interesting argument against the reducibility of the mental, because it 
perhaps tells us something about states of minds and not just about the ways we talk about 
                                               
1259 See Kim, 1999. 
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these states. The irreducibility which follows from externalism moves the discussion from the 
conceptual to a more ontological level. This is perhaps not the way that Davidson would have 
described the situation, since for him the mental constitutes a conceptual and not an 
ontological category. However, as I have argued, the question of the sense and extent to 
which mental states can be reduced to brain states may be interesting. Can beliefs be found 
inside the brain? Where in physical reality are my beliefs? Some philosophers think that these 
are not especially interesting questions. There are good reasons to assume that most cognitive 
scientists or neurophilosophers think otherwise. I think that an answer to this question has 
some relevance  to  some questions in the philosophy of mind and for sciences studying the 
mind.  
 Let us suppose that I have a belief and you have attributed the belief to me by familiar 
means.  If  externalism  is  true,  it  seems  that  we  have  no  other  way  than  the  familiar  way  to  
make mental state attributions; we cannot find states of mind just by looking into the brain.1260 
This in turn would mean that states of the mind are not intrinsic states of an agent, or at least 
that that they cannot be identified by studying the internal constitution of the agent alone. 
Davidson discusses externalism and its relation to the irreducibility of the mental in two ways. 
On the one hand, the claim about externalism seems to be an epistemological claim, but on 
the other hand at times Davidson seems to be making more of an ontological claim. It is 
surprising that only few commentators have discussed this aspect of the irreducibility of the 
mental.1261 It is possible that most commentators equate the dispositional character of mental 
concepts with the externalism of mental states.1262 What may cause confusion is Davidson’s 
statement that one reason for the irreducibility of the mental is the “causal character of mental 
concepts”.1263 By this expression Davidson is however not referring to the argument described 
in section 3.3.3. After discussing the dispositional character of mental concepts, Davidson 
notes that:  
 
                                               
1260 This is especially true with respect to beliefs; the situation is more complex with respects to beliefsc.  If O-
physicalism is true, they should literally be inner states of an agent. 
1261 The few exceptions are Shea, 2003, Rowlands, 1990 and Dardis, 2008. 
1262 At times Davidson seems not to make a very clear distinction, as far as the irreducibility of the mental is 
concerned, between the dispositional character and externalism of mental concepts. He claims, for example, that: 
“[…] states of mind… are identified in part of their social and historical context in which they are acquired; in 
this respect they are like other states that are identified by their causes, such as suffering from snow blindness or 
favism….” (Davidson, 1988a, 51) In section 3.3.3 we saw how favism was used as an example of a causal 
concept, and the claim was that one reason for the irreducibility of the mental is the fact that mental concepts are 
also causal concepts. 
1263 See Davidson, 1995a. 
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There is one more... consideration which militates against the nomological and  definitional reduction 
of mental concepts to those of physics: the fact that propositional attitudes and related events and states 
are in part identified in terms of their causal and other relations to events extraneous in time and place...  
If externalisms of these sorts are... dominant and unavoidable features of the mental, the impossibility 
of incorporating psychology into a unified scientific theory of the world is clear.1264  
 
Davidson concludes that the “externalism” of mental states and events can be used to 
discredit type–type identity theories.1265 This aspect of the irreducibility of the mental has 
been ignored by all those commentators who argue against the anomalism of the mental. 
 Davidson argues that propositional attitudes, the semantics of spoken words, and 
behavior, are all like the state of being sunburnt. The state of being sunburnt is necessarily 
caused by the sun, but it could be possible that two states of the skin could be intrinsically 
identical even though only one of them would be the state of sunburn.1266  Davidson sees an 
interesting similarity between the state of sunburn and the state of belief when he notes that 
“my belief that moon is gibbous depend[s] in part on the causal history of my relations to the 
moon. But it could happen that two people were in relevantly similar physical states… and yet 
one could be… thinking of our moon, and the other not.”1267 This view could be interpreted as 
an ontological claim, because Davidson speaks of states instead of concepts. However, as 
already mentioned, in the argument from externalism to irreducibility, two lines of thought, 
epistemological and ontological, can be detected. Let us consider the epistemological claim 
first.  The  main  point  of  this  claim  is  that  in  order  to  be  able  to  identify mental states, an 
interpreter has to refer to the social and physical environments in which the interpretee has 
acquired these states. This is to repeat the claim that in belief attribution conditions of holism, 
externalism and normativity have an essential role, and there is no way to reject these 
principles as long as it is propositional attitudes that are being attributed.  
 This way of identifying beliefs does not have ontological implications; there is no 
reason to claim that the states so identified would not be subjective physical states which 
supervene  on  the  states  of  brain.  The  causal  history  of  mental  states  is  relevant  only in the 
sense that it affects the way in which we have to identify these states. Davidson notes: “[...] 
how we describe and identify events and states has nothing directly to do with where those 
states are.”1268 Indeed, “[mental] states are ‘inner’ in the sense of being identical with states of 
                                               
1264 Davidson, 1997c, 71. 
1265 Davidson, 1987. 
1266 Davidson, 1995a. 
1267 Davidson, 1995, 122. 
1268 Davidson, 1988a, 52. 
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the body, and so identifiable without reference to objects or events outside the body....”1269 
The ontological claim, however, changes this picture. Davidson writes:  
 
[...] subjective states are not supervenient on the state of the brain or nervous system: two people may 
be in the same physical state and yet be in different psychological states. This does not mean... that 
mental states are not supervenient on physical states, for there must be a physical difference somewhere 
if psychological states are different. The physical difference may not be in the person....1270  
 
The reference is to subjective states which do not supervene on the states of the nervous 
system. Davidson is eager to emphasize that the physical states of two people on which 
mental states supervene cannot be identical, because physical states cannot be identical unless 
they inhere in the same object. These physical states can be identical in “all relevant respects”, 
and yet the psychological states may still be different. Davidson notes that this in fact is the 
position of AM. For two people to think alike, there do not have to be things – actual entities 
– which are or need to be identical. There cannot be identical physical entities, for the reason 
described above, and the expression “mental entity” cannot be anything but a metaphor. 
 The quote clearly suggests that in Davidson’s view, the states of belief and other 
mental states are not supervenient on the physical states of an isolated agent. This in turn 
suggests that the individuation of beliefs necessarily requires a reference to the outside world. 
There is an intrinsic physical state which is the belief, but this state does not wholly determine 
what  somebody  believes.  Whether  your  belief  is  the  same  as  mine  does  not  depend  on  our  
intrinsic physical properties, and therefore the question of whether our beliefs are the same 
cannot be resolved by considering only these properties. What is interesting is the claim that 
the mental states in question can be different although  the  physical  states  of  our  brains  are  
intrinsically identical. It seems that a specific mental state is identical to a physical state, even 
though it  cannot  be  identified  as  mental  without  a  reference  to  the  reality  outside  the  brain.  
This raises the ontological question of where the mental states actually are. Are they wholly in 
the head or not?  
 What  the  ontological  claim  seems  to  make  clear  is  that  there  is  no  hope  of  
individuating mental states by referring to the intrinsic physical properties of an agent. But, 
this  being  the  case,  what  does  it  mean  to  say  that  “[B]elief...  is  supervenient  on  facts  of  
various sorts, behavioural, neurophysiological, biological and physical.”1271 On behavioural 
facts yes, but in what sense are beliefs supervenient, for example, on facts at the 
                                               
1269 Davidson, 1987, 20, my emphasis. 
1270 Davidson, 1989a, 62. 
1271 Davidson, 1983, 147. 
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neurophysiological level? If beliefs cannot be individuated as neurophysiological events, in 
what sense are they then neurophysiological events? What is the reason for defending the 
supervenience relation between the mental and the neurophysiological? A beliefc would, 
supposing that substance dualism is false, be supervenient on neurophysiological facts. But 
what  about  a  belief  of  which  an  agent  need  not  be  aware?  On  what  does  such  a  belief  
supervene? Perhaps Davidson emphasizes the supervenience of beliefs on facts of various 
sorts  merely  in  order  to  remind  us  of  the  truth  of  physicalism.  If  this  aspect  is  left  aside,  I  
believe that the following is a better formulation of the nature of the supervenience relation 
between beliefs and “other levels of reality”: “[…] all there is for the... interpreter to get 
right... is what supervenes on causal interactions among speakers and the events and objects 
of their world.”1272 Since the whole truth about the mental is captured by what the interpreter 
“gets” right, the whole truth about the mental rests on the supervenience relation between 
mental phenomena and behavior. Davidson claims that mental phenomena supervene on the 
physical properties of our bodies.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  view  is  meant  to  emphasize  the  
importance of the whole human being in the mind–brain debate. By arguing that our bodies 
constitute the “essential link between our minds and the rest of the nature”, Davidson places 
the behavioral, instead of the neural level in the forefront in a similar way to von Wright.1273 
This view stresses the primacy of interpretation and suggests what the main thesis of 
interpretative intentional realism should be: when we talk about beliefs let us forget the talk 
about neurophysiology and concentrate on the relations between speakers and the world. This 
view  agrees  with  von  Wright’s  claim  that  the  behavioral  level  has  semantic  priority  with  
respect to the mental, which in turn has epistemic priority with respect to neural. 
 It seems to me that the ontological claim is indeed the argument that Davidson uses to 
defend the irreducibility of the mental. He says:  
 
If mental properties are supervenient not only on the physical properties of the agent but in addition on 
the physical properties of the world outside the agent, there can be no hope of discovering laws that 
predict and explain behavior solely on the basis of intrinsic feature of the agents.1274 
 
Many  naturalists  seem  to  think  that  the  possibility  of  “scientific  psychology”  requires  that  
there be correlations between beliefs and some intrinsic physical properties of agents. 
Chomsky, for example, suggests that a naturalistic study should concentrate only on the 
                                               
1272 Davidson, 1999z, 81. 
1273 See Davidson, 1993f, 295. 
1274 Davidson, 1995, 122. 
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internal states of an organism.1275 Fodor famously claimed that in cognitive psychology, the 
strategy of “methodological solipsism” should be adopted. Stich has argued that scientific 
psychology should ignore the semantic aspect of propositional attitudes. The examples are 
numerous. Davidson refers especially to Fodor and Chomsky when he says:  
 
The reason thinkers like... Fodor and... Chomsky want to find a purely internal element or aspect of the 
propositional attitudes is obvious: it is only if mental properties are supervenient on the physical 
properties of the agent that there can be any hope of identifying the mental properties with physical 
properties, or of finding lawlike connections between the two.1276  
 
The externalist feature of mental states makes their reduction to physical states problematic. I 
think that this is one of the most fascinating of the problems of reducibility, because it 
challenges the possibility that mental states could be reduced to the states of the brain. If I am 
correct about the ontological nature of this argument, it seems that it differs in important 
respects from the two previous arguments which base the irreducibility of the mental on 
conceptual reasons. Being a different kind of argument, the argument from externalism 
strengthens the overall case of the irreducibility of the mental. Perhaps the most interesting 
question about the possibility of reduction is whether we can literally point out within the 
brain those parts, entities or states which correspond to mental states. Neuroscientists claim 
that they are already doing this. But are they really pinpointing mental phenomena inside the 
brain?  
 If  the  externalism  of  mental  states  is  true  –  if  it  is  the  case  that  beliefs  do  not  
supervene on the states of brain or nervous system – then it seems clear that beliefs will not be 
found inside the brain. This would dismiss a form of reduction which is based on the idea that 
all scientific truths should ultimately be explicable, in principle at least, by referring to 
fundamental laws governing the behavior of microphysical particles. If the ontological claim 
is correct, it seems that the microphysical particles on the basis of which scientific truths 
about beliefs could be expressed cannot be those of the brain alone. This would at least show 
that mental states are not “brain-reducible”. I will let the reader decide the importance of this 
view. The claim that beliefs do not supervene on the intrinsic features of a person connects 
with  the  claim  made  in  section  3.2  about  the  priority  of  the  mental  over  the  physical.  The  
beliefs simply cannot be found inside an isolated brain; the psychological level is required to 
verify the claim that a specific state of the brain is also a state of belief. If externalism is true, 
then the criterion of a belief cannot be found from the brain, just as von Wright claims. 
                                               
1275 Chomsky, 2000. 
1276 Davidson, 1995, 122. 
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  One obvious consequence of Davidson’s commitment to externalism is that he has no 
use for “narrow content”, the search for which has been the task of many contemporary 
philosophers. States with narrow content would be needed for scientists to predict the 
behavior of an individual merely from the observation of the individual’s brain. The scientists 
in our laboratory example from section 3.2 would thus need the concept of a narrow 
psychological state.  Davidson rejects the idea of a narrow content and thereby the possibility 
of any scientific psychology based on it because he does not understand what kind of states 
such narrow states could be. Davidson claims that these states cannot be beliefs or desires 
because the contents of these states are dependent on the causal histories of individuals, and 
each individual has a unique history. His conclusion is: “There are no propositional attitudes 
(the ‘narrow ones’) that are supervenient on the physical state of the individual taken in 
isolation from her history, society and environment.”1277 Beliefs are not atomic features of the 
brain which could be considered individually in isolation from their propositional 
environments. The content of beliefs is not an item that can be defined in isolation from other 
beliefs. This is a straightforward consequence of interpretationism. 
 The rejection of narrow content has one interesting philosophical implication, namely 
the suggestion that a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of me would not necessarily have the 
mental states that I have. In some philosophical thought experiments we are sometimes asked 
to imagine that it is possible to create a perfect physical copy of Georg. If we are only 
physical objects, combinations of physical particles which function within the boundaries of 
physical laws, what would prevent our duplication? Could we not imagine that a perfect 
physical copy of Georg could be made if we knew enough of the behavior of physical 
particles and physical laws? Here the intuitions of philosophers differ about the mental states 
of the copy. Some, like Davidson, claim that since the copy of Georg lacks the kind of causal 
history that Georg has,  the copy cannot have thoughts at  all.  A perfect physical  copy would 
behave  just  as  Georg  does,  and  no  one  could  tell  the  difference  between  them.  Davidson’s  
conclusion is, however, that the copy would not have thoughts even if it seemed to have them. 
Many see this as an absurd conclusion, especially if the story is told in the way that makes it 
the case that the copy seems to have thoughts. From the perspective of the anomalism of the 
mental, the claim that physical identity does not entail mental identity is, however, a natural 
conclusion.  In  the  context  of  externalism,  this  conclusion  seems to  be  drawn from the  view 
                                               
1277 In Caorsi, 1999, 332. 
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that beliefs are essentially relational states, and copying the intrinsic properties of an object 
does not necessarily mean that the extrinsic properties get copied too.  
 From the perspective of interpretationism, the conclusion is problematic however. It is 
not clear how the claim fits with the position of “third-person Cartesianism”. If there is no 
difference in the behavior of Georg and his copy and no one could tell, based on their 
behavior, which one has beliefs and which one does not, what would it mean to say that 
Georg actually has beliefs but the copy does not have them? I think that if we want to benefit 
from these kinds of wild thought experiments, our conclusion should be robustly 
metaphysical: contentful states without history are impossible. What makes a state have 
content is the process of learning, in which certain states get to be connected to the 
environment and thereby come to be about the environment. One may see this as an 
implausible suggestion, but the alternative is to assume that states or objects with history 
could be replaced with their ahistorical counterparts in a way that would make no difference 
whatsoever.  I  don’t  think  this  sounds  plausible  either.  We  are  asked  to  imagine  that  an  
intrinsic copy of anything physical is possible, in principle. Of course everyone agrees that 
this kind of duplication will, most likely, never succeed. But why do we not want to say that 
the duplication is not possible – is it because to become a certain kind of state requires a 
certain kind of development through natural selection and learning? This would be nothing 
more than a “metaphysical” interpretation of Davidson’s views about the sociality and 
intersubjectivity of thought. 
 
3.4 Conclusions of chapter three 
 
In this chapter I have clarified the reasons for believing in the irreducibility of the mental. My 
conclusion is that the arguments for the anomalism and irreducibility of the mental are not 
conclusive. Davidson himself admitted that nothing in what he says about these matters can 
be  considered  as  a  proof,  and  that  there  is  no  knock-down  argument  for  AM.  It  seems  
absolutely clear to me that the truth of the irreducibility of the mental cannot be proven. This 
is true of most philosophical claims, and I believe that we should have an interest in the 
arguments for irreducibility even though they do not conclusively show that the mental is 
irreducible. 
 My reading of Davidson emphasizes that the irreducibility of the mental is based on 
our choice to treat humans in a certain kind of way. If we want to see each other as rational 
beings who can act out of reasons, we cannot get rid of our mental vocabulary. In my view the 
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“essence of Davidsonian irreducibility” is captured in the idea that our mental vocabulary is 
not an optional part of our conceptual resources. It is not a vocabulary which could be 
replaced with another, different kind of vocabulary without losing the explanatory power that 
the former vocabulary has. Davidson wanted to resist the irresistible ambition to consolidate 
our vocabularies of explanation, description and prediction. The important question is why 
this ambition should be resisted. The answer is that by getting rid of our mental vocabulary, 
we would leave behind something which we are capable of doing now. We can understand 
people in terms of mental concepts, in terms of their propositional attitudes. This kind of 
understanding would simply not be possible in terms of a language which did not refer to 
these attitudes and to the logical relations which exist between different mental phenomena. 
But it is just these relations which matter to our rational explanations, and rational 
explanations matter to us. 
 My interpretation is that all the reasons or arguments for the irreducibility of the 
mental serve the more general motivation to maintain our mental vocabulary. In section 3.1, 
we saw that the original argument for the anomalism of the mental in fact challenges only the 
view that psychophysical laws could be strict. Davidson’s claim is therefore much more 
principled  and  also  much  weaker  than  most  interpreters  have  taken  it  to  be.  It  is  more  
principled in the sense that Davidson was interested in the question of whether there is some 
essential difference between the mental and the physical. As I showed in section 3.1, in 
Davidson’s view there is such a difference because physical vocabularies belong to the same 
conceptual domain, and therefore an in-principle reduction of physical vocabularies to the 
vocabulary of physics is possible. Our mental vocabulary will not reduce to physical 
vocabularies because of the disparate commitments of these different vocabularies. Again, our 
mental vocabulary will not reduce as long as we are not willing to change the subject, that is, 
as long as we are not willing to accept that mental phenomena could be given conclusive non-
mental criteria. 
 The actual argument against psycho-physical laws described in sections 3.1.1 and 
3.1.2 leaves something to be desired. It is definitely not a conclusive argument, but is based 
on the view that we cannot accept that our statements about the mental would be ultimately 
constrained by evidence from a different conceptual domain. As the discussion of section 3.1 
showed, there are various confusions relating to questions of how the argument should be 
understood and how strongly it should be taken. I am not confident that I have been able to 
completely clarify the obscurity that most critics see around the argument for the anomalism 
of the mental.  
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 The anomalism of the mental is, however, only one aspect of the non-reductive views 
of Davidson. In section 3.2, drawing on von Wright’s suggestion about the epistemic priority 
of  the  mental  with  respect  to  the  neural,  I  clarified  the  claim  that  attributions  of  mental  
phenomena must be faithful to their respective sources of evidence. It was claimed that mental 
phenomena have behavioral criteria – and therefore facts about the brain, although serving as 
symptoms  of  the  mental,  cannot  be  the  basic evidence on which attributions of the mental 
could be grounded. I think that von Wright’s contribution to the discussion concerning the 
irreducibility of the mental is extremely relevant. It shows something very basic about the 
mental–physical relation; from a logical point of view, the relation between mind and brain is 
accidental, whereas the relation between mind and behavior is conceptual and not empirical. 
This kind of philosophical insight is not appreciated by those naturalists who are interested in 
the mind–brain relation. In my opinion, von Wright’s claim that this is an empirical question 
and therefore not of interest for philosophy is a deep philosophical insight, the importance of 
which is not easily admitted by those who want to turn philosophical questions in scientific 
ones. 
 Davidson’s reasons for the irreducibility of the mental, which were discussed in 
sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, can be seen merely as adding details to the view of why mental 
concepts cannot be eliminated or reduced to physical concepts. Davidson thought that holism, 
externalism and the normative features of the mental stand or fall together. These are elements 
of psychological concepts which cannot be eliminated without radically changing the subject. 
The dispositional character of mental concepts exhibits an important feature which cannot be 
eliminated from these concepts without losing their explanatory power. The normativity and 
rationality of thoughts enables us to see how their attribution is necessarily governed by the 
subjective  norms  of  the  interpreter.  Seeing  mental  states  from  the  perspective  of  the  
interpreter helps us to see how these states must be tied to the environment and to the history 
of the interpretee. This demolishes any hope of finding a purely subjective, narrow element of 
belief which would be implemented in the brain. The fact that the features of the mental stand 
or  fall  together  means  that  one  cannot  easily  reject  the  irreducibility  of  the  mental  without  
rejecting the whole interpretationist conception of the mental.  
 Many commentators claim that Davidson’s argument against psychophysical laws is 
successful only against traditional models of reduction, which require bridge-laws between 
the mental and the physical. This may be correct, but it is not clear whether it is a fair 
criticism against the Davidsonian position; it cannot be expected that an argument which was 
developed to refute a specific form of reduction could be extended to very different reductive 
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models. In sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.3.1 I showed, however, that two recent reductive positions 
are  not  entirely  safe  from  the  Davidsonian  challenge.  In  order  to  see  this,  it  is  crucial  to  
recognize that the argument for the irreducibility of the mental should not be equated with any 
specific technical argument defending such irreducibility. My claim is that the overall 
motivation to defend the view of why we need different kinds of vocabularies for explaining 
the nature of human life is Davidson’s most important insight. The reasons arising from this 
motivation are not taken seriously enough by those who would like to reduce minds to 
molecules. 
 In this chapter I have clarified the question “What are the reasons for the 
irreducibility of the mental?” and concluded that although a proof of irreducibility is too 
much to ask for,  there are nevertheless severe problems facing the claim that the mental could 
be completely reduced to the physical. Mental phenomena and mental explanations are 
indispensable. This suggests that the truth of physicalism, which in fact does not get support 
from Davidson’s and von Wright’s arguments, seems to be even more unwarranted. The truth 
of physicalism cannot be shown. In the next chapter I will consider what kind of clarification 
the non-reductive position at which we have arrived can provide of the problem of mental 
causation. 
 
Chapter four: The problem of mental causation and the possibility of 
epiphenomenalism    
 
The main question of this chapter is: Can non-reductive physicalism solve the problem of 
mental causation? In  the  context  of  physicalism  the  problem  of  mental  causation  is  clear.  
The problem is that of how phenomena intuitively taken to be mental can have causal efficacy 
in a thoroughly physical reality. In the context of physicalism, the general strategy for solving 
this question is also clear. We should find the neural correlates of mental phenomena and 
explain how these neural phenomena cause behavior. From the perspective of the problem of 
mental causation, all proposals about how to naturalize mental phenomena have the same 
purpose: They attempt to show how something physical can have the properties that we 
attribute to mental phenomena and explain how these mental–physical entities can have 
causal powers. 
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 Recently there has been an increasing interest in the question of how mental causation 
can be understood in the context of physicalism.1278 Kim is perhaps the most active 
philosopher who has discussed the problem of mental causation and its relation to 
physicalism.1279 According to him, the problem of mental causation is this: “How can the 
mind exert its causal powers in a world that is fundamentally material?”1280 For Descartes, 
who is often interpreted as the traditional source of the mental causation debate, the problem 
was  how  a  non-physical  mind  can  have  an  effect  on  the  physical  world.  But  in  its  modern  
form, the problem of mental causation is not really about how a non-physical mind can have 
causal powers. It is rather the question of how a physical mind can have causal powers. Kim 
refers to Davidson’s “Mental Events” as the source which reawakens the interest in the 
problem of mental causation, which had been a largely non-discussed issue for centuries. The 
problem is, however, that although AM established the physical nature of mental events, it 
left unanswered the question about the causal efficacy of these events. The current situation, 
owing much to “Mental Events”, is as Kim puts it, that: “...our basic physicalist 
commitments... can be seen as the source of our current difficulties.”1281 Kim’s own view is 
that if a broadly physicalistic world view is accepted, then the solution to the problem of 
mental causation has to be reductive. This is a consequence of the more general naturalistic 
view that the only way to vindicate the status of mental phenomena is through reducing them 
to physical phenomena, by showing how the mind fits in the physical world. Kim concludes: 
“...if we want mental causation, we had better be prepared to swallow reductionism whether 
we like it or not.”1282 The  reason  for  this  is  that  from the  physicalistic  principles  which  are  
required “for a physicalistic world view”, only one seems to be negotiable. Kim claims that 
the principles that cannot be rejected if a physicalistic world view is to be accepted are those 
of: a) physical causal closure, b) exclusion, and c) mind-body supervenience.1283  The  
principle which has to be rejected is the one about mental–physical property dualism (to 
which non-reductive physicalism is committed).1284 Non-reductive physicalism, if it accepts 
mental–physical property dualism, cannot adequately solve the problem of mental causation, 
                                               
1278 See for example Crane, 1992, 1995, Heil and Mele eds., 1993, Leiter and Miller, 1998, Macdonald and 
Macdonald, 1986, 2006, Thomasson, 1998, Walter and Heckmann eds., 2003,Yablo, 1992. 
1279 Kim, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1993b, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005. 
1280 Kim, 2001, 271.  
1281 Kim, 2001, 272. 
1282 Kim, 2001, 278. 
1283 The principle of causal exclusion states that:” If an event e has a sufficient cause, c, at t, no event at t distinct 
from c can be a cause of e (unless this is a case of genuine causal overdetermination).” (Kim, 2001, 276)   
1284 Although, as I argued in chapter two, it seems that many forms of non-reductive physicalism, for example 
the positions of von Wright and Davidson, are not vulnerable to the charge of property dualism. 
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because it is this very principle that has to be rejected to vindicate mental causation. I think 
Kim’s basic conclusion about the prospects of non-reductive physicalism is sound and well 
argued.1285 Non-reductive physicalism cannot provide a reductive solution to the problem of 
mental causation. This was something to be expected, because a reductive explanation would 
conflict  with  the  most  basic  idea  of  non-reductive  position.  Kim’s  claim  is,  as  it  were,  a  
truism. But I think that the question of whether non-reductive physicalism should be rejected 
as a view about the mind because it cannot provide the kind of solution required by reductive 
physicalism is another one altogether. For the reasons to follow, we should disagree with Kim 
on  his  claim  that  non-reductive  physicalism  as  a  theory  about  the  mind  should  be  rejected.  
Kim’s main reason for rejecting non-reductive physicalism is that this position cannot explain 
how mental causation is possible.   
 A widely accepted contemporary view is that the solution to the problem of mental 
causation has to be reductive. The conclusion is not surprising if we consider the reasons why 
reductionism is the suggested solution to the problem of mental causation. On the one hand, if 
we start with the view that non-mental reality is thoroughly physical (O-physicalism) and 
claim that only physical things can have an effect on the physical structure of reality (causal 
closure of the physical), then the conclusion is simple: mind has to be physical if it is to have 
causal efficacy in the physical world. Mental causation, far from creating a problem for 
physicalism, can be used as an argument which leads to physicalism – or at least to the mind–
brain identity theory. This argument is based on the view that causal realm is physically 
closed. This, together with the view that mental causation is real, leads to a physicalistic 
conclusion. As we have seen, closure can be used to defend physicalistic intuitions in various 
ways. In chapter two it was shown how Davidson has been criticized based on the fact that if 
closure is assumed, monism follows. A similar kind of criticism can be applied here with 
respect to the problem of mental causation. If causal closure is assumed, a reductive solution 
to the problem of mental causation seems to be necessary. Mind is incorporated into physical 
reality through mind’s causal efficacy. The alleged efficacy of mind implies both that mental 
causation must be a form of physical causation and that mind, the seat of mental causation, 
must itself be a physical phenomenon. 
 On  the  other  hand,  if  we  start  with  the  standard  naturalistic  view  that  mind  is  a  
physical thing, then a tempting and natural conclusion is that its causal powers are due to its 
                                               
1285 Kim claims: ”…under nonreductive physicalism it is not possible to make sense of mental causation…” and 
mentions especially Davidson’s position. See the interview at http://www.ephilosopher.com/page.php?15. Kim 
(1995a) also rejects, for example, Searle’s biological naturalism because it cannot solve the problem. 
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physical nature. Why would mind be anything special in this respect if it is a physical thing? 
The complicated arguments, attempting to demonstrate that reduction is the only way to solve 
the problem of mental causation, seem unnecessary if either one of the above-mentioned 
physicalistic options are already chosen. If ontological physicalism about non-mental reality 
and closure are accepted, then the physical nature of mental causation follows. If the 
physicality of the mind is accepted, then too the physical nature of mental causation follows. 
In his latest book Kim summarizes his view by noting that his position:”... begins by 
embracing ontological physicalism.”1286 But if this is so, the need to argue that mental 
causation needs “vindication” through reduction seems, if not unnecessary, at least irrelevant 
since the truth of ontological physicalism is already assumed. Mental causation is thus not 
needed to establish the truth of physicalism although it could be used for such purpose.1287 
Kim admits that assuming the causal closure of the physical may sound question-
begging to those who have a more dualistic view about the nature of reality, but claims that 
the  argument  for  the  need  for  reductive  explanation  is  effective  without  this  assumption  as  
well.1288 But it is nevertheless interesting that according to Kim the causal closure of physical 
reality comes back to this: “If a physical event has a cause that occurs at t, it has a physical 
cause that occurs at t.”1289 It seems that this formulation leaves room for a mental cause that 
could  also  occur  at  time t, and the formulation would thus not be question-begging from a 
dualistic perspective. But, in order to prevent causal overdetermination, Kim notes that we 
could adopt a stronger form of physical causal closure, stating that: “Any cause of a physical 
event  is  itself  a  physical  event  –  that  is,  no  nonphysical  event  can  be  a  cause  of  a  physical  
event.”1290 A physicalist could simply adopt this stronger form of closure and thus 
straightforwardly reject the possibility of mental–physical causation. This would be wildly 
question-begging from a dualistic perspective. For this reason, Kim argues that “for a 
philosophical gain” the weaker form of closure should be chosen. This sounds strange. How 
could we choose the “strength of closure”? Isn’t the nature of this closure an empirical issue? 
As we remember, Kim has claimed that the closure principle is not an empirical issue for the 
physicalist. This means that a physicalist could as well accept a stronger form of closure. Is a 
weaker form of closure then accepted only “for the sake of argument”? So we could claim. 
                                               
1286 Kim, 2005, 174. 
1287 ”The principle of causal interaction” in Davidson’s argument is used n this way. 
1288 It is clear that Kim himself accepts the closure principle so the problem of mental causation should not be a 
problem for him. 
1289 Kim, 2005, 43. 
1290 Kim, 2005, 50. 
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 If a strong form of closure is rejected and a weaker form of closure is accepted, the 
argument for the need for reduction relies on the exclusion principle, which Kim in this 
context strangely describes as a “commonsensical assumption about causality.”1291 We are 
told that exclusion principle is: “...virtually an analytic truth with not much content....”1292 We 
should wonder what the argumentative value of such a truth is for the problem of mental 
causation, which is an empirical problem. Nevertheless, the argument, which combines a 
weak form of closure and the exclusion principle, has the consequence that we “know”, for 
example, that pain occurs only because a certain neural state occurs1293. Suppose that pain 
causes your finger to twitch. According to Kim it is “highly likely” that there is a story about 
how a neural state caused the twitching of the finger and, by applying the exclusion argument, 
the only way in which pain can make a causal difference is by being the causally efficacious 
neural state. What follows from this, or so it seems to me, is a trivialization of the problem of 
mental causation. The combination of weak closure and the exclusion principle is no less 
question-begging than the argument which is based on a stronger form of exclusion. The 
(non-)problem of mental causation and its solution for the physicalist can actually be 
summarized by Kim’s words: “If mental phenomena are neural processes in the brain, there 
will be no special mystery about mental causation….”1294 This indeed seems to be the case if 
one accepts the if-clause – and accepting it requires no more and no less than accepting the 
truth of O-physicalism. 
                                               
1291 Kim, 2005, 155. In another passage the exclusion principle is described as being a “general metaphysical 
principle” which does not favor physical causes over mental ones. (Kim, 2005, 17) It is hard to see that this 
principle would be a “commonsensical” assumption about causation because, quite likely, people usually do not 
have commonsensical assumptions about the nature of causation at all. A more serious problem is this. 
According to the exclusion principle if an event e has a sufficient cause c at time t, there cannot be an event 
distinct from c which could be the cause of e. But since the exclusion problem is neutral with respect to the 
mental and physical causes, why could not the excluding cause be mental? This possibility is denied only if 
ontological physicalism and the principle of causal closure are already taken for granted. 
1292 Kim, 2005, 51. 
1293 The possibility of a mental cause is thus excluded right from the beginning for reasons which have nothing 
to do with the exclusion principle itself. Now, do we really know that pain occurs because a certain neural state 
occurs and that pain without this state is impossible? I don’t know the answer but I cannot think of an argument 
which could show that pain has to be identical with a certain kind of neural state Kim (2005, 155) claims that we 
do not think that there could be sensations that could float free from the brain. This conviction, the acceptance of 
O-physicalism, makes the mind–body problem and the related problem of mental causation easy to answer. Even 
if the ontological claim is accepted there remains the conceptual point emphasized by von Wright; the criterion 
of pain is something else than a neural state. Therefore pain could – in some sense of the word “could” – be 
present in the absence of the neural state. What seems to be true at least is that, in principle, pain can be realized 
by  different  neural  states  and  therefore  it  s  not  true  that  pain  is  identical  with  a  certain kind of neural state. 
Therefore it is incorrect to say that “we know that pain occurs because a certain neural state occurs” because the 
expression “certain neural state” does not, in Kim’s jargon, refer to any neural state whatsoever, it  refers to a 
specific state. Moreover, even if the ontological point is accepted with respect to sensations there remains the 
question whether the same point can be established in the case of other mental phenomena like beliefs. 
1294 Kim, 2005, 153. The appeal of reductionism “…lies in its promise of a direct and simple account of mental 
causation.” (Kim, 1995a, 194, my emphasis) But perhaps it is a mistake to think that every problem should have 
a direct and simple solution. 
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 It is easy to understand why a reductive solution to the problem of mental causation is 
the solution which non-eliminativist naturalistic philosophy has to aim for. A solution which 
did not naturalize mental causation by showing its proper place in the physical world would 
render the nature of this causation disturbingly mysterious and at odds with a scientific world 
view. I believe that since this says more about the commitments of naturalism than about the 
problem of  mental  causation,  it  is  good to  be  aware  of  the  healthy  attitude  that  also  is  well  
described by Kim. Although he acknowledges that physicalism is the view in the philosophy 
of mind of the 20th century, he notes that “would-be physicalists” need to consider what kind 
of physicalism or how much physicalism it is possible to actually have. In this consideration, 
when the truth of physicalism is not obvious and not taken for granted, the problem of mental 
causation represents a profound challenge for physicalism. If the important physicalistic 
principle  of  causal  closure  or  the  truth  of  O-physicalism  is  not  taken  for  granted,  mental  
causation does not help  the  argument  for  physicalism.  It  is  important  to  see  that  since  the  
problem of mental causation is still unresolved, physicalism – if it is to survive as an all-
encompassing world view – must explain where, if anywhere, we belong in the physical 
world (as Kim himself concludes).1295  This requires showing, not merely assuming, that 
mental phenomena are in fact physically reducible.1296 This is an empirical task. The problem 
of mental causation must be actually solved before ontological physicalism can be fully 
embraced. Therefore Kim’s own view, which starts by embracing physicalism, has the 
situation backwards. It expresses a commitment which is, but need not be, be taken for 
granted. 
How about a position like Davidson’s or von Wright’s, which emphasizes the 
principled irreducibility of the mental, with respect to the problem of mental causation? I 
think there is only one answer: this kind of position simply cannot solve the problem of 
mental causation. Kim is right in his claim that mental causation creates insuperable 
difficulties for non-reductive physicalism.1297 But, or so I claim, here we can and in fact have 
to make a choice. We can either reject the view that mental phenomena are irreducible or we 
can accept Davidson’s and von Wright’s arguments. Needless to say, these arguments are 
inconclusive, somewhat obscure and perhaps far from convincing. Because I admit that a non-
                                               
1295 It should be acknowledged that Kim’s (2005) last word on the prospects of physicalism is skeptical and he 
thinks that, pace many critics and commentators, the label “reductionist” does not well describe his position.  
1296 We can thus say that the acceptance of the if-clause requires that one is able to show, not merely stipulate, 
that mental phenomena are physical phenomena. 
1297 We  can  therefore  absolutely  agree  that  from  the perspective of physicalism: ”…anomalous monism falls 
short as an account of mental causation.” (Kim, 1998, 33)  
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reductive position cannot reductively solve the problem of mental causation, there is no need 
to participate in any discussion which focuses on the exclusion problem and related worries. 
From a Davidsonian–von Wrightian perspective this discussion is overtly metaphysical. I 
believe this is one important reason why von Wright and Davidson did not participate in the 
current mental causation debate. From their perspective, the discussion is built on certain 
confusions; the most severe of these confusions, so it seems, is the claim that we do not really 
understand the phenomenon of mental causation unless we give a reductive explanation of it. 
Whether or not these arguments for the irreducibility of the mental are convincing, it 
is clear that this kind of solution to the problem of mental causation which, according to the 
naturalistic consensus should or must be searched for, is absolutely not an option for 
Davidson or von Wright. This being said, a curious caveat must nevertheless be noted. Kim 
claims that if mental phenomena are neural processes in the brain then there will be no special 
mystery about mental causation. If mental phenomena are neural processes then the 
ontological mystery of mental causation disappears. But according to Davidson and von 
Wright, mental phenomena are neural processes in the brain. By accepting token-identity they 
certainly  agree  with  the  view  that  mental  phenomena  are  also  neural  phenomena.  We  have  
seen that the interpretationism of von Wright and Davidson goes against the view that mental 
phenomena are internal neural entities, but at the same time they seem to accept this identity 
in their monistic ontologies. If Kim thinks that the mental–neural identity solves the problem 
of mental causation then he should accept that the position of Davidson and von Wright; 
essentially the position of non-reductive physicalism avoids the mystery of mental causation 
in the same way that their views avoid the ontological mystery of the mind–body problem. 
But I think that a complete ontological solution to the problem of mental causation that would 
leave no puzzlement would require showing that mental phenomena are actually reducible to 
physical phenomena. This is not possible according to Davidson and von Wright. But neither 
is there any reductive approach in the philosophy of mind which has shown how to really 
reduce mental phenomena. From the ontological point of view, the positions of von Wright 
and Davidson are thus on the same level as reductive theories. 
Because an essential aspect Davidson’s and von Wright’s views is the principled 
irreducibility of the mental, they cannot at the same time suggest that mental causation can be 
reductively explained or “vindicated”. Moreover, there is an important element in von 
Wright’s and Davidson’s views which shows the impossibility of a reductive explanation of 
mental  causation  but  this,  so  I  claim,  is  a  positive contribution to the problem of mental 
causation. It is the claim that a reductive explanation of mental causation would not explain 
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what  the  relation  of  mental  causation  is  meant  to  explain.  The  situations  where  we  explain  
something by referring to mental causes could not be explained in a vocabulary lacking 
mental terms. Mental explanations explain phenomena in a different way than physical 
explanations. Mental causes – reasons – explain in a different way than phyiscal causes; 
therefore a reduction of a reason to a cause would result in a loss of explanatory power. The 
conflict between irreducibility and the demand of naturalization is at the center of any 
discussion in which the merits of Davidson’s and von Wright’s views are considered. A 
position which aims at the naturalization of mental causation cannot tolerate the irreducibility 
they embrace, and takes non-reductive physicalism to be an unscientific view. Conversely, a 
position which argues for irreducibility sees the desire for naturalization as an expression of 
scientism. A reconciliation of these conflicting views seems unlikely. The starting points 
upon which the arguments rest are too different. 
 If it is argued that a mental–physical reduction is possible, the strategy for 
approaching the problem of mental causation is simple. The purpose is to understand how 
brain causes movements that we take to be voluntary and how mental phenomena that we 
subjectively experience relate to the brain events which can be objectively studied.1298 The 
focus will be increasingly inwards, towards the brain, and the entities under consideration are 
cells, neurons, and other microscopic features of the brain. EEG-curves, fMRI-scans and 
other results of neuroimaging techniques will be the evidence on the basis of which 
conclusions about mental causation are drawn. On this approach, mental causation is 
causation between physical entities, and because the purpose is to understand better the nature 
of physical causation,  sciences  such  as  chemistry  and  ultimately  physics  are  relevant  in  
addressing the question of how mental causation takes place in the brain.1299 The benefits of 
this approach are clear; it promises to provide a coherent picture of our place in the universe. 
Human self-understanding increases when the prediction and control of our behavior becomes 
strict and when explanations become more accurate. The alleged promise of this approach is 
objective truth. A reductive explanation would settle the question of whether a mental cause 
could really be causally efficacious. The way to find out whether a mental cause can be really 
                                               
1298 Fodor (1994a, 292), for example, notes that the agenda is to: “…Explain how minds qua material objects 
could have the properties they do” and continues in a naturalistic spirit that “…it is…reasonable to wonder 
whether this is a research agenda in philosophy.” 
1299 Just to use one example. In “How Molecules Matter to Mental Computation” Thagard argues : “There is 
considerable evidence that chemical complexity really does matter to brain computation, including the role of 
proteins in intracellular computation, the operations of synapses and neurotransmitters, and the effects of 
neuromodulators such as hormones.” (Thagard, 2002, 429)The conclusion is: ”[…] it may be time for…the 
philosophy of mind to become, like current biology and medicine, molecular.” (Thagard, 2002, 444) For a 
comprehensive attempt to turn philosophy of mind molecular, see Bickle, 2003. 
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causally efficacious is by considering whether the physical correlate of the mental 
phenomenon is causally effective. 
 I think that we should recognize also the risks of this program and of the underlying 
desire on which the program is based. Some of these risks are recognized by few of those who 
suggest that mind should be reduced to matter, but the possible concrete consequences of 
these risks are often neglected. Kim, for example, notes: “…reductionism, when applied to the 
mental, appears, at least to some, to have the unfortunate consequence of killing the patient in 
the process of curing him: in its attempt to explain mental causation, it all but banishes the 
very mentality it was out to save.”1300 A non-reductive solution threatens to turn mind into an 
epiphenomenon without causal powers, whereas a reductive solution threatens to eliminate 
the mental altogether. When thinking about these “purely philosophical issues” we should 
recognize that the problem of mental causation is related also to broader questions. What if a 
reduction of mind to molecules suggests that most of the time we are not “in charge” of 
ourselves? Are we willing to accept this kind of situation, which may be an actual 
consequence of scientific research? Or are philosophers again needed to convince us that 
“compatibilism” is something which we can have faith in? It is not obvious that an 
explanation of mental causation in physical terms is something which should be pursued.  
If mental phenomena are reduced to physical phenomena and if the physical nature of 
mental causation is shown, the possibility that we lose our freedom has to be considered. On 
the one hand, it is possible that through a reductive explanation of mental causation the 
possibility of objective explanation and control of mental causation is opened. Our sense of 
freedom, autonomy, and dignity would suffer if outsiders knew our inner life better than we 
know it  ourselves,  or  if  our  actions  were  to  become strictly  predictable.  On the  other  hand,  
finding the “true”, that is, physical mechanisms of human cognition may have the 
consequence  that  mental  phenomena  are  left  with  no  causal  role  to  play.  Perhaps  we  often  
misinterpret ourselves, our motives and our reasons for our actions. Sciences studying the 
brain could show that this is indeed the case. Neuroscience could show that the mental cause 
which we thought to be causally efficacious, and in terms of which we explained our action, 
was in fact a non-cause. This kind of result would certainly decrease our sense of freedom and 
could have a severe effect on our psychological well-being. It can also be imagined that 
describing  us  finally  “as  we  truly  are”  may  have  the  consequence  that,  in  the  name  of  
consistency, our commonsense understanding of ourselves would have to be replaced by the 
                                               
1300 Kim, 1995a, 194. The actual consequences of this conclusion are nevertheless not discussed further by Kim.  
Examples of these actual consequences will be considered in the appendix. 
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“true” description. A simple example of this could be a situation where a person sees a mental 
“defect” as an essential part of her personality while doctors or other specialists, knowing the 
physical cause of this defect, suggest that it should be “taken care of” or “cured”.1301 The way 
in which mental illnesses are often treated in modern society is an example a situation where 
mental and physical facts are measured against each other and the former are seen as inferior 
in  comparison  to  the  latter.  These  and  similar  kind  of  risks  are  real,  as  the  titles  of  recent  
books like The Illusion of Conscious Will1302 or Living Without Free Will show.1303 These 
kinds of books show that philosophers and scientists are drawing drastic conclusions from 
pertinent empirical data. I believe the conclusions are such that they put human freedom into 
jeopardy. This is not terribly surprising, because the picture of reality which the natural 
sciences describe is mechanical and deterministic. When conscious free will, which 
exemplifies mental causation, is fitted into this picture a conflict is to be expected. The 
consequence is a human being which starts to increasingly resemble a physical mechanism – 
a machine. 
 One  natural  way to  react  to  my criticism is  to  claim that  scientific  research  must  be  
allowed to take its  course.  If  the progress of science shows that freedom is an illusion, then 
this is a conclusion with which we have to live. If freedom is an illusion it does not help to 
hope  or  wish  that  things  should  be  otherwise.  Enthusiasts  claim  that  we  must  accept  the  
consequences of scientific findings whatever they may be. But why should this be so? The 
question of whether scientific progress is always desirable requires a value judgment which 
cannot be decided through scientific research. But the need to make the choice based on 
values cannot be ignored; brain-research is already having concrete consequences which 
touch upon legal, social, medical and moral questions. If history is any guide to what will 
happen, it is plausible that these consequences will increase in the future and therefore a new 
kind of attitude is needed for new kinds of moral problems.1304 How we react to these 
consequences is an important question. We can appreciate also the view that it is important to 
clarify human nature in any way possible. Those who defend this view would perhaps claim 
that we have no choice but to stand with truth on this question. But we do have a choice. We 
can choose human freedom as a primitive concept and consider what the human condition is, 
or has to be, in a context where this basic fact is defended. It is not obvious that truth will set 
                                               
1301 Consider Thagard’s suggestion that philosophy of mind should become molecular as medicine has already 
done.  
1302 Wegner, 2002. 
1303 Pereboom, 2001. 
1304 It may be thought that “objectivity” is what “scientific philosophers” search and that their work is therefore 
meant to be value-free. As we will see in the appendix, there are reasons to think that the opposite is true.   
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us free, and those who want to follow all possible paths of scientific research must be willing 
to take the consequences. 
 What  kind  of  “form of  life”  we want  to  live  is  partly  up  to  us.  We do  consider  the  
possible consequences of scientific progress – for example, the question of where limits of 
gene-manipulation should be drawn or whether such limits should be rejected once and for 
all. Why wouldn’t these considerations be relevant when it is consciousness, personality, 
personhood which is at stake? The view that we are  the  controllers  of  mental  causation  is  
essential for our self-image. In each individual case, it is the mysterious I who is in control. 
Kim reminds: ”[…] we care about mental causation… because, first and foremost, we care 
about human agency.”1305 In the end it is not the abstract demands of physicalism but the 
importance  of  our  self-image  as  free  agents  which  leads  us  to  contemplate  the  problem  of  
mental causation and which, in some philosophical circles, leads to attempts to “vindicate” 
mental  causation.  I  think  it  is  this  basic  fact  –  human agency  –  which  must  be  our  starting  
point, and all possible measures should to be taken in order to save it. Rejecting agency for 
abstract metaphysical or methodological reasons is the last resort and even dualism is a better 
option, pace Kim’s fear. This kind of claim cannot, of course, be much further argued. But if 
one is categorically opposed to this suggestion, it is because one has already accepted a 
certain view about how things have to be. But this view is not in harmony with the way we 
think things are. We should remind ourselves of Putnam’s words: “The strength of the 
’Objectivist’ tradition is so strong that some philosophers will abandon the deepest intuitions 
we have about ourselves-in-the-world, rather than ask (as Husserl and Wittgenstein did) 
whether the whole picture is not a mistake.”1306 It is not the obscure desire to “save freedom” 
that counts but actual human life, which shows that freedom is a non-negotiable fact about us 
as long as we have, as we currently do, a certain view about ourselves. Our lives show what 
we value and what we really believe. Some of these beliefs may be illusions, but a life with 
illusions may be better than a life without them. 
 A naturalistic philosophy of mind usually neglects these kinds of concerns 
completely. Wittgenstein, Davidson and von Wright all expressed worries about the de-
humanization of people and emphasized that the possible harmful consequences of the 
scientific image of man needed to be acknowledged. Wittgenstein took them very seriously 
and  worried  that  philosophers  are  apt  to  miss  what  lies  before  everyone’s  eyes.  Of  the  
possible negative consequences of “objectivism” von Wright writes:  
                                               
1305 Kim, 2002, 675. 
1306 Putnam, 1987, 9. 
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That somebody else should have supreme authority in cases which concern my ‘inner life’ may be 
thought humiliating. May not such an authority misuse his position for ‘brain-washing’ – perhaps with a 
view to furthering uniformity in people’s thoughts and actions? And may not this lead to the gravest 
injustice in treating a person? Of these dangers we have good reason to be aware.1307 
 
According to von Wright there is something tragic about cases where a person’s own 
judgment about themselves is overridden by a “supreme authority”. What is so tragic about 
the situation? I think that one way to understand this is to claim that people should not be 
treated in this way; we should not think of each other as mere brains that can be manipulated. 
If person’s own judgment is constantly overridden, the result is likely a feeling of alienation 
and this is a direction which we should not take: it is not the way that people should be 
treated.  
 Although von Wright and Davidson raise worries against the consequences which 
may follow if our mental lives were reduced to nothing but brain-activity, this is not the 
reason why they cannot solve the problem of mental causation; my claim is that this is part of 
the reason. It is not the unwillingness to jeopardize human freedom which forces Davidson 
and von Wright to conclude that a reductive explanation of mental causation is impossible. 
This being said, it needs to be recognized that the reason for developing a theory like AM, in 
addition to securing the status of physicalism, was to secure the autonomy of agency. 
Davidson claims that: “Anomalism of the mental is… a necessary condition for viewing 
action as autonomous.”1308 He writes also: “…accounts of intentional behavior operate in a 
conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of a physical law by describing both 
cause and effect… as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.”1309 The fact that intentional 
behavior operates in a framework which, due to irreducibility, escapes the reach of physical 
laws, is what grants intentional behavior its autonomy. Von Wright, on the other hand, claims 
that:  “It  is  not  by  being  exempted  from  the  bondage  of  natural  law  that  man  is  a  free  
agent.”1310 He emphasizes that freedom of agency is a result of our capability to understand 
man as a person, and we cannot understand the rest of reality and nature in this way. It could 
be tentatively claimed that we can understand man as a being with a “Wittgensteinian soul”, 
that is, our attitude towards other human beings is of a certain kind. When discussing the 
philosophical  problems  of  mind,  von  Wright  did  not  hesitate  to  occasionally  use  the  term  
                                               
1307 Von Wright, 1985, 26-27. 
1308 Davidson, 1970, 225. 
1309 Ibid. 
1310 Von Wright, 1985 43. 
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“soul”. I believe this term, even when stripped of its religious connotations, captures 
something important of the attitude which we should have toward other human beings.  
  Davidson’s and von Wright’s arguments against reducibility have the consequence 
that a reductive explanation of mental causation is out of the question. The motives of 
Davidson and von Wright in defending irreducibility and thereby human freedom are of 
course interesting because, it seems to me, in the end it is the desire to defend freedom that 
leads to the arguments for irreducibility, which in turn leads to the rejection of reductive 
explanations of mental causation and thus to the securing of human freedom. The search for 
the motives of von Wright and Davidson need not concern us here.1311 Here I merely 
acknowledge that they cannot accept a reductive explanation of mental causation because of 
their reasons for irreducibility. If we agree with Kim that mental causation should be 
reductively explained and that non-reductive physicalism cannot do this, we should ask 
whether positions like von Wright’s and Davidson’s can make any positive contributions 
toward “solving” the problem. I believe there are many such contributions. 
The first thing that must be noted is that the nature of the problem of mental causation 
changes notably if seen from the Davidsonian–von Wrightian perspective. The new problem 
of  mental  causation,  as  I  would  like  to  call  it,  is  the  cluster  of  problems  such  as  the  
following:1312 What is the status of mental explanations?  How  should  we  understand  these  
kinds of explanations? Can these explanations be trusted? Is there an essential difference 
between mental explanations which are made from the first- and third-person perspectives? 
There are many related questions that should be considered if the reality of mental causation 
is accepted and a reductive explanation is ruled out. I suggest that the most important question 
is: on what grounds can we believe that a mental explanation is true? Why should we be 
interested in this? Because we care about human agency; we want to know whether the 
mental cause in terms of which we explain our behavior can be trusted; we want to be 
transparent to ourselves. The question is important because it really matters to our lives. The 
question of whether or on what grounds I can trust my own self-explanations has profound 
importance for my psychological well being, and for my whole identity as a person who is 
driven by certain motives and desires. The question of how to trust mental explanations is the 
new problem of mental causation, and a reductive answer to it is not a possibility for a non-
                                               
1311 What such motives could be is nevertheless an interesting question. Why some philosophers end up 
defending eliminativism while others argue for non-reductive physicalism is a question worth considering. In the 
appendix I will briefly consider some possible motives of von Wright and Davidson. 
1312 I use the expression ”new problem of mental causation” to distinguish the problem from the traditional 
problem of mental causation which is the question how mental qua physical can cause.  
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reductive physicalist. Without mental–physical reductions the traditional problem of mental 
causation becomes a problem about the nature of mental explanations. On those occasions 
when we use mental explanations and think that they are true, we believe that we have 
detected a mental cause. This cause is whatever happens to be the mental entity in terms of 
which the explanation is given. This mental entity is a genuine mental cause, because its 
causal power cannot be explained physically. The causal efficacy of mental phenomena is 
grounded purely on mental explanations.  
Those who reject Davidson’s and von Wright’s reasons for the irreducibility of the 
mental would claim that a reductive explanation of mental causation is possible. This would 
mean that  the  considerations  about  the  new problem of  mental  causation  are  futile,  because  
there is no such a problem. The truth of mental explanations is grounded on the fact that the 
mental entities to which the explanations refer have causally effective physical counterparts. 
Against this charge I reply that my interest in rejecting the traditional problem of mental 
causation and focusing on the new problem of mental causation is not based solely on the 
acceptance of von Wright’s and Davidson’s arguments. My claim is that even if a reductive 
explanation of mental causation could be possible, such an explanation should not be 
explored. Although I discuss the new problem of mental causation because it is a problem for 
Davidson and von Wright, the reason for considering this is more far-reaching. I will argue in 
the next sections that the new problem of mental causation and a form of epiphenomenalism 
related to it are something which should interest us because they have actual relevance for our 
lives. The question of how mental phenomena qua physical phenomena can be causes is 
instead solely a philosopher’s problem; it is an important problem but it does not have 
relevance for our daily lives. Already Descartes noted that the problem of mental causation 
becomes a problem for us only when we start to philosophize. An updated version of this 
observation could be the view, inspired by Wittgenstein, that mental causation becomes a 
problem for us only when we start to philosophize in an unhealthy way. The new problem of 
mental causation is instead a deep problem which may affect the way we live.  
The perspective that I am suggesting could be called an epistemological or 
deflationary approach to mental causation.1313 That the problem of mental causation should be 
carried on in terms of epistemological considerations instead of metaphysical ones is a 
strategy defended for example by Burge1314 and Baker.1315 My interpretation is that von 
                                               
1313 For this label see Walter, 2007. 
1314 Burge, 1993. 
1315 Baker, 1993. 
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Wright’s approach to the problem of mental causation belongs to these epistemological or 
deflationary approaches. His claim that the mental has epistemic priority over the neural has 
the consequence that the assumed causal connection between neural processes and muscular 
movements  cannot  be  the  warrant  of  truth  of  the  rational  explanation  of  an  action.  We  can  
recall Davidson’s suggestion that, in the case of mental properties, we can “[…] concentrate 
on what might be called the epistemological problem and let the ontological problem, if there 
is one, take care of itself. For I think that if we were to solve the epistemological problem we 
would lose interest in the supposed ontological problem.”1316 I admit that in the context of O-
physicalism metaphysical questions are part of the problem of mental causation. There are 
metaphysical aspects of the problem just like there are metaphysical aspects of the mind–body 
problem which cannot be completely rejected merely by accepting the position of 
interpretationism. Some of these problems are challenges for a non-empirical position like 
von Wright’s and Davidson’s if these positions contain views which compete with empirical 
claims. But I also believe that by considering the epistemological question we are able to see 
that mental causation does not need vindication through reduction. Burge suggests that we:  
 
[…] take as our philosophical starting-point, not a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of causation 
or of reality, but a range of explanations that have been found worthy of acceptance. They… include 
commonplace explanations that explain the phenomena that we encounter in everyday life…. If we put 
aside the metaphysical picture and begin with the explanations that work, causation becomes an 
explanatory concept.1317 
 
Baker has a similar view: 
 
If we put aside the metaphysical picture and begin with the explanations that work, causation becomes 
an explanatory concept.… If we reverse the priority of explanation and causation that is favored by the 
metaphysician, the problem of mental causation just melts away.1318 
 
This is a profoundly important insight. The overtly metaphysical approach to the problem of 
mental causation, which has survived thanks to the domination of naturalism, is a modern 
result of philosophers’ tendency to imitate science (which, in Wittgenstein’s words. is the real 
source of metaphysics). The demand for reductions is an unhealthy sign. We can and should 
consider the problem of mental causation without being biased by a metaphysical framework 
of materialism; the reasons for believing that even O-physicalism is true are unconvincing.  
                                               
1316 Davidson, 1995b, 44. 
1317 Burge, 1993, 92-93. 
1318 Baker, 1993, 93. 
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If we are convinced that reduction of the mental to the physical is impossible, the way 
to approach the new problem of mental causation is certainly not simple. The purpose is to 
understand how a mind–body system, an entity called person, functions in a mental–physical 
reality. A person, a psychophysical unity, is not clearly separable into “mind” and “body”. A 
conclusion resembling this kind of view was reached when discussing the nature of 
Davidson’s and von Wright’s ontological positions. The final consequence of taking 
interpretationism seriously is that the problem of mental causation becomes the problem of 
how people can trust the mental explanations in terms of which they explain themselves and 
others. 
 
4.1 What happens to mental causation if the mental is not an ontological category? 
 
Before I present a view which emphasizes the epistemology of mental causation over the 
metaphysics of mental causation, I will consider Davidson’s “official solution to the 
traditional problem of mental causation. He, unlike von Wright, did participate in the 
contemporary debate, which focuses on the metaphysical problematique of mental causation. 
Davidson did this in order to defend AM against critics who argue that AM cannot solve the 
problem of mental causation. The more severe and very common complaint is that AM 
implies the causal inertness of mental phenomena. But how should we think of the problem of 
mental causation from a Davidsonian perspective if the irreducibility of the mental is 
accepted? What can be said about this problem if the mental is seen as a conceptual and not 
an ontological category? 
Different questions comprise the problem of mental causation. On the one hand it can 
be asked how mental events, in virtue of being mental, can cause something. On the other 
hand, the modern challenge seems to be the question of how mental phenomena, in virtue of 
being physical, can cause something. This is the question that especially worries naturalists. 
At least three different stances towards the problem of mental causation are possible. Perhaps 
they do not exhaust the alternatives but, rejecting substance dualism, it is difficult to think of 
a proposal that would not fall, in one way or another, among the following suggestions. 
 
1) The question of how mental phenomena cause things cannot be separated from the 
question of how we give mental explanations. Causal efficacy of mental 
phenomena is tied to the way in which we explain or understand something as 
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being performed because of mental causes. Causation and causal explanation 
cannot be clearly separated. 
2) Mental phenomena cause things because they are identical to physical phenomena 
and physical phenomena have causal powers. 
3) Mental phenomena do not cause anything. They are epiphenomenal.    
 
Although I believe that an epistemological or deflationary approach to the problem of mental 
causation should be defended, it still seems to me that each of these suggestions contains part 
of the possible truth. In the following I will clarify this claim and show how difficult it is to 
conclude what Davidson’s view about mental causation is. Those critics who see AM as a 
version of epiphenomenalism have oversimplified both Davidson’s views and the problem of 
mental causation. 
 The three solutions above can be all true at the same time. Let us consider a case 
where it seems to me that I do something because I believe B and desire D. I go to a museum 
because I believe there is currently a Picasso exhibition and I want to see his paintings. 
According to 1), if I go to the museum the explanation that I give of the situation warrants my 
saying that my belief–desire pair caused my action.  The  reason  that  I  believe  that  B and  D 
caused my action is just the fact that I can give an explanation in which I refer to B and D and 
I take this explanation to be true. If I could not offer this kind of explanation we could not 
even  start  to  ask  whether  B and  D were  causal  factors  in  my behavior,  and  the  question  of  
mental causation would not arise. In the 1960s the famous debate between Davidson and the 
intentionalists began from the question of how to distinguish efficacious reasons from 
existing reasons. Davidson’s view is usually interpreted as a suggestion that an underlying 
causal  relation  secures  the  truth  of  reason-explanations.  I  believe,  however,  that  we  should  
read Davidson in a different way. As in the case of von Wright, the truth of rational 
explanations is based on the facts of interpretation. It could be said, as Davidson is interpreted 
as claiming, that if B and D really caused an action, there must be an underlying causal 
relation  between the  action,  B and  D.  But  this  does  not  explain  at  all  why or  how we take  
rational explanations to be true. The expression “really” in this context is meaningless. 
Stoutland’s perspicuous analysis has convinced me that Davidson’s position has been widely 
misinterpreted.1319  I believe that both Davidson and von Wright want to defend the view that 
the truth of rational explanations does not depend on the assumed causal connection between 
reason and action. Our acceptance of the truth of the claim that I went to the museum because 
                                               
1319 Stoutland, forthcoming, 1999, 2008, 2008a. 
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I wanted to see the Picasso exhibition does not depend on our conviction that a causal relation 
exists between the reason and the behavior. Of course, there are cases when I have reasons to 
go the museum and I go there but not because of these reasons, and there are cases when I 
have reasons to go the museum and I do go there because of the reasons. The causal theory 
does not explain how we could really distinguish these cases. 
But the claim that a mental explanation is all we need to draw the conclusion that B 
and D caused my behavior does not exclude the possibility that B and D caused my behavior, 
because they are physical states which can be causally efficacious because of their physical 
properties. Answer 1) does not exclude answer 2), and if we want to know how B and D 
caused my action it may be the case that the answer must refer to physical mechanisms which 
are currently unknown. But whatever the future of mind–brain identity turns out to be, our 
understanding about the nature of reason explanations and our belief in them does not depend 
on it.  In “Actions, Reasons and Causes” Davidson famously claimed that the laws which 
back up rational explanations use concepts of neurology, chemistry or physics.1320 He 
insisted:  
 
Nothing I have said implies that we cannot give causal scientific explanations of particular human 
actions, thoughts and the like… if we choose a particular event, there is no reason why we cannot say 
this particular event (and here we describe it with a physical description) is a causal factor in the 
production of this mental event… there is no reason… to suppose that we cannot name the causes of 
mental phenomena.1321 
 
Davidson’s later position is suspicious of this view. I think that the mental became more 
irreducible than the previous quote suggests. On the other hand, the above view does not say 
much about the possibility of mental causation. It could be easily admitted that a physical 
event is a “causal factor” in the production of a certain mental event; this is what we do all the 
time. Davidson’s suggestion that a causal scientific explanation of a particular human action 
or thought could be given is certainly more problematic. If we ask how my belief B caused 
my  other  belief  C  or  my  action  A,  and  require  that  the  answer  must  be  given  in  physical  
terms,  it  is  difficult  to  think  what  kind  of  answer  would  satisfy  our  interest.  I  admit  that  I 
cannot imagine what kind of answer would be satisfying. 
It is possible to defend the idea that the mental is causally efficacious in virtue of 
being identical with the physical while insisting that, because of the irreducibility of the 
                                               
1320 Davidson, 1963, 17. A similar point is repeated when Davidson (1999, 654) notes: “[…] either can we infer 
from the fact that what we typically think of as the reasons for an action are not events that there aren’t events 
that are essential to the causing of the action. These events may or may not be mental in any ordinary sense.” 
1321 Davidson, 1964, 48. 
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mental, we can never say how mental qua physical causes things. This is a very disappointing 
result for those who would like to describe how the mental aspects of an event are related to 
the event’s physical aspects. This ontological disappointment can be lessened by noting that 
our inability to give this kind of description does not mean that there is no such a relation. The 
fact that we cannot describe how mental qua physical causes does not mean that mental 
causation is an illusion if causation is understood in terms of explanation. The proponent of 1) 
could conclude that questions about “causation itself” cannot sensibly be asked outside the 
context of causal explanations. Mental explanations warrant the talk of mental causation but 
strictly speaking there is no such thing as mental causation. 
 A proponent of 2) can accept all of this and contend that those events which can be 
described in the mental vocabulary have causal efficacy because they are physical events and, 
by definition, physical events have causal efficacy. What he would perhaps deny is the claim 
that the truth of mental explanations does not depend on the underlying physical mechanisms. 
In his opinion it is precisely the working of this mechanism which warrants the legitimacy of 
mental  explanations; there is  no real  mental  cause if  it  is  not backed up by a causal relation 
between physical events. As a reply, the proponent of 1) could ask whether the value or 
relevance of  the  explanation  “I  went  to  the  museum  because  I  wanted  to  see  a  painting  of  
Picasso” would be lost if it turned out that I had, let’s say, no nervous system at all. The 
answer to this question is not obvious; if we explained person’s behavior in terms of his 
beliefs and desires and it turned out that he has no brain, would we say that all the 
explanations were false? It certainly depends on our concept of causation. Wittgenstein, for 
example thought the most important thing that needed to be done in explanations of thought 
and brain-processes was to reject all the old prejudices about causality. He famously claimed 
that it is perhaps time for our concept of causality to get upset. Perhaps we are not willing to 
take this drastic step. The question of how we would react if we were to find out that a certain 
person has no brain at all or that his brain was made of silicon is nevertheless interesting. 
Would we conclude that all mental explanations are false? If so, should we now conclude that 
all our current mental explanations may be false because we cannot be sure that other humans 
have brains? If we were to discover that the brains of others were made of silicon or plastic, 
would our puzzlement be less than in the case where nothing inside the skull could be found? 
A mechanistic view about causation requires the postulation of a mediating mechanism, but is 
this mechanism necessary for us to believe in mental explanations? 
According to proposal 3), mental phenomena do not cause anything. This claim can be 
understood in different ways. One way to make sense of it is to say that the mental aspects of 
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a phenomenon are irrelevant to what the phenomenon causes. In the example considered here, 
this could mean that the content of my belief, namely “that there is a Picasso exhibition in the 
museum” is irrelevant to what I do. A defender of this view could claim that my behavior, a 
trip to the museum, has a physical cause but the cause is not related to the fact that I believe 
something. A relaxed form of epiphenomenalism could be defended by claiming that usually 
our beliefs do not cause anything, but sometimes they do, and when they do it is because they 
are physical things. Yet another approach with an epiphenomenalist streak is to claim that we 
have absolutely no way of telling when our beliefs cause something and when they don’t. 
This possibility being the case, the threat of epiphenomenalism, or the threat that our beliefs 
are irrelevant in each specific case, is always a possibility. This is compatible with the view 
that we can have well-functioning mental explanations, the adequacy of which depend on the 
connections between the concepts used in these explanations.  
 My claim is that, surprisingly, Davidson can be interpreted as holding each of the 
views 1–3. First, what is Davidson’s relation to the view that the problem of mental causation 
cannot be separated from the ways in which we give mental explanations? He says, for 
example, that: “We can specify the logical relations between the propositional contents of the 
appropriate beliefs and desires and the description of the action under which they rationalize 
it. What we apparently can’t do is say in clear detail how the mental attitudes cause the 
action.”1322 One  of  Davidson’s  central  claims  in  the  1960s  was  that  reasons  are  causes  and  
that reason-based explanations are a form of causal explanations. In true reason-based 
explanations, belief and desire cause the  action.  But  our  knowledge  of  the  correctness  of  a  
mental explanation, or our belief in its truth, does not depend on our knowledge of how belief 
and desire cause the action. Indeed: “[…] we can explain behaviour without having to know 
too much about how it was caused”1323 and this is the main point of reason-based 
explanations. This connects with the claim that mental concepts are dispositional concepts; 
explanations in terms of them are not full in the same sense as the explanations of physics are. 
There is no way to check, outside the context of mental explanation, whether the belief and 
desire really cause the action to be explained.1324 This was something vigorously emphasized 
by von Wright, who noted that in reason-based explanations the causal hypothesis rests on the 
acceptance of the reason-based explanation and therefore, quite obviously, the warrant of 
                                               
1322 Davidson, 1993f, 307. 
1323 Davidson, 1974b, 232. 
1324 To state the issue in these terms (does x really cause something) is misleading because this question does not 
make sense if the view that the causal efficacy of the mental is tied to mental explanations is accepted. When 
explanation instead of causation becomes the primary concept, the “real-question” does not make sense. 
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truth of the reason-based explanation cannot rest on the causal hypothesis.1325 If  the official  
Davidsonian line is taken, then it can be claimed that if a belief causes an action then there is 
a causal relation between them. But it is not possible to tell, independently of a reason-based 
explanation, whether a belief causes an action, and therefore whether there really is a causal 
relation between mental phenomena and the action in question. This means that the question 
of mental causation is in the end a question about the nature of reason-based explanations. 
This in turn means that mental causation should be insulated from physiology; the 
phenomenon of mental causation should be freed from the grip of a picture which is a result 
of causation is seen in the physical sciences. The attempts of naturalists to analyze mental 
causation come to a dead-end when faced with the question: Did belief B really cause action 
A? An attempt to answer this will refer to some reason-based explanation and it will have to 
take this explanation as its starting point. This is von Wright’s point about the epistemic 
priority of the mental as applied to the problem of mental causation. I gladly admit that my 
way to state the issue may ignore the philosophical motivation which guides certain 
philosophers’ attempts to analyze mental causation. I nevertheless believe that the motivation 
itself should be challenged; the problem of mental causation should be considered outside the 
jungle of empirical metaphysics by taking into consideration the primacy of our actual 
practices – as Baker and Burge among others have concluded. We should not let abstract 
metaphysics be our guide because, as Burge notes: “[…] the probity of mentalistic causal 
explanation is deeper than the metaphysical considerations that call it into question.”1326  
 What is Davidson’s relation to the second view, which claims that the causal efficacy 
of the mental is secured because mental phenomena are physical phenomena? Here we again 
see the relevance of the question of what Davidson’s form of monism actually is. If physical 
monism is accepted then the claim that mental phenomena can cause and do cause in virtue of 
being physical phenomena is understandable. Indeed, the truth of physicalistic monism is 
important because “the ontological reduction, if it succeeds, is enough to answer many 
puzzles about the relation between the mind and the body, and to explain the possibility of 
autonomous action in a world of causality.”1327 The interpretation that Davidson defends 2) is 
justified given that he says:  
 
[…] supervenience implies that if two events differ in their psychological properties, they differ in their 
physical properties (which we assume to be causally efficacious). If supervenience holds, psychological 
                                               
1325 See section 3.2. 
1326 Burge, 1993, 115–116. 
1327 Davidson, 1978, 88. 
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properties make a difference to the causal relations of an event, for they matter to the physical 
properties, and the physical properties matter to causal relations.1328  
 
This sounds like a claim that events have causal relations because they have physical 
properties; it is at least the way that most commentators have read Davidson. It is difficult to 
say how to exactly understand the expression “matters” in this context.  One plausible way to 
understand the claim is to conclude that causal relations obtain because of physical properties. 
For example,  if  we want to say why a piece of chalk broke when it  hit  the floor,  we would 
have to refer to the microscopic properties of the chalk.1329 This is a plausible claim given a 
broadly physicalistic view of the world. Why would the situation be any different in the case 
of mental phenomena if mental phenomena just are physical phenomena? The claim that 
causal relations obtain because of physical properties is also an easy answer to the question of 
why AM is not consistent with epiphenomenalism. It is because “[a]nomalous monism holds 
that all mental events, at least all those that enter into causal relations, are identical with 
physical events. Therefore they are caught up in the exactly same causal nexus in which we 
assume physical events are caught up.”1330 There is only one structure of causal relations and 
events exist  in this structure because they are physical.  This is  not to say that we could not 
understand events as being causes also when described in the mental vocabulary. Given what 
we know about Davidson’s physicalism, the following view is understandable: “Anomalous 
monism  makes  sense  of  the  claim  that  attitudes  are  dispositions  to  behave  in  certain  ways,  
which are in turn physiological states, which finally are physical states….”1331 Given this 
view, there is no reason to doubt that a physical mechanism could explain how something 
mental caused what it did.  
 What is AM’s relation to epiphenomenalism? Davidson is not defending 
epiphenomenalism but he makes statements which could be interpreted as pointing towards a 
form of epiphenomenalism. Although Davidson argues that AM is not consistent with 
epiphenomenalism he also admits, surprisingly, that: “[Anomalous monism]… is consistent 
with the (epiphenomenalist) view that the mental properties of events make no difference to 
causal relations.”1332 However, AM does not imply epiphenomenalism because Davidson 
                                               
1328 Davidson, 1993d, 197, my emphasis. 
1329 See Davidson 1964. 
1330 In Caorsi, 1999, 338. Consider also: “Cause is the cement of the universe; the concept of cause is what holds 
together our picture of the universe, a picture that would otherwise disintegrate into a diptych of the mental and 
the physical” (Davidson, 2001, xv) If epiphenomenalism were true, the mental would float away from the reach 
of the physical resulting in a diptych of two substances. 
1331 Davidson, 1997c, 72. 
1332 Davidson, 1993d, 196. 
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thinks that 2) is correct. But the situation is not so straightforward because Davidson also 
notes that: “There is a harmless sense in which one can say the contents of the reasons on 
which we act is irrelevant to the causation of the action, because we can, in theory, explain 
why the action occurred using only physical laws and descriptions.”1333 My interpretation is 
that here Davidson departs from von Wright, who wants to make a firm distinction between 
reasons and causes as well as between behavior and action. From von Wright’s point of view, 
Davidson  is  here  guilty  of  conceptual  confusion  when  he  says  that  an action could be 
explained using only physical descriptions. It is of course possible that by the term “action” 
Davidson is referring to the bodily movement; if this is the case the term is ill-chosen in this 
context. Likewise, a comment that: “Someone can describe an act of mine… in terms of 
movements described behavioristically, or in the language of physics and so can I”1334 is 
obscure.  Perhaps  the  claim  should  be  read  as  a  suggestion  that  the  event  which  can  be  
described as an action can also be described in other vocabularies. But, as far as I understand, 
an action could not be described as an action in a non-mental vocabulary. In order to describe 
the event which is my action in the vocabulary of physics, one would first nevertheless have 
to identify the action in the familiar way; this I take to be the crucial lesson of von Wright.  
Davidson nevertheless claims that the contents of the reasons on which we act is 
irrelevant to causation. Those, like Dretske or Fodor, who claim that an argument against 
epiphenomenalism  requires  precisely  an  explanation  of  how  the contents of reasons are 
relevant would surely be dissatisfied with Davidson’s position. The use of the term causation 
is problematic because Davidson’s claim really seems to be that the fact that my mental state 
has the content which it has is irrelevant to what it causes.1335 Perhaps it is really the case that 
Davidson does not see the mental as being efficacious, at least not qua mental. Even though 
we have not seen a coherent view which would explicate what this qua mental could mean in 
the context of O-physicalism, perhaps the claim that the content of a belief is irrelevant to 
what it causes suffices as a view which deprives the mental aspects of an event of their causal 
powers.  What could also be considered as a statement of epiphenomenalism from Davidson’s 
part is the following claim: “Since beliefs, desires, and intentions aren’t entities, it is a 
metaphor to speak of their changing and hence an extension of that metaphor to speak of them 
as causes and effects.”1336 The claim that the talk of beliefs and desires as causes and effects 
is an extended metaphor sounds puzzling. It seems to me that there is a kind of constructivist 
                                               
1333 In Caorsi, 1999, 338, my emphasis. 
1334 In Caorsi, 1999, 335. 
1335 Kalderon, 1987, claims that Davidson’s accounts fails to explain the causal efficacy of semantic content. 
1336 Davidson, 1999, 654. 
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element in Davidson’s view about mental causation. He notes that we cannot talk about 
mental causation if the cause is thought of in a “neutral mode” so that the cause is disregarded 
its mental status as belief or other mental phenomenon. In order not to think of the cause in a 
neutral mode, “we introduce a mental description of the cause, which thus makes it a 
candidate for being a reason.”1337 This of course goes well together with the claim that events 
are mental only as described, or with the view that in radical interpretation behavior is taken 
as data on the basis of which a set of attitudes is hypothesized. These hypothesized attitudes 
help the interpreter to explain what he has observed. The claim that the set of attitudes of the 
interpretee is always a hypothesis could be likened to von Wright’s important observation that 
the attributions of mental phenomena are always accompanied with a residue of meaning. It 
seems to me that, on a Davidsonian–von Wrightian account, from a third-person point of view 
the attitudes which explain actions are hypothetical entities. As Davidson concludes: “We, 
watching a creature adjust its behavior to its needs and opportunities, read into that behavior 
the beliefs and desires and intentions that naturally occur in animals with thoughts.”1338 Here 
we should recall the discussion of section 3.3.2 where the subjective aspect of mental state 
attributions was emphasized. What we read into the behavior of others is a result of our 
subjective considerations about how to best make sense of the subject in a particular situation. 
Whereas Davidson’s views here are consistent with interpretationism, it is not so clear what 
these views tell us about the reality of mental causation.  
 This brief description of Davidson’s relation to 1–3 should be enough to show that, 
given his physicalistic monism, he can accept all of the three solutions to the problem of 
mental causation and can accept them together without being grossly inconsistent. 
Unfortunately the situation is not so straightforward because in addition to 1–3 there is 
Davidson’s “official proposal”.  
 
4) Events are causally efficacious. The causal relation is an extensional relation 
between events and its nature cannot be further analyzed. 
 
I  believe  this  view  of  Davidson  is  best  understood  in  relation  to  his  version  of  neutral  
monism. Causal relations obtain between events which are non-abstract particulars, but there 
is no ultimate explanation of why or how they  hold.  The  problem  is  that  one  can  argue  in  
favor of 1—3, where the second view expresses a commitment to physicalistic monism, or 
                                               
1337 Davidson, 1982a, 180. 
1338 Davidson, 1999c,  207. 
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one  can  argue  in  favor  of  1),  3),  and  4)  where  the  fourth  view  expresses  a  commitment  to  
neutral monism, but one cannot consistently defend all solutions 1–4. So, either 2) or 4) must 
be rejected. Which one should Davidson reject? Which one should we reject? 
 What exactly is Davidson’s official position? Two of its most important claims are 
that events are non-abstract particulars and that extensional causal relations exist between 
them. In “Thinking Causes”, Davidson emphasizes these claims because he thinks that an 
ignorance of them is the main reason which has lead critics to accuse AM from 
epiphenomenalism. Given these two views Davidson is entitled to say: “[…] given my 
concepts of events and of causality, it makes no sense to speak of an event being a cause ‘as’ 
anything at all.”1339  The fact that an event is a physical event cannot explain everything that 
the event causes and this goes against view 2). It makes no sense to say that an event caused 
something “as physical” or “as mental” Indeed: “It is events that have causes and effects. 
Given this extensionalist view of causal relations, it makes no literal sense… to speak of an 
event causing something as mental, or by virtue of its mental properties, or as described in 
one way or another.”1340   
Davidson’s general claim is that it makes no sense to say that an event causes 
anything in virtue or its properties or that it causes something because of its properties. This, 
according to many, is an astonishing view. As Welshon comments:  
 
I find this proposal incredible… although… events themselves have causal powers and are causally 
efficacious, nothing mental or physical about them is that in virtue of which they have those causal 
powers, and nothing mental or physical about them is that in virtue of which they are causally 
efficacious. But on the face of it,  this claim seems fantastic, for, if true, [an]… event’s causal powers 
would be something brute about it, inexplicable by any science, including physics.1341  
 
Welshon makes an interesting comment when he notes that, on Davidson’s account, the 
causal powers of an event would be inexplicable even by physics. This cannot be entirely 
correct because Davidson claims that physics could cover reality in full. But, as discussed in 
section 2.1.3 Davidson’s example of a strict law does not use causal concepts. It merely 
asserts that certain states follow from certain others. In a sense this is not a causal explanation 
at all, because it does not answer the question of why state B followed state A.  
How could Welshon’s puzzlement be clarified? Given Davidson’s “nominalism”, his 
view is that properties cannot cause anything because they are abstract objects. Individual 
things with those properties can, however, be causally efficacious. The rejection of the causal 
                                               
1339 Davidson, 1993d, 188. 
1340 Davidson, 1993d, 196. 
1341 Welshon, 1999, 113. 
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efficacy of properties may seem harsh,  but I  think there is  a closely related insight which is 
interesting. It is this: does it make sense to ask, in the case of a particular unrepeatable event, 
what its causally efficacious property was, i.e. what was the property  that  was  causally  
efficacious? As Davidson asked in “Causal Relations”: “How could Smith’s actual fall, with 
Smith weighing, as he did, twelve stone, be any more efficacious in killing him than Smith’s 
actual fall?”1342 How  could  we  say  that  the  property  of  weighing  twelve  stone  was  the 
causally efficacious property responsible for Smith’s death following his fall? It was the fall 
which caused the death. Given that Smith’s fall was an event of a man weighing twelve stone 
falling, shouldn’t we rather say that: “[…] every property of every event is causally 
efficacious”, as Davidson does?1343 Because Davidson thinks that every property of an event 
is essential to it, in his view it makes no sense to choose properties which could be somehow 
more causally efficacious than others. A critic like Welshon claims that if this road is taken, 
then AM is saved from epiphenomenalism but only at the cost of accepting that events do not 
cause other events because of their properties. The claim that an event’s causal powers would 
be something brute about it is a “fantastic and incredible suggestion” according to Welshon, 
but others have recognized that this is indeed a view that Davidson seems to defend. Child, 
for example, notes that the relation of causation can be taken to be a basic, natural relation 
between events which does not hold in virtue of anything else. He compares it to other natural 
relations like temporality. When a precedes b, the temporal relation between them does not 
hold in virtue of anything else more basic; its holding is itself a basic fact. Marras notes that 
for  Davidson,  the  causal  relation  is:  ”[…]  a  fundamental,  primitive  relation,  not  one  to  be  
explained or analyzed in terms of more basic nomic relations between properties.”1344 
Commentators  who  ignore  this  are  simply  accusing  AM  from  a  perspective  which  a  
proponent of the position would not accept.  
 Davidson never tried to analyze the causal relation very clearly, perhaps because it 
appears on his list of concepts which cannot be reduced to more basic concepts. Let us ignore 
here  the  question  of  why the relation of causality cannot be analyzed. For our purposes it 
suffices to note that Davidson does not analyze this relation, and therefore critics who argue 
that, according to Davidson, events can enter into causal relations only in virtue of, the fact 
that, or because, their strictly nomic properties are mistaken.1345 This applies, for example, to 
                                               
1342 Davidson, 1967a, 150. 
1343 Davidson, 1987a, 113. 
1344 Marras, 1999, 276. 
1345 It has to be noted that certain views of Davidson certainly justify this interpretation. 
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the critical views of, Sosa, Stoutland, Johnston and Kim.1346 As Marras observes, AM in 
itself: “[…] has nothing to say about the causal powers of properties, mental or physical, or 
about what it is ‘in virtue’ of which events have their causal powers.”1347 This being the case, 
the views from “Thinking Causes”, which emphasize that the relation of causality is 
extensional, certainly make sense. Davidson claims that, given his view of properties, he has 
never argued that events are causes because of their physical properties.  
Campbell has taken Davidson’s later position seriously and recently defended AM as 
a non-reductive solution to  the  problem  of  mental  causation.1348 His position is interesting 
and, so it seems to me, a quite accurate reading of Davidson’s views – but the view is 
problematic for one reason. The reason is that Campbell attributes to Davidson a strong form 
of nominalism. Although there are reasons to claim that this attribution makes sense, there are 
also reasons, as I showed in section 2.3.4, to think that Davidson’s view of properties is not as 
straightforward as Campbell takes it to be. Campbell rejects the standard criticism against 
AM on the grounds that it does not take Davidson’s nominalism seriously enough, and 
thereby attributes to Davidson a metaphysical position which he does not hold. Whereas this 
is a fair comment, it is not clear whether nominalism can serve as a starting point for a viable 
account of mental causation. 
 If Davidson’s nominalism indeed commits him to a version of neutral monism in 
which causality holds between events as a brute fact, the remaining question is: is this the 
final word or does the physicalistic interpretation make sense after all? To answer this 
question we have to try to separate the questions of causal explanation and causation. 
 
4.1.1 Davidson on causal explanation and causation 
 
According to my interpretation, at least as long as we stay inside the Davidsonian perspective, 
the questions about causation and causal explanation cannot be clearly separated. Davidson 
claims  that  if  an  event  A causes  an  event  B,  then  this  is  true  no  matter  how the  events  are  
described. This is turn suggests, or could be taken to suggest, that it is something in the events 
which is responsible of the fact that the one causes the other. But since it is in a sense up to us 
                                               
1346 See Sosa, 1984, Stoutland, 1985, Johnston, 1985, Kim, 1993. I claimed earlier that, according to Davidson, 
“causal relations are physical relations.” Since I am here only trying to explicate Davidson’s position (4), I am 
not taking back this claim. Indeed, as I noted, only one of 2) or 4) can be true and the other must be rejected. My 
claim is that we should perhaps accept 2). The view that causal relations are physical relations agrees with this 
position.  
1347 Marras, 1999, 277. 
1348 Campbell, 2008. 
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what we count as an event, it seems that events themselves do not have clear spatio-temporal 
boundaries. This being the case, we can say that once we have sliced up reality into certain 
events, it is then something inside those slices which explains why one slice causes another. 
 Let  us  suppose  that  we  want  to  claim that  an  event  A causes  another  because  of  its  
physical properties and that those properties are intrinsic to the event in the sense that: a) they 
are inside the spatio-temporal slice that we count as an event A, and b) those properties exist 
regardless of us. Let us accept for the sake of argument that this is a rough description of how 
we think about the nature of causation or causal relations. But what does it mean to say that 
the properties of the event are out there regardless of us, if we choose what counts as an event 
on the occasion to be explained? Let us imagine that we have identified an event – an 
avalanche – which we take to be the cause of another event – the destruction of a hut. Which 
properties of the avalanche are causally efficacious on this occasion? Davidson would say that 
if the avalanche (event A) caused the destruction of the hut (event B), then this is true 
regardless of how we happen to name the events.  But what does this claim tell  us about the 
question of whether A caused B? If A causes B, there is a relation holding between them – but 
do we have any way to tell when or whether there really is such a relation? Is our only way to 
get a grip on that relation through causal explanation? Is the existence of the relation 
derivative from the fact that we think that A caused B on certain occasion? If so, what reason 
is there to insist that the causal relation is an extensional relation? 
 Let us imagine another example: every day when I look out of my window at noon I 
observe the following: a man walks down the street and when he passes a certain store, the 
door of the store opens. Is there a causal relation between these two events? Perhaps, but how 
am I to tell? I have observed these two events occurring every day for ten years and this could 
be a reason for me to conclude that the one causes the other. But it is of course possible that 
their simultaneous existence is an accident and there is no causal relation between the events. 
As Hume pointed out a long time ago, the causal relation cannot be observed. I believe the 
question  of  how  to  find  out  whether  two  events  are  causally  related  becomes  especially  
pressing in the case of mental causation. Of course, in the case of the man and the store door, 
I could say that if the appearance of the man causes the store’s door to open then there indeed 
is an “extensional relation of causality” between the events, but does this claim say anything 
beyond the triviality that “A causes B iff A causes B”? Davidson claims:  
 
[…] we must distinguish firmly between causes and features we hit on describing them and hence 
between the question whether a statement says truly that one event caused another and the further 
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question whether the events are characterized in such a way that we can deduce… that the relation was 
causal.1349 
 
But what are causes without the features in terms of which we describe them? When can we 
say truly that an event caused another? It seems that we cannot in any clear sense speak of a 
cause without identifying, through using a feature of the cause, something as “the” or “a” 
cause. This being the case, it seems that the concept of a causal relation sounds like an 
abstraction,  and  nothing  can  be  said  of  it  without  a  causal  explanation.1350 When Davidson 
says that “Causality relates events however described…”1351 or that “Causal relations… have 
nothing to do with how we describe or classify events…”1352 what can this possibly mean? 
What are these relations? Why do they hold? These claims could be interpreted along the 
lines proposed above in a) and b), but since Davidson does not recognize the existence of 
properties it is difficult to think that he would allow properties to be something in virtue of 
which events stand in causal relation to each other. If there are no such things as properties 
does it make sense to ask which properties are causally efficacious and which are not? No. 
But if it is not in virtue of causally efficacious mind-independent properties that events cause, 
then  what  does  it  mean  to  speak  of  a  causal  relation  which  is  independent  of  our  ways  of  
describing and classifying events?  Davidson claims that: “[…] if causal relations are ‘in 
nature’, it makes no sense to classify them as logical or contingent”.1353 In my opinion this 
claim includes a problematic proviso; if. The question of whether causal relations which hold 
independently of us exist, is similar to the question of whether it makes sense to speak of 
events outside all descriptions. It is clear that somehow Davidson tries to maintain this idea of 
neutral  events,  but  it  is  difficult  to  understand  what  they  are  because  events  are  always  
described as mental or physical. As I showed in section 2.6, formulating the nature of neutral 
monism is not easy.   
There are therefore two deep problems for Davidson’s position. On the one hand, there 
is the question of whether anything about causal relations can be said outside the context of 
causal explanation. If not, what is the point of saying that causal relations are extensional 
while causal explanations are intensional? On the other hand, the question is why – i.e., in 
virtue of what – or how are two events causally related? Suppose that we want to explain a 
                                               
1349 Davidson, 1967a, 155. 
1350 I  noted  that  Davidson  does  not  want  to  analyze  the  relation  of  causality.  But  why  then  say  that  it  is  an  
extensional relation? Since we lack a detailed analysis of the relation, what would be a reason to believe that this 
claim about extensionality is true? 
1351 Davidson, 1993e, 312. 
1352 Davidson, 1993e, 313. 
1353 Davidson, 1985, 224. 
485 
 
specific event, say the death of Georg on 1.1.2000. We know that he died from a heart attack. 
But consider the many ways that we could start  to try to explain his death.  I  already gave a 
good explanation; the cause of death was a heart attack. This explanation satisfies our 
epistemic interests. Most of us understand this explanation, but it is not the most detailed 
explanation available. We could ask, when told that Georg died of a heart attack: “Yes, but 
why?” We have identified a particular event, which is Georg’s death. Should we say that the 
cause of the death was a heart attack or that the heart attack was identical with the death of 
Georg? We should say that the heart attack was the cause of Georg’s death and not identical 
with it, because the former occurred before the latter. But then we could ask how the heart 
attack caused the death, or what caused the heart attack. Both questions are, or may be, 
relevant  when  explaining  Georg’s  death.  If  we  focus  on  the  second  question,  the  question  
about our explanatory interests becomes especially relevant. We ask what caused the heart 
attack of Georg’s, which is a particular event existing at a particular time in a particular place 
and occurring for a period of time.1354 In considering this question we can make the sphere of 
explanation larger or smaller. Larger, if we start to consider, for example, why Georg’s heart 
was in the kind of condition it actually was. Smaller, if we start to consider, for example, how 
a heart attack is related to the functioning of blood vessels and cells. If we expand the 
explanation we could be interested to hear that Georg refused to obey his doctor’s orders, that 
preceding the heart attack Georg had a stressful weekend or that his father died of a heart 
attack at  young age,  and so on. If  we want to reduce the sphere of explanation we could be 
interested to hear that there was a blockage in a certain artery, and that this blockage was a 
result of such and such chemical processes, which in turn were a result of such and such 
lower level processes and so on.  
If we are now being asked why Georg died or what was the cause of his death what are 
we to say? Should we say that he died because there was a blockage in his artery or because 
such and such chemical processes happened, or because he had a father with certain kind of 
genes, or because he refused to listen to his doctor, or because he had a very stressful 
weekend? In some sense the claim that Georg died because of a heart attack is our best 
explanation; we can say that the heart attack was surely a cause of the death. But was it the 
cause? In the case of a unique unrepeatable event, which every event is, does it make sense to 
speak of the cause? If we have a reason to believe that Georg’s refusal to obey his doctor was 
a  causal  factor  in  his  heart  attack,  it  seems  that  we  are  entitled  to  say  that  this  refusal  two  
                                               
1354 What caused the heart attack is obviously a different question than what causes a heart attack. 
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years earlier was, partly, what caused his eventual death. How we choose to answer the 
question “Why did Georg die?” seems to depend, partly, on what we take to be an adequate or 
a good answer. In explaining something we may choose the cause according to our special 
explanatory interests.1355 In  some context,  a  reference  to  Georg’s  refusal  to  obey  his  doctor  
may be a better answer than a reference to the condition of Georg’s vessels. If we believe that 
ignoring the advice of the doctor was a causal factor in Georg’s death, it would be strange to 
say that the disobedience did not cause his death because the death was caused by a blockage 
in his artery. Almost anything can stand in the relation of causal explanation to something. 
My claim is that the relevance of a certain explanation, and therefore the relevance of a 
certain causal relation, depends on whether or not it improves our epistemic situation. 
Whether it does so, can be evaluated only subjectively. 
I think there is something attractive about the idea that events do not stand in causal 
relations to each other because of their properties, or better, that if they do, it is because of all 
of their properties, as in the case of Georg’s death. Should we say that all the factors to which 
we can refer in explanation were part of the cause? If we consider any actual event occurring 
in the real world, it is clear that the event under consideration is unique. Events in time can 
happen only once. The dramatic idea behind this view becomes obvious if we think, for 
example, of meaningful moments of our lives, the uniqueness of which are clear to us. If we 
consider  an  event  which  is  the  first  meeting  of  two people  we can  ask:  why did  they  meet,  
why did this event occur? What was the cause of this event? It is possible to become anxious 
when it is realized that the meeting was, in a sense, the sum of endless and arbitrary events. 
When the situation is considered it becomes clear that there is no single answer to the 
question: ‘what was the cause of a specific meeting at a specific time in a specific place?’1356 
If nothing  can be pinned down as the cause,  we  could  just  as  well  say  that  everything 
preceding that specific moment in the history of the universe was relevant for the fact that the 
moment occurred.1357 
                                               
1355 A  good  question  is  whether  this  should  be  thought  of  as  a cause or as the cause, and whether there is a 
meaningful distinction to be made between the two in this context. 
1356 Many would be willing to analyze this question in terms of counterfactuals, but it seems hopeless. Had the 
bus broken down he would not have been in place X at time t. Why assume that this analysis would be correct in 
a reality in which the bus had broken down? The nature of reality would have been different; perhaps the man 
would have taken a train or taxi instead. 
1357 Although it seems clear that everything cannot be relevant for the fact that a specific meeting of two people 
occurs. The meeting takes place at 1.1.2000. How could a small meteor hitting the surface of Mars on 1.1.1970 
be relevant for the meeting? The relevant boundaries must be drawn somewhere, but how are they to be drawn? 
On the other hand, perhaps the meteor, through a freakish causal chain, had some relevance. Can we completely 
exclude the possibility that this is not the case when it comes to a unique, specific event?  
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Every event is unrepeatable.  This  clarifies  Davidson’s  claim  that  every  property  of  
every  event  is  essential  to  it,  and  that  every  property  of  every  event  is  causally  efficacious.  
From  this  view  it  follows  that:  “If  we  consider  an  event that is a “full, sufficient” cause of 
another event, it must, as Mill pointed out long ago, include everything in the universe 
preceding the effect that has a causal bearing on it, some cross section of the entire preceding 
light cone….”1358 A man is killed with a gun. Intuition perhaps tells us that had the gun been 
equipped with a silencer, the death would have nevertheless occurred if the silenced shot were 
similar to the original shot in other respects. Given that every property of an event is essential 
to it, Davidson concludes that in this case the second shot would have resulted in a death, but 
it could not have been the same death as caused by the loud shot – nor would the shots have 
been the same.1359 If this is true then it really does not make sense to say that the loudness of 
the shot was irrelevant to what the shot caused, because the shot that was fired was in fact 
silent and it caused what it did. Had it been loud it would not have caused the same things.  
So, is it possible to answer the question “What is it about events c and e that makes it 
the case that c is the cause of e?”1360 from Davidson’s perspective? What was it, after all, 
about the avalanche that caused the destruction of the hut? What was it about the heart attack 
that caused Georg’s death? I think that we have to conclude that this question does not make 
clear sense from the Davidsonian perspective. But if this is the case how should we interpret 
Davidson’s claim that we assume that physical properties are causally efficacious and that 
physical properties matter to causal relations? Well, Davidson argues that: “Properties are 
causally efficacious if they make a difference to what individual events cause.…”1361 The 
problem with this view, together with the view that the laws which connect causally related 
events deal with “microscopic properties” of the objects involved in the events, is the issue of 
how well it fits with Davidson’s dismissal of properties in favor of predicates. It surely 
sounds strange to say that “Predicates are causally efficacious if….” I think that the only way 
to understand the claim that physical properties are causally efficacious or matter to causal 
relations is to say that physical predicates are “causally efficacious” if they matter to physical 
explanations and that causal relations cannot be understood a being anything else than 
explanatory relations. A causally efficacious property is nothing but an aspect of an event 
which we take to be causally efficacious, and this aspect we choose according to our 
                                               
1358 Davidson, 1993d, 199. Consider also, the cause of a specific action: “The “cause” must embrace everything 
in the universe within the sphere defined by the distance light travels in the interval from t to t’ from the region 
of the cause to the region of action.” (Davidson, 1999p, 639-640) 
1359 The example is Sosa’s. Davidson discusses it in 1993d. 
1360 Kim, 1993, 22. 
1361 Davidson, 1993d, 198. 
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explanatory interests. Causally efficacious properties are thus completely explanation-
dependent. The questions of what kind of events exist, where the boundaries of events are to 
be  drawn,  and  how  many  events  occur  on  a  certain  occasion  are  up  to  us.  We  have  to  
conclude that there is no such thing as causation separated from our explanatory practices, 
and there is no point in talking of causal relations as separated from these practices. Crane has 
complained that Davidson’s position: “[…] seems to leave us unable to answer the question 
of why certain explanations are better than others by invoking the efficacious features of 
reality.”1362 But what features could be invoked independently of explanatory interests? My 
claim is that certain explanations are better than others because they satisfy our epistemic 
curiosity in a better way. 
We can now re-analyze the Davidsonian solutions to the problem of mental causation. 
According to my interpretation the options were the following: 
 
1) The question of how mental phenomena cause things cannot be separated from the 
ways in which mental explanations are given. The efficacy of the mental is tied to 
the way that we explain or understand something as being performed because of 
mental causes. Causation and causal explanation cannot be clearly separated. 
2) Mental phenomena cause things because they are identical to physical phenomena 
and physical phenomena have causal powers. 
3) Mental phenomena do not cause anything. They are epiphenomenal.  
4) Events are causally efficacious. The causal relation is an extensional relation 
between events, and its nature cannot be further analyzed. There is no answer to 
the problem of mental causation beyond the answer that events can cause things. 
 
In  our  re-analysis,  let  us  for  the  moment  ignore  the  third  possibility.  This  is  obviously  one  
answer  to  the  problem  of  mental  causation,  but  it  is  not  a  satisfying  answer  for  those  who  
believe that mental causation is real. From what has been said above, it should be fairly clear 
that proposal 1) seems to be by far the most plausible. 
According to proposal 2), mental phenomena can cause things because they are 
identical with physical phenomena and physical phenomena are causally efficacious or, as 
Davidson reminds us, because physical properties are causally efficacious. The relation of 
supervenience is meant to connect the mental properties of an event with the event’s physical 
                                               
1362 Crane, 1995, 228. 
489 
 
properties. But, as we have already seen, Davidson’s view of properties makes this kind of 
answer difficult to understand. In fact, whereas the standard formulation of supervenience in 
the contemporary philosophy of mind is made in terms of physical and mental properties, 
Davidson, when being precise, formulates his version of supervenience in terms of predicates. 
He writes: “[…] a predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if and only if p does not 
distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S”.1363 This is one important way in 
which Davidson has expressed his view about supervenience. As the discussion of sections 
2.1.2 and 2.3.6 showed, sometimes Davidson speaks of supervening properties or 
“features”1364. He notes that a feature F may supervene on a set of features F1 even if F cannot 
be defined in F1 or  related  nomologically  to  features  in  F1. According to Davidson this 
describes the nature of the mental–physical relation. The relation could be called anomalous 
supervenience, as Davidson himself does call it.1365 I am not aware that anyone else other than 
Davidson would have used this expression. Anomalous supervenience goes well together with 
AM, of course; it is unclear, however, how this understanding of supervenience fits with the 
more usual understandings. This may be yet one more issue where commentators misinterpret 
Davidson’s position.1366 On the other hand, “anomalous supervenience” may give credence to 
Hare’s complaint, mentioned earlier, that Davidson managed to turn a very clear notion into a 
mysterious one. 
Let us assume that the formulation of supervenience in terms of predicates instead of 
properties or features is the best way to characterize Davidson’s understanding of 
supervenience.1367 A consequence of this is that it is perhaps impossible to compare 
Davidson’s view to the views which take a more metaphysical attitude towards 
supervenience. This kind of comparison cannot lead to constructive results if both sides hold 
on to their respective views about the nature of supervenience and their underlying 
metaphysics. This being the case, I believe that some of the criticisms against Davidson’s 
position are irrelevant, except from a perspective which here turns out to be question-begging. 
It is disappointing that critics see Davidson’s position only from their own perspectives, 
which in turn makes the criticism insignificant as many commentators have noted.1368 The 
criticism is, of course, appropriate if it is meant to question whether Davidson is right – but 
                                               
1363 Davidson, 1993d, 187. 
1364 Consider: ”Mental concepts are supervenient on physical concepts in this sense: if events fail to share a 
mental property they will fail to share at least one physical property” (Davidson, 1995c, 207). 
1365 In Caorsi, 1999. 
1366 For different analyses of Davidson’s supervenience, see Zangwill, 1993, van Brakel, 1999, Klagge, 1990. 
1367 ”The notion of supervenience, as I have used it, is best thought of as a relation between a predicate and a set 
of predicates in a language”, as Davidson (1985, 242) notes. 
1368 For an insightful discussion see van Brakel, 1999. 
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usually the criticism is based on a straightforward assumption that his view about properties is 
incorrect. This leads to a situation where critics fail to appreciate the interesting aspects of 
Davidson’s view and conclude that his proposal is “incredible”. Van Brakel has concluded, 
when referring to the dispute between Davidson and his critics about mental causation that: 
“[t]he critics, after twenty years of studying…’Mental Events’, don’t seem to understand 
[Davidson’s position] and don’t really address it.”1369 I believe this is a fair statement; I have 
showed how Bickle and others do not really address the issues that Davidson sees as 
preventing the reducibility of the mental. Those who accept a different view of properties than 
Davidson does do not usually give reasons for this. It is not clear that Davidson’s alleged 
skepticism towards properties is less justified than a straightforward acceptance of properties. 
 It is not surprising that the primacy of interpretation, which is a central theme in 
Davidson’s philosophy, plays an essential  part  also in the question about the efficacy of the 
mental. Some commentators have noticed this. Campbell points out that Davidson’s version 
of supervenience: “[…] is not metaphysical dependence but is rather a form of semantic 
dependence since the relation is one between mental and physical predicates.“1370 Mental 
predicates are attributed according to the general principles of interpretation. These 
attributions are based on physical evidence; changes in physical facts concerning, for 
example, the behavior of the interpretee or his environment will affect what mental predicates 
can be attributed to him in a way that respects the principles of interpretation. There is a very 
general  relation  of  dependency  between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  but  this  is  a  different  
kind of relation of dependence than suggested by those who have a metaphysical view of 
supervenience and who claim that mental properties supervene on physical properties. 
Davidson notes that: “[…] an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in 
some physical respect.”1371 But as I argued in 3.3.4, the physical change which is required for 
a mental change does not need to be in the object. Objects may differ mentally while being 
physically identical, but if there is a mental difference or change, there must be some physical 
difference between the objects. Davidson notes that there must be a physical difference 
somewhere, but the difference may not be in the person.1372 The difference may be, for 
example in the personal histories. 
We are justified in attributing mental states to an interpretee on the basis of her 
behavior, and behavior requires physical changes. Without these changes we have no 
                                               
1369 Van Brakel, 1999, 12. 
1370 Campbell, 1998, 37. 
1371 Davidson, 1970, 214. 
1372 Davidson, 1989a. 
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evidence, or to use von Wright’s term criteria, for mental attributions. Therefore the mental 
predicates that can be applied to an interpretee depend on the physical predicates that can be 
applied to her. In my view the semantic dependence, which in Campbell’s view describes 
correctly the nature of Davidsonian supervenience, could be seen as describing also von 
Wright’s view. Although von Wright, when discussing the nature of supervenience, used the 
expression “supervenient in time”, I fail to see why the semantic relation between the 
behavioral and mental which is essential to von Wright’s position could not be understood in 
terms of supervenience. Davidson’s anomalous supervenience is not a reductive relation and 
neither is the semantic relation – with its residue of meaning – between the behavioral and the 
mental. If we recall how von Wright stresses the semantic connection between the mental and 
the behavioral, we should conclude that the views of Davidson and von Wright about the 
nature of supervenience are similar. This is at least one way that von Wright’s position could 
be understood, and related to the contemporary discussions about the nature of supervenience 
and the problem of mental causation. Von Wright’s conclusion is that: “since the relation of 
behaviour to the mental is semantic and not causal, we cannot by transitivity conclude that the 
neural is cause of the mental, nor, needless to say, the mental of the neural.”1373 
It is not clear that the general dependency of mental on the physical should be seen as 
giving any priority to the latter. Campbell claims: “Since interpretation must begin with 
physical evidence, I take this dependence of the mental on the physical to be a fundamental 
feature of Davidson’s theory.”1374 But as I showed in section 2.5.2 when discussing the nature 
of radical interpretation, it is not obvious that the evidence for the attribution of mental 
predicates is entirely physical. The data in radical interpretation is partly physical, partly 
mental and perhaps the best way to describe the relation between the mental and the physical 
is along the lines that von Wright suggests, namely as being a conceptual mixture. But it is 
clear that Davidson’s understanding of supervenience differs importantly from the usual 
understanding. Van Brakel concludes: 
 
If any particular supervenience relation is relative to a passing theory of interpretation… and if there is 
little support to assume there are strict laws, this provides a very different perspective from the 
mainstream concern with supervenience, which is wedded to a microreductionistic Scientific Image.1375 
 
There are good reasons to agree with van Brakel and Campbell given Davidson’s views about 
the nature of the mental. I must add, though, that sometimes Davidson himself seems to see 
                                               
1373 Von Wright, 1994, 109. 
1374 Campbell, 1998, 38. 
1375 Van Brakel, 1999, 20. 
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his version of supervenience as a more metaphysical relation than it is, thereby giving support 
to the views of his critics. This becomes obvious from Davidson’s admittance that his version 
is very close to Kim’s notion of “weak” supervenience which is, after all, a thoroughly 
ontological view. Kim has affirmed that he sees Davidsonian supervenience in this way. It is 
no wonder that Kim can therefore raise criticisms against this notion, because Davidson’s 
version of supervenience does not agree with Kim’s intuitions. Whereas Kim claims that 
supervenience is best understood as a reductive relation, we have seen that Davidson uses the 
term “anomalous” when describing his understanding of supervenience.  
Davidson’s use of the terms of his critics is unfortunate and causes confusions.1376 It 
also leaves the reader under the impression that Davidson himself was confused about his 
own position. As Klagge has noted:  
 
[…] there are two very different notions going under the name ‘supervenience’. There is [a] 
methodological constraint on a theorizer – and there is Kim’s notion – a substantive constraint on the 
relationship of facts in possible worlds. Davidson’s view’s on supervenience uneasily straddle these 
different notions.1377 
 
Davidsonian supervenience could be understood, interestingly, as a methodological 
constraint. On the other hand we could conclude, as de Caro has perspicuously done, that in 
Davidson’s writings two different concepts of supervenience can be detected. But what if 
supervenience is thought of as a semantic relation? In von Wright’s case this is the route that 
is taken. Can something else be concluded from the suggestion that Davidson’s supervenience 
or von Wright’s mental–behavioral connection is a semantic relation? 
That supervenience is best understood as a semantic relation is another reason to claim 
that it is not the causal efficacy of physical properties which has a role in Davidson’s account 
of mental causation. Supervenience connects predicates, not properties. This supports the 
view that when we talk of causation we are usually talking of causal explanation, because 
predicates are relevant for explanations. Against my interpretation that causal relations are 
actually explanatory relations, Davidson would say that: “causal relations… are not in any 
                                               
1376 An example of this kind of confusion is expressed by Kim. He says: “Davidson is unlikely to feel 
comfortable with unrestrained talk of properties; he would perhaps prefer to talk of predicates instead…. 
Davidson interpreters  may need to  be  careful  about  such issues.  However,  we will  carry  on  our  discussion  in  
terms of properties and other reified entities.” (Kim, 2003, 135) But if the issue is more substantial, then it is not 
just  “Davidson  interpreters”  who  have  to  worry  about  it,  because  then  the  criticism  based  on  certain  
understanding of the nature of supervenience simply does not apply to Davidson’s position. Campbell correctly 
notes that: “Since Davidson’s version [of supervenience] relates predicates rather than properties, and the sort of 
dependence this expresses is semantic rather than metaphysical, Davidson need not be troubled by Kim’s worries 
about modality.” (Campbell, 1998, 38) 
1377 Klagge, 1990, 347. 
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direct sense language-dependent”1378 and that they are somehow “in nature”. But what does 
this mean if causal relations do not hold in virtue of the physical and mind-independent 
properties of events? We can tentatively accept Davidson’s view that causal relations are “in 
nature”, but there is no answer to the question of why there exist such relations, and there is 
nothing that could be specified in virtue of which the relation holds.  For these reasons, it 
seems to me, saying that these relations are “in nature” is pointless. This being the case, the 
answer to the problem of mental causation cannot really be proposal number two, which ties 
the causal efficacy of the mental to the causal efficacy of the physical. Strictly speaking, an 
event’s causally efficacious physical properties are inferred from explanations into which the 
descriptions of other relevant events enter because they satisfy certain predicates. The 
properties referred to by the explanatorily relevant predicates are then treated as being 
causally efficacious. 
 Proposal 4) seems also to be an unsatisfying answer to the problem of mental 
causation. According to this proposal, mental events can cause something because it is in the 
nature of events to cause things. Therefore it should be the case that the fact that an event is 
mental or physical is irrelevant to its causal efficacy. But in Davidson’s view, supervenience 
ensures that if two events differ in their psychological properties they also differ in their 
physical properties and, since the latter are causally efficacious, it seems to be the case that 
mental properties matter, after all, to the event’s causal efficacy. But this suggestion cannot 
work if proposal 2) is rejected. On the one hand, Davidson tries to say that only events have 
causal efficacy but, on the other hand, they would not have the causal powers which they 
have if they were not the events they are, and they would not be the events that they in fact 
are if they lacked some of the physical or mental properties which they actually have. It is 
difficult to see how these views could be reconciled. How does the view that “[…] if causal 
relations and causal powers inhere in particular events… then the properties we happen to 
employ to pick them out or characterize them, cannot affect what they cause”1379 fit with the 
claims that “…properties are causally efficacious if they make a difference to what individual 
events cause, and supervenience insures that mental properties do make a difference to what 
mental events cause”1380or “Either they [mental properties] make a difference [to the causal 
relations of an event] or they don’t; if supervenience is true, they do”?1381 Since Davidson 
wants to formulate his thesis of supervenience in terms of predicates instead of properties, it 
                                               
1378 Davidson, 1985, 224. 
1379 Davidson, 1993d, 190. 
1380 Davidson, 1993d, 198. 
1381 Davidson, 1993d, 197. 
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makes no sense to say that mental properties do make a difference to what mental events 
cause.  
We could accept proposal 4) as a suggestion about why mental events cause things, 
the answer being that it is because they are events, but this is not a clarifying answer. It would 
be almost like saying that mental phenomena cause things just because they do. If the claims 
that events have the powers to cause things is meant to be an answer to the problem of mental 
causation, we are back to the issue of how we explain or understand certain events as being 
causes of others. When we take events to be the relata in causal relations, we are once again in 
the realm of causal explanation because when we start to talk about events we have to talk 
them under certain descriptions, and which descriptions we choose depends on our 
explanatory  interests.  Putting  things  this  way  once  again  raises  the  question  of  what  
Davidson’s view about the nature of events is. Are they physical in themselves or are they 
neutral? If the mode of being of events were physical then we could perhaps defend proposal 
2), which claims that events cause things because of their physical properties. This proposal is 
rejected by Davidson, and therefore the interpretation that events are neutral gains more 
credibility. But the neutral status of events is a formulation which remains obscure, because 
whenever one starts to talk about them, one identifies them under their physical or mental 
descriptions.     
    
4.1.2 Davidson on mental causation and rational explanation 
 
The  conclusion  of  the  previous  section  was  that  the  best  answer  to  the  problem  of  mental  
causation that can be found from Davidson’s views was the proposal that causation cannot be 
separated from explanation. The question of how mental events cause cannot be answered 
outside the context of rational explanations.  “Mental qua mental” causation is to be answered 
in terms of rational explanations, whereas “mental qua physical” causation is a confusion 
when seen from a non-reductive point of view. Causation and causal explanation cannot be 
clearly separated, and the expression ‘mental causation’ becomes obscure. As Davidson 
reminds us: “[…] it makes no literal sense… to speak of an event causing something as 
mental….”1382 Yet, he uses expressions like “[…] mental properties do make a difference to 
what mental events cause”1383 or “… self-criticism… is clearly a case of mental causality that 
                                               
1382 Davidson, 1993d, 196. 
1383 Davidson, 1993d, 198. 
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transcends reason…”1384 and “… certainly the ways metaphor, imagination, conceptual 
creativity and daydreaming work their wonders in the mind are cases of mental 
causality….”1385 Mental  cause  is  defined  by  Davidson  as  a  state  with  propositional  content,  
and he claims that in standard reason-based explanations the propositional contents must have 
appropriate logical relations to each other. The states of belief and desire must however also 
cause the explained state or event.1386 Although there is the demand that a belief or other 
mental  phenomenon  must  cause  the  explained  event,  it  can  also  be  said  that  reasoning  is  a  
process which can be thought of as entirely mental, as Davidson notes.1387 
 But how should we understand the expressions mental causality or mental cause if it 
makes no sense to speak of an event that causes something as mental? Isn’t mental causation 
exactly an example of an event causing something because it is a mental event? The only way 
to make sense of this apparent problem is to note that the word “cause” can be understood in 
different ways. Davidson notes that: “Everybody allows that most talk about causality is 
interest-relative; what we call “the” cause of some event is some feature chosen from the 
totality of causal factors which particularly interests us….”1388 This observation we made in 
the case of Georg’s death. We choose the cause of death from a point of view of some 
particular interest.1389 Some critics suspect that if an event has all its properties essentially and 
if  every property is  causally efficacious,  it  follows that we should say, for example,  that  the 
loudness of the shot is relevant to whether the shot causes a death or not. Marras claims: “On 
Davidson’s account, the loudness of the shot, or even its having been fired from a dusty gun, 
would be as relevant to the death it caused as the physical properties of the shot that we would 
normally hold responsible for the victim’s death….”1390 This, however, cannot be the case 
according to Marras because: “Clearly, not all properties of an event are equally relevant, or 
essential, to what it causes.”1391 I would answer perhaps they are, perhaps they aren’t; it partly 
depends  on  what  one  means  by  the  term  “relevant”.  If  we  consider  what  the  “ultimate”  
answer to the question “What caused X?” was, we would perhaps have to include everything 
preceding X in a spatio-temporal region of a certain size. Davidson is not eager to analyze 
                                               
1384 Davidson, 1982a, 186.  
1385 In Caorsi, 1999, 327. 
1386 Davidson, 1982a. 
1387 Davidson, 1993f. 
1388 Davidson, 1993g, 287. 
1389 As Davidson (1999x, 573) notes, an insufficient explanation does not mean that nothing has been explained. 
The fact that we do not know how a certain physical mechanism behind mental causation works does not mean 
that explanations referring to mental causes would not be explanatory. 
1390 Marras, 1997, 185.  
1391 Ibid. 
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causation in terms of counterfactuals because counterfactual claims should always be 
evaluated in the context in which they are made. This is just to repeat the point that 
explanations in general must be evaluated in a specific context. I believe that this suggestion 
of Davidson’s is not completely consistent with his claim that “[…] interest aside, every 
property of every event is causally efficacious.”1392 What does causal efficacy outside all 
interests mean? Could it mean that every property of every event can be chosen to  be  a  
causally efficacious property depending on our interests? It is not easy to conclude how this 
“hyper-essentialism” about events should be understood. Commentators like Burge and Sosa 
have found it implausible; Burge thinks that the thesis is indefensible.1393 Davidson himself 
notes that although his view has the consequence that, say, if a particular soldier in the First 
World War had not been shot then the First World War would have not been the First World 
War, the question of whether this would make any difference depends on the context where 
this counterfactual claim is made. Because counterfactuals depend on context, it is a mistake 
to base our metaphysics on them; Davidson thus rejects the counterfactual analysis of 
causation. This being said, he claims that laws are true generalizations which support 
counterfactuals precisely because the correctness of laws and explanations, like 
counterfactuals, depends on our interests.  
 Although it is true that one could argue that the dustiness of a gun could be relevant to 
what  it  causes,  it  does  not  follow  that  on  Davidson’s  account  we  should  think  that  the  
dustiness of the gun is a relevant property to which we should refer in explaining why the shot 
caused a death. Remember: “What we call ‘the’ cause of some event is some feature chosen 
from the…causal factors which interests us…”1394 and “[…] depending on the sort of 
explanation we are interested in, different properties of events are treated as causally 
efficacious.”1395 It seems to me that those who argue that the dustiness of a gun is a relevant 
property that should be considered if we want to find out what was it about a shot that caused 
a death neglect the fact that causally efficacious properties are derived from explanations 
which satisfy our particular interests. It is an obscure claim that the properties which seem to 
be irrelevant for the occurrence of a certain effect would be as relevant as those which we 
actually take to be relevant. When we want to explain why a certain effect occurred we treat 
certain properties as being more relevant than others. There is no “metaphysical answer” to 
the  question  of  whether  they  are  more  relevant.  As  far  as  mental causation is concerned, 
                                               
1392 Davidson, 1987a, 113. 
1393 Sosa, 1993, Burge, 1993. 
1394 Davidson, 1993g, 287, my emphasis. 
1395 Davidson, 1987a, 113, my emphasis. 
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another way to argue against Marras could be the following. Certain properties matter to those 
causal relations which ground rational explanations. Mental predicates in terms of which 
rational explanations are given supervene, above all else, on behavioral predicates. They do 
not supervene on all physical predicates of an object. What is relevant for the explanation – 
and thus causing – of action are those features which supervene on the causal interactions 
between agents and events and objects in the world, and not the features which supervene on 
neurophysiological and physical facts. Davidson notes that the supervenience of mental on 
physical facts of various sorts does not suggest epistemological priorities.1396 As far as I can 
see this cannot be entirely correct; on a Davidsonian account the behavioral level is 
privileged, and if we take von Wright’s argument seriously then this level should be 
privileged. 
When Davidson talks about causation it is often causal explanation that he is actually 
referring to, although he also wants to keep questions about causation and causal explanation 
clearly separate. We can take a “generous attitude” towards the nature of cause and then all 
kinds of things can be causes. Stones can be causes, people can be causes and states can be 
causes, as Davidson claims.1397 So it is not the case, as Crane for example claims, that 
“followers of Davidson will say that only events can be causes….”1398 Crane, who vigorously 
wants  to  have  causally  efficacious  properties,  thinks  that  followers  of  Davidson  cannot  say  
that a skater’s weight or the ice’s fragility is literally a cause of the ice’s breaking. But what 
does “literally” mean? When the Davidsonian generous attitude towards causes is taken, it 
certainly can be said that the weight of the skater caused the ice to break; to insist that this 
was literally the cause does not make sense from the generous point of view. The generous 
attitude agrees with the way the concept of “cause” is used in ordinary speech and in this 
context,  so it  seems to me, the concept is  very closely tied to that of explanation. Insofar as 
we want to talk about mental causation, or insofar as Davidson uses this expression, the talk 
should be understood as referring to mental explanations because the expression “mental 
cause” is clearly tied to our ordinary notion of cause. This being said let us draw a conclusion 
of Davidson’s views about mental causation by briefly considering the peculiarities of 
rational explanations and how they differ from physicalistic explanations. 
In section 3.2, the rationalizing aspect of rational explanations was already discussed. I 
claimed, drawing strongly on the views of von Wright, that the explanatory force of rational 
                                               
1396 Davidson, 1983. 
1397 Davidson, 1993g. 
1398 Crane, 2008, 181. 
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explanations is not based on the assumption that a causal relation between attitudes and action 
exists; the derivation goes the other way around. If we think of reasons as causes it is because 
we have taken a generous attitude towards the term “cause”. Although Davidson in “Actions, 
Reasons and Causes” claimed that rational explanations are, and must be, a form of causal 
explanation, it should now be clear that the expression “causal explanation” must be 
understood differently in each case. Davidson himself seemed to loosen the idea that reasons 
are causes, emphasizing instead that they are rational causes. What is obvious is that the 
explanatory force of rationalizations comes from a different source than the explanatory force 
of causal explanations. “Mental causality” is a fall-out of rational explanations, which in turn 
should be understood as a form of understanding explanations in  roughly  the  sense  that  is  
familiar from the views of von Wright. 
Although Davidson sometimes uses the term “mental causation”, we should conclude 
that this expression is confusing from a Davidsonian perspective. Events cause other events, 
but the fact that an event happens to be a mental event does not explain its causal powers. The 
fact that the event is mental may, however, explain why we can explain something by 
invoking the mental description of the event. This being the case, it can be said that mental 
events cause the effects which can be explained by referring to mental descriptions. More 
than Davidson von Wright wants to make a clear distinction between reasons (which belong 
to the realm of mental, or to the “world of spirit”) and causes (which belong to the realm of 
laws).  He  notes:  “[…] the  determinants  of  action,  I  would  maintain,  are  of  totally  different  
kind from causes and effects among events in nature. They fall under a different concept of 
causation….”1399 Interestingly, Davidson observes that: “The fact that these relations 
[between the mental and the physical] are so deeply puzzling suggests some sort of misfit 
between the concept of causality and the concept of a thought.”1400 This is an interesting view 
when compared against the main claim of “Actions, Reasons and Causes” which was, after 
all, that reasons, which belong to the realm of the mental, must be causes. But it seems to me 
that the “misfit” now suggests that reasons cannot be causes in the strict sense of the word. As 
Davidson admits: “[the ordinary notion of cause], which is closely tied to explanation, and is 
therefore sensitive to how cause and effect are described, differs radically from the notion of 
cause we employ when we are describing a relation in nature between events.”1401 In 
Davidson’s view there are two fundamentally different notions of “cause”; it is easy to see the 
                                               
1399 Von Wright, 1974a, 2. 
1400 Davidson, 1993f, 298. 
1401 Davidson, 1993f, 307. As I have noted it is very unclear what the “relation in nature” can be on a 
Davidsonian account.   
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similarity of this view to the view of von Wright.1402 Although “Actions, Reasons and 
Causes” has been usually interpreted as defending a position which brings reasons and causes 
together,  I  believe  that  the  irreducibility  of  the  mental  marks  a  clear  conceptual  distinction  
between them. A naturalist would applaud “Actions, Reasons and Causes” while thinking that 
“Mental Events” and its defense of anomalism and irreducibility of the mental spoils the 
picture.1403 
It therefore seems that when we speak of mental causes on a Davidsonian account we 
are not, strictly speaking, implying that the mental phenomena to which we refer are causes. 
Therefore  critics  who  accuse  Davidson  of  epiphenomenalism  have  a  point.  A  widely  
recognized worry is that Davidson’s views have epiphenomenalist and antirealist aspects. 
These worries are not completely misplaced – although, as I have argued, some critics seem to 
derive these worries from the wrong sources – for example, from the fact that Davidson does 
not explain how properties could be causally efficacious. In fact, Davidson does offer a 
proposal about what makes a property causally efficacious – namely, its occurrence in a law 
by  reference  to  which  explanations  are  given.  This  is  obviously  not  a  kind  of  answer  that  
would satisfy the critics, because they want to know what it is about the properties that makes 
them causally efficacious. But it should be also obvious that a theory like Davidson’s simply 
cannot provide a detailed account of mental causation. Why? Because the main claims of AM 
are: 1) from an ontological point of view mental phenomena are identical to physical 
phenomena, and 2) explanations referring to mental phenomena are autonomous. If we could 
explain how mental phenomena cause physical phenomena, or vice versa, we would run the 
risk that mental explanations could be replaced by physical explanations, thus making the 
former useless. This possibility is real because mental phenomena are physical phenomena, 
and therefore there exist physical relations between the phenomena which fall under strict 
laws. So, given Davidson’s views about the nature of the mental and its irreducibility, it is not 
surprising that he does not and cannot offer a theory of mental causation. This being said, it 
could be claimed that Davidson does offer a half-hearted theory of mental causation. It is a 
brute fact about events, mental or physical, that they have causal powers. But this answer does 
not  satisfy  a  critic  who  wants  to  know  whether  the  mental aspect of an event has causal 
efficacy. 
                                               
1402 Stoutland (1999) has argued that the difference between von Wright and Davidson is largely terminological. 
Given Davidson’s views as described here, Stoutland’s claim seems to correct. 
1403 I thank Louise Antony for sharing this personal impression of hers about Davidson’s position.  
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Since Davidson does not explain how mental causation works, his position could be 
accused of involving epiphenomenalism. He admits: “[…] we can’t say in clear detail how the 
mental attitudes cause the action”.1404 This kind of view does not make one’s position 
epiphenomenalist. But what about the claim which was mentioned already: “There is a 
harmless sense in which one can say the contents of the reasons on which we act is irrelevant 
to the causation of the action, because we can, in theory, explain why the action occurred 
using only physical laws and descriptions.”1405 The way I interpret this view is that something 
causes an action and the content of the reason which explains the action is irrelevant to the 
causation. This sounds like a form of epiphenomenalism. Further interesting remarks make it 
problematic  to  say  what  Davidson  actually  thinks  about  the  causal  efficacy  of  reasons.  He  
notes: “[…] we [cannot] infer from the fact that what we typically think of as the reasons for 
an action are not events that there aren’t events that are essential to the causing of the action. 
These events may or may not be mental in any ordinary sense.”1406 So, the reasons to which 
we refer as the reasons for action are not necessarily the causes of the action; in fact the event 
which causes the action may not be mental in any ordinary sense. What causes my action can 
be something other than the mental event by reference to which I explain the action. This 
being the case, it should be obvious that Davidson’s references to “mental causality” should 
really be taken metaphorically. It is not the case, at least not obviously, that the reasons to 
which we refer as reasons for actions pick out causally efficacious physical events. This is not 
surprising given Davidson’s “interpretationism” and its consequence that explanatory 
attitudes need not correspond to anything running through the agent’s head before an action 
takes place.  
I think that the most severe problem is that “Davidson’s reasons” may be both non-
existent and non-efficacious. One could argue that there is therefore a very easy route to 
epiphenomenalism in Davidson’s theory – namely, a kind of antirealism about mental events. 
If the existence of mental states is doubtful then so is certainly their causal efficacy. In fact, as 
I have shown, Davidson concludes that talking of beliefs, desires, and intentions as causes and 
effects is a metaphorical. This is because, strictly speaking, only events can be causes and 
mental “entities” like beliefs are not events. Davidson claims: “[…] when we mention beliefs 
and  desires  to  explain  an  action,  we  are  describing  key  aspects  of  the  circumstances  under  
                                               
1404 Davidson, 1993f, 307. 
1405 In Caorsi, 1999, 338. 
1406 Davidson, 1999, 654, my emphasis. 
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which the agent acted.”1407 Or, “What we mean, in my view, when we speak of beliefs, 
desires, and intentions as causes of actions is that they are significant causal conditions of 
actions.”1408 These remarks suggest that Davidson does not see reasons as causally efficacious 
entities and this suggests that the explanatory force of rational explanations should be seen 
following from the fact that they enable us to see and understand a situation they explain in a 
certain way.1409 
An interesting consequence of this is the following. Davidson’s most important claim 
in the philosophy of mind is that mental explanations are autonomous and indispensable. 
Against this view, the claim that we could, in theory, explain why an action occurred using 
only our physical vocabulary is obscure. However, since Davidson also argues that “no one” 
would accept the physical explanation as an explanation of action viewed as an action, the 
irreducibility of reason-based explanations stands. Therefore it is difficult to see the point in 
claiming that “in theory” an action could be explained with only physical concepts. Davidson 
seems to think of actions in two different ways. On the one hand, they are physical 
phenomena and therefore there is, in theory, a physical description which applies to them. On 
the other hand, they are mental phenomena and identifiable as actions only in our mental 
vocabulary. But if the irreducibility of the mental operates also at the token level, why would 
we be willing to hold on to the idea that actions are in any clear sense physical phenomena? 
 
4.2 The new problem of mental causation, epiphenomenalism and precursory reasons 
 
I have suggested that if the irreducibility of the mental is accepted, then a reductive 
explanation of mental causation is impossible.1410 Sometimes Davidson expresses a positive 
view about the possibility of certain kinds of reduction – as for example, when in one of his 
earliest  articles  he  claims:  “[…] there  is  no  reason  why we cannot  say  this  particular  event  
(and here we describe it with a physical description) is a causal factor in the production of this 
mental event.”1411 Davidson seems to be ambivalent about the question of what science can 
and cannot explain about mental phenomena. The same is true of von Wright, who claims that 
the problem of consciousness is a philosophic muddle which cannot be clarified through 
science, but who also refers to scientific results as a reason to believe in epiphenomenalism. It 
                                               
1407 Davidson, 1993g, 287-288. 
1408 Davidson, 1999q, 499.  
1409 See section, 3.2. 
1410 Hutto (1999) has reached a more general conclusion: If psychology must be understood by interpretationalist 
lights, then it simply cannot be reduced or naturalized. 
1411 Davidson, 1964, 48. 
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seems to me that even Davidson’s “positive remarks” about the prospects of science go too 
far if the claims about token-irreducibility and of the nature of mental states are taken 
seriously. Indeed, as Davidson notes in his skeptical mood: “[…] human thoughts correspond 
to so little of the material world that no self-contained science can be based exclusively on 
them.”1412  
In chapter three I gave reasons to believe in the irreducibility of the mental and 
showed the extent to which Davidson and von Wright are committed to the irreducibility of 
the mental. When discussing these somewhat technical questions, the most important thing is 
to recognize the “spirit” in terms of which von Wright and Davidson think about the place of 
the mental vis-a-vis physical  reality.  In  the  last  three  sections  I  have  described  Davidson’s  
relation to the problem of mental causation and considered how he could answer the problem. 
I conclude that from the perspectives of Davidson’s and von Wright’s positions, a reductive 
solution is impossible. Let us nevertheless note that Davidson makes an interesting although 
obscure remark about the possibility of a solution:  
 
[…] the problem of how beliefs and desires cause an action when they give the reason it was performed; 
the problem of how external events cause sensations and beliefs in perception and memory; the problem 
of how one belief causes another when we reason – could it be the case that there exist “solutions” to 
these problems, even if for some reason we cannot arrive at them?1413 
 
The claim that there could be solutions although we could not arrive at them is puzzling. We 
could only speculate about what kind of “solutions” Davidson might have had in mind. 
I believe we have to once more ask what the problem of mental causation actually is. 
Kim states that the problem is not so much one of whether mental causation is possible, but 
how it  is  possible given certain assumptions about the nature of reality.  He rejects positions 
which claim that mental causation is an obvious fact and that there is no special problem 
related to it. Kim admits that the existence of mental causation is a fact, but this does not 
remove the worry about how it is possible. I want to argue that the how-question should be 
considered in a broader setting than in the context of O-physicalism. I have suggested that the 
new problem of mental causation is the question of how to tell that a mental explanation is 
true. The problem of mental causation can be approached either from a metaphysical 
perspective where the essential question is how an overdetermination of action by mental and 
physical  causes  is  possible,  or  from a  methodological  one  where  we ask  what  the  nature  of  
mental explanations is and how they differ from scientific explanations. It would be an 
                                               
1412 Davidson, 1993f, 312. 
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exhaustive task to address the contemporary discussion, which accepts as its starting point the 
metaphysical perspective. My intention is to consider how the problem of mental causation 
could be thought about outside the jungle of empirical – physicalistic – metaphysics. There 
are three reasons for this. The first is the attempt to clarify how the problem could be 
addressed from Davidson’s and von Wright’s points of view. The second is the belief that 
there are good reasons to think that the irreducibility of the mental is true. The third is the 
conviction that a reductive solution to the problem of mental causation should not be sought 
because it jeopardizes the distinctiveness of human agency. 
The modern way to state the problem of mental causation seems to start from two 
assumptions. The first is that epiphenomenalism is false. The second is that mental properties 
are  real.  Given  these  two assumptions,  the  problem is  to  explain  how mental  properties  are  
causally efficacious, that is, how mental events or states cause something “qua mental”. I do 
not wholly understand how a contemporary physicalist can formulate the problem in this way. 
If it is agreed that reality is thoroughly physical, then the expression qua mental is misplaced 
from the start. If causation is a physical phenomenon and if there is such thing as mental 
causation, then the question is what kind of physical states mental states are, and what allows 
them to be causally efficacious? I think that in order to answer this question we would have to 
show how the mental reduces to the physical by explaining how the “entity” that we now 
describe in our mental vocabulary could be described in our physical vocabulary. If we could 
describe this and if we could describe how causation worked between physical entities, we 
would have answered the question of “How mental causation is possible” – without invoking 
qua mental expressions. This is how the situation should be from a properly physicalistic 
perspective, because in a physical reality there is not, or at least should not be, room for 
things to cause anything “as mental”. From the perspective of O-physicalism, both proposals 
1) and 2) from section 4.1 will do as solutions to the problem of mental causation; they 
merely mark the difference between metaphysical and methodological approach. If we are 
metaphysically oriented physicalists, we should proceed in the spirit of suggestion two, which 
is the line taken for example by Kim. If we are more epistemologically oriented, I believe we 
should explore the possibilities of suggestion number one. Keeping these possibilities in mind 
I want to suggest a different kind of solution, which is based on the view that the possibility 
of epiphenomenalism should be taken seriously. It seems to me that our inability to provide a 
reductive solution to the problem of mental causation opens up this possibility. Whereas a 
reductive solution could kill the patient in the process of seeking a cure, it could also 
“vindicate” mental causation.  
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In considering the possibility of epiphenomenalism let us consider how the problem of 
mental causation could arise. We have observed action A and we think that a mental state M 
caused A. The situation is like this: 
 
M                                A (M – M)      
 
The arrow implies a causal relation. Given what we think we know about human physiology 
we also believe that there is a physical cause for the occurrence of A. The situation is like 
this: 
 
   P                                A      (P – M / P –P) 
 
The  arrow stands  for  a  causal  relation  between a  physical  state  P  and  action  A.  On the  one  
hand there seems to be a causal relation between mental phenomena (M – M); on the other 
hand there seems to be a causal relation between physical and mental phenomena (P – M).1414 
The problem of mental causation arises when we ask what the relation between these two 
relations is. Are there two relations or just one? The problem is easily seen if we assume that 
everything that happens must have a sufficient physical cause.  Then it  seems to be the case 
that the relation P – M is the only required causal relation. This raises the question of what the 
role of M – M relation is? The problem is to explain what the relevance of M – A is,  if  the 
causal relation obtains between P and A.  
When discussing how supervenience is related to the problem of mental causation, 
Kim claims that there are two possible answers to why M*1415 was instantiated on a certain 
occasion.  Either:  a)  M  caused  M*,  or  b)  P*,  the  physical  supervenience  base  of  M*  is  
instantiated. Kim claims that there is a real tension between these answers and it is this: in 
order  for  M  to  cause  M*,  M  would  have  to  cause  P*.  This  would  be  a  case  of  mental-to-
physical causation, which is not easily tolerated if the truth of supervenience is assumed. In 
this context supervenience is defined by Kim in the following way: 
 
Mental properties supervene on physical properties in the sense that if something instantiates any 
mental property M at t, there is a physical base property P such that the thing has P at t, and necessarily 
anything with P at a time has M at that time.1416 
 
                                               
1414 If we understand the outcome as an action. Otherwise the relation is between physical phenomena (P – P). 
1415 In Kim’s formulation M* is some mental property. We can here think of it as referring to A in our example. 
1416 Kim, 1998, 39. 
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Given this assumption, it follows that M has a physical supervenience base P. From this it 
follows that in order for M to cause M*, M has to cause P*. It should be noted that this last 
assumption is based entirely on Kim’s metaphysical understanding of supervenience. 
According to this view, higher level properties depend on the properties at a lower level – and 
this being the case a base property must be instantiated if a supervenient property is to be 
instantiated. As Kim claims when giving an example of how aesthetic properties supervene:  
 
To make your painting more beautiful… you must do physical work on the painting and thereby alter 
the physical supervenience base of the aesthetic properties you want to improve. There is no direct way 
of making your painting more beautiful or less beautiful; you must change it physically if you want to 
change it aesthetically – there is no other way.1417 
 
But is this really so? Does a “physical supervenience base of aesthetic properties” make 
sense? It seems that, according to Kim, an aesthetic property is something which can be 
clearly and in some sense observer-independently identified. But do we know what kind of 
properties aesthetic properties are? Could it not happen that a painting looks more beautiful to 
me today than it did yesterday without there being any relevant physical change in the 
painting? Would it be false to say that, this being the case, the painting isn’t more beautiful? 
Kim argues that the physical properties of a painting must be changed in order to change its 
aesthetic properties; “there is no other way”. But why could we not change the person who 
evaluates the painting? This, of course, would not make the painting more beautiful. But are 
there such things as intrinsically beautiful paintings? Is it correct to claim that aesthetic 
properties are independent of observers? If not, then it is not just the properties of the painting 
on which its beauty supervenes; this can be likened to Davidson’s later understanding of 
supervenience. The supervenience base is wider than the intrinsic properties of an object – 
recall the example of a sunburn.  
What  are  the  facts  or  physical  properties  on  which  the  beauty  of  a  painting  
supervenes? This is a question which is not easily answered. If we consider why this painting 
is beautiful now although it wasn’t beautiful one month ago, it is not clear what the total 
supervenience base is that should be considered. It is perhaps something in the painting, 
although it cannot be anything which wasn’t there before. Perhaps one’s knowledge of the 
painting has increased and thereby it somehow seems, or as I would say is, more beautiful. Or 
perhaps the observer is just in a happy state of mind and therefore “everything seems 
beautiful”. These are not naïve answers to the question “Why is this painting beautiful?”, 
                                               
1417 Kim, 1998, 43. 
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because we cannot make a clear distinction between something seeming beautiful and 
something being beautiful. Suppose I say that the painting is more beautiful today than 
yesterday. If supervenience is understood as a non-reductive relation, then it is not possible to 
say what the properties of the painting are, on which its beauty supervenes. But if this is true, 
how could I insist that the painting must have changed? Can we exclude the possibility that 
the beauty of the painting depends entirely on me? Yesterday I could not see the beauty of the 
painting; today I see that the use of this color, the arrangement of these lines is the reason why 
the  painting  is  beautiful;  now  I  see  its  beauty.  But  no  physical  work  has  been  done  on  the  
painting.  
If this is the case also with mental properties, that they are in a sense interpreter-
dependent, then it is not clear that we could make sense of mental properties which could be 
independently identified and thereby clearly correlated with their physical base. If the 
situation is seen from the perspective of “Davidsonian supervenience”, we do not have to 
assume that the supervening properties of the painting would depend just on its intrinsic 
properties. If the supervenience relation is to be understood as holding between predicates, 
then we can say that there has to be some physical change if the painting is to change from 
grotesque to beautiful – but the change does not have to occur in the painting. If, instead of 
understanding supervenience as a metaphysical thesis, we understand it as a thesis about our 
use of words or about the logical or conceptual relations between the application of certain 
concepts, then we do not have to insist that a change in the supervenient property (predicate) 
is linked to a narrow physical supervenient base through laws. 
Now we can ask what the causal status of M and P with respect to P* is, and thereby 
to M*. Kim argues that since P is sufficient for M and M is sufficient for P*, P is sufficient 
for P* – and we thus have a reason to claim that P precludes M as being a cause of P*. Kim 
claims  that  “the  most  natural  way”  to  see  the  situation  is  to  say  that:  P  caused  P*,  and  M  
supervenes on P and M* supervenes on P*.1418 Then the situation looks like this: 
 
 M  M* 
    
 P  P*  
 
                                               
1418 Kim, 1998, 45. 
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The arrows from P to M and from P* to M* are best understood not as causal relations but 
perhaps as relations of “constitution” or “realization”. The problem for the reality of mental 
causation now is that there seems to be only one causal relation, and that exists between 
physical  states.  What  happened  to  M  –  M,  P  –  M,  or  M  –  P  causation?  The  source  of  the  
problem is obviously the assumption that there is such thing as causation where one member 
is a mental phenomenon. I think that Kim is correct in his view that mental causation does not 
fit the picture described by non-reductive physicalism very well. In my opinion, the reason for 
this is that the assumptions of non-reductive physicalists about the nature of causation are 
thoroughly physicalistic. What follows if we challenge these assumptions and start from the 
claim that it is not obvious that there is any kind of causation in which one member is a 
mental phenomenon? 
 The consequence of this would be something which could be called the causal 
impotence of thoughts. This suggestion may seem implausible. Depending on how strong we 
think the claim to be, it turns out that: a) mental phenomena never cause anything (which is 
the standard understanding of epiphenomenalism), b) mental phenomena cause something 
only rarely, or that c) we have no way to tell when mental phenomena cause something, and 
this  being  the  case  we  can  never  be  sure,  on  a  given  occasion,  whether  mental  phenomena  
were causally efficacious. The last option opens also up the possibility that in each specific 
case mental phenomena are causally inefficacious. My “epiphenomenalist solution” does not 
however claim that mental phenomena cannot ever cause anything. This suggestion would be 
too harsh since it would so blatantly conflict with our common-sense understanding1419. My 
claim is rather that in many cases thoughts do not cause the things we take them to cause – in 
these cases thoughts are causally impotent – and if we choose to think that thoughts did cause 
something, our only evidence for this is a mental explanation which we decide to trust. 
 
4.2.1 Epiphenomenalism 
  
Although epiphenomenalism has been seen as an alternative in the history of philosophy it is 
not  currently  a  widely  accepted  view.  Putnam,  for  example,  has  labeled  it  as  a  C-R-A-Z-Y 
doctrine.1420 The status of epiphenomenalism and the possible reasons for it have nevertheless 
                                               
1419 It is of course possible, in some sense of the word, that our common-sense understanding is completely false 
,but if this is really the case then this really seems to be the end of the world as Fodor (1987) has noted. 
1420 Putnam, 1999. 
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been under discussion also recently.1421 Suggestions especially referring to neuroscientific and 
psychological evidence tentatively point towards the conclusion that perhaps a form of 
epiphenomenalism  could  be  true  after  all.  These  suggestions  seem  to  be  better  accepted  
among neuroscientists than among philosophers. 
Global epiphenomenalism, which claims that mental phenomena are always causally 
impotent never cause anything, is an inconvenient conclusion. At the same time it has to be 
admitted that this, the total causal inefficacy of mental phenomena, is possible and it may 
actually be our situation. There is no evidence which could settle the question of whether 
global epiphenomenalism is true or not. It may be the case that mental phenomena never 
cause anything and that a kind of pre-established harmony is true, but we will never know 
whether this is so.1422 Let us therefore start with the assumption that global epiphenomenalism 
is false, because mental phenomena seem to have causal efficacy. But can the causal efficacy 
of mental phenomena be proven?1423 Was a specific mental phenomenon really a causal factor 
at time t? Did it cause the action which is explained by reference to it? A reductive 
explanation of mental causation in physical terms would be a step towards a vindication of 
mental causation. This way is blocked for those, like Davidson and von Wright, who defend 
the irreducibility of the mental. My claim is that the possibility of conditional 
epiphenomenalism threatens those positions which claim that an actual reduction of mental 
phenomena to physical phenomena is not possible. According to the doctrine of conditional 
epiphenomenalism, mental causes, which we take to be causally efficacious, are causally 
inefficacious from time to time. If conditional epiphenomenalism is true, then it is always 
possible that on a specific occasion a mental phenomenon in terms of which we explain our 
own actions or the actions of others is without causal power. Whereas global 
epiphenomenalism may be labeled a crazy doctrine and its interest for our lives is minimal, 
the possibility of conditional epiphenomenalism is something which has importance for 
various issues. If conditional epiphenomenalism is true then the questions, for example, about 
the status of mental explanations, responsibility, or self-knowledge have to be reconsidered. If 
a mental cause can be causally inefficacious on any specific occasion, how to decide whether 
an  agent  is  to  be  blamed  or  praised  of  what  (s)he  did?  If  a  mental  cause  can  be  
epiphenomenal, then how to determine whether I acted when I thought I acted? If there are 
                                               
1421 See, for example, Lyons, 2006, Campbell, 2001, 2005, Caston, 1997, Lyons, 2006, Pauen, 2006. 
1422 This being the case we cannot even consider which position - global epiphenomenalism or non-
epiphenomenalism  -  is more probable. 
1423 If global epiphenomenalism is true then the causal efficacy of thoughts cannot be proven. 
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two candidates for a mental cause in terms of which I explain my action, how to decide which 
one is causally efficacious? 
 Because of these important consequences, the possibility of conditional 
epiphenomenalism should be taken very seriously. But are there reasons to believe that this 
form of epiphenomenalism is actually true? Indeed there are. Non-reductive physicalism is 
especially vulnerable to the threat of conditional epiphenomenalism, because in its context the 
causal efficacy of mental phenomena cannot be proven by showing that they are identical to 
the states of brain (which we assume to be causally efficacious). But to say that non-reductive 
physicalism is vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism or, as many contemporary 
philosophers claim, that it leads to epiphenomenalism, is misleading because conditional 
epiphenomenalism is a general challenge. Conditional epiphenomenalism is just not a 
philosopher’s fantasy but a position which may describe our actual situation; there is sound 
evidence that we are often mistaken in self-reports about the reasons for our actions. What, 
then, are the reasons for believing that conditional epiphenomenalism is true? I will consider 
von Wright’s reasons for defending epiphenomenalism. In doing this, I will briefly refer to 
scientific evidence which supports the view that conditional epiphenomenalism could be true. 
The  focus  will  be  on  evidence  that  is  the  result  of  recent  studies  of  the  brain.  This  kind  of  
evidence has led philosophers to consider the possibility of epiphenomenalism. In addition to 
the results of neuroscience, I will also consider evidence from studies in psychology.  
 
 4.2.1.1 Von Wright’s epiphenomenalism 
 
The problem of mental causation troubled von Wright. He noted that it had always been a 
mystery to him how a causal mechanism between a physical event and, for example, a 
sensation could work, and concluded: “[…]  no discoveries of a scientific nature, however 
exciting, would make me understand better, I am afraid, the ‘transformation’ which occurs 
when a sensation originates.”1424 Perhaps it was this mysterious connection which led von 
Wright to claim that in the picture of natural connections, the mental has no role. In the part 
of reality investigated by science, the mental has no place. This is an intriguing suggestion. 
Von  Wright  seems  to  claim  that  the  problem  of  consciousness  and  the  problem  of  mental  
causation  will  never  be  solved  scientifically.  I  believe  he  would  thus  disagree  with,  for  
example Kim, who claims that there will be no special mystery of mental causation if mental 
                                               
1424 Von Wright, 1997a, 152. 
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phenomena are neural processes in the brain. Reduction provides a direct and simple account 
of mental causation. Von Wright thinks that this would not dispel the mystery around the 
problem. 
Von Wright’s reasons for arguing for epiphenomenalism give us one interesting way 
to think about the problem of mental causation.1425 Unlike most contemporary philosophers 
von Wright admits his affiliation to epiphenomenalism. This is surprising; epiphenomenalism 
is a strange position and not many philosophers are willing to defend it. Von Wright was 
however tempted by epiphenomenalism and wrote that: “In the view that I am... advocating, 
there is no causal interaction between the mental and the material.”1426 This  is  a  
straightforward claim.1427 Von Wright is willing to make an even more daring claim when he 
notes that the denial of mental–physical interaction is essential to his position.1428 Although, 
as we will see, this claim can be given a weak reading, von Wright nevertheless defends 
dramatic intuitions when he argues that consciousness stays outside the spatio-temporal web 
of causally related events, or that a sensation is neither caused nor causally efficacious.1429 
The latter claim von Wright affiliates with epiphenomenalism as it is traditionally 
understood.1430 This suggests that von Wright accepts the central principle of 
epiphenomenalism.  It  could  be  argued  that  he  goes  even  deeper  to  the  maze  of  
epiphenomenalism than traditional epiphenomenalists like Huxley who denied the causal 
efficacy of mental phenomena but were not willing to claim that mental phenomena are not 
caused by physical phenomena. Von Wright namely suggests that sensations cannot cause 
physical phenomena and cannot be caused by them. Kim, who has claimed that Davidson’s 
position leads to the same consequences, has noted that “Cartesian souls” would be very 
lonely “entities” because they would be causally cut off from everything.1431 If consciousness 
stays outside the spatio-temporal web, then von Wright’s Cartesian consciousness is in danger 
of becoming the kind of lonely soul described by Kim. 
The denial of mental-physical interaction means that: “There is no... causality in the 
sense of either “material cause – mental effect” or “mental cause – material effect.”1432 This 
bears a resemblance to the view that we have already considered, namely: 
                                               
1425 The material of this section is taken partly from Kuusela, 2009. 
1426 Von Wright, 1998, 108. 
1427 In the only review of In the Shadow of Descartes that I am aware of, Kivinen (1998) describes the claim as 
“extremely fudgy, to put it mildly”. 
1428 Von Wright, 1997a. 
1429 Ibid. 
1430 Von Wright, UPb. 
1431 Kim, 1993, 2001. 
1432 Von Wright, 1998, 109. 
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M  M* 
    
    S                                         S 
P  P*  
  C 
 
A physical event P causes (C) another physical event P*. According to Kim, there is a relation 
of  constitution  or  realization  between  P  and  M  and  P*  and  M*.  In  this  picture,  there  is  no  
room for mental causality. Von Wright’s claims that a relation exists between P and P*, but 
there is no relation of mental causation. There is, however: 
 
 […] a connection or, if one wishes, parallelism between the two [mental and the physical]. This 
“parallelism” is there by virtue of the criterional (“semantic”) relation between, on the one hand, 
behavioural and mental (intentional) phenomena and, on the other hand, mental phenomena (sensations) 
and things and events in the physical world.1433  
 
In the previous diagram, I have marked, along von Wrightian lines, with “S” (for semantic) 
the relation which Kim takes to be a metaphysical relation of constitution or realization. I 
think that von Wright’s suggestion fits well with how Davidson might think of the case if we 
understand Davidson’s version of supervenience as being a semantical relation. 
 Is this view plausible? It amounts to saying that when I have a reason R and I think 
that I act because of it, there is nevertheless no causal relation between my reason and my 
action. If epiphenomenalism is true, on what is our conviction that cases of “mental cause – 
material effect” are commonplace based? I think that von Wright’s answer is half-hearted. It 
is based on the view that in humans the development of cognitive capabilities goes hand-in-
hand with the development of the brain. The congruence between the mental and the bodily 
aspects of action is a harmony established in the course of individual’s life. Despite this 
harmony, which is best described in terms of the semantic relation, there is no causality 
involved between the mental and the physical. The conclusion of von Wright is:  
 
We  have  two  sets  of  events  in  the  world  of  space  and  time,  overt  behaviour  and  neural  
 processes, and between them causal relationships. We also have, like a “shadow” 
 accompanying the first set of events, a sequence of mental states and processes,  semantically 
connected with it.1434 
 
                                               
1433 Von Wright, 1998, 109. 
1434 Von Wright, 1994, 147-148. 
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According to von Wright this suggestion is also a solution to the problem of mental causation. 
We should note that the solution works only because it denies the existence of mental 
causation. This is how von Wright’s “emergentism” or epiphenomenalism avoids the problem 
of mental causation. Von Wright’s version of supervenience was discussed in section 2.2.1. 
His use of this concept illustrates how the neural level has causal priority. Von Wright writes: 
“A causal relationship between a mental and a physical phenomenon is supervenient in time 
on a causal relationship between two physical events….”1435 A formulation which illustrates 
the causal role of physical events with respect to mental ones is the following:  
 
Whenever a physical event P can be correctly called cause (effect) of a mental event M, there exists 
another physical event F such that the duration of M is included in the duration of F, and such that F is 
the effect (cause) of P.1436 
 
I claimed in section 2.2.1 that von Wright’s views about supervenience are not easy to 
understand. It is not clear what a claim that a “volitional act is temporally included in cerebral 
processes”  means,  or  how  we  should  understand  the  suggestion  that  “a  reason  is  a  mental  
episode which is a temporal segment of a neural cause”.1437 In order to honor the honesty of 
von Wright, it has to be noted that he considered these views very difficult even for 
himself.1438 I  believe  that  using  supervenience  as  a  semantic  relation  could  provide  one  
clarifying way to describe von Wright’s view, although he himself did not use this expression.  
 Von Wright accepts a form of epiphenomenalism, but what is his reason to claim that 
the mental and the physical do not interact causally? The mere assertion that the relation 
between the mental and the behavioral is semantic is not enough. In von Wright’s case there 
are two reasons to argue for epiphenomenalism. First, by denying mental–physical interaction 
“conceptual convenience” is gained, because a conflict with the views about the workings of 
causality in nature is avoided. A denial of interaction safeguards the causal closedness of the 
physical world order. What is denied is the possibility of Cartesian interactionism,  while at  
the same time a special form of interaction is affirmed. This is done by introducing a relation 
of supervenience which replaces the talk of mind–body interaction with talk of causal 
connections between physical events only. In this sense, von Wright accepts interactionism 
without violating the principles of physical science. Interestingly, von Wright describes this 
                                               
1435 Von Wright, UPd, 6. 
1436 Ibid. 
1437 Ibid. 
1438 A note expressing von Wright’s worries was attached to the unpublished manuscript.  
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position, which accepts interaction, as a position revindicating some Cartesian intuitions.1439 
Acceptance of interactionism of this kind is also an acceptance of a form of 
epiphenomenalism given von Wright’s view that causal relations occur between physical 
events and that the mental is merely a byproduct of underlying neural phenomena. The 
situation can be illustrated with this diagram.                                   
 
      M 
 
 
                            S                 N                  B 
 
                                              time 
  
S here stands for sound, N for a neural event, M for the sensation of sound, that is, hearing, 
and B for behavior. Two problematic relations of the diagram are the assumed to be the 
physical–mental relation between N and M and the assumed mental–physical relation 
between M and B.  
The diagram describes a situation where a sound S causes a neural event N. A neural 
event in turn causes a bodily reaction B. This is a causal explanation involving only physical 
phenomena. Something physical, a state or succession of states, takes place in the brain as a 
result of the sound. N can be understood to include everything physical in the brain which 
mediates between the sound and consequent behavior. N would include various neural states 
and processes. If everything which happens has a cause, it must be the case that if M (hearing) 
occurs, then S is also its cause. A physical phenomenon S causes us to hear a sound. To avoid 
a dualistic interpretation, M must be understood as a peculiar kind of neural state. In addition 
to the causal explanation we have also a reason-based explanation, which claims that M 
causes B.  
N, understood as a succession of neural states, causes behavior B. What about M? M 
and N are a “joint effect”, a mental–physical effect, of S, but the relation between M and N is, 
according to von Wright, best understood as a relation of temporal simultaneity so that M is 
part of N. M does not have to exist during the totality of successive states which form N, it 
may occur anytime between N, understood as a combination of N1…Nn, and B. As we have 
                                               
1439 Von Wright, UPd. 
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seen,  it  is  not  entirely  clear  how  von  Wright  sees  the  relation  between  N  and  M.  M  is  an  
emergent byproduct of N and the notion of supervenience is meant to clarify their relation. As 
noted in section 2.2.1, von Wright’s views about supervenience remain vague by being 
formulated in terms of temporal instead of spatial coincidence – and since he does not discuss 
the related concepts of “realization” or “constitution” the concept, just like Davidson’s 
“anomalous supervenience”, does not explain much.1440 The best description of the relation of 
M and N is von Wright’s claim that it is a part–whole relation, which cannot easily be 
understood as a relation of causality or a relation of identity.  In the previous diagram, the 
dotted line between M and N illustrates this.  
Von Wright argues that whereas N causes B, the part of it which is M is causally 
inefficacious.  In  order  to  show  why  the  situation  gives  the  appearance  of  mental  cause  –  
physical effect, we re-draw the diagram in the following way. 
               
                                              M  R                    A 
 
 
                              S                   N                    B 
 
                             time 
Because of the occurrence of a causally inefficacious sensation which is simultaneous with a 
causally effective neural state, we interpret the behavior B as action A. This we do because M 
functions as a reason for us to act. But this does not make the sensation the cause of A / B. 
The causal relation, which we thought to exist between M and B, has been changed to an 
explanatory  relation  that  explains  M as  a  reason  for  A or  A as  a  consequence  of  M.  As  we 
have seen, one way in which reason is defined by von Wright is as “[…] a mental episode 
which is a temporal segment of… physical cause of a bodily movement, which the reason is 
said to motivate.”1441 The relation between M and A can be understood in two ways. From the 
perspective of M, it is an explanatory relation which, so to speak, refers to the future and 
anticipates the occurrence of A. Seen from the perspective of A, it is a semantic relation 
which means that M occurred. We can understand action in terms of reasons by looking back 
after the action has taken place, or we can look forward from the perspective of reasons and 
                                               
1440 What further confuses things is the fact that when discussing supervenience von Wright uses expressions like 
”included” which certainly have spatial connotations. 
1441 Von Wright, UPd, 5. 
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consider what is going to happen. Needless to say, if M is causally inefficacious it becomes 
puzzling how we could predict anything in terms of it. Von Wright does not discuss this 
important problem. Kim, who now doubts his own model of epiphenomenal or supervenient 
causation, claims that inserting the kind of arrow like R: “[…] could… be philosophically 
pernicious if it should mislead us into thinking that we have thereby conferred on M, the 
mental, event some real causal role.”1442 As I have shown, this quasi-causalism of M is also 
criticized by von Wright. But if M does not have causal powers, the pressing question is why 
a reference to it would have any explanatory power either. A partial answer to this problem 
will be given in the next section.    
Are there reasons to think that this speculative model could reflect what actually 
happens at the causal level in the cases in which we understand behavior as action because we 
interpret the former as being caused by underlying mental states? It is certainly imaginable 
that something like this could be happening, but there is also empirical evidence to support 
this speculation. The second reason which points towards an epiphenomenalist conclusion in 
the views of von Wright is his interpretation of the empirical evidence given by neuroscience. 
He mentions especially the much debated work of Benjamin Libet.1443 One conclusion of 
Libet’s research is that a conscious decision to act, which in this context we may define as a 
reason, is preceded by an unconscious buildup of electrical charge, which we may define as 
the cause, within the brain. The finding of this readiness potential is  what  has  partly  
motivated the technologically oriented research that aims to develop brain–computer 
interfaces and related machines. Readiness potential, at least according to some 
neuroscientists, is the real cause of action. Already in 1983 Libet and his colleagues 
concluded that: “These considerations would appear to introduce certain constraints on the 
potential of the individual for exerting conscious initiation and control over his voluntary 
acts.”1444 Libet’s conclusions have been recently verified and further studied by 
neuropsychologist Angela Sirigu.1445 Desmurget, Sirigu and others have very recently 
claimed that:  
 
[…] motor intention and awareness are emerging consequences of increased parietal activity before 
movement execution. The subjective (and potentially illusory) feeling that we are executing a 
movement does not arise from movement itself, but is generated by prior conscious intention and its 
predicted consequences.1446 
                                               
1442 Kim, 2003, 148. 
1443 Libet, 1985, 2004, Libet et al. 1983. 
1444 Libet et al., 1983, 641. 
1445 Sirigu et al., 2004, Kilner et al., 2004, Desmurget et. al, 2009. 
1446 Desmurget et al., 2009. 
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In their study Desmurget et al. stimulated a part of the brain of a patient thereby creating a 
strong intention and desire for hand, arm, or foot movement. When the intensity of the 
stimulation was increased the patients believed they had really performed these movements. 
On the other hand, stimulation of the premotor region triggered contralateral movements but 
the participants firmly denied that they had moved. From these results the researchers noted: 
“[…] the fact that patients experienced a conscious desire to move indicates that stimulation 
did not merely evoke a mental image of a movement but also the intention to produce a 
movement, an internal state that resembles what Searle called ‘intention in action’”.1447 For a 
brain-oriented philosophy of mind driven by naturalism these findings are not surprising. It 
does create problems for a view, such as Davidson’s, according to which intentions are not 
“little entities lodged inside the brain”. If intentions can be artificially produced by 
stimulating  the  brain,  then  a  claim  that:  “We  do  not  expect  to  be  able  to  change  people’s  
beliefs and desires by tinkering with their brains”1448 faces serious trouble. The recent 
findings of Desmurget and others certainly create interesting questions for the future and 
widen the gap between philosophically and scientifically motivated theories of mind. I think it 
is quite puzzling, definitely thought-provoking and possibly alarming that intentions are 
already produced artificially. Many who are enthusiastic about the prospects of neuroscience 
always insist that scientific discoveries cannot jeopardize free will and human freedom; they 
are not a threat. Philosophers who foolishly believe in compatibilism reach the same 
conclusion. I think it is quite obvious that if desires can be created simply by stimulating the 
brain and if we know that such and such stimulation causes such and such desire, then this 
will have some consequences for our autonomy and especially for our idea of autonomy. 
 In section 3.2 I briefly mentioned that the kind of scientific results described here 
perhaps challenge a philosophical non-reductive theory of action and its autonomous rational 
explanations.1449 Von Wright, however, seems to use this kind of evidence, above all else, to 
defend his epiphenomenalist position. He argues, referring to neuroscientific findings, that if 
it can be shown that B occurs before M:  “[…]  this  may  be  regarded  as  a  ‘proof’  that  the  
sensation (consciousness, something mental) is causally inefficacious i.e. it has no causal role 
to play at all.”1450 He  gives  an  example.  Pain  behavior  may  occur  before  pain  is  felt.  This  
being the case, the sensation of pain has no causal function to perform which could be 
independently established. The time-lag between behavior and sensation must of course be 
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very brief, otherwise the agent in question would be puzzled and not understand the 
“connection” between the two. In von Wright’s opinion the case where B occurs before M: 
“[…] shows that sensation…  plays no causal role in the production of the movement… this 
reversal of the temporal order corroborates my thesis that the ‘mind’ has no (independent) 
causal role whatsoever in producing changes in the material world.”1451 In my opinion the 
claim that mind has no independent causal role in producing changes is startling; the claim of 
an eliminativist would not be more daring. 
It is interesting that in addition to the “conceptual convenience” von Wright refers also 
to empirical evidence. The reference is perhaps best explained by von Wright’s respect for a 
scientific world view. In 1966 von Wright had a brief debate with another Finnish 
philosopher, Raimo Tuomela.1452 Tuomela claimed that von Wright’s position has the 
consequence that a mental occurrence cannot be a cause of behavior or the cause of the goal, 
which is a causal consequence of the behavior. Von Wright replied that in his writings he had 
not made this challenging claim, but perhaps Tuomela thought he saw this claim “between the 
lines.” Von Wright then goes on to admit that he is indeed inclined to think that the claim is 
correct although he does not know how to prove it; the reason that von Wright is inclined to 
accept the view is that denying it would go against a healthy scientific world view. It can thus 
be seen that already in 1966 that “conceptual convenience” was von Wright’s reason for 
defending a form of epiphenomenalism. I suggest that, thirty years later, the reference to 
neuroscientific evidence is von Wright’s “proof” or “corroboration” for why the claim should 
be accepted. At least from time to time von Wright seems to think that neuroscience may have 
notable results for the autonomy of the mental. As I have shown, he thought that the work on 
the mirror-neurons of monkeys may be an advance towards finding type–type identities, and 
sometimes sees his own work as having an affiliation with eliminative materialism. Von 
Wright also noted that the kinds of cases where B (A) precedes M may show that an actionist 
description of what happens may seem to be “out of place.”1453 Already in 1966 he had 
concluded that perhaps there will be a time when all action would appear to us as mere 
movement and would be described as such. He thus concluded that it was possible that causal 
analysis of behavior would replace the analysis of behavior in mental terms. Von Wright 
notes that from our current point of view, such a form of life perhaps looks to us stranger than 
the life of a Martian; it is nevertheless possible that this will be our fate. 
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 When von Wright refers to neuroscientific evidence, he makes much use of the cases 
where B could occur before M. Let us nevertheless suppose that M occurs little before B. Is 
the causal efficacy of M then secured? No, because referring to Libet’s work we can say that 
the causal role of N is “already on its way” and therefore M, although perhaps part of N, 
cannot have a role in the causation of B. If voluntary movements are preceded by a certain 
kind of activation in the brain,  N, which occurs before people make the decision to act, this 
could be a reason to say that although the decision M occurs before B, M is nevertheless 
predated by N, which without doubt is the cause of B. As von Wright says, referring again to 
the neuroscientific evidence, there might be reasons to think that N would have produced B 
also in the absence of M, which means that we should attribute causal priority to N in relation 
to M. Closely related to this is von Wright’s claim that if M and N occur simultaneously, then 
there cannot be a causal relationship between them. They are a joint effect of some physical 
event P (S in our diagrams), and we may have reasons to think that P could have produced N 
without  producing  M.  Sound  waves  entering  the  ear  can  produce  neural  events  without  
producing sensations. Interestingly, von Wright’s arguments for epiphenomenalism depend 
greatly on the considerations of the temporal relationships between neural and mental events. 
When considering whether mental states are causally efficacious it is crucially important to 
show their correct place on the time-axis, where causally efficacious neural events exist. This 
is a task which, to some extent, can be approached empirically as the neuroscientific research 
shows. But I think we should agree with von Wright’s conclusion that when it comes to 
timing of consciousness “[…] things are very tricky and unperspicuous here.”1454 
If von Wright’s claim about the nature of the mental is taken seriously, we face a 
situation where consciousness would be causally cut off from everything. There must be a 
way out from this kind of understanding of consciousness if we value our view of ourselves 
as free agents. As far as von Wright’s position is concerned here, an important caveat must be 
noted. Despite the strong views that I have described, there are reasons to think that von 
Wright is not defending global epiphenomenalism. As he surprisingly says: “Of course, 
physical stimuli of sense-organs call forth sensations, and reasons move agents to act.”1455 An 
important reason why Wright’s views do not imply global epiphenomenalism is his 
understanding of the concept of a cause. When von Wright says that consciousness stays 
outside the web of causally related events we need to understand what he means by a web of 
causally related events. He is talking about events which can be understood as being related in 
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terms of a relation which von Wright calls Humean or nomic.  This  relation  satisfies  the  
following conditions: 1) Cause and effect can be described in terms which make it possible to 
identify them independently of one another; 2) There is a law-connection between cause and 
effect. Both von Wright and Davidson emphasize that mental events cannot be related to 
physical events with this kind of relation. But this is not to deny that mental events can cause 
things  and  be  caused  by  physical  events  in  a  looser  sense  of  the  word.  We  have  seen  that  
Davidson wanted to reserve room for a loose concept of cause. Stoutland has noted about von 
Wright’s position that:  
 
In denying that explanations of behavior as intentional are causal… [von Wright] was denying that they 
are nomological, which does not rule out their being causal in some other sense that does not depend on 
nomological connections at any level….1456  
 
I agree with this observation. Stoutland claims that when von Wright denied that reason is a 
cause he always had the Humean conception of cause in mind.1457 Von Wright’s 
understanding of the concept of cause may explain many of the confusions that can arise if the 
arguments for epiphenomenalism are read out of context. In the preface to Explanation and 
Understanding von Wright notes: “Those who think that actions have causes often use ‘cause’ 
in  a  much  broader  sense  than  I  do  when  I  deny  this.  Or  they  may  understand  ‘action’  
differently.  It may very well be, then, that ‘actions’ in their sense have ‘causes’ in my sense, 
or that ‘actions’ in my sense have ‘causes’ in theirs.”1458 Stoutland has noted that mere verbal 
differences are an important reason why on certain questions the positions of von Wright and 
Davidson have been misinterpreted as being completely opposite to each other. Perhaps von 
Wright’s  epiphenomenalism  can  be  clarified  as  well  by  focusing  just  on  his  use  of  
terminology. I believe that Stoutland’s observation however neglects an important aspect of 
von Wright’s position, namely that the problem of epiphenomenalism in von Wright’s view 
does not relate merely to  our  understanding  of  the  concepts  of  action,  cause,  or  
nomologicality. Stoutland’s claim that von Wright was not really disputing that mental 
explanations are causal in some sense ignores von Wright’s references to neuroscientific 
evidence. It is surprising that in the articles where Stoutland discusses von Wright’s views 
about philosophy of action or compatibilism he does not consider von Wright’s later position.  
I believe that the conceptual reading cannot completely explain von Wright’s relation 
to  epiphenomalism.  But  there  is  one  more  –  and  very  important  –  reason  that  von  Wright’s  
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position can be seen to secure the reality of mental causation against epiphenomenalism. This 
is von Wright’s claim that the mental has epistemic priority over the neural. We have seen 
that at times von Wright argues that the mental is a “shadow” accompanying natural 
connections. The metaphor of mental being a shadow of the underlying physical processes is 
often used in formulating the position of epiphenomenalism.1459 But, surprisingly, this is not 
von Wright’s last word. Because the mental has epistemic priority over the neural, it follows 
that the same priority holds also for rational explanations of action in relation to neural 
explanations of the movements involved in the acting. Although von Wright has suggested 
that the mental should be seen as having a shadowy role, his final conclusion, quite 
astonishingly, turns the picture completely around. He wants to challenge the modern view 
which, by the use of supervenience, lets the mental be the shadow. That contemporary 
philosophy of mind ascribes to the mental the same shadowy role as traditional 
epiphenomenalism is von Wright’s interpretation of the situation. This interpretation is not 
entirely out of place if we consider how eliminative materialism, for instance, understands the 
status of the mental. But when the picture is turned around, von Wright writes:  
 
I think that…’neural epiphenomenalism’, as I propose to call it, is wrong. I would challenge it and 
reverse the perspective completely. I shall maintain that the neural chain is a ‘shadow’ in relation to the 
chain of mental events and that rational explanations of action have epistemic priority in relation to 
behavioural and neural explanations.1460 
 
But how should we understand von Wright’s claim that actually the “neural chain is 
supervenient on the mental one”?1461 In the standard understanding of supervenience, the 
relation is thought to be a relation of determination or dependence. Kim has argued that 
supervenience is best understood as a reductive relation. How does von Wright’s claim fit 
with this understanding about the nature of supervenience? It seems to me that we must 
conclude that it cannot be made to fit with the standard understanding of supervenience. The 
only way to make sense of the claim that the neural level is supervenient on the mental is to 
accept the epistemic priority of the mental and grant primacy to mental explanations as I have 
suggested. The conclusion of von Wright is: 
 
If my argument is correct, it has a remarkable consequence for the ‘place of the brain’ in the mind–body 
problem-complex. Since the mental has epistemic priority in relation to the neural, and similarly 
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rational explanations in relation to (neurological) causal explanations, the mental not only cannot be 
‘reduced’ to the neural, but the neural cannot be used to ‘explain’ mental phenomena.1462  
 
In essential respects this is a similar position to Davidson’s. The mental is irreducible and 
inexplicable in physical terms. Davidson’s reaches the conclusion through the arguments for 
the irreducibility of the mental which we have considered in chapter three, whereas von 
Wright uses the epistemic priority of the mental to reach the same conclusion. Von Wright’s 
argument is elegant and suggestive. I see it as a very tempting answer to the problem of 
mental causation and pointing in the right direction as far as a solution to the new problem of 
mental causation is concerned. I suggest that we could be satisfied with this conclusion. In 
section 4.2.2 I will describe how this view can inspire a non-reductive solution to the new 
problem of mental causation. Von Wright’s suggestion that rational explanations have 
epistemic priority in relation to behavioral and neural explanations seems to be on the right 
track and could be related to the epistemological or deflationary approaches of Burge, Baker 
and others. I believe this would be one clear way to bring the views of von Wright into the 
middle of recent debates in the philosophy of mind. 
 Since  one  central  aim  of  this  work  is  to  clarify  the  views  of  von  Wright,  I  
unfortunately cannot be completely satisfied even with this conclusion. The reason for this is 
that von Wright’s conclusion described above is reached before the empirical evidence in 
favor of epiphenomenalism is given a role in von Wright’s writings. “Neural 
epiphenomenalism” is rejected in “In Defense of Psychology”, which dates back to 1996. This 
is consistent with the fact that von Wright ascribes the shadowy role to mental phenomena in 
“Mind and Matter”, which was published in 1994. At that time von Wright seemed to defend 
neural epiphenomenalism; two years earlier he had claimed that empirical evidence 
corroborates his claim that the mind has no independent role whatsoever in producing changes 
in the material world.1463 The most surprising thing is that after having rejected neural 
epiphenomenalism in 1996, von Wright goes on in 1997 to describe his position as a form of 
emergentism or epiphenomenalism and claims that consciousness stays outside the spatio-
temporal web of causally related events. As noted already, von Wright’s views are not 
entirely consistent. In section 3.2 we saw that, according to von Wright, the fact that humans 
have brains can be ignored when considering the philosophical mind–body problem and 
related perplexities. Whereas in 1992 von Wright denies the importance of brain in the mind–
body problem, in 1999 he claims that: “Serious thinking about [psycho-physical interaction] 
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must  take  into  account  the  role  played  by  the  nervous  system  (the  brain).”1464 I find it 
implausible that von Wright would have changed his views so dramatically about these 
important questions in such a short timeframe. What should therefore be our final conclusion 
about von Wright’s position?  
Perhaps the final conclusion should not be forced. In the preface of In the Shadow of 
Descartes von Wright writes: “Some things may strike the reader… as mildly contradictory. It 
was not always possible for me to make up my mind definitely on alternative positions. I have 
not wanted to conceal or smooth out the agonies which thinking about the fundamental 
questions of philosophy always caused me.”1465 If this is how von Wright saw his own 
position how could we smooth out the agonies? Although von Wright was willing to admit 
that a time might come when we stop to describe human life in terms of actions, he 
nevertheless wanted to vigorously defend, as the epistemic priority of mental and rational 
explanations show, the autonomy of agency. The possibility entertained by von Wright of 
future humans who see each other not as acting but merely moving is nevertheless interesting. 
As we saw in section 3.2, at one point von Wright claimed that actions could perhaps be read 
off from the brain. Davidson and Quine, both anomalous monists, claimed that such a 
reduction to neurology cannot happen. Quine, despite his eliminativist views, admitted – in a 
very comforting spirit to my ears – that: “It might be, now and forever, that the only way of 
guessing whether a man is inspired or depressed, or deluded, or in pain, is by asking him or 
by observing his gross behavior; not by examining his nervous system.”1466 This is what was 
suggested in the laboratory example of section 3.2. Kim, often considered a modern 
reductivist par excellence, admits that mind cannot be completely reduced to the physical and 
that the behavioral level is indispensable. It is interesting to note that Quine and Kim, for 
example, seem to stress the importance of behavior whereas von Wright at times is willing to 
make the more daring claim that mental phenomena could be reduced to neural phenomena. 
As a curiosity we can further note that in the turbulent years for the philosophy of mind in the 
1960s von Wright was willing to defend epiphenomenalism whereas Davidson defended the 
choice to see human beings as an anomaly. I conclude, however, that von Wright dismissed 
these eliminativist views at the end of his career. This being said, these views perhaps suggest 
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that the conflict resulting from trying to combine the teachings of Kaila and Wittgenstein was 
something which von Wright never managed to solve completely.  
Without suggesting that this is von Wright’s view I propose that, as long as we want 
to see ourselves as free agents, we cannot really allow mental events to be connected to 
physical events by a nomic relation. In this sense consciousness, as long as freedom is an 
essential feature of it, cannot be part of the spatio-temporal web of law-governed events. It is 
useful to recall Davidson’s famous claim: “The anomalism [lawlessness] of the mental is… a 
necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous.”1467 I think that von Wright makes a 
similar  point  with  his  dramatic  claim  that  causation  is  restricted  to  physical  phenomena  of  
nature and that consciousness has no place there. Von Wright once noted that it is not possible 
to raise one’s arm and observe the cause as well. A Humean cause and a reason for action 
cannot thus co-exist at the epistemological level. The claim is that:  
 
 When I observe, I let things happen. When I act, I make them happen. It is a contradiction in terms both 
to let and to make the same thing happen on the same occasion. Therefore no man can observe the 
causes of the result of his own basic actions.1468  
 
Davidson makes a similar point: “When we are making up our minds what to do or what to 
think  we  cannot  at  the  same  time  conceive  of  our  reasoning  as  bound  by  the  strict  laws  of  
physics.”1469 This is a partial answer to the problem of how reasons can explain even though 
they are merely supervenient on the efficacious physical causes. The epistemic practice of 
explaining actions in terms of reasons, as long as it works and as long as we keep on using it, 
must be seen as carrying a certain ontological import. Yet, there remains a puzzle. How can 
we be free if everything is strictly determined? Is the view that we are free, that mental 
causation is real, only a result of our ignorance about the neurological causes of actions? 
Already in Explanation and Understanding von  Wright  notes:  “The  conceptual  basis  of  
action, one could say, is partly our ignorance (unawareness) of the operation of causes….”1470 
This can be compared to Davidson’s observation that “Too many of the causes and effects of 
human thoughts are unknown to human thought.”1471 It  could  be  said  that  we  believe in 
mental causation because we do not know the underlying neural mechanisms and we cannot 
reach them because no man can observe the causes of his own basic actions. This motivates 
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the need for reason-based explanations. The view expressed in Explanation and 
Understanding is repeated thirty years later when von Wright concludes:  
 
No assumption about ‘gaps’ in the causal order is needed in order to understand the possibility of 
action. The result of an action is caused (Humean) by muscular movements which in their turns are 
caused by impulses from the brain to the muscles. But the cause (Humean or not)…from the brain to the 
muscles we simply do not know…there may be such causes or there may be not. 1472 
 
This insight expressed in an unpublished note tellingly titled “Eureka!” shows that in von 
Wright’s final view, it is our unawareness of the Humean causes that makes action possible. It 
could be argued that it is only our incomplete or inadequate knowledge which makes mental 
causation  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  our  belief  in  agency  is  a  result  of  those  experiences  
which indicate to us that we can make things happen. In Explanation and Understanding von 
Wright describes the other part of the conceptual basis of action which is: “[…] our 
confidence that certain changes will happen only when we happen to be acting.”1473 Also this 
aspect is repeated when von Wright states his final conclusion: “[…] even a convinced 
determinist… would say that we act and agree that a change produced by as agents would not 
have occurred had it not been for the interference of the agent.”1474 It  could be said that the 
confidence that we can act is epistemic, but the fact that we have it has an ontic foundation in 
certain regularities in the world. Incomplete knowledge about (mindless) nature together with 
our complete knowledge about our own nature opens the space for mental causation.  
Empirical evidence, such as the kind of neuroscientific findings that we have 
discussed, suggests that mental explanations may not be causal in any sense. I find it 
interesting that von Wright was so eager to stress the relevance of neuroscientific evidence as 
corroborating his thesis about the mind’s causal inefficacy. It seems to me that the views of 
von Wright as described in section 4.2.1.1 do not fit well with his admittance that “of course” 
reasons move agents to act. Von Wright’s repeated references to epiphenomenalism and his 
formulation of the mental–physical relation in the way characteristic of traditional 
epiphenomenalism raises the question of how von Wright can also pledge the causal efficacy 
of the mental. What can be said at the very least is that von Wright’s references to 
epiphenomenalism are unfortunate if they are not meant to implicate some kind of real causal 
inertness of the mental. If references to epiphenomenalism allow mental causes to be the kind 
of causes that Stoutland suggests, then von Wright chose his words poorly. I believe von 
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Wright  did  choose  his  words  carefully  and  therefore  I  take  the  references  to  neuroscientific  
evidence as suggesting that he really wanted to deny the causal efficacy of certain mental 
phenomena, or at least wanted to allow the possibility that these phenomena may turn out to 
be without causal efficacy. 
 
4.2.1.2 Apparent mental causation 
 
 We have seen von Wright’s two reasons, conceptual convenience and empirical evidence, for 
defending  a  version  of  epiphenomenalism.  We  could  accept  von  Wrightian  
epiphenomenalism as a “negative solution” to the problem of mental causation. Although the 
possibility of epiphenomenalism cannot be refuted, few would be willing to rest with the 
conclusion that consciousness stays outside the spatio-temporal web of causally related events 
or that sensations are neither caused nor causally efficacious. Only few philosophers are 
willing to rest with the epiphenomenalist conclusion if the epiphenomenalist claims like von 
Wright’s are meant to indicate real causal inefficacy.  
 But if mental causation is unreal, if mental states and events are really mere 
epiphenomena as von Wright suggests, then why do we so often think differently? On what is 
based our conviction that mental states and events are causally efficacious? I believe that 
when thinking about this aspect of the problem of mental causation, we can benefit from von 
Wright’s observation that the relation of the mental and the physical is semantic. Perhaps this 
helps  us  to  understand  why we so  often  think  that  there  was  a  relation  of  the  form “mental  
cause – physical effect”. It seems to me that we must offer some explanation for why we so 
often see our behavior in terms of this relation. But to say that we need to give this kind of 
explanation is of course not to say that there actually is such a mental–physical relation 
involved in the cases which we explain in terms of it. One possibility, somewhat inspired by 
von Wright, to think of the “mental cause – physical effect” relation could be the following. 
 
M               A 
 
 
P                                  B 
 
The diagram describes a situation where a physical event P in the brain causes behavior. The 
same physical event P causes also a mental event M, in this case a conscious experience. This 
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may create the illusion that M is the cause of B. From this perspective, behavior B would be 
understood as action A having M as its reason-cause. The arrow between B and A is meant to 
indicate that, at the level of behavioral manifestations B and A are identical. But although 
there is a causal relation between P and B as well as P and M, it could be the case that there is 
no causal relation from M to A – which would mean that although M temporally precedes B / 
A, there is no causal relation between them. 
 Some psychologists have considered the cases where we seem to think that our mental 
states were causes of our actions in the way mentioned above. I am referring to a model 
suggested by psychologists Wegner and Wheatley.1475 What they call “a model of conscious 
will” looks like this.                                
 
   Experience of conscious will 
 
Thought           Apparent causal path         Action 
 
        Actual causal path 
 
 
Unconscious cause of thought                   Actual causal path  
  
Unconscious path 
 
Unconscious cause of action  
 
Wegner and Wheatley claim that people can experience conscious will quite independently of 
any actual causal connection between their thoughts and actions. This claim they take to be 
fairly uncontroversial from the perspective of empirical findings.1476 The model of conscious 
will described above is meant to be a model that is consistent with these findings. In this 
model, conscious will is experienced to the degree that an apparent causal path is inferred 
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from thought to action. The better the chances for such inference, the clearer the feeling that 
one is “in charge”. 
The model describes a flow of various events leading to a voluntary action. On the 
one hand there is an unconscious cause of action. We see an actual causal path leading from 
the unconscious cause to the action. This can be understood as a physical cause. On the other 
hand, there is an unconscious mental process which gives raise to conscious thought.1477 
There may be a link between these unconscious processes, but there need not be. The question 
of whether there is such a link is irrelevant to the perception of the apparent path from 
conscious thought to action. Wegner and Wheatley conclude: “There need be no actual path 
here, as it is the perception of the apparent path that gives rise to the experience of will: When 
we think that our conscious intention has caused the voluntary action that we find ourselves 
doing, we feel a sense of will. We have willfully done the act.”1478 The problem is here 
formulated in terms of free will, but the implications for the problem of mental causation are 
obvious.  In  the  diagram  the  arrow  “experience  of  conscious  will”  could  as  well  read  
“experience of mental causation.” The simple explanation of Wegner and Wheatley is that: 
“[…] it may be that people experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought 
as the cause of action.”1479 I think that the claim that apparent mental causation is a result of 
our incorrect self-interpretation is an interesting and plausible suggestion. According to 
Wegner and Wheatley the source of this misinterpretation could be:  
 
[…] a causal illusion that is the psychological equivalent of the third variable problem in causal 
analysis. We can never be sure that A causes B, as there could always be a third variable, C, that 
causes both of them. In the same sense, we can never be sure that our thoughts cause our actions, as 
there could always be unconscious causes that have produced them both. The impression that a 
thought has caused an action rests on a causal inference that is always open to question….1480 
 
This sounds very plausible and relates to the general problem which I raised earlier. How can 
we be sure that there is a causal relation between the events that we perceive? It seems that 
when it comes to a specific case of mental causation there is nothing in the experience of 
mental causation itself that could guarantee that our thoughts cause our actions. What could 
convince us that a third variable has not interfered with the chain existing between our 
thoughts and actions? We have the ordinary experiences which give strong support for the 
                                               
1477 I hesitate to use the expression unconscious mental process.  I  would  thus  liken  this  process  to  a  physical  
process of which we are not aware. 
1478 Wegner and Wheatley, 1999, 482, my emphasis. 
1479 Wegner and Wheatley, 1999, 480. 
1480 Wegner and Wheatley, 1999, 482. 
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view that mental causation is not apparent, but unfortunately these experiences do not show 
that we could not be mistaken in each individual case. Although, for the sake of sanity we 
should not claim that global epiphenomenalism is true, we have to accept the possibility that 
in many cases where we seem to observe mental causation the phenomenon of mental 
causation is only apparent. Evidence from psychology supports this conclusion. When 
philosophers consider the problem of mental causation they usually start from the assumption 
that seemingly clear cases of mental causation are cases of mental causation – and then the 
problem is to explain how this kind of phenomenon is possible in a physical reality. But if we 
do not have a fool-proof method for distinguishing the apparent cases from the actual cases, 
then the prospects for a metaphysical solution to the problem of mental causation look dim.  
 Apparent mental causation is a result of our incorrect self-interpretation. But in a 
similar  fashion,  we  could  claim  that  “real  mental  causation”  is  a  result  of  our  correct self-
interpretation. My tentative suggestion is that the problem of mental causation is solved when 
we accept that mental explanations are the best evidence of the occurrence of the relation of 
mental causality. The question of how the causal relation itself is possible is irrelevant.1481 If 
the mental is not an ontological category in any clear sense, it is perhaps being too optimistic 
to wait for an ontological solution to the problem of mental causation. Perhaps we should, 
after all, agree with von Wright that there isn’t substantial relation of “mental cause – material 
effect” or vice versa. The idea of this relation is a result of a certain kind of interpretation we 
make of ourselves. The facts on which this interpretation is based are numerous; there are 
various psychological factors, the existence of which strengthens an agent’s conviction that he 
was the cause. Wegner and Wheatley claim: “Because we have thoughts of what we will do, 
we can develop causal theories relating those thoughts to our actions on the basis of priority, 
consistency, and exclusivity.”1482 This suggestion can be compared to the recent suggestion of 
neuroscientists: “The subjective (and potentially illusory) feeling that we are executing a 
movement does not arise from movement itself, but is generated by prior conscious intention 
and its predicted consequences.”1483 The  priority,  consistency  and  exclusivity  are  important  
factors in person’s self-image as a being with a conscious will. When we see a connection 
between thought and action, we expect that the thought should occur before the action 
                                               
1481 We can still  understand that  there  is  a  desire  to  ask  this  how-question.  But  the  only  way to  even to  try  to  
answer it would require a quite concrete reduction of the mental to the physical, and all the irreducibility 
arguments so far suggest that this project is hopeless. As noted in section 4.1 we can of course accept the view 
that the problem of mental causation is solved when we state that mental phenomena are physical phenomena 
and the latter are causally efficacious. But is this an answer to the problem of mental causation? 
1482 Wegner and Wheatley, 1999, 490. See also Wegner, 2003a. 
1483 Desmurget et al., 2009, my emphasis. 
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(priority), be consistent with the action (consistency), and not be accompanied by other 
potential causes (exclusivity).  
These three principles seem to relate to our more general understanding of the nature 
of causality. This understanding is something which we have learned. It seems, for example, 
that our understanding of the exclusivity principle depends on our learning of what kind of 
things can be causes of what kind of other things. There is evidence showing that humans 
tend  to  discount  the  causal  influence  of  X  on  Y  if  there  is  potential  Z  that  could  be  also  a  
cause. Whether Z can be a causal factor on this occasion depends on our general knowledge 
and understanding of how reality works. When applied to the case of mental causation we 
could perhaps say that what kind of mental causes a person can detect is partly dependent on 
what kind of psychological understanding a person has developed. According to von Wright, 
the capacity to have reasons for one’s actions develops when a child “[…] grows up to be a 
member of society, learns to speak and do various things, to understand the meaning of 
challenges and institutions, and to participate in various practices….”1484 Once this “form of 
life” is learned, the capability of seeing semantic relations between behavior and mental 
phenomena becomes possible. Interestingly, Wegner and Wheatley note that “the principle of 
consistency in the experience of will draws on the observation that the thoughts that serve as 
potential causes of actions typically have semantic associations with the actions.”1485 The 
semantic associations to which psychologists refer could be linked to von Wright’s more 
philosophical observation that the relation between the mental and the behavioral is semantic. 
It  could  be  claimed  that  the  proposal  that  real  mental  causation  is  a  result  of  our  
correct self-interpretation immediately faces an obvious problem, namely the possibility that 
people interpret themselves incorrectly. If people infer wrongly the relation of mental 
causation when there is none, how could self-interpretation serve as a solution to the new 
problem of mental causation? I admit that this is a severe problem, but I nevertheless suggest 
that, at least in the absence of conflicting evidence, there is a presumption that a person acted 
because of a mental cause. Wegner and Wheatley note: “The experience of will can be an 
indication that mind is causing action, especially if the person is a good self-interpreter, but it 
is not conclusive.”1486 I wholeheartedly agree with this view, except for the last sentence 
which I recognize to be exactly the point that the psychologists want to make. It seems to me 
that an experience of will is surely a good indicator of a mind causing an action, and the more 
                                               
1484 Von Wright, 1998, 37. 
1485 Wegner and Wheatley, 1999, 485. 
1486 Wegner and Wheatley, 1999, 490. 
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sensitive a man is to the workings of his mind, the more aware he is of himself, and the better 
the chance he has to observe whether he is really the cause. We can agree that the experience 
is not conclusive, but I think we have to agree that it is hard to think of evidence which would 
be more conclusive. This is where the discussion has to end, since lacking mental–physical 
reductions we have no other way to approach the problem. 
One could say that how we interpret the agent’s view about his role in the causation of 
his actions is related to the way we see, or want to see, the whole situation. If we think that he 
was  the  cause  of  what  happened,  we  are  taking  him  to  be  responsible  for  the  obvious  
consequences, i.e. to be a candidate for moral evaluation; in short we take him to be an 
autonomous human being. Perhaps the agent’s own certainty could be measured by 
considering to what extent he is committed, for example, to the consequences. The 
presumption that a sincere agent is the cause of his actions does not give us absolute certainty 
about what happened, but we cannot do any better. If we consider the neuroscientific and 
psychological evidence, we have reasons to believe that the mental phenomena in terms 
which  we  explain  our  behavior  are  epiphenomenal from time to time.1487 I  suggest  that  we  
should  therefore  conclude  that  “conditional  epiphenomenalism” is  true.  It  is  good to  realize  
this, because it makes us consider the extent to which we are, or think we are, transparent to 
ourselves. How often do we know the reasons which influence us and how often do we make 
false inferences and thus summon up the phenomenon of apparent mental causation?1488 The 
possibility of conditional epiphenomenalism reminds us how poorly we know ourselves. 
 In addition to what has been already suggested, I think there are two general 
observations which could be used to defend the view that we are mysteries to ourselves and 
that it is not clear when or how often we in fact make conscious decisions. On the one hand, 
let us consider the simple event of the occurrence of a certain thought. Suppose that you are 
lying on your back, watching the sky, when suddenly a thought that you should call you 
brother occurs. Or suppose that I instruct you to “clear your mind” and to think nothing. It is 
not easy to maintain a completely blank mind; it is actually extremely difficult especially if 
instructed to do so. Sooner rather than later some thought occurs in your mind. You cannot 
control the thought, you cannot prevent it from occurring and you cannot decide what kind of 
new thoughts will occur as a result of the first thought. In this sense you are really a victim of 
your circumstances. Why a certain thought occurs literally from nowhere is a truly puzzling, 
even disturbing question. I think we could say that this is real emergence, the case of neural 
                                               
1487 For further neuroscientific considerations, see Pockett, Banks, and (eds.), 2006. 
1488 For examples and for a very interesting discussion see, Wilson, 2002. 
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“quantity” turning into mental quality. Even if we could demonstrate that a specific thought 
was “realized” because neural state N occurred, would this be a satisfying answer to the 
question of why this unique thought with the specific content C occurred? Why did the neural 
state realize just this thought?  In the end, the thoughts we happen to have are not up to us and 
neither can we control the moment when they occur.  
 Closely related to this realization is the insight suggested, for example, by Galen 
Strawson.1489 It is old wisdom, pointed out by Schopenhauer among others, that a man can do 
what he wants to do but he cannot determine what he wants. Whereas we sometimes can 
control what we want by desperately pushing our desires towards a certain direction, there is 
always  the  troubling  question  of  where,  if  anywhere,  the  original  desires  come  from.  They  
seem to be just a result of the fact that we are the kind of persons we are. Environment and 
heredity entirely shape our characters. But we are not, and cannot be, responsible for our 
environment and we certainly cannot be responsible for our heredity. So it could be claimed 
that in a fundamental sense we are not, and cannot ever be, responsible for our characters, and 
this being the case, we cannot be responsible for what we do. Whatever I do is determined by 
my past self and I had no control over the events that shaped me in the past. This self-
determination is something whose consequences for our capability to choose freely should be 
considered more carefully. Such a task cannot be carried out in this work, but it seems to me 
that it would support the case of conditional epiphenomenalism or at least clarify the question 
of how poorly we know ourselves and how little control we have over our decisions. 
Whereas conditional epiphenomenalism looks to me to be very plausible, global 
epiphenomenalism is more problematic.  We have no good reasons to believe that we would 
be mistaken about ourselves all the time. If we consider how well our explanations work, it 
would be irrational to claim that they always fail to capture the mental causes behind our 
actions. If mental explanations are really always pseudo-explanations then, to use Fodor’s 
words, that simply is the end of the world. 
 
4.2.2 Precursory reasons 
 
In this section I suggest a way to think about the new problem of mental causation. As noted 
at the beginning of this chapter, the approach that I find most congenial can be described as an 
epistemological or deflationary approach to mental causation. It is partly inspired by the “non-
                                               
1489 Strawson, 1986. 
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causalist” aspects of von Wright’s and Davidson’s positions and it partly depends on the 
distinction which was briefly suggested in section 2.5.1 between beliefsc and beliefs.  
I have repeatedly claimed that a non-reductive position cannot provide a reductive 
explanation for the problem of mental causation. My suggestion is that if, as von Wright and 
Davidson claim, there is no scientific solution to the problem of mental causation then the real 
problem for any non-reductive view about the mind is to answer the question of how to decide 
when an explanation which refers to mental causes is true. This question is relevant for our 
self-conception as agents that can act out of reasons, choose freely their actions, and in this 
sense influence the course of their lives and shape their destiny. If we cannot tell when our 
explanations of actions are correct, we face a situation where our conception of agency is 
constantly jeopardized. If we cannot explain when mental explanations of behavior are correct 
we have to, or least can in principle, doubt our reasons all the time and speculate about 
whether or not we are in charge of our own actions. 
The question of “when I am in charge and how to decide this” is related to pragmatic 
problems, such as: when can a person be held responsible for her actions? If it cannot be 
shown that a mental cause was operative in the production of an action then a person could, in 
principle,  claim  that  it  was  not  (s)he  who  did  something  shameful  or  blameworthy,  it  was  
her/his brain. In the cases when we conclude that the person was not in charge of their actions, 
they cannot be judged according to the same standards as “normal” people. Sometimes we 
accept that the person as a deliberating and autonomous individual could not prevent what 
their body caused.1490 The question of how to solve the new problem of mental  causation is 
interesting from a philosophical point of view, but it has also relevance for the question of 
when a person is responsible for what they did.  I  have concluded that the impossibility of a 
reductive explanation for the problem of mental causation leads to the possibility of 
conditional epiphenomenalism. A solution to the new problem of mental causation does not 
remove this possibility; it merely states the conditions which must be satisfied in order to 
solve the new problem. My suggestion is that the possibility of conditional epiphenomenalism 
is something which remains even if we provide a solution to the new problem of mental 
causation. Conditional epiphenomenalism is thus an important part of the answer to the 
traditional problem of mental causation. 
 The new problem of mental causation is the problem of how to tell when a mental 
explanation is true. When does this kind of explanation refer to something which is causally 
                                               
1490 For a discussion. see for example, Glannon (ed.), 2007, Gazzaniga, 2005. 
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effective in the production of behavior? This question cannot be answered by claiming that 
such an explanation is true when mental causes are identical with the neural causes resulting 
in behavior. Whereas this claim is what the following answer implies, it cannot be used as a 
ground for the truth of mental explanations because it cannot be shown that there actually was 
a neural cause corresponding to the mental cause in terms of which an action is explained. 
Our inability to show the correspondence between the causes leads to the possibility of 
conditional epiphenomenalism. If we now try to solve the new problem of mental causation, 
we have to consider how to decide whether an explanation like “Georg bought apples because 
he likes their taste” is true. I will consider this question by describing the famous pantyhose 
experiment of Nisbett and Wilson.1491 In this experiment Nisbett and Wilson set up a market 
survey table outside a shopping centre, placed pairs of pantyhose on the table and asked the 
random shopping centre customers which of the various pairs they preferred, and why. 
 Suppose, in the spirit of the experiment, that there are four pairs of pantyhose A, B, 
C, and D in front of me. I am asked to choose one and I choose pair D by picking it up. When 
asked why I chose that particular pair I answer: “Because the material looked good.” Then we 
have the following situation.  
 
The material looked good (R)           Picking up pair D (A)  
 
In a certain situation I have a reason (R) for action, an action (A) occurs and we think there is 
a  relation  between  (R)  and  (A).  We  can  call  this  relation  a  causal  relation,  but  should  
understand it in the spirit of what we have learned from von Wright. It is not a nomic relation, 
but causal in some other sense. 
In the original experiment all  pairs of pantyhose were identical  and this fact  was not 
known by the participants. Nisbett and Wilson, on the other hand, knew in advance that given 
a choice among three closely-matched alternatives, there is a bias to pick the last one. The 
human cognitive system is a curious apparatus and many facts of how it “makes choices” or 
“interprets” data below the conscious level are known. It is known, for example, that people 
tend  to  prefer  objects  on  their  right  and  therefore  we can  predict  that,  given  identical  pairs,  
pair D will be over-chosen. Indeed, in Nisbett’s and Wilson’s experiment pair D got picked up 
almost four times as often as pair A. The rightmost pair was heavily over-chosen, but the test-
subjects did not give the position of the pair as their reason for picking it up. This being the 
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case, there is a good reason to think that the people who chose pair D did it just because the 
pair was the furthest one on their right side. Then the situation is like this. 
 
Pair D was on the right side (C)                   Picking up pair D (B)  
 
Here we have a cause (C), behavior (B) and a causal relation between them.  Reason does not 
belong to this situation and therefore, according to the view that I have been trying to put 
forward, the picking up of pair  D ceases to be an action (A).  Let us suppose that so far the 
situation is as described. I pick up pair D and give my reason when asked. I have thus given a 
reason-based explanation. People responsible for the experiment think that I picked up pair D 
because it was on my right side, and they give a causal explanation of what has happened. The 
question that I want to raise is: How to decide which explanation is correct? Both cannot be 
correct; if I picked up pair D because the material looked good it was not the case that I 
picked up the pair because it was on the right side. If, on the other hand, I picked up the 
rightmost pair because it was the rightmost, then I did not pick up pair D because its material 
looked good. If we believe that the mental will not be reduced to the neural, then we cannot 
identify my reason with a cause; an answer which argues that a neural state caused my 
picking (and we know the real cause when we identify the causally efficacious neural state) 
cannot help. Moreover, the explanation referring to C refers to the human visual system and 
its physical properties, whereas the explanation referring to my reason does not refer to such 
properties. It could therefore be the case that my visual system is working normally and 
unconscious processing is taking place in the brain simultaneously with the neural state, 
which would be understood as my reason if the identification made sense. There would be 
thus two candidates for a neural cause. Which one of these would be the real cause? 
Let us suppose that after my choice I am immediately asked why I chose pair D and I 
answer:  because  it  had  the  smoothest  material.  We could  doubt  this  explanation  because  all  
the pantyhose were identical; yet we cannot deny that it could have been my real reason; 
maybe, for some reason or other, I really felt that  pair  D  had  smoother  material  than  other  
pairs.  To  insist  that  I  could  not  have  felt  this  because  the  pairs  were  identical  is  an  absurd  
claim. The person in charge of the experiment is referring to his knowledge and claiming 
authority over the explanation, and I do the same. Who is correct? The question is more 
severe in cases where the issues at stake are more serious. We can assume that knowledge 
about the brain could be used in cases where it is important to decide whether or not an agent 
is lying about his actual reasons. In these cases a conflict between the agent’s own view and 
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the view of an outsider could have drastic consequences. The interest in brain-scanners or 
mind-reading machines is clearly increasing, and there are already various suggestions about 
how such new technology could be used.  
Not surprisingly, institutions like law-enforcement agencies and the military have 
expressed a lot of interest in mind-reading technology. The Churchlands, just to use one 
example, have speculated about how neural facts could be used to draw the line between 
normal and abnormal people. I believe we are aware of the ways in which something like this 
has been happening for some time. Mental illnesses are being diagnosed in terms of physical 
evidence, and medicines are offered instead of therapy. Whereas currently it seems to be 
trendy to claim that mental illnesses, addictions and other problematic mental–physical 
phenomena need to be understood from a perspective which draws together the results of 
psychology, brain-sciences and perhaps even sociology and philosophy, we can imagine a 
situation where the neural evidence alone would become the criterion for these problematic 
phenomena.  It  seems  to  me  that  a  philosophical  view,  like  the  one  put  forward  by  
neurophilosophers, is simultaneously a suggestion about the nature of the desirable society 
which these philosophers would like to pursue. Let us suppose, referring again to the 
imagined experiment, that I am not aware of my reason for picking up pair D but that I can 
state it when challenged.  
We can play with counterfactuals and say that if this really was my reason then I 
would have been able to state it before I acted. But this observation is of no use if I actually 
was unaware of the reason before the action. What can guarantee that the reason that I give is 
not an invention? In Nisbett’s and Wilson’s experiment, people gave all kinds of reasons for 
picking up D but all these reasons, if based on the differences between the pair of stockings, 
look suspicious because there were no differences between the pairs. People offered fabricated 
reasons which, given the situation, sounded reasonable to them. It seems that people tried to 
answer intelligently, and in the original experiment no one offered as a reason the position of 
pair D. In fact, when people were offered this explanation, they treated it as being very 
strange. On the view that I am proposing this is no surprise, because this fact was actually not 
a reason, it was a cause, and we have no reason to think that humans are usually aware of the 
causes of their behavior. The mechanism responsible for the fact that people tend favor 
objects on their right side may very well be hidden from our conscious access; likewise for 
many similar kinds of mechanisms. 
My claim is that if a person picks up pair D because it is on his right side and gives a 
fabricated reason, then the picking is not an action. What happened can be explained in 
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physical terms, in terms of a causal explanation. It is nevertheless plausible that people firmly 
claim that they had a reason for what they did and they are “absolutely sure” that they did not 
invent this afterwards. It seems to me that if we do not require the awareness of one’s own 
reasons before the action, we cannot tell whether the picking of pair D was an action. In this 
case, we should trust the person responsible for the experiment and conclude that I picked up 
pair D because it was on my right side. D’s position caused “me”  to  choose  it.  But  what  
should we say about the situation if I was aware of my reason before the behavior? 
I suggest that a crucial distinction between precursory and retrospective reasons needs 
to be made. Precursory reasons are those of which an agent is aware before the relevant action 
is  carried  out.  Retrospective  reasons  are  those  to  which  he  refers  after  the  action  has  been  
performed  and  of  which  he  was  not  aware  before  the  action.  I  can  give  the  reason  for  my  
action in two different ways, namely before the  action  takes  place  or  after the action has 
already been performed.  I believe that a distinction between two kinds of reasons is required 
in order to see the difference between these two kinds of explanations. Let us suppose that I 
was not aware of my reason for picking up pair D before my behavior and before the question 
about my reason was put. Yet, immediately when I was asked about my reasons, I gave the 
reason “the material looked good”. In the terminology that I am suggesting, I would be giving 
a retrospective reason, which is something that becomes visible only after the action as a 
result of self-observation. The essential question is: what is the explanatory strength of a 
retrospective reason in the pantyhose scenario? What is the guarantee that this kind of 
rationalization of action is not my invention? If a precursory reason is mere invention the 
existence of which is confirmed after an action has taken place, what would be our reason to 
think that such a reason was a causal factor in what happened? Is the reason relevant for the 
fact  that  I  picked up pair  D? If  the reason did not exist  before the action, how could it  have 
causal relevance for the action that occurred? The problem with the explanation that refers to 
a retrospective reason is that the temporal order of the reason and action seems to be such that 
an explanation of the latter in terms of the former is not possible. 
My claim is that if I explain why I chose pair D by referring to a retrospective reason, 
then  we  are  entitled  to  think  that  outsider’s  explanation  of  the  behavior  by  referring  to  the  
position of D could be correct and my sincere explanation false. This would mean that there is 
no mental explanation for “my” behaviour, and an outsider would be the supreme judge with 
respect to the question of what happened. It is a statistical fact that people tend to prefer 
objects on their right side. This, together with the fact that we do not have a satisfying mental 
explanation of why I picked up pair  D, is  a reason to think that a non-mental  explanation is 
537 
 
satisfying. Lacking a better answer and knowing that in situations like the one described in the 
pantyhose example people are often affected by the position of the object, a non-mental 
explanation is reasonable.  The  cause  would  override  the  reason,  and  the  outsider  would  
override agent’s autonomy and self-knowledge. 
The situation changes in a crucial way if I have a precursory reason for my picking. 
Suppose  that  before  I  make  my  choice  I  am  aware  of  why  I  am  choosing  pair  D;  simply  
because the material looks good. We could debate whether it is possible that one pair looks 
better than the other if the pairs are identical. This, whether I can prefer one over the other if 
all  are  identical,  is  a  good  question.  Let  us,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  fabricate  the  
following  story.  I  examine  the  pairs  and  when the  time of  pair  D comes,  for  some obscure  
reason or another, a pleasant sensation or thought occurs in me. Unbeknown to me, this 
pleasant sensation makes me to see pair D in a “fashionable light” and a thought “This 
material looks good” occurs to me. This is surely something that can happen. Then we have a 
situation like this. 
 
        S / T                             PR                     A  
 
A pleasant sensation (S) or thought (T) causes a precursory reason (PR), which is a reason for 
my action (A). Why PR  exists  does  not  really  matter,  what  is  important  is  that  it,  de facto, 
occurs. The case can be made without imagining the intervening pleasant sensation. I pick up 
pair D because of my precursory reason that the material looks good. It is my belief that the 
material looks good, which causes me to choose the pair, but the belief may of course be 
false. Nevertheless, it truly was my reason for picking up D. 
 If I am aware of my reason before I make my choice, there is every reason to believe 
that this reason is what made me act. The situation is a mirror-image of the situation where I 
give  a  retrospective  reason.  In  the  latter  case,  it  is  the  explanation  of  the  outsiders  that  we  
should accept, whereas in the former case we cannot sidestep the fact that I actually had a 
reason  for  my action.  When I  have  a  precursory  reason,  the  fact  that  people  tend  to  choose  
objects on their right side becomes secondary – as far as explanation is concerned – in 
comparison to the reason I had. If I have a reason for my action and I know this, how could I 
accept the claim of an outsider that this reason was in fact not my reason for my action? The 
fact that people tend to choose things on their right side and the fact that I chose pair D does 
not  exclude  the  possibility  that  I  did  it  for  a  reason.  The  lesson  is  this:  in  the  case  of  
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retrospective reason, we have no ground for saying that an action was performed whereas in 
the case of precursory reason we have no ground to say that an action has not been performed. 
A precursory reason we can understand as a thought of which I am aware before the 
action.  A  precursory  reason  comes  close  to  von  Wright’s  definition  of  “Cartesian  
consciousness.”  A  subject  is  in  this  sense  conscious  if  he  is,  for  any  given  mental  state  M,  
aware of whether or not he experiences M or not. A precursory reason is something of which 
the agent is necessarily aware, because having a precursory reason simply is a conscious 
reflective thought. It is for this reason that I have emphasized that an essential distinction 
between beliefs and beliefsC needs to be made. Only beliefsC can function as precursory 
reasons and only precursory reasons can secure mental causation. From an ontological point 
of view we can ask what the status of beliefsC is. We are aware of beliefsC. In the context of 
O-physicalism, I find it difficult to see what else beliefsC could be than internal entities 
“running through the subject’s mind”. We can recall Child’s analysis of the central lesson of 
interpretationism: ”The attitudes we cite in explaining an action need not correspond to 
anything running through the agent’s head before she acted.”1492 This is true, but then we 
should ask whether the attitudes used in mental explanations really cause anything. 
In the pantyhose example I would have a precursory reason if I had a conscious 
thought “This material looks good” before I proceed to pick up pair D. Let us suppose that, 
when asked, I  would give a reason of which I  was aware before the action occurred. In this 
case,  it  would  be  difficult  to  see  why  or  how  a  neurological  or  any  other  non-mental  
explanation could override my sincere judgment. People tend to over-choose objects on their 
right side, but what would be the relevance of this fact for the particular case where there 
exists  a  mental  explanation  in  terms  of  precursory  reasons?  In  those  cases  where  an  agent  
gives a retrospective reason, a non-mental explanation may have overriding potential with 
respect to the agent’s own explanation because the non-mental explanation refers to 
something which did exist before the action occurred, whereas the mental explanation refers 
to no such thing. Something caused  the  action  and  in  the  absence  of  a  precursory  reason  a  
non-mental explanation may very well be acceptable. However, in the cases in which a 
precursory reason does exist, there is no rationale for accepting the truth of non-mental 
explanations. A precursory reason is a genuine mental cause and a non-mental explanation 
cannot override an explanation which refers to such a cause. What could convince us that a 
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precursory reason was not the agent’s reason for acting? How could an outsider know better 
the inner life of a subject than the subject himself? 
An explanation referring to a precursory reason thus has priority over an explanation 
which refers to a non-mental cause. I suggest that a non-mental explanations cannot override 
explanations referring to precursory reasons, and that an explanation referring to retrospective 
reasons does not automatically override a non-mental explanation. In the context of a non-
reductive position, the problem of mental causation is re-formulated as the problem of how to 
tell when a mental explanation is true. My tentative answer to this question is that we can trust 
only those mental explanations which refer to precursory reasons. The model presented here 
is, of course, very crude and must be developed further in the future. I have offered only an 
outline of a view which to me looks far more reasonable than a metaphysical approach to the 
problem of mental causation; my purpose has been only to give a new way of thinking about 
the problem. The specific questions on which this model should focus in the future relate 
especially to the problems concerning self-deception and to the human desire to invent 
rationalizing explanations. Whereas these are interesting questions for psychology, clarifying 
the conceptual distinction between reasons and causes and between action and behavior is the 
task of philosophy, and empirical data alone cannot tell us how we should understand 
experiments like the one described by Nisbett and Wilson and the results of these 
experiments. I hope that the general idea, and above else motivation, behind the model which 
emphasizes the importance of retrospective reasons is clear. 
I believe that the claim that we can trust only those mental explanations which refer to 
precursory reasons is in essential respects in harmony with von Wright’s view that the mental 
has epistemic priority over the neural. Whereas von Wright’s and Davidson’s views about the 
special nature of reason-based explanations and about the irreducibility of the mental have 
inspired the kind of model which I suggest here, it seems to me that their views face certain 
difficult problems with respect to the precursory / retrospective reason distinction and the 
distinction between beliefs and beliefsC. By using the precursory / retrospective distinction, let 
us consider a more complicated example than the Nisbett–Wilson experiment. Let us suppose 
that I go to a party. Upon my arrival I am asked “Why did you come? It is rare to see you at 
parties.” I answer: “I wanted to see my friends.” We can assume that the person who asked 
the question is usually satisfied with this kind of an answer and so am I. The questioner 
would, in his philosophic mood, conclude that since I came to the party and gave the reason 
that I wanted to see my friends, I also believed that my friends would be present and these 
facts jointly caused me to come to the party. The answer I gave is a perfectly adequate answer 
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to the question; it is understood immediately and we can “see” a connection between my 
answer and my action. One could say, as von Wright does, that here my action can be 
understood in the light of the reason without inferring a causal connection, i.e. the action 
becomes perfectly understandable when the reason is known, and this is the end of the story. 
But could we still ask the question of what my real reason for coming to the party was? Did I 
just come up with an adequate and reasonable answer which made sense when faced with the 
question “Why did you come?” This would mean that I would have given a retrospective 
reason for my behavior. Or had I been contemplating in silent von Wrightian monologue the 
question  of  whether  I  should  go,  and  decided  that  I  wanted  to  see  my  friends?  This  would  
mean that I would have had a precursory reason for my action. 
Davidson would say that my desire to see my friends was, together with my belief, my 
reason for going to the party if it caused me to go. The reason which caused me to go is the 
reason why I am at the party. But to insist on this does not help us to answer the question of 
which of the reasons was actually my reason for going, or whether there was a reason at all. It 
seems to me that von Wright and Davidson do not make a clear distinction between 
precursory and retrospective reasons, which leads to the problems we have described. 
Davison notes: 
 
We cannot suppose that whenever an agent acts intentionally he goes through a process of deliberation 
or reasoning, marshals evidence and principles, and draws conclusions. Nevertheless, if someone acts 
with an intention, he must have attitudes and beliefs from which, had he been aware of them and had 
the time, he could have reasoned that his action was desirable….1493  
 
Von Wright agrees: “In order to call a movement intentional it is not necessary that the 
subject should have formed an intention to perform it before actually performing it. 
Sometimes this [forming an intention] happens.”1494 Let us suppose that I went to a party but 
there was no process of reasoning. Should we say that if I had been aware of my beliefs and 
had time before the party, I could have reasoned that I should go to the party? Perhaps, but 
this is not a satisfying answer to the question what s my reason to go the party was if I didn’t 
actually go through a process of reasoning. Davidson admits that an agent does not have to be 
aware of the reasons on which he acts and which can be used to explain his actions. But this 
being  the  case,  what  can  ensure  that  the  agent  does  not  invent  his  reasons  afterwards?  My  
question is: what is the explanatory role of retrospective reasons on Davidson’s and von 
                                               
1493 Davidson, 1978, 85. 
1494 Von Wright, 1998, 142. 
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Wright’s accounts? That von Wright accepts retrospective reasons as genuinely explanatory 
becomes clear from the following: 
 
Although an explanation in terms of reasons may point far beyond the context of the action in time, the 
reasons must yet, all of them, be present in the context. The agent need not be aware (“thinking”) of (all 
of) them when he proceeds to action but they must be present in the sense that he subsequently can say, 
if challenged, that he had them then. He did not invent them afterwards, nor had he completely forgotten 
about them. He would have been able to state them when proceeding to action had he, for whatever 
reason, reflected on why he was doing what he was doing. 1495 
 
For behavior to count as intentional action, it is enough according to von Wright that I can 
give reasons for my action when challenged. These reasons can be such that I do not have to 
be aware of them when I begin to act, but they do not count as reasons if I invent them 
afterwards or if I had completely forgotten them. In other words, retrospective reasons which 
I can give when challenged count as explaining my action if I don’t invent them. 
This is all very tempting, but here the problem that I am raising becomes clear. If my 
reasons for an action were reasons of which I  was not aware before the action, how can we 
exclude the possibility that I did not invent them afterwards? I can say that I didn’t invent 
them, but I can be wrong. Human nature being what it is, we have a tendency to try to make 
sense  of  ourselves.  This  is  precisely  what  happened  in  the  experiment  of  Nisbett  and  Ross.  
The  participants  were  not  willing  to  admit  that  they  had  invented  their  reasons.  If  I  give  a  
retrospective reason and someone challenges it by saying “No, you didn’t have that reason, 
you invented it!” I will likely protest. I can sincerely declare that I had this reason before the 
action, although I wasn’t aware of it. Who is to say that I am not correct in my view? Well, 
here we have a reason to challenge my view on the grounds that if I was not aware of my 
reason, what actually is my reason to say that I had it before the action took place?   
How would von Wright or Davidson describe the pantyhose situation? We should 
recall what von Wright says:  
 
[the reasons] must be present in the sense that he subsequently can say, if challenged, that he had them 
then. He did not invent them afterwards, nor had he completely forgotten about them. He would have 
been able to state them when proceeding to action had he, for whatever reason, reflected on why he was 
doing what he was doing.1496 
 
Suppose that I am not aware of my reason to pick up pair D but I can state it when challenged. 
On the von Wrightian account this would count as a genuine reason if I had been able to state 
                                               
1495 Von Wright, 1998, 33. 
1496 Von Wright, 1998, 33. 
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it when proceeding to action. But what can ever guarantee that I would have been able to state 
it? Von Wright notes that I need not be aware of the reason but he also notes that, in order for 
my reasons to count as reasons, I should have not completely forgotten them. How can these 
views be reconciled? It is plausible that people firmly claim that they had a reason for what 
they did and they are “absolutely sure” that they did not invent it afterwards. This being the 
case, von Wright’s account cannot help to solve the question of whether what happened was 
an action of the agent. The same is true of Davidson’s position: “[…] if someone acts with an 
intention, he must have attitudes and beliefs from which, had he been aware of them and had 
the time, he could have reasoned that his action was desirable….”1497 It is not required that I 
must be aware of my attitudes and beliefs if I act intentionally, only that had I been aware of 
them I could have seen the connection between the attitudes, beliefs and the action. 
In a sense, Davidson and von Wright do worry about the questions of whether 
retrospective reasons can be efficacious and whether these reasons can be taken to refer to 
anything at all. It seems that von Wright is more aware of these problems than Davidson. He 
makes the distinction between existing and efficacious reasons and concludes: “Only of 
efficacious reasons do we say that the agent acted for those reasons or because of them.”1498 
Only efficacious reasons belong to the explanation of person’s action in terms of reasons. This 
is an important distinction, but it does not separate reasons in the same way that the 
distinction between precursory and retrospective reasons does. The problem is that it seems 
possible that the retrospective reasons by reference to which we often explain can be non-
existing and therefore non-efficacious. Davidson puts little emphasis on the view that we 
should be consciously aware of the reasons on which we act. As he notes: “It is clear that 
most of our actions are not preceded by any conscious reasoning or deliberation.”1499 This 
being the case, Davidson seems to accept the view that usually we explain our actions and the 
actions  of  others  by  referring  to  retrospective  reasons.  Von  Wright  has  a  similar  view:  “In  
many, perhaps most, cases the agent just has some reasons and then acts – and only in 
retrospect, if at all, does he reflect (“think) on them and makes it clear to himself or to others 
why he acted.”1500 This is what happened when I went to the party and gave a reason when 
                                               
1497 Davidson, 1978, 85. 
1498 Von Wright, 1998, 19. 
1499 Davidson, 1987a, 107.  
1500 Von Wright, 1998, 142. This can however be compared to the following: ”That an agent acted for a certain 
reason normally means that something was, for this agent, a reason for doing something and that he set himself 
(chose, proceeded, maybe upon deliberation) to do this thing for that reason.” (Von Wright, 1998, 11) The 
problematic expressions are: “agent has a reason” and he “chose to do a thing for a certain reason.” How should 
we understand the expressions “having a reason” and “choosing” if it is not required that the agent is aware of 
the reasons he has and if he does not consciously choose? Is choosing (and here I mean real choosing) without 
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asked. Perhaps I had several reasons and I possibly acted because of one or more of them, but 
I became aware of them, and I started to think about them, only when challenged. This is also 
what von Wright and Davidson could say about the pantyhose case; a person just had some 
reason and acted, and only in retrospect does he think of the reason and make clear to others 
why he acted. But this will not work if the “choosing” of pair D was really caused by its 
location. 
Although von Wright claims that perhaps in most cases the agent just has some 
reasons and acts accordingly, he also thinks that normally an agent knows what he did and 
also why he did it; he knows what his reasons were. This being the case no explanation is ever 
required for most actions. Upon self-reflection an agent would straightforwardly know why he 
did a certain thing and nobody would have a reason to doubt this explanation. Although this is 
a common-sense view, it is naïve from a philosophical and psychological point of view, 
especially if explanations in terms of retrospective reasons are accepted as genuine 
explanations.1501 The trustworthy self-reflective retrospective processes to which von Wright 
refers can be misleading. Von Wright is aware of this: “The self-reflective process can be 
called “rationalization”. Sometimes it consists in the agent just inventing, post hoc, reasons 
which in fact he did not have.”1502 Von Wright’s exact definition of rationalization is: “The 
phenomenon called ‘rationalization’ occurs when I give reasons which were in fact not the 
reasons for which I acted.”1503 Whereas in Davidson’s terminology “rationalization” is a form 
of explanation, one could interpret von Wright as claiming that rationalization is not a form of 
explanation. Von Wright’s view is not clear, though, because he notes that that the borderline 
between pre-existing reasons and the subsequent rationalization of an action is often blurred. 
In saying this, he seems to imply that the subsequent rationalization is a form of explanation 
in terms of retrospective reasons; yet he also claims that rationalization is a process in which I 
give reasons which were not the ones for which I acted, and in this latter sense rationalization 
is surely an incorrect explanation if it deserves the name “explanation” at all. Let us 
understand rationalization in this latter sense from now on. The problem that I have posed for 
von Wright and Davidson can be thus summarized: are explanations in terms of retrospective 
reasons always rationalizations? If the answer is yes, then retrospective reasons are never 
                                                                                                                                                            
deliberation possible? Isn’t the term “choice” defined as something which one makes because of certain reasons, 
and can you do this if you are not aware of the reasons? 
1501 One should remember the huge amount of empirical evidence showing people’s defects in their self-
understanding. Von Wright notes that the issues considered here create interesting problems for psychology but 
he ignores them as not being philosophical problems. In this context I am not certain how von Wright draws the 
philosophical / non-philosophical distinction and what he means by it. 
1502 Von Wright, 1998, 142. 
1503 Von Wright, 1998, 89. 
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genuinely explanatory. If the answer is no, how can we distinguish genuine explanations in 
terms of retrospective reasons from rationalizations?  
Although I hesitate to conclude that explanations in terms of retrospective reasons are 
always pseudo-explanations because they do not give the reasons for which I actually acted, it 
seems difficult to see what could convince us that retrospective reasons really were reasons 
for my action. There seems to be a clear difference between cases when I am aware of my 
reasons before the action and therefore act, and cases where I, when challenged, give reasons 
of which I was not earlier aware, retrospectively. In the first case “the reason was there”; this 
is so to speak an ontic truth, and the main question is whether it was efficacious. In the second 
case we have to consider both whether the reason existed and whether it was efficacious. 
From the fact that something is a reason for action it does not follow that an agent has that 
reason for his action. From the facts that something is a reason for action and that the agent 
has that reason for action it does not follow that he does the action for that reason. Both von 
Wright and Davidson are of course aware of these facts, and their respective views in the 
philosophy of action are meant to solve the problem of how efficacious reasons could be 
pointed out. It seems to me clear that a reference to causality does not solve this problem. Von 
Wright, who sees no hope in the causal answer, argues that necessary criteria for a true 
reason-based explanation are twofold. First, the given reason must be (i.e. must count as) a 
reason. A physical event under its physical description would not count as a reason since 
having a reason requires understanding something. Second, the agent must have or must have 
had the reason on the occasion in question. My claim is that this approach cannot solve the 
question of whether retrospective reasons are efficacious. But is there any way to solve this 
problem? I think that we should applaud von Wright’s answer to the question of how to 
identify efficacious reasons:  
 
The efficacious reasons are those in the light of which we explain the action.  I maintain, in other words, 
that one cannot separate the question of the efficaciousness of the reasons from the act of understanding 
the action as having been performed for those reasons. This means that the truth of the action 
explanation has no basis in facts other than the understanding itself of the action in the context of its 
reasons.1504  
 
In  the  spirit  of  what  has  been  said  about  reasons  and  actions,  this  kind  of  view  was  to  be  
expected. Mental concepts to which actions belong are so connected to each other that we 
cannot begin discussing the efficaciousness of reasons outside the context of the actions 
which they are taken to be reasons for. This observation of von Wright should be considered 
                                               
1504 Von Wright, 1998, 21, last emphasis mine. 
545 
 
very seriously because it clarifies remarkably well what we mean when we say that the mental 
is a conceptual category. Mental phenomena exist only in a certain kind of context. We can 
make sense of the existence of mental phenomena only in a certain kind of context. What von 
Wright says in the above quote has the wider consequence that the efficaciousness of a reason 
is tied to the idea of a consensus about the question of which reason explains the action in the 
best way. Suppose that we have competing reasons for why I did something. Since equating a 
reason with a cause is out of the question, the only alternative is to see the explanatory – and 
therefore efficacious – reason as being the one which fits best the overall context of action. 
The efficacious reason is the one in terms of which the whole situation makes the most sense. 
This being the case, understanding becomes a central concept because there is no truth about 
the reasons for actions outside the consensus, outside our understanding of what the reasons 
for  a  certain  action  were.  Von  Wright  concludes  that  in  the  end  the  truth  of  an  action  
explanation consists in agreement between the participants who evaluate which reasons are to 
be taken explanatory ones in relation to a given action that needs explaining.    
We cannot study the efficaciousness of a reason outside the context of action. This is 
something which also Davidson would accept. When we explain an action in terms of its 
reasons, we imply that those reasons were efficacious. The causal aspect of reasons is, so to 
speak, derivative from the understanding of actions and reasons at the mental level. Whereas 
we who want to defend the autonomy and irreducibility of the mental can easily agree to the 
view which emphasizes the connection between explanation and understanding, one could 
still ask the question about the status of retrospective reasons. If we understand an action in 
terms of them, should they immediately be counted as being efficacious? Does understanding 
an action in terms of retrospective reasons establish their status as efficacious reasons? Is it 
enough to make the retrospective reasons efficacious? 
The proposal which I want to make and which is not easily accepted is the following. 
We should reject the idea that retrospective reasons can be really explanatory and thus 
consider the possibility that actions in terms of these kinds of reasons are not actions at all. 
This may be a disturbing result. According to this proposal, behavior would count as action 
only if an agent is aware of his reasons before the action and proceeds to the action because 
of those reasons. This means, perhaps quite counterintuitively, that my getting up from bed in 
the morning would not count as an action of mine unless I had made a conscious decision to 
get up. This may sound intuitively implausible but I see no harm in calling actions only those 
occasions  of  behavior  which  result  from conscious  reasoning.  This  would  mean that  we  act  
only rarely but, as the neuroscientific and psychological evidence could be taken to suggest, 
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this may exactly be the case. Perhaps one reason why this view may seem to go so strongly 
against our intuitions concerning the frequency of our actions is the fact that many of our 
daily actions have become automatic.1505 The mind is often planning, anticipating, predicting 
or remembering. It re-evaluates the past scenarios or creates models of the future. Minds seem 
to have this possibility to wander and not stay in the present partly because we so easily 
manage to function without thoughts. When problems arise the conscious mind comes to 
rescue but otherwise we go on quite well without it in our daily tasks. Automatized action, as 
we could call it, is an interesting phenomenon because conceptually it belongs somewhere 
between genuine action and mere reactions. 
We may also call these automatic occurrences of behavior actions, but my claim is that 
they are not genuine actions and it would be better to describe them as reactions. However, 
this would be a misleading term as well because an automatized action is an event which had 
a reason of which the agent was aware when he learned how to act in certain circumstances. 
Consider for example the fact that I usually turn off the light in the living room when I leave 
the house. This has become a reflex-like operation. I claim that this behavior is not genuine 
action because there is no precursory reason of which I am aware before I act. Yet, if asked 
why I turned off the light I could easily give an answer: I want to save electricity. A child who 
is learning this fact, i.e. why the light should be turned off is, at least at some point, aware of 
why  he  turns  of  the  light  and  is  thus  acting.  It  does  not  take  long  for  the  child  to  become  
automatized in this task and then he ceases to act and starts to react. This is what we do most 
of the time; react. These reactions or automatized actions are very much like actions at the 
superficial level precisely because they have their reasons in the past. Since we are often 
aware of these reasons when we see another person reacting, we describe the reactions as 
actions. Given this well-entrenched, deep habit it is difficult to accept the view that genuine 
actions should follow only from precursory reasons. 
Most of the time we act automatically and it is worthwhile to ask whether many of our 
“actions”  would  be  better  understood  as  being  closer  to  complex  reflexes.  Since  we  are  
reluctant, and rightly so, to call actions those occurrences of behavior for which no reason can 
be given, we should consider whether the same skeptical attitude should be taken towards 
behavior which is explained by reference to retrospective reasons. The status of these reasons 
as efficacious reasons is obscure. By claiming that behavior counts as action only if it can be 
explained  in  terms  of  precursory  reasons,  I  am claiming  that  the  capability  to  act  is  closely  
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tied to one’s conscious awareness of oneself. In their respective ways both Davidson and von 
Wright acknowledge its importance when they insist that our capacity to have reasons is a 
result of our development in a social setting among language-users. I think we could say that 
our becoming conscious is the result of the same development. Both von Wright and 
Davidson connect the capability to have reasons to the capability to understand and, as was 
argued in chapter one, the connection between understanding and conscious awareness is an 
intimate albeit not a clear one.  At the same time it should be noted, as I showed in section 
2.5.1, that von Wright’s and Davidson’s views about the nature of the mental do not explicate 
the role of consciousness and they do not hesitate to describe mental phenomena in terms of 
dispositions, which are ultimately physical mechanisms. Interpretationism does not require 
attitudes to be definite entities. Although this may not straightforwardly lead to mental 
antirealism,  it  does  raise  questions  about  the  status  of  the  mental.  I  suggest  that  we  should  
explore further the view that it is not possible to act at all without the self-reflective capacity 
which having reasons for actions is. By stressing the importance of precursory reasons we are 
stressing the importance of the use of this capability in our talk of actions and their reasons. 
 
4.2.2.1 The consequences of taking precursory reasons seriously 
 
In the previous section it was claimed that an explanation referring to a precursory reason has 
priority  with  respect  to  an  explanation  which  refers  to  non-mental  causes.  What  kind  of  
consequences would this kind of view have? I have claimed that the new problem of mental 
causation is the question of how to tell whether a mental explanation is true. The suggestion is 
that such an explanation is true insofar as it refers to the precursory reasons which the agent 
sincerely takes to be the causes of his action. The importance of this suggestion is that it 
allows us to see ourselves more transparently. If you contemplate your reasons and arrive at 
conclusions accordingly, this is the highest degree of freedom that you can exercise as a 
human being. The suggested approach encourages people to observe themselves more 
thoroughly; the better one knows one’s precursory reasons and contemplates them, hence the 
greater the chance that one’s actions really are caused by his beliefs and desires. This is not a 
claim which could be proved or disproved empirically; it is a suggestion about how to think 
about the relation between reasons and actions. From the third-person perspective there is 
always  going  to  be  a  fatal  defect  in  this  model,  because  an  interpreter  must  rely  on  the  
sincerity of the subject’s reports. But insofar as the suggestion leads to increased self-
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monitoring and self-analysis, the importance of the epistemological approach for the acting 
individual can be notable.  
In trying to think about the possible consequences of taking retrospective reasons 
seriously, I have greatly benefited from the views of psychologist Timothy Wilson, who has 
claimed that although our behavior is largely manipulated by adaptive unconscious responses, 
we may train this mechanism so that it will better respond in the ways in which we would like 
act. Wilson suggests: “By being careful observers of our own actions, we can learn a lot about 
ourselves… if we want to change some aspect of our adaptive unconscious, a good place to 
start is deliberately to begin acting like the person we want to be.”1506 He also notes: “The 
difference between self-revelation and self-fabrication is crucial from the point of view of 
gaining self-knowledge.” 1507 I  believe  that  an  approach  focusing  on  the  role  of  precursory  
reasons could be a small step towards a model which could start solving these problems. This 
kind of suggestion may contain severe conceptual pitfalls, but it seems to me that the overall 
idea could nevertheless be worth exploring. We can suppose that our daily behavior is largely 
automatic and driven by unconscious processes; we have only rarely precursory reasons for 
our  actions.  But  we  also  have  an  image  of  the  kind  of  person  we would  like  to  be,  and  we 
have an ideal how we would like to act towards others. In most cases we merely act without 
contemplation. But if we focus to develop our capability for self-analysis, it may turn out to 
be the case that our capability for making well-contemplated decisions in the future will 
increase. Then we would not be at the mercy of our adaptive unconscious responses, or to the 
extent that it still guided our behavior, it would work more according to the way that we want 
to see ourselves – as individuals who make decisions and are responsible for their actions. 
 In  the  cases  when  we  explain  ourselves  retrospectively, the doubt concerning the 
efficaciousness of reasons exists in principle. The conviction that a thought has caused an 
action rests on a causal inference that is always open to question. It could be argued that this 
doubt exists also in the case of precursory reasons and therefore the distinction between two 
different types of reasons cannot help in deciding whether the latter reason was really my 
effective reason. I admit that also precursory reasons are threatened by the possibility of 
incorrect causal inference, but I nevertheless suggest that the process of contemplation (which 
is essential in the forming of precursory reasons) may convince the acting individual that, as a 
result of contemplation, he now really knows his reasons. Explanations in terms of reasons are 
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generally explanations which try to capture the agent’s point of view; it is this point of view 
which the agent can explicate by focusing on his precursory reasons. 
My suggestion that explanations in terms of precursory reasons should override other 
explanations could be accused of “subjectivism” and of overtrusting our ability for self-
observation. These are justified complaints, but I suggest that here we should also consider 
the question what kind of image of humans we want to hold. When the reasons for our actions 
are concerned, do we want to hand over the final verdict to outsiders? It could be done if we 
decide that non-mental explanations override explanations in terms of precursory reasons. 
Then only the opinions of outsiders would count, because we do not have access to the causes 
of our actions. Von Wright concluded that there is something tragic about the cases where the 
opinion of the outsider overrides the self-understanding of a person. I agree with this; we 
should thoroughly consider what kind of position we are willing to defend. 
 From psychological research we know many cases the conclusions of which have 
similar consequences for human autonomy as the pantyhose experiment. For example, studies 
suggest that referees tend to unconsciously show a bias towards athletes with red outfits.1508 If 
this is true, one conclusion would be that the referee favored a certain athlete, not because he 
thought he was the best competitor, but because the evaluator’s visual system was biased 
towards red objects. Likewise, it is shown that when people are in groups, an individual’s 
willingness to help a person in need decreases. When asked why help was not offered, people 
do not refer to the size of the group. Statistically this is true. But what is the relevance of these 
studies when we consider the behavior of an individual? An approach like Nisbett’s and 
Wilson’s focuses on the behavior of a person and replaces the asking for reasons with an 
attempt to come up with statistically supported generalizations which will reveal the causes 
behind the behavior. An approach like this sees reasons as causes and attempts to show that 
the real causes are something other than the reasons to which the individual refers. A 
consequence of this could be a new approach to human behavior; on this approach, the 
concept of reason disappears. 
Is  this  the  kind  of  approach  to  human  behavior  that  we  are  willing  to  defend?  The  
studies on “biased-referees” have already led to suggestions that red clothes should be 
removed from certain sports. A new specific view about the nature of reasons and causes may 
thus  have  concrete  effects  on  our  policies.  I  believe,  however,  that  here  something  is  going  
wrong. When we are asking a person for reasons, we are not interested in the unconscious 
                                               
1508 Hagemann, Strauß, Leißing, 2008. 
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physical processes which may be taking place. We are interested in the person’s thoughts, 
desires and emotions. When we try to find the reasons of a person we may be, and often are, 
interested to see the situation from the agent’s point of view. We want to see what it was in 
the action that was appealing to somebody. When we consider whether an action was 
reasonable we are considering the question of what is reasonable according to our 
understanding, but we are also considering the unique perspective of another human being. 
When,  in  the  midst  of  everyday  life,  we  are  asking  why somebody is  at  a  party  we are  not  
requiring him to advance a hypothesis or a theory about his inner processes. We may be 
interested in finding out the attitudes of others because we are interested to understand why he 
has acquired further beliefs; to know the beliefs of another person is to that extent to 
understand the person. In these cases we are not concerned with the discovery of causes but 
with the attempt to understand the person’s behavior as an action of a rational animal. This 
point is again and again emphasized by Davidson and von Wright, and it is curious how 
categorically it is ignored by those who want to equate reasons with causes. 
Those approaches, be it Nisbett’s and Wilson’s psychological approach, or Bickle’s 
new wave reductionism, which attempt to equate reasons with causes and replace ordinary 
explanations of ourselves with scientific explanations make the severe mistake of suspecting 
that a scientific explanation reflects a discovery about the true causes of our actions. Because 
mental explanations and non-mental explanations are different, the former cannot be replaced 
by the latter. Mental explanations from a third-person perspective are based on the 
interpretation  of  an  agent,  and  this  is  a  procedure  which  has  no  counterpart  in  the  sciences,  
which try to explain behavior without the use of mental terms. There cannot be scientific 
discoveries concerning our true reasons, and an approach which tries to replace reasons with 
causes should be seen, not as a scientific discovery, but as a proposal about how to think of 
human action. The experiments of Nisbett and Wilson show nothing about the reasons of the 
participants and it cannot turn out that explanations in terms of causes can show that reason-
based explanations are false or can be replaced, as for example the Churchlands or Bickle 
claim.  Whether  we  are  willing  to  accept  a  new way of  thinking  about  human behavior  is  a  
question the answer for which depends on what kind of value we want to put on the reasons 
that other human beings offer for their actions. The kind of value we will choose to put on 
these reasons will also show what our relationship to other people is and what our attitude 
towards another thinking being is. 
If we wish to know why a referee judged the red-suited athlete to be the winner, we 
are not looking for the answer that his visual system shows a bias towards red objects.  In a 
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society where the importance of science has been overemphasized at the cost of understanding 
causal concepts, a tendency to explain with only one type of cause (a tendency against which 
already Wittgenstein warned) has become a trend.  If this trend continues and escalates, we 
may arrive at a point where the causal hypotheses start to concretely compete with rational 
explanations. Then the choices we have to make are real, practical and very pressing. By 
suggesting that precursory reasons should have authority over causal ones, I try to point us in 
a direction where such conflict would not occur. Obviously, those who would be willing to 
misuse the causal hypotheses which are backed up by empirical evidence are not moved by 
the sincere reports of an agent. As von Wright pointed out: “It is characteristic that those who 
misuse their authority when they disqualify the testimonies of the agents often do this in the 
name of ‘higher’ truth, perhaps sanctioned by ‘science,’ which the recalcitrant agent is been 
forced to accept.”1509 It seems to me that if the causal explanations start to triumph over 
rational ones, this will be a time when scientific discoveries result in the destruction of human 
beings. It is a start of very unfortunate era. 
 
4.3 Conclusions of chapter four 
  
The discussion of this chapter is based on the conviction that non-reductive physicalism 
cannot offer a reductive solution to the problem of mental causation. This conviction has 
remained largely without argument, but I fail to see how a position which strongly 
emphasizes in-principle irreducibility could come up with or accept an explanation that 
explained the causal efficacy of the mental in neural, or more broadly in physical, terms. This 
being said, at least on Davidson’s non-reductive account causal efficacy is easily explained. In 
sections 4.1, 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, I described two alternatives by which Davidson might secure the 
causal powers of mental phenomena. On the one hand, mental events are identical with 
physical events and physical events have causal powers. On Davidson’s account, identity 
grants causal powers to mental events; physicalistic monism secures the causal efficacy of 
mental. On the other hand, mental events are events and events have causal powers. Both 
answers are unsatisfactory from the critics’ point of view. They would reply that both answers 
leave unexplained the question of how exactly mental phenomena cause – for example, how it 
is the case that the content of a belief can have causal efficacy. It seems to me that this 
question remains, and must remain, without an answer if a non-reductive position is accepted. 
                                               
1509 Von Wright, 1985, 27 
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 Von Wright remained outside the contemporary mental causation debate. I argued in 
section 4.2.1.1 that his most interesting contribution to the discussion was the consideration 
about the status of epiphenomenalism. Although von Wright’s final word was that “of course” 
reasons move agents to act and that mental explanations enjoy autonomy over neural ones, I 
believe that his discussions of epiphenomenalism may provide an interesting starting point for 
those who see a form of epiphenomenalism as a real possibility. I suggested that a non-
reductive position cannot avoid the possibility of conditional epiphenomenalism, and that this 
possibility is something which should be accepted as part of our situation.  A suggestion about 
how apparent mental causation could occur was given in section 4.2.1.2. 
 A first sketch towards a new way to see the problem of mental causation was offered 
in section 4.2.2. This “solution” of the new problem of mental causation starts from an 
epistemological of deflationary perspective, thereby rejecting the overtly ontological approach 
to the problem. By stressing the importance of precursory reasons the model takes into 
account the view that a satisfactory account of mental causation must grant a causal role to 
states of the brain. My claim is that Davidson’s and von Wright’s positions do not explain this 
role in a satisfying way because these positions do not require that an agent be aware of the 
reasons which explain his actions. This being said, by focusing on the ways in which mental 
explanations work, the approach that focuses on precursory reasons privileges mental facts 
over neural ones. Section 4.2.2.1 contained a brief discussion of the possible consequences of 
the view that precursory reasons are required for genuine actions. Two consequences should 
be  emphasized.  On the  one  hand,  by  consciously  focusing  on  the  reasons  one  has  for  one’s  
actions, one may influence one’s adaptive unconscious, thereby getting a better control over 
one’s automatized behavior. Although complete escape from self-determination is an idle 
dream, my claim is that the better one is aware of one’s reasons the more freedom one enjoys. 
On the other hand, an approach which emphasizes the epistemic practice of explaining an 
agent’s actions in terms of his precursory reasons is a suggestion about how we should see the 
nature of human being; as an autonomous being and not a machine, the behavior of which can 
be explained in purely physical terms. 
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Appendix: Against Material Mind 
 
According to ancient wisdom it is better to travel well than to arrive. Sometimes the process 
of reaching a conclusion may be more important and edifying than the conclusion itself. The 
writing process of this thesis led me to consider those broader problems of physicalism that 
should concern us in the future. After the thesis was completed I realized that the focus of this 
work should have been on different questions, but by then it was too late to change anything. 
In this appendix I very briefly turn my focus to the kind of problems which, or so I believe, 
should be brought into the discussion in the contemporary philosophy of mind.  
 My  original  motivation  for  writing  this  thesis  was  to  clarify  Davidson’s  and  von  
Wright’s positions, to understand their claims better, and to consider whether these claims are 
relevant in the context of modern naturalism and its physicalistic ontology. Whereas the 
writing process made Davidson’s and von Wright’s positions clearer, a conviction that these 
philosophers were not really addressing the deepest problems of physicalism started to 
emerge. My initial impression was that von Wright and Davidson could resist the challenge of 
naturalism because of their understanding of the nature and purpose of philosophy. In chapter 
one, I showed that their conception of philosophy is influenced by Wittgenstein’s view that 
philosophy is not one of the sciences. However, when we consider Davidson’s and von 
Wright’s arguments in the philosophy of mind, I think we have to conclude that in many cases 
they try to compete with empirical views and are not faithful to their conception of 
philosophy.  
 Wittgenstein once asked: what is the use of studying philosophy, if it does not 
improve your thinking about the questions of everyday life. He thought that it was very 
difficult to think really honestly about one’s own life and other people’s lives. These 
considerations are more difficult and more important than the considerations about abstruse 
philosophical questions. Wittgenstein concluded that the trouble was that thinking about the 
questions of everyday life was: “...not thrilling, but often downright nasty. And when it’s 
nasty, then it’s most important.”1510 I  think  it  is  these  nasty  questions  on  which  we  should  
increasingly focus as philosophers. In times, like ours, when the belief in scientific progress is 
well accepted in society and has mesmerized many philosophers as well, we should critically 
evaluate the view that only science will carry us into an earthly paradise. It may be 
intellectually amusing, perhaps even satisfying, to challenge other philosophers’ 
                                               
1510 As quoted by in Malcolm, 1984, 93-94. 
554 
 
interpretations or show that there are inconsistencies in the views of, for example, Davidson 
and von Wright. In a doctoral thesis it is necessary to show that new “scientific knowledge” 
has  been  produced.  All  the  “technical  work”  in  this  thesis,  such  as  the  analysis  of  how von 
Wright’s supervenience should be understood or what Davidson exactly means with his 
argument for the anomalism of the mental, is very entertaining. But are we, in focusing upon 
these technical questions, turning philosophy into the playground of professional philosophers 
where the discussion and argumentation goes around in circles? Are we turning philosophy 
into a self-sustaining enterprise with no practical import? Has philosophy become a 
specialized and compartmentalized discipline where there is no room for considerations of 
how to live a decent life or what kind of idea of human beings we want to hold? Contributing 
to the technical discussion that is carried on by professional philosophers and convincing 
them that one’s research is “vitally important” for the contemporary discussion is the best way 
to get funding for one’s research. But is this kind of philosophy important, i.e. does it matter? 
Should we, instead of letting the philosopher continue these inbred discussions, demand that 
(s)he should work also on unhealthy habits of thought, unchallenged assumptions, and values 
that are taken for granted? Should philosophers reach beyond their narrow discipline and 
address those problems which influence the majority of humans? I believe, without 
attempting to prove it in this work, that the answer to these questions is affirmative. This 
belief, which is the result of this work, casts serious doubt over the previous five hundred 
pages of description and analysis. 
 Instead of discussing the technical details of why physicalism is a problematic 
position, we should consider why it may be a nasty view – and thence focus on the possible 
consequences to which this ideology may lead. Yes, I describe physicalism as an ideology 
which reflects the deeper motivations of its practitioners. Trying to show the connection 
between a philosopher’s philosophical views and their views, for example, on politics is a 
formidable task, and one which I shall not attempt here. I claim, however, that the most 
serious threat of a material mind is that many of its prophets also have views about the 
direction in which society should be heading, and the material mind is an auxiliary which 
helps  them  to  reach  this  destination.  If we want to object to this destination, we have to 
fiercely object to the material mind.  
 In this appendix I am not trying so much to argue for a view as to raise thoughts and 
concerns. Perhaps it is a mere coincidence that a materialistic view of human nature is in 
many cases related to certain kinds of societal and political ideas. Without insisting that these 
views  are  related,  I  merely  give  a  few  examples  of  how  broader  questions  are  guiding  any  
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philosophy of mind which has turned naturalistic. The purpose of these examples is to 
challenge the reader to consider whether a physicalistic philosophy of mind could be 
unhealthy in some ways, and whether the ideology behind it should be challenged. Certain 
forms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind go together with the dehumanizing trend of 
modern  society.  The  desire  for  mental-physical  reductions  can  be  seen  as  an  expression  of  
how vocabularies should develop. Reductions pave the way for conceptual changes. These 
changes will eventually lead to more substantial changes. When forms of speech become part 
of the ordinary way of talking, they shape our world. When another human is a brain instead 
of a person to us, the consequences go far beyond technical philosophical disputes. A 
scientific conception of human beings that is based on the results of brain research may create 
concrete problems that decrease the sphere of human freedom and autonomy. I believe that 
the most serious challenge for physicalism is thus a kind of ethical concern, relating to how a 
physicalistic ideology shapes our ways of thinking and thereby human life. 
 Neurophilosophy is an updated version of naturalism, one which challenges also 
conceptual analysis (philosophy as it is traditionally understood). Conceptual analysis has 
“stumbled to its knees”, as Patricia Churchland so vividly claims.1511 Her  view  is  that  
productive philosophers of mind/brain are steeped in the relevant empirical sciences. I would 
claim that since Western society has a very positive attitude towards science and progress, it 
is not surprising that non-empirical philosophers of mind are currently a minority. In the 
prevailing atmosphere of optimism it is unfortunately often forgotten that, when the term is 
used in a value-free manner, progress may lead to disaster. Scientific philosophers, sometimes 
showing open contempt for traditionally oriented philosophers, claim that the results of their 
research have only positive consequences and that an agenda which reveals objective facts 
cannot be harmful. “Truth” must be allowed to take its course. It is easy to see, however, that 
neurophilosophy is a project with potentially serious threats, and it could be argued that the 
seeds  of  these  threats  are  already  visible.   Science  may  turn  out  to  be  a  threat,  not  only  to  
philosophy but more generally to human life. In his recent book Neurophilosophy at Work 
Paul Churchland suggests that cognitive neurobiology and computational neuroscience can 
solve many of the perplexities which have troubled philosophers. Churchland suggests, for 
example, that cognitive neurobiology could have an impact on moral issues, which have been 
the concern of philosophers, and that it could serve as a tool in moral correction:  
 
                                               
1511 Churchland, 2008. 
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There remain... the genuine abnormals, for whom moral correction is first a matter of trying to repair 
or compensate for some structural or physiological defect(s) in brain function. Even if these people are 
hopeless, it will serve a social policy to identify them reliably, if only to keep them permanently 
incarcerated or otherwise out of the social mainstream... Where the deficit is biochemical in nature - 
giving rise to chronically inappropriate emotional profiles, for example - neuropharmacological 
intervention, in the now familiar form of chronic subdural implants, perhaps, will return some victims 
to something like a normal neural economy and a normal emotional profile... these individuals will 
then also be candidates for the resocialization techniques imagined earlier for disadvantaged 
normals.1512  
 
I hope that the reader shares my uneasiness with this view. Why is the view dangerous? When 
a neurophilosopher refers to a future brain science and in the same context refers to hopeless 
people who have chronically inappropriate emotional profiles who should be taken care of 
with neuropharmacological intervention, he is putting forward an agenda. As part of this 
agenda, Churchland has speculated how future generations may see the world in such a 
different way that they: 
 
[...] sit on the beach and listen to the aperiodic atmospheric compression waves produced as the 
coherent energy of the ocean waves is audibly redistributed in the chaotic turbulence of the shallows. 
They do not observe the western sky redden as the Sun sets. They observe the wavelength distribution 
of incoming solar radiation shift towards the longer wavelengths (about 0.7 x 10-6 m)....1513                
            
These generations will communicate with “Übersetzen” or through direct brain-to-brain links. 
Churchland suggests that when science reveals truth about reality, children can be trained 
accordingly so that they will enjoy the pleasure of seeing reality in a true perspective. The 
claim that a specific group of people knows what is good for others is familiar from the 
course of history. Should we worry that the brave new world of neurophilosophy, where 
inappropriate emotional profiles are fixed, may turn out to be a disquieting place? Once the 
view that neuroscience describes the one true human nature is accepted, it becomes easy to 
think of each other as mere brains instead of equal persons who deep down share a system of 
beliefs and values. When neuroscience makes the demarcation between normal and genuinely 
abnormal, how many hopeless people will we find? 
Churchland believes that the development of neuroscience will: “[...] reconfigure our 
legal practices, our correctional practices, our educational practices, and perhaps even our 
recreational and romantic practices.”1514 But it is not obvious that a technologically more 
powerful theory of human nature is necessarily an improvement. Whereas Churchland admits 
that the benefits of neurophilosophy are not certain, he does not consider the possibility that 
                                               
1512 Churchland, 1998e, 52. 
1513 Churchland, 1979, 29.  
1514 Churchland, 2000, 74. 
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the program of neurophilosophy could worsen our situation. We can control the outcomes of 
science because, according to Churchland, individual people of our age are at least “little 
superior” both in scientific and moral knowledge when compared to the people of the 
previous centuries.1515 We Westerns know that earth is not flat and we do not burn people as 
witches.  Our  conception  of  what  is  socially  acceptable  has  changed  for the better. The 
possibilities of what we can become have increased enormously. A person can be a real estate 
agent, a securities investigator or a congressional lobbyist. Churchland thinks that these 
activities are new contributions to the well-being of humankind and the increase of scientific 
and moral knowledge has made this progress possible. The existence of corporations, stock 
markets, and banks are signs of progress suggesting increases in the quality of life. Thanks to 
science, now hand-held GPS devices and credit cards are possible.  
This is what Churchland counts as progress, progress for the better. If uncontrolled 
growth is progress, then – I guess – humankind is making progress. In the current system of 
global capitalism, the desire to “improve” things is always present. In this kind of competitive 
environment different providers, be they philosophers or salesmen, see their product as the 
product which makes life better. It is telling that in Churchland’s view: “[…] we’re coming to 
an age where cognitive prosthetics, whether they’re, you know, just sticking some extra RAM 
into your head somewhere, or more realistically, interacting with a machine. We can enhance 
human cognition….”1516 It is indicative of the current ideology that cognitive prosthetics are 
seen as an enhancement of human cognition. Would extra RAM in our heads improve our 
lives? Perhaps it would allow us to perform ordinary tasks more effectively than we currently 
do. But whose interests would this serve? Is it an objective worth pursuing? It is in the 
modern capitalistic system, where the value of a human being is measured by how well (s)he 
“performs” or achieves the goals set by the society.  
 Philosophers do not work in an intellectual vacuum outside society. A philosopher’s 
world view’s relation to his philosophy is a complex issue, but I think a question worth 
considering is whether there is a connection between Churchland’s philosophy of mind, his 
conviction that scientific progress should continue, and his view that America is a great 
                                               
1515 Patricia Churchland (2008) notes: “Moral attitudes can change when the benefits of a technology are clear 
and demonstrable.” This is true, but the change is not necessarily for the better. Of course, from the viewpoint of 
an American scientist / philosopher certain customs, beliefs, habits, values or moral characters may look such 
that they are in need of revision. But this person lives in a society where certain values, beliefs, and moral 
characteristics are taken to be exemplary, and where the belief in scientific and technological progress and 
solutions is high.   
1516 From the transcript of an interview, retrieved from http://thesciencenetwork.org/programs/the-science-
studio/from-the-engine-of-reason-to-the-seat-of-the-soul-a-brain-wise-conversation 
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nation.1517 As a curiosity we can note that Patricia Churchland has written a chapter for 
Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on 
Bioethics.1518 The council advises the US president on ethical issues which are related to 
advances in biomedical science and technology. Churchland’s advice for the council is: “[…] 
far from being undermined by neuroscience’s insights into human behavior and its causes, 
moral responsibility is actually put on a firmer and more realistic basis, the more we 
understand about the neurological substratum of our moral life.”1519 In his book The Ethical 
Brain Michael Gazzaniga, one of the pioneers in cognitive neuroscience, sees neuroethics as: 
“[…] an effort to come up with a brain-based philosophy of life.”1520 He thinks that modern 
science should ultimately replace “non-rational belief systems” and describe a “natural order” 
in which we all can believe. Gazzaniga hopes that neuroscience will reveal the ethics built 
into the human brain so that we may begin to live more fully by them.  
 Is it a coincidence that Gazzaniga is also part of the US President’s Council on 
Bioethics? He is not worried about the negative consequences of scientific progress because: 
“[…] society as a whole seems always to return to the reasonable use of new knowledge.”1521 
When considering whether cloning-technology could lead to drastic negative results 
Gazzaniga concludes that it could not: “[…]  because  we  are  a  moral  society  that  will  not  
allow such extremes. While they have occurred throughout history, we have gotten rid of 
them—whether they be extreme dictators, extreme fashions, or extreme drugs.”1522 If we 
consider the history of the 20th century this view sounds absurd and almost like an insult 
against those who suffer in the world today. Gazzaniga’s view cannot be based on anything 
but faith that moral progress goes together with technological progress. Of this we have not 
one shred of evidence. Gazzaniga’s view about scientific progress is not based on science but 
on his interpretation of human history and on the morality of American people.1523  
 Is it a co-incidence that Bickle – who demands ruthless reductionism, does not give a 
hoot about the philosopher’s intuitions and does not bother to read Kripke – is “a self-
described political conservative” who opposes the “poverty and silly demands most Ph.D. 
graduate programs impose on students” and argues that the solution is to point “some 
conservative undergraduate students to Ph.D. programs and exposing them to the joys of 
                                               
1517 The same question should of course be asked in the case of other philosophers; I use the Churchlands here 
only as an example. 
1518 Schulman (ed.), 2008. 
1519 Churchland, 2008a, 117. 
1520 Gazzaniga, 2005, 11. 
1521 Gazzaniga, 2005, 54. 
1522 Gazzaniga, 2005, xvii. 
 1523 For further analysis see, Rasmusson, 2009. 
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academic life”?1524 It is surprising that a conservative neurophilosopher defends reductionism 
instead of methodological pluralism? Is it a coincidence that William Casebeer a philosopher, 
cognitive scientist and an intelligence officer in the United States Air Force ,who is one of the 
writers of the report “Neuroethics and National Security”, has published with Patricia 
Churchland and received “the campus-wide outstanding thesis award” for his dissertation 
completed at University of California at San Diego, where both Paul and Patricia Churchland 
are professors?1525 
 In sum, is it a coincidence that there seem to be many relations between 
neurophilosophy and certain kind of politics, the worst example being academic involvement 
in military research?1526 Why is it that a neurophilosopher is sitting in the president’s council 
instead of non-reductive physicalist, panpsychist, emergentist, or epiphenomenalist? There are 
of course clear reasons why a neurophilosopher is heard over epiphenomenalist when it comes 
to political and societal questions, but this also shows that in modern society there is a need 
for a certain kind of philosophy of mind. I am not claiming, obviously, that every philosopher 
of mind with a reductionist view is a political conservative. I am not seeing a conspiracy of 
conservatives who try to infiltrate the philosophy of mind. I am merely giving a few examples 
of how positions in the philosophy of mind go, if not hand in hand with politics, at least quite 
well together with specific ideologies. Gazzaniga thinks that America is a moral society and 
Paul Churchland notes: “Thanks first to our founding constitution, America has been free of 
the sorts of spiritual and intellectual oppressions often found elsewhere.”1527 The spiritual-
cum-political tyranny displayed in “fundamentalist Muslim countries such as Afghanistan and 
Iran” is unthinkable in America, claims Churchland.1528 He also thinks that America is one of 
the best examples of religious diversity in human history and believes that is one of the 
reasons why America is a great nation.1529 Without taking a stance on these opinions, I believe 
we can justifiably ask how they influence the philosophical positions of their holders. Perhaps 
Churchland believes that a terrible misuse of neuroscience is unthinkable in the United States. 
But given the moral example that America has shown, this belief is certainly an illusion.  
It is not obvious that scientific progress is something that will benefit mankind. The 
agenda of neurophilosophy is, however, based on the conviction that an increase of scientific 
                                               
1524 Bickle’s brief views about conservatism are from: http://www.danielpipes.org/comments/21631. 
1525 See Casebeer et al., 2007 and Casebeer and Churchland, 2003. 
1526 For a discussion of the relations between brain research, academics ,and the military see Moreno, 2006. 
1527 Churchland, 2001, 76. 
1528 Ibid. 
1529 In an interview, retrieved from http://thesciencenetwork.org/programs/the-science-studio/from-the-engine-of-
reason-to-the-seat-of-the-soul-a-brain-wise-conversation 
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knowledge is good in itself. Paul Churchland writes that because sciences which study the 
brain are: “[…] pregnant with promise and their effects on social practice are already being 
felt”1530 it is therefore “[…] now hardly the time to become faint of heart or feeble of 
vision.”1531 This is the talk of a demagogue; we must move forward and there is no time to 
hesitate. Paul and Patricia Churchland raise their criticisms especially against religions, the 
hinderers of progress, which try to impose their moral truth on everybody by insisting that:  
“[...] I have to dress in a certain way, or I have to have my feet bound or I have to wear a bag 
over my head or I have to have such and so many babies or I can’t have any babies or blah 
and blah and blah....”1532 I find this pejorative talk especially disturbing since it is coming 
from esteemed academics. I find it worrying that neurophilosophers who downgrade the 
beliefs of people living, for example, in ”fundamentalist Muslim countries” are eager to talk 
about genuinely abnormal people who should be fixed with resocialization techniques or 
neuropharmacological interventions. The Churchlands object to the idea that metaphysics 
could give a special insight into moral truths. But scientific and political enterprises are not 
really that different from religious fanaticism. The science of today tells how people should 
live and imposes its metaphysics into the moral sphere.  If neuroscientists and 
neurophilosophers are sitting in the President’s Council on Bioethics of the world’s only 
superpower, it is reasonable to think that their metaphysical beliefs partly dictate policies 
which have effects on other people’s lives 
 I believe that Patricia Churchland’s observation applies also to the enthusiasm of 
neurophilosophers: “Even thoughtful, experienced, balanced people may be ignorant of 
certain facts or may themselves be blinded by certain hopes and passions.”1533 The best way 
to keep the neuroscientific enthusiasm alive is to emphasize its benefits and ignore its 
negative aspects. This strategy has been used many times before, when it has been important 
to  sell  a  new scientific  development  or  ideology to  a  wider  audience.  It  is  commonplace  in  
science. Research in physics was not advertised by emphasizing the fact that it perhaps 
allowed the development of weapons which are now a threat to our existence. Gene research 
is not marketed saying that it may accidentally create new diseases.1534 I haven’t seen 
neurophilosophers discussing the possible abuse of their brain-centered conception of man. 
                                               
1530 Churchland, 2000, 74. 
1531 Ibid. 
 1532From the transcript of an interview, retrieved from http://thesciencenetwork.org/programs/the-sciencestudio/ 
from-the-engine-of-reason-to-the-seat-of-the-soul-a-brain-wise-conversation 
1533 Churchland, 2008.  
1534 Such cases have already occurred, and in retrospect it is now known that the scientists responsible were 
hesitating on whether the results should be published or not. In any case the damage was already done. 
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The possible serious consequences for our self-conception and for human freedom will never 
be the consequences in terms of which brain research will be sold to the public. 
I believe that if we want to consider why a reductionist view about the mind is really 
a threat and why a material mind should be objected to, we have to consider the harmful 
consequences of reductionism, the ideology on which it is based and the motivation which 
drives its proponents. Likewise, if we want to understand why Davidson and von Wright 
defend a non-reductionist and in some sense unscientific position in the philosophy of mind, 
we must understand their motivation for defending this kind of view. My claim is that the 
motivation has nothing to do with the technical philosophical arguments involved, but is 
closely related to von Wright’s and Davidson’s views about the nature of a humane society 
and  about  the  idea  of  human  beings  that  they  are  willing  to  defend.  This  motivation  is  not  
very different from Wittgenstein’s skeptical attitude towards scientism and the dehumanizing 
trend  of  modern  society.  I  will  point  out  only  the  sources of motivation of these three 
philosophers, suggesting that this is a topic for further future consideration and research. 
Wittgenstein’s non-philosophical background strongly influenced his philosophical 
views. The relation between Wittgenstein’s Spenglerian view about culture and his 
philosophical views is much discussed. Wittgenstein’s influence on von Wright is also well 
recognized. The relation between von Wright’s philosophy of mind and his Wittgensteinian 
pessimism has not, however, been studied well enough. Wittgenstein himself feared that the 
more we know scientifically about human psychology, the less secure could our 
understanding of others and ourselves be. In 1945 Wittgenstein wrote to Malcolm: “Only 
extraordinary scientific achievements have a way, these days of being used for the destruction 
of human beings. (I mean their bodies, or their souls, or their intelligence). So hold on to your 
brains.”1535  This was a result of Wittgenstein’s more general worry that possibly:  
 
…the  age  of  science  and  technology  is  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  humanity;  that  the  idea  of  great  
progress is a delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that there is nothing 
good or desirable about scientific knowledge and that mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is 
by no means obvious that this is not how things are.1536 
 
This pessimism about the idea of scientific progress was likely fuelled by Wittgenstein’s 
experiences during the first decades of the 20th century. He was not optimistic about the 
prospects of science: “Nothing is more conservative than science. Science lays down railway 
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tracks. And for scientists it is important that their work should move along those tracks.”1537 It 
is characteristic of science that it elbows out other intellectual methods, ignoring the purposes 
of these methods. Wittgenstein’s words sound prophetic once we consider how scientific 
philosophy has become a dethroner of traditional philosophy.  
 How should we understand the claim that extraordinary scientific achievements could 
be used to destroy the soul of the human being and that we should therefore hold on to our 
brains? I think two readings can be given. First, the suggestion that we should hold on to our 
brains could be taken to be merely a plea for healthy skepticism against the hegemony of 
science. Wittgenstein thought that philosophers are often tempted to imitate the methods of 
science and this desire has foul consequences. So, perhaps Wittgenstein was merely 
suggesting that thoughts should be kept honest and critical. He made the comment when 
discussing psychoanalysis; although Wittgenstein admired Freud, he also claimed that false 
conclusions could be drawn if psychoanalysis was understood as a science which describes 
how things really are. The hypotheses of psychoanalysis should not be seen as scientific 
claims but rather as concepts offering a new perspective on human nature. In section 4.2.2.1, I 
made a similar remark about the “causal view” that equates reasons which causes and, like in 
Nisbett’s and Wilson’s experiment, tries to replace incorrect rational explanations with 
explanations referring to causes. The causal explanations are based on statistically supported 
generalizations. The suggestion that these causes should replace an agent’s reasons is  not  a  
scientific discovery; it is rather a proposal about how to think of the nature of human beings. 
I think a more interesting reading of the “hold on to your brains” claim is that 
Wittgenstein wanted to warn against neuroscientific infiltration of the brain; this warning is 
more relevant now than it was in Wittgenstein’s times. What is the reason for this warning? 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts on this question are hard to follow. I think one important suggestion 
is that a science which focuses on the brain and perhaps attempts to replace ordinary mental 
concepts would impoverish our ways of reacting to each other. Wittgenstein wrote: 
“Psychological concepts are related to those of the exact sciences as the concepts of science 
and medicine are to those of old women who spend their time nursing the sick.”1538  The 
concepts of old women are important because they serve different purposes than the concepts 
of science and medicine; when we encounter a sick person we should not care just about the 
disease but should also pay attention to the human being who has the disease. Sometimes 
doctors confront a disease without treating the patient; in the age of medicalization people are 
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offered simple solutions in terms of drugs. Perhaps doctors who cure but do not care do not 
have time or skills to use the concepts of old women. Medicine without comfort, which 
focuses on prevention or cure, is the medicine of our times. Wittgenstein thought that we 
should address other human beings in a different manner. He wrote to his friend Drury, who 
was practicing medicine: “Look at your patients more closely as human beings in trouble and 
enjoy more the opportunity you have to say ‘good night’ to so many people. This alone is a 
gift from heaven which many people would envy you. And this sort of thing ought to heal 
your frayed soul.”1539 If a human being is for us merely an object for scientific study and if we 
do not study the faces of our fellow men closely enough we, according to Wittgenstein, do not 
live in the world in which we are. If we would look closely enough into the faces of others we 
would no longer think that they may turn out to be beings without beliefs and desires, and we 
would no longer pursuit our reductive agendas; we would accept that certain facts are visible 
– like our lives – and would no longer crave explanations.  
If psychological concepts relate to the concepts of the exact sciences in the same way 
that the concepts of old women do to the concepts of medicine, then it could be argued that 
psychological concepts serve essentially different purposes than the concepts of the exact 
sciences. It is these concepts that are essential in keeping the: “[…] faith …what my heart, my 
soul needs….”; it is psychological concepts that are for the “[...] soul, with its passions.”1540 
This sounds eloquent. But an aspect of our being escapes rationalization and eludes scientific 
exploration. In the current culture it is too easy, too convenient, to take a certain picture of 
what  it  is  to  be  human  for  granted;  according  to  this  picture  we  are  just  very  complicated  
machines. But the way we understand our own passions, faith or other psychological 
phenomena, cannot be corrected by claims which refer to neural facts. Is it naïve to hold on to 
this mystical dimension? Wittgenstein wrote: “In former times people went into monasteries. 
Were they stupid or insensitive people? - Well, if people like that found they needed to take 
such measures in order to be able to go on living, the problem cannot be an easy one!”1541 To 
dismiss those aspects of human life which elude scientific solutions is a form of 
dehumanization; these aspects are essential part of human life and the psychological concepts 
which are needed for describing them stand in the middle of our life. “The human being is the 
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best picture of the human soul”, as Wittgenstein suggested.1542 What happens to the human 
soul if we turn our gaze inwards towards the brain?  
Material mind banishes the human soul. What kind of being is a soulless being? 
Wittgenstein thought that if we imagine a person without a soul, then we really have to 
imagine a body which acts like an automaton and not like normal human bodies, the essential 
feature of which is their unpredictability. The more we stress the importance of unconscious 
mechanisms in the explanations of actions, the more we see each others as machines and the 
less emphasis we put on the view that human beings are beings with souls – that is, beings 
that should be treated in a certain way. In Zettel Wittgenstein imagines a tribe that we would 
like to enslave. The justification for this would have been that: “The government and 
scientists give it out that the people of this tribe have no souls; so they can be used for any 
arbitrary purpose.”1543 If anyone would claim that there is something mental going on inside 
these beings this would be laughed at “like stupid superstition.”1544 It  seems  to  me  that  
something like this is our current inhumane attitude towards non-human animals; they are 
beings without souls. Perhaps in the future an attitude somewhat similar to this will be our 
attitude also towards other humans. Eliminative materialists ridicule the idea that we act on 
our beliefs and desires. They claim that our basic conception of human cognition may be a 
myth – stupid superstition –  which has been moderately useful in the past, but which is false 
at the core. Neuroscientific evidence is ready to bring down this myth. It may also allow us to 
detect the people who are hopeless, beyond neuroscientific repair, and who should therefore 
be identified and kept permanently incarcerated. Are these people modern versions of 
Wittgenstein’s slaves? 
One further dehumanizing consequence of brain research which worried Wittgenstein 
was that we would come to explain human action solely in terms of causes.  A culture which 
emphasizes the usefulness of scientific knowledge is in danger of becoming a culture where 
there is  a tendency to explain with only one kind of cause – that which is familiar from the 
natural sciences. It seems to me that Wittgenstein goes against this tendency when he writes: 
“No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated 
with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes 
from brain-processes.”1545 He continues: “It is thus perfectly possible that certain 
psychological phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically, because physiologically 
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nothing corresponds to them.”1546 This resembles the claim that token-identity is confusion; 
nothing physiological corresponds to psychological phenomena. Davidson, for example, 
thought that: “[…] human thoughts, correspond to so little of the material world that no self-
contained science can be based exclusively on them.”1547 Wittgenstein’s claim that there may 
be a “[…] psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds”1548 
could be likened in spirit to Davidson’s claim against the possibility of psycho-physical laws. 
But Wittgenstein’s claim is more daring because he is suggesting that there does not need to 
be a physical cause mediating in the nervous system between psychological phenomena. As I 
have shown, von Wright tentatively accepted this view.  
Wittgenstein though that: “Nothing is more important in explanations of thought and 
brain processes than throwing away all the prejudices about causality. This seems to me by far 
the most important step.”1549 I believe we can conclude that, with some reservations, 
something similar could have been said also by von Wright and Davidson. Von Wright’s 
references to epiphenomenalism and his claim that consciousness stays outside the chain of 
causally related events suggest that in his view there is an essential difference between the 
causal relations in nature and the ‘causal’ relations involving mental phenomena. Davidson, 
on the other hand, suggested: “The fact that these relations [between the mental and the 
physical] are so deeply puzzling suggests some sort of misfit between the concept of causality 
and the concept of a thought.”1550 The claim that there is a misfit between the concept of 
causality and thought is not as radical as the claim that all prejudices about causality must be 
rejected when thinking about thoughts and brain processes. We are tempted to insist that 
mental causation must have a physiological explanation. But, as Wittgenstein asks: “Why 
don’t we just leave explaining alone? – But you would never talk like that, if you were 
examining the behaviour of a machine! – Well, who says that a living creature, an animal 
body, is a machine in this sense?-“1551 
 My claim is that Davidson, like Wittgenstein, is worried about the possible 
dehumanizing consequences of reductive views. This worry is what ultimately motivates his 
non-reductive position. One of the most important and interesting interpretations of Davidson 
that I have come across is Bill Martin’s view that AM is not only a view in the philosophy of 
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mind but also an “ethical-political principle”.1552 I believe this is an accurate way to see AM 
in a wider setting.1553 It explains why in Davidson’s view the irreducibility of the mental is 
principled in the sense that  we  cannot  really  allow the  reduction  or  elimination  of  mental  
concepts. In chapter three, I discussed how Davidson claims that a nomological slack between 
the mental and the physical is essential as long as we  want  to  hold  a  certain  view  about  
ourselves. By describing our behavior in terms of mental concepts, we remove it from the 
direct reach of any physical law. Davidson is not denying that increased knowledge about the 
brain  would  not  better  explain  why  we  think,  reason  and  act  as  we  do.  He  did  research  in  
experimental psychology before coming to accept the view that psychology should be likened 
to philosophy. He was thus aware of psychological research and suggested that brain research 
can make relevant contributions to the problems of mind. There are thus reasons to think that 
the principled rationale for defending the irreducibility of the mental is something else than 
the belief that mental phenomena are mysterious and beyond the reach of science. The reason 
to defend the irreducibility is deeper than most commentators are willing to see. 
 I think we should conclude that there may be forms of reductionism which can be 
compatible with Davidson’s views about the irreducibility of the mental. In a sense, the 
irreducibility is more relaxed than most critics have thought. As I concluded in section 3.1, 
the thesis of the anomalism of the mental suggests only that mental–physical laws cannot be 
as strict as the strictest laws of physics. But Davidson acknowledges that there are pragmatic 
reasons why the status of our mental vocabulary should be secured. He notes that the 
common-sense perspective of folk-psychology is a “bit freestyle”, but indispensable.1554 I 
think that this view can be likened to Wittgenstein’s suggestion that psychological concepts 
resemble  the  concepts  of  old  women who take  care  of  the  sick.  Davidson  notes:  “We have  
such a keen interest in the reasons for action and other psychological phenomena that we are 
willing to settle for explanations that cannot be made to fit perfectly with the laws of 
physics.”1555 Davidson admits that he can imagine a science concerned with a human 
behavior, one that would be purged of mental concepts, but notes that he cannot see what its 
interest  would  be;  what  would  this  science  tell  us  about  human action? This is Davidson’s 
pressing question.  
 The  pragmatic  considerations  do  not  yet  explain  why  AM  should  be  seen  as  an  
ethical-political principle. It becomes clear only when we consider Davidson’s claim that the 
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limit we place on the social sciences is set by us when we decide to view humans as rational 
agents with goals and purposes that are subject to moral evaluation. This decision has 
enormous importance. According to Martin we need a view like AM because without an 
anomaly there is no human being; the human being is itself an anomaly.1556 Is it essential for 
our self-conception, for our psychological well-being, that  we see ourselves as anomalies of 
nature? I find this line of reasoning very tempting. It seems to me that Wittgenstein, Davidson 
and von Wright stress this idea in their different ways. Wittgenstein wrote that: ”[…] 
unforeseeability must be an essential property of the mental.”1557  Davidson concluded: 
“When we are making up our minds what to do or what to think we cannot at the same time 
conceive  of  our  reasoning  as  bound by  the  strict  laws  of  physics.”1558  Finally, von Wright 
suggested: “The conceptual basis of action, one could say, is partly our ignorance 
(unawareness) of the operation of causes….”1559 This is part of the fascination of being 
human;  we  err  and  are  not  transparent  to  ourselves;  we  are  surprised  to  find  that  we  act  
against our better judgment or that others do not act as we have predicted. Perhaps in the 
future a physicalistic conception of a human being could factor out the anomalies and 
inadequacies of human life. In this process it would factor out also the human being. Should 
we be daring enough to allow the dramatic re-shaping of our-self conception? Von Wright 
thought that the future life of “humans” who would merely behave would appear 
incomprehensible to us, but if this is our fate we should not be fearful of it – because the fears 
that are real now could not be expressed any longer, in fact they would simply not exist, in the 
reshaped form of life. To me this sounds like a suggestion that if future generations are born 
in prison, it does not worry them because they do not know and cannot dream of a different 
reality.  When faced  with  the  enthusiasm of  technology and  its  promise  that  all  problems of  
human life will be solved, we can decide now how much we value our current self-conception 
and whether we want to preserve it. 
 Incidentally, Martin started to appreciate AM’s political dimension when he heard 
Patricia Churchland suggesting that certain people should be “fixed”. This was ten years ago. 
Neurophilosophers who are now “at work” suggest that in the future RAM-chips should be 
installed in peoples’ heads and that a brain-based philosophy of life should be adopted. Martin 
sees Davidson’s position as an alternative to these kinds of approaches; it is an alternative 
way to think about the mental lives of humans. He is not the only one to make this 
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interpretation. Ramberg has claimed that: “Scientism… renders us subject to certain forms of 
oppression”1560 and concludes that Davidson’s views can be seen to provide tools “[...] in a 
struggle against the steady spread of the dehumanizing, homogenizing management of human 
existence that is the real threat of scientism.”1561 These tools may help us to challenge the idea 
of humans which seems reasonable now when it is so blindly believed that a scientific 
discovery is always an improvement.  
 Great scientific improvements can be used also as tools for great oppression; the 
techniques which would allow causal explanations to reign over mental explanations could be 
used to challenge the autonomy of the individual. On the hand one, causal explanations could 
be used to disqualify the verdict of the acting agent about his efficacious reasons. On the other 
hand, these explanations could be used to justify behavior which we would otherwise judge as 
unacceptable. These are the worst-case scenarios. If we decide that, as suggested in section 
4.2.2,  people  are  less  eager  to  help  others  when  they  are  a  part  of  a  group  or  that  referees  
unconsciously favor athletes dressed in red, shouldn’t these findings have consequences for 
the ways we morally evaluate the people in question? If a referee treats an athlete unfairly, 
can we blame him if his visual system is biased and his adaptive unconscious makes the 
“decisions”? If in these cases we decide to withdraw our moral evaluations, this is also a 
statement which downgrades the autonomy of the individual, because we are expressing an 
attitude that a human being is completely at the mercy of forces which are unknown to him. 
 Wittgenstein  was  a  lone  wolf.  Davidson,  despite  the  originality  of  AM,  stayed  quite  
faithfully inside the tradition of analytic philosophy. Von Wright’s position differs from those 
of Davidson and Wittgenstein because he was very concerned of societal problems, 
participated in public discussions and attempted to reach a wider audience through his non-
philosophical writings.1562 As a philosopher von Wright had a side which was lacking in 
Davidson and Wittgenstein, and it is this side which best explains von Wright’s motivation 
for adopting a non-reductive position.1563 My claim is that von Wright’s philosophy of mind 
can be correctly understood only against the skeptical attitude that he had towards his times. 
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Von Wright’s  broader  concerns  were  at  the  forefront  of  his  work  during  the  1980s,  but  the  
implications of scientific progress worried him until the end. He was troubled by the 
”apocalyptic mood” which cast its shadow over the end of the 20th century, and even noted 
that  his  pessimism had  given  rise  to  a  kind  of  depression.  I  think  that  von  Wright’s  remark  
about Wittgenstein applies also to his own position:  
 
Wittgenstein… thought… that the problems with which he was struggling were somehow connected 
with the ‘way people live’… with features of our culture and civilization to which he and his pupils 
belonged. His attitude to this culture was… one of censure and even disgust. He therefore wished these 
ways of life changed, but he had no faith that he or his teaching would change them.1564 
 
Von Wright was perhaps too much of a humanist to describe his own view towards society in 
terms of “disgust”. But, so it seems to me, he was deeply disappointed, or perhaps saddened is 
the right word, to see where scientific rationality had brought humankind.  Humans should be 
able to reason about what is best for them. The current situation, however, shows that we have 
not  been  able  to  use  our  wisdom wisely.  Many of  the  most  severe  problems of  today  are  a  
result of the arrogant belief that humans can control all the outcomes of rationality.  
 Von Wright certainly thought that there were many things wrong with our current way 
of life. It is interesting how different conclusions can be drawn from the triumph of science. I 
have briefly described how Paul Churchland welcomes technological innovations because 
they contribute to the well being of mankind, and how he wants to come up with a 
technologically more powerful theory of human nature which enables people to stick RAM-
chips into their brains and enhance their cognition. Von Wright does not share this vision. 
Whereas Churchland is eager to point out the alleged benefits of many technological luxuries, 
von Wright did not hesitate to stress the problems that technology has brought along with it. 
Private motoring and mass-tourism he described as “plagues”, noting that he did not want to 
“sugarcoat” things by using euphemisms as many are willing to do in our fraudulent 
world.1565 Von Wright’s conviction was that if the current state of the world and the reasons 
for it were properly considered, a suggestion that the standards of living or material well-
being should be increased would sound so hollow and absurd that anyone with even moderate 
intelligence would be embarrassed to use these suggestions in the debate concerning the 
nature of future society.1566  
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Believers in progress, like Churchland or Gazzaniga claim without hesitation that we 
are better off than before. Von Wright thinks that this comment is both stupid and thoughtless, 
because usually the term “we” refers to Western people, ignoring the majority of people 
living today. Von Wright concluded that a typical Western country is “an island of happiness” 
in a troubled word, but it is unclear whether increased purchasing power and other merits of 
modern society show that the people of these societies are psychologically healthier, more 
satisfied with their lives or better oriented to the conditions of living than previous 
generations.1567  The rationalism inherent in Western culture has created a fragmented picture 
and with the loss of unity, “[…] the world around us assumes increasingly absurdist features. 
Life loses its meaning. Our rationality turns out to be only the reverse side of a new form of 
irrationality.”1568  Von Wright predicted that in the future an increasing number of people 
would find their labor meaningless and for them society would seem inhuman; the result 
would be massive alienation. An individual human being cannot really comprehend the 
overall situation. The possibilities of participating in decision making processes diminish. 
This widens the gulf between the power elite and the masses of vassals. Unemployed and 
other unfortunate people who have been pushed aside are in danger of becoming 
“Untermenschen” who remain passive and adjust to the contours of life dictated by the 
dynamic and effective specialists of economy, science, technology and administration. Von 
Wright concluded that this bifurcation creates a substrate for attitudes which may be truly 
described as fascist.   
Von Wright’s view of the current state of the Western civilization was very bleak, and 
to him the future did not look any brighter. Together with politics, philosophy he saw as being 
in a state of helplessness, which revealed itself in the ways that philosophers were clinging on 
to  formal  logic  or  turning  their  interests  to  the  history  of  philosophy;  these  trends  in  
philosophy von Wright saw as forms of escapism. Many philosophers do not address the 
severe problems of our times. But should they face them? In chapter one, I claimed that 
philosophy is distancing itself from ordinary life; perhaps this work and many of the questions 
discussed in it testify well to this claim. It is a telling fact about the current state of philosophy 
that many philosophers have either allied with science or have constructed a self-sustaining 
discussion, for example, about the modal nature of supervenience. I also suggested that in 
times like ours it  should perhaps be a responsibility of a philosopher to take a stance on the 
practical problems facing humanity, which are so severe. Perhaps a philosopher should feel 
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special responsibility towards others. This is of course only a personal opinion and I cannot 
convince the reader that this is what every philosopher should do.  But I agree with von 
Wright’s plea:  
 
When the system of values that underlies a culture weakens, those values may become false. Then the 
main duty of a philosopher is… to philosophise with a hammer. At such a time the philosopher must 
break  and destroy  the  old… the  philosopher  will  display  a  kind  of  anarchy… as  a  precondition  for  a  
new, healthier culture. Our own time is such a time. My own belief is that the best thing philosopher can 
do today is to act as a critic of his own time.1569    
 
Perhaps we are already doomed, but von Wright saw two alternatives as far as the future was 
concerned,  and  only  time  will  tell  which  will  actualize.  On  the  one  hand,  we  may  learn  to  
tolerate the conditions of life which seem utterly inhumane to us now.  We  may  come  to  
accept that humans are navel-gazing consumers and nothing more. But for us to whom this 
consequence and conception of humanity is intolerable, von Wright’s hesitant final alternative 
may seem to be worth developing and exploring. He notes that his hope, insofar as one can 
speak of such, is directed towards the protest which arises against this so-called “progress” 
from within. This possible protest is grounded in the same power which has created the 
current situation: human rationality.  
 At this point the reader is certainly wondering how cultural criticism can possibly 
relate  to  the  irreducibility  of  the  mental.  In  chapter  one  I  raised  the  question  of  what  a  
philosopher’s motivation for defending a certain position could be. Positions in the 
philosophy of mind do not exist in isolation and they often indirectly express a commitment 
to a certain kind of ideology or to certain values. In many cases the motivation for defending a 
certain philosophical view can be traced back to the worldview of a philosopher. We should 
not doubt that the proponents of scientific philosophy of mind honestly think, or hope, that 
scientific progress will benefit, if not mankind, at least a the fortunate Western people that 
comprise part of it. But I believe that those, like Wittgenstein, Davidson, and von Wright who 
argue for the irreducibility of the mental believe just as firmly that the threats posed by 
technological progress are greater than the possible benefits. Since von Wright thought that 
Western civilization was in decline and that we are living in apocalyptic times, it is plausible 
to think that this kind of all-encompassing view influenced his specific philosophical views. 
He  proposed,  in  a  very  different  manner  than  the  admirers  of  progress,  that:  “[…] we have  
arrived at a station when something has come to an end and when reconsideration of our 
destiny is imperative. Spiritually, we are in a period of what I propose to call reflective dusk. 
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Before us is the impenetrable darkness of night.”1570 There cannot be any proof that this is so, 
but it is possible to see things from this perspective. From this point of view the new trends, 
like a thoroughly material mind, may appear as signs of regression and not as steps forward. It 
is telling that whereas Paul Churchland thinks that the progress of technology will turn us into 
beings who communicate with “Üebersetzen”, von Wright thinks that the same progress will 
turn the majority of people into “Untermenschen” who feel alienated and disconnected from 
reality.  
 Whereas Churchland wants to escape the prison of fate through technology, by 
controlling, manipulating and modulating the course of nature, von Wright humbly proposed 
that humans should recognize and understand their limits; we are masters and slaves of our 
own  destiny.  This  is  what  it  means  to  be  human.  It  is  not  a  negative  remark  about  human  
nature, but a comment on how the human condition can be understood. The lives of humans 
show that there is no human nature the essence of which could be found from the brain, and 
consequently there is no essence of humanity which could be shaped according to an ideal 
based on science. There are only individual human beings who act in imperfect and 
sometimes hideous ways when trying to shape their lives according to their own 
understandings of what is valuable and what is not. 
Wittgenstein feared science could lead us to think that our ordinary ways of 
understanding others are inferior when compared to sophisticated scientific methods. He 
thought that extraordinary scientific achievements could be used to destroy the “human soul.” 
It  is  therefore  understandable  why  he  was  not  enthusiastic  about  a  scientific  philosophy  of  
mind. Davidson, as we have seen, suggested that the limit of reducibility of the social sciences 
is set by us when we decide to view men as rational agents with goals and purposes who are 
subject to moral evaluation. It is revealing that Davidson begins one of his earliest articles by 
posing the following question: “Can we hope to give an exhaustive description of man and his 
behaviour, in the physical vocabulary or concepts of the physical sciences, that is, the 
sciences which treat of non-animal, non-human phenomena on a par with others?”1571 He 
notes that we wish to make clear where we stand with respect to this question and then goes 
on: “[…] do we have any choice, but to stand where the truth is? [...] I believe that there is 
something quite appropriate in the idea of taking a stand in this matter. There is an element of 
choice involved in the answer to this question, in my opinion.”1572 Why should the choice be 
                                               
1570 Von Wright, 1997d, 13. 
1571 Davidson, 1964, 226. 
1572 Ibid. 
573 
 
made? Davidson is not worried about the possibility that we could invent thinking machines, 
conscious robots to which mental vocabulary could be meaningfully applied.1573 But he is 
worried about the possibility that “[…] at some point we should stop applying concepts of 
rationality, intentionality and moral evaluation to men.”1574 I suggest that this worry is 
ultimately Davidson’s reason for defending the irreducibility of the mental and grounds the 
motivation for his anti-reductionism.  
Martin,  who  suggested  that  AM  is  an  ethical-political  position  wished  that  “[...]  
Davidson would be a bit more explicit about what makes him, in the general context of 
analytic philosophy, a real humanist, especially in comparison to the ‘neurophilosophers’ and 
others who are attempting to show that humans are just a more complex form of thermostat or 
frog.”1575 Here is my answer to Martin. At the very beginning of his career, Davidson thought 
that we should take stand in this matter because not taking a stance could lead to a point 
where rationality, intentionality and morality would not be part of the human life. I suggest 
that when Davidson – forty years after taking the stand – is still willing to resist the 
“irresistible urge” to consolidate our vocabularies of explanation, it is the same motivation 
which grounds his will. A possible consequence of a scientific philosophy of mind would be 
the dehumanization and mechanization of humans because we would no longer see humans as 
rational and moral beings, but more like physical objects functioning according to physical 
laws. The behavior of these objects would be freed from any “anomalies” or “residues of 
meaning”. But if we think that the human being is an anomaly, then a complete scientific 
understanding of the nature of humanity would also be the end of humanity. I am not sure that 
there  can  be  an  argument  demonstrating  that  this  result  must  be  prevented  at  all  costs;  the  
decision to argue against a scientific understanding expresses no more, and no less, than a 
commitment to what we find important. 
 Unforeseeability  belongs  to  the  human condition.  If  we  say  that  we  cannot  figure  a  
person  out,  this  is  not  a  similar  kind  of  remark  to  the  comment  that  we  cannot  figure  out  a  
certain mechanism. This is one essential distinction between a human and a machine. Suppose 
that we could predict perfectly the behavior of others. This would diminish the difference 
between humans and machines and Wittgenstein, like Davidson, feared that it would 
eventually change our attitudes towards other humans. We all know the basic facts of human 
life;  we know that those who cry are in pain and not pretending, we feel  empathy when we 
                                               
1573 This possibility, which did not worry Davidson in 1964, has for many philosophers and scientists become 
increasingly worrying in the 21st century. 
1574 Davidson, 1964, 231. 
1575 Martin, 1996, 120. 
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see pain in the eyes of others, we treat each other as persons – at least from time to time. But 
as Wittgenstein: suggests:  
 
[…] imagine that a kind of thermometer is used to ascertain whether somebody is in ‘pain’. If someone 
screams or groans, then they insert the thermometer and only when the gauge reaches this or that point 
do they begin to feel sorry for the suffering person, and treat him as we do someone who ‘obviously is 
in pain.1576 
 
We have not yet reached this position in our society and the thought-experiment may seem 
queer. If we see that somebody is in pain, why use a special thermometer? He who has need 
for such a device is still confused about the symptoms and criteria of mental phenomena. 
Those who would feel sorry for others only after consulting their thermometers would be 
strangers in a society which is formed in accordance with our current self-conception. As 
Wittgenstein notes: “Where measuring is not important we don’t measure, even if we are able 
to.”1577 But on the other hand, there are signs that the criteria for mental states are changing 
from behavioral to purely physical. Given the development of fMRI-scanners and other brain-
imaging techniques, the case that Wittgenstein asks us to consider may be close to reality. In 
section 3.2, I noted that scientists are suggesting that “mind-reading” is already possible and 
articles like “Decoding Mental States from Brain Activity in Humans”1578, “Reading Hidden 
Intentions in the Human Brain”1579 and so on are being published. Will the criteria for mental 
phenomena  change,  and  do  we  as  a  result  become  creatures  who  feel  sorry  for  others  only  
after checking our thermometers? Wittgenstein asks:  
 
[…] would [we] give up our language-game which rests on ‘imponderable evidence’ and frequently 
leads  to  uncertainty,  if  it  were  possible  to  exchange it  for  a  more  exact  one  which  by  and large  have  
similar consequences. For instance, we could work with a mechanical ‘lie detector’ and redefine a lie as 
that  which  causes  a  deflection  on  the  lie  detector.  So  the  question  is:  Would  we  change  our  way  of  
living if this or that were provided for us? And how could I answer that?1580 
 
The question of whether we will change our way of living if these new possibilities are 
provided is relevant now. And how could we answer that? Do we want to defend a common-
sense  conception  of  ourselves  or  are  we  willing  to  hand  over  to  experts  the  possibility  of  
passing a final verdict about the mental which is based on physical, objective evidence? I 
claim, at the risk of being “unscientific”, that we have to prevent mental–physical reductions 
in order to save the purposes of mental concepts and the form of life which is made possible 
                                               
1576 Wittgenstein, 1992, 93e. 
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by them. This is what we can call the inescapability of the mental. On the one hand, we 
simply cannot escape the fact that certain behaviors of a human being means for us that he is 
in a pain; we automatically see the pain. Usually a human being feels sorry for those who are 
in pain; this is also a fact which we cannot escape. On the other hand, understanding people in 
terms of mental concepts is mandatory as long as we want to see people in a certain way. If 
we got rid of the mental concepts then our whole attitude towards other people would change; 
we would not see the consciousness in their faces and our attitude towards others would not 
be an attitude towards other souls.  
Wittgenstein felt disgust for philosophical theories and his critical view about the 
darkness of his times explains a part of his resistance against a reductive view about the mind. 
Davidson, as far as I know, was not especially hostile towards the currents of his times, but 
his view about the mind, which is based on the choice to defend non-reductivism, is 
exceptional in the contemporary philosophy of mind. Von Wright’s position differs in an 
interesting way from the positions of Wittgenstein and Davidson. He doubted whether the 
triumph of technology had increased the quality of life and feared that technology might be 
misused. Von Wright was clearly worried that technological developments allowed for the 
increased manipulation and control of human beings and decreased the possibility of real 
democracy and freedom. For von Wright, the problem of human freedom was especially a 
social problem and the more metaphysical aspects of this problem were secondary. The 
plausible consequences of technology for human freedom and autonomy von Wright saw as 
negative. Man’s emancipation and autonomy as an independent agent were in danger of 
becoming lost because the global system based on technology was continually battering the 
world of experience.  
Given von Wright’s worries about the negative consequences of technological 
progress could he really have defended a reductive view about the mind? Could he have 
defended a technologically-based material mind which could have negative consequences for 
human freedom? If von Wright believed, pace Gazzaniga for example, that technology will be 
misused and that the consequences will be  harmful,  it  would  have  been  irrational  for  him to  
defend a position in the philosophy of mind which could facilitate a move in this direction.  I 
think that even if von Wright thought that a thoroughly material view about a human being 
was possible, he could not have defended such a view. Is it a co-incidence that both 
Wittgenstein and von Wright, deeply pessimistic about their times, ended up defending 
positions which so strongly emphasized the autonomy and irreducibility of the mental? Is it 
only  a  coincidence  that  those  thinkers,  like  Churchland  or  Gazzaniga,  who  have  a  positive  
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view about scientific progress and believe that science can solve all the problems it creates, 
end up defending a reductive view about the mind? Von Wright thought that we should 
seriously consider what kind of society we wish to build and this question involves a value 
judgment; the answer is partly subjective, a matter of taste and depends on subject’s 
aspiration.1581 My claim is thus that the motivation to defend the irreducibility of the mental is 
essentially related to the choice regarding the kind of society towards whose actualization we 
should work. The majority of von Wright’s work in the philosophy of mind was done after the 
idea of progress became problematic for him and after he began to question the foundations of 
our current lifestyle. In 1979, von Wright speculated that perhaps something radically new 
against the current Zeitgeist may rise from “hermeneutic understanding”1582. Roughly twenty 
years later he suggested that the search for a congenial worldview may lead to a situation 
where we willingly reject the idea of a complete explanation. Then we would no longer yearn 
for a general theory encompassing all natural phenomena, we would expect that the 
phenomena studied by the human sciences would not reduce to phenomena studied by the 
natural sciences, and this would lead to the rejection of reductions. Von Wright concluded 
that this result could be called the “deconstruction of Western cultural heritage”, and the 
consequence would be a diversified following of the scientific world view, a form of 
pluralism.1583 I think that von Wright managed to reach this position in his philosophy of 
mind; he chose to reject the tempting idea of an all encompassing view, although he believed 
that a science with a holistic methodology would for a long time receive less support than 
natural science.  
Are these worries about the progress of technology, about the threat of a material 
mind, reasonable? Is neo-luddism a gratuitous worry and should a right-minded modern 
person go along with the technophiles? The development of neuroscience has been fast in the 
first  decade  of  the  21st century.  What  literally  would  have  been  wild  science  fiction  a  few  
years ago is becoming reality today. Different sciences are being invaded from below by the 
physico-chemical approach to the study of nature. The possibility of the genetic 
manipulability of life is greatly influencing biology. Nowhere is our desire to steer the course 
of nature more evident than in the approaches of the most recent technologies. It is possible to 
get a glimpse of this invasion from below and the problems relating to it by considering the 
topics discussed in Neuroethics, which is a journal published since 2009. They include, 
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among  others,  “Advancing Neuroregenerative Medicine”1584,  ”The  Future  of  
Psychopharmacological Enhancements”1585, “Knocking Out Pain in Livestock”1586 and 
“Neuroenhancement of Love and Marriage: The Chemicals Between Us”1587. The key concept 
in this discussion is enhancement.  It  is  emblematic  of  the  21st century  that  there  is  an  
increasing desire to enhance human cognition by sticking artificial modules into people’s 
brains  or  by  doping  humans  with  psychotropic  drugs  –  when at  time same time the  current  
problems created by technology are left without solution. Most of the desired enhancements 
are unnecessary from a reasonable point of view; healthy college students use 
methylphenidate to improve alertness, concentration, and academic performance.1588 Many 
see this not as a form of drug use, but as voluntary self-improvement. Although we may grant 
people the right to enhance their cognition up to a point, how should society react when 
students start demanding cosmetic neurology, cognitive prostates or psychotropic drugs? In a 
society where technological progress is praised, where enhancement has become a norm, it 
becomes extremely difficult to explain why such cognitive enhancements do not belong to 
anyone. Should every parent be allowed to enhance their perfectly normal child? Societies 
cannot promise enhancements to everyone; currently even normal health care is beyond the 
reach of huge numbers of people.  It is utterly clear that the most recent technological 
innovations will always benefit only those who are already well off. RAM-prosthetics enable 
the rich and fortunate to enhance their cognition, and this will further widen the gap between 
the enhanced and non-enhanced. If the neuroenhancement of love is possible, this will never 
be available for the masses. On the other hand, pharmacological or neuroscientific 
interventions  can  be  used  to  standardize  the  mental  economies  of  the  abnormal.  Is  this  the  
kind of society we want to build and leave for the future generations? 
 People anxiously want to get rid of negative feelings because we are living in a 
culture where negative feelings are considered unnatural. Nowadays medicines are the 
standard device for normalization. The political philosopher John Gray has written that the 
humanist successors of religion who believe in salvation through science hope that ”in the 
near future everyone can be happy. Societies founded on a faith of progress cannot admit the 
normal unhappiness of human life.”1589 Indeed, Paul Churchland thinks that increased 
capabilities to control, intervene and modulate the mental lives of humans will “[…] lead to 
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greater humanization of the individual humans… it will allow us to be more kind, more 
insightful, more caring about other people and much more effective…. I don’t fear it at all on 
the whole.”1590 Perhaps this is true, only time will tell. But what prevents us now from being 
more kind and caring about other people? Should we, instead of developing cognitive 
prosthetics, consider what we could give up in order to create some righteous balance in the 
divided world? To give up some of the technological innovations of which we already enjoy 
and stop the development of new ones is difficult because technology speeds up the rhythm of 
life so much that the soul of a person cannot sustain the result. Perhaps we will soon need, 
and not merely desire, cognitive enhancements in order to survive. Many senior citizens are 
already feeling that they do not belong in a world the progress of which they cannot 
comprehend. Perhaps science will make us all happy and super-effective; then it would have 
succeeded in destroying the human being. 
The threats arising from reductive views about mental causation are similar to the 
threats of the material mind. I claim that even if a reductive explanation of mental causation 
were possible, such an explanation should not be given. Advances in genetic technology have 
raised the possibility of controlling the bodily and mental development of the individual. A 
reductive solution to the problem of mental causation would allow the increased manipulation 
and control of, and intervention in the mental life of a person. But people should not be 
treated in this way; we should not think of each other as mere brains that can be manipulated. 
If person’s own judgment is constantly overridden by experts who work in the name of 
authority, the result is likely a feeling of alienation and this is a direction which we should not 
take; it is not the way how people should be treated. This is why I argued in section 4.2.2 that 
we should let precursory reasons override non-mental explanations. We should attempt to 
come up with a view of how non-physical mental causation is possible; a model referring to 
precursory reasons is a suggestion about the kind of direction in which we could proceed. We 
should have more faith in human beings than we currently do and ultimately grant them 
autonomy by deciding to respect their self-understanding. A thorough self-monitoring could 
lead  to  an  increased  self-understanding,  and  through that  to  a  more  meaningful  life.  On the  
other hand, a decision to trust a non-mental cause over a precursory reason would be an 
expression of a certain kind of attitude towards human beings. Is this attitude objectionable? 
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Is it possible to provide an argument demonstrating that people should not be exploited? Here 
I shall not make an attempt at such a difficult task. 
In a culture which is based on hyper-rational attitudes and its technological 
achievements, other forms of spiritual life tend to wither away because they are taken to be 
inferior. Those who believe in the Great Idea of Progress think that the future will be better 
than  the  present.  They  believe  that  perceiving  the  “darker”  side  of  civilizations  helps  us  to  
move on to higher levels of enlightenment; we do not want to be forced to have bags over our 
heads. Paul Churchland’s opinion is that: “[…] life now has more meaning, more potential for 
humans than it has ever had before.”1591 This is thanks to science. But I would claim, science 
the deliverer of mankind is also the standardizer of mankind. Science makes the work of 
societal judges easier, and perhaps science will eventually lay down the standards of 
normality. I believe it was this kind of possibility which troubled Wittgenstein when he wrote: 
“Madness need not be regarded as an illness. Why shouldn’t it be seen as a sudden – more or 
less sudden – change of character? Why shouldn’t a man suddenly become much more 
mistrustful towards others? Why not much more withdrawn? Or devoid of love?”1592   
 What could set the limits of reasonable human behavior, what could dictate what a 
reasonable life should look like? Science cannot do this. Von Wright suggested that the only 
hope is that we make a deep revision of current values and priorities by acquiring new 
wisdom “[…] which will make us more humble and respectful, not only in our attitude to 
other cultures, but also to that which is the common frame of all cultures, viz. nature, the 
Mother Gaia, which nourishes us materially.”1593 How could this revision of values happen?  
The  restriction  of  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  would  be  a  drastic  solution,  but  if  the  quest  for  
knowledge threatens our existence then the question of whether the rights of the individual 
should be narrowed down is perhaps mandatory. It is an unfortunate paradox that the threats 
of technology may lead to a situation where we have to limit individual freedom; wouldn’t 
this be another form of fascism which merely replaces the imagined fascism of science and 
technology? We can only hope that humans are wise enough to willingly abandon destructive 
projects, but whether this can happen as long as we are driven by an economic system which 
encourages competition is uncertain. 
The culmination of philosophical progress is  the  achievement  of  wisdom.  Could  
philosophers help people to acquire the new kind of wisdom which von Wright called for? 
                                               
1591 From the transcript of an interview, retrieved from http://thesciencenetwork.org/programs/the- science-
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Insofar as the views of a philosopher influence the thinking of others, a philosopher 
influences the way of life of others. By changing the attitudes of humans, by changing their 
lives, a philosopher is changing the nature of reality. The task of philosophy, the task of 
philosopher, which was considered in chapter one, demands that a protest must be raised 
whenever  lies  are  being  imposed  on  us  and  whenever  we  are  asked  to  forget  or  accept  the  
injustices that are being carried out. I believe, however, that a radical infiltration of the lives 
of people cannot be our ultimate savior. In the end, the conclusion which is both edifying and 
troubling is that humans must change themselves, because whatever evils technology may 
bring, it is humans using and developing technology which are the real threat. An authority, 
be it a philosophical, political or scientific, cannot bring real change. In one of his last 
writings von Wright suggested that: “A restoration of morality can happen so to speak only 
‘from below’ in the form of reinvigorated basis of morality in custom and good manners.”1594 
How to change humans then? Wittgenstein wrote: 
 
The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible 
for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and 
life, not through a medicine invented by an individual. - Suppose the use of motor-cars produces or 
encourages certain illnesses, and mankind is plagued by such illness until, from some cause or other, as 
the result of some development of other, it abandons the habit of driving.1595 
 
There is no final answer to the question of how the thoughts and lives of human beings could 
change for the better; it requires a real change in our lifestyle, an infiltration from below 
which must start in individuals. Davidson once wrote that it is not easy to act: “when we 
know a choice open to us will profoundly and irreversibly change our lives and ultimately 
affect the sort of person we are.”1596 But  when we do decide  to  act:  “[…] on  the  basis  of  a  
reasoned consideration of the values involved, and of what will happen to our future selves, 
this over-viewing of ourselves and our place in the world is perhaps the highest exercise of 
rationality.”1597 
 We can only hope that through the highest exercise of the characteristic human skill, 
rationality,  we  can  shape  our  values  from  below,  hold  on  to  the  integrity  of  our  souls,  
recognize  the  value  of  other  people  and  abandon  the  desire  to  base  our  humanity  on  a  
technologically more powerful theory of human nature. How likely such an outcome is I shall 
not predict, but as it is sometimes said, today’s dreams are the realities of tomorrow. 
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